THese things being premised, I betake my self to that which was at first proposed as the chief design of this Book, namely, to prove the Reasonableness and the Credibility of the Principles of Natural Religion.
By Religion, I mean that general habit of Reverence towards the Divine nature, whereby we are inabled and inclined to worship and serve God after such a manner as we conceive most agreeable to his will, so as to procure his favour and blessing.
I call that Natural Religion, which men might know, and should be obliged unto, by the meer principles of Reason, improved by Consideration and Experience, without the help of Revelation.
This doth comprehend under it, these three principal things:
-
A belief and an acknowledgment of the Divine Nature and Existence.
-
Due apprehensions of his Excellencies and Perfections.
-
Suitable Affections and Demeanour towards him.
Concerning each of which I shall treat in order.
I. There must be a firm belief of the Divine Nature and Existence. Primus est Deorum culius, Deos credere, saith Seneca. Answerable to that of the Apostle, He that comes to God, must believe that he is. (Heb. 11. 6) Now that this is a point highly credible, and such as every sober rational man, who will not offer violence to his own faculties, must submit unto, I shall endeavour to evince by the plainest Reason.
In treating concerning this Subject, which both in former and later times hath been so largely discussed by several Authors, I shall not pretend to the invention of any new arguments, but content my self with the management of some of those old ones, which to me seem most plain and convincing. Namely, from
-
The Universal consent of Nations, in all places and times.
-
The Original of the World.
-
That excellent contrivance which there is in all natural things.
-
The Works of Providence in the Government of the World.
-
From the Universal Consent of Nations in all places and times, which must needs render any thing highly credible to all such as will but allow the human nature to be Rational, and to be naturally endowed with a Capacity of distinguishing betwixt Truth and Falshood.
It is laid down by the1 Philosopher as the proper way of Reasoning from Authority, That what seems true to some wise men, may upon that account be esteemed somewhat probable; what is believed by most wise men, hath a further degree of probability; what most men, both wise and unwise, do assent unto, is yet more probable: But what all men have generally consented to, hath for it the highest degree of evidence of this kind, that any thing is capable of: And it must be monstrous arrogance and folly for any single persons to prefer their own judgments before the general suffrage of Mankind.
It is observed by AElian, That the notions2 concerning the Existence and Nature of God, and of a future state, were more firmely believed, and did usually make deeper impression upon the illiterate Vulgar, who were guided by the more simple dictates of Nature, than upon several of the philosophers, who by their art and subtilty were able to invent disguises, and to dispute themselves into doubts and uncertainties concerning such things as might bring disquiet to their minds.
That all Nations of men now do, and have formerly owned this Principle, may appear both from present experience, and the History of other Times and Places. And here I might cite abundance of the best Authors that are extant, concerning the truth of this in all other Ages and Nations. But for brevity’s sake I shall mention only two, Tully and Seneca. Quae gens est, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat3 sine doctrinâ, anticipationem quandam Deorum, quam appellat […] Epicurus. What kind of men are there any where, who have not of themselves this prenotion of a Deity? And in another place: Nulla gens est, neque tam immansueta4 neque tam fera, quae non etiamsi ignoret qualem habere Denm deceat, tamen habendum sciat. Amongst all mankind there is no Nation so wild and barbarous, who though they may mistake in their due apprehensions of the nature of God, do not yet acknowledg his being. And elsewhere: Nulla est gens tam fera, nemo omnium5 tam immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit Deorum timor. There is no Nation so immensely barbarous and savage, as not to believe the existence of a Deity, and by some kind of services to express their adoration of him. So Seneca, Nulla gens6 usquam est, adeo extra leges moresque projecta, ut non aliquos Deos credat. There is no where any Nation so utterly lost to all things of Law and Morality, as not to believe the existence of God.
He that shall traverse over all this habitable Earth, with all those remote corners of it, reserved for the discovery of these later Ages, may find some Nations without Cities, Schools, Houses, Garments, Coin; but none without their God. They may, and do vastly differ in their Manners, Institutions, Customs: But yet all of them agree in having some Deity to worship.
And besides this Universality as to Nations and Places, it hath been so likewise as to Times. Religion was observed in the beginning of the World, before there were Civil Laws amongst men, I mean any other than the meer wills of their Princes and Governours.
The Works of Moses are by general consent acknowledged to be the most ancient Writings in the world. And though the design of them be to prescribe Doctrines and Rules for Religion, yet there is nothing offered in them by way of proof or perswasion concerning the Existence of God; but it is a thing taken for granted, as being universally acknowledged and believed. Nor do we read that any of the other Ancient Law-givers or founders of Commonwealths, who thought fit to prescribe Rules for the Worship of God, have endeavoured to perswade the people concerning his Being; which yet had been most necessary, if any doubt or question had then been made of it; as being the very foundation of Religion, and a disposition so requisite to qualifie men for Society and Government.
And as it hath been thus in former times, so is it now amongst the Nations more lately discovered, and not known to former Ages. ‘Tis excellently said by Tully, Opinionum commenta delet dies,7 Naturae judicia confirmat: That time wears out the fictions of Opinion, and doth by degrees discover and unmask the fallacy of ungrounded perswasions, but confirms the dictates and sentiments of Nature; and ‘tis a good sign that those Notions are well established which can endure the Test of all Ages.
There are two things may be objected against this Argument.
-
That there is no such Universal Consent as is pretended.
-
If there were, This would signifie but little, because it may as well be urged for Polytheism and Idolatry.
-
That there is no such Universal Consent as is pretended, Because there are some Nations in the world so wild and savage, as not to acknowledg any Deity; which by several Historians is reported of the Cannibals in America, and the Inhabitants of Soldania in Africk, who are so sottish and grosly ignorant, that they differ very little from Brutes, having scarce any thing amongst them of Civil Policy, and nothing at all of Religion, or any publick Assemblies for Worship: Besides such particular persons, pretending to Learning and Philosophy, as in several Ages have openly asserted, and professedly maintained Atheistical Principles, as Diagoras, Theodorus, Pherecides, and others are said to have done.
To this it may be said, that supposing these reports to be true, There may almost in all kinds be some few instances, besides and against the general course of things, which yet can no more be urged as prejudices against the common and most usual order belonging to them, than Prodigies may to prove, that there is no Regularity in the Laws of Nature. Is there any Equity or the least colour of Reason in this? For a man to take an Essay of the nature of any species of things from such particular instances, as in their kinds are monstrous? Because beasts may sometimes be brought forth with five legs, and it may be two heads, is it reason therefore to conclude, that no other shape is natural to their kind? Specimen naturae cujuslibet, a naturâ optimâ sumendum est, (saith Tully) The Essay of any kind is rather to be taken from the best and most usual, than from the worst and most depraved part of it. Will it therefore follow, that Honey is not naturally sweet to our taste, because a sick palate doth not judg it to be so? Such dissolute persons, as are altogether immersed in sensuality, whereby they have besotted their judgments, cannot be looked upon as the most competent instances of what belongs to Humane nature.
Where there is either a defect of reason, or a gross neglect in exciting a mans natural faculties, or improving his reason, by a due consideration of such consequences as do most naturally result from it: In such cases, it cannot otherwise be expected, but that he must come short of that knowledg which he is naturally capable of, and should have, were it not for these defects.
Some men are born blind, or have lost their sight, will it hence follow, that there is no such thing in nature as Light or Colour? Others are Lunaticks or Ideots, should any man from hence infer, that there is no such thing as Reason? No man may raise any doubt from such instances as these, but he that will make it a serious Question, Who are the mad men, whether those in Bedlam, or those out of it? Whether Ideots are not the wisest of men, and all others the veryest fools, according as they are at the widest distance from them? Can that man be thought to need any further confutation or pursuit, who is forced to fly to such a retreat?
As for those instances of particular persons, whom stories deliver down to us, as being professed Atheists, it may be said.
-
‘Tis plain, that some of these were counted Atheists and Despisers of Religion, because they did endeavour to confute the fopperies of the Heathen worship, and deny the Sun and Moon, and the several Idols that were adored in their Countries, to be true Gods: The loose and vitious Poets, having so far debaucht the understandings of the Vulgar, in those darker ages, as to make them believe vile and filthy things of their Gods, unsuitable to all Principles of sobriety and common reason. Upon this, several men, who were more judicious and virtuous than others, thought themselves obliged to reclaim the people from such mischievous fopperies: In order to which, besides the more serious arguments which they made use of, they did likewise by jeers and scoffs endeavour to render these vitious Deities contemptible, and to deride them out of the world. And for this were they by the foolish superstitious multitude counted Atheists, which was the case of Anaxagoras, Socrates, and others.
-
Let it be supposed, that some men have declared a disbelief of the Divine nature in general; yet as there have been always some monsters amongst men, in respect of their Bodies, so may there be likewise in respect of their minds. And this no prejudice to the standing laws of Nature. And besides it ought to be considered, that the same stories which mention such persons as profest Atheists, do likewise give an account of divers signal judgments, whereby they were witnessed against from Heaven.
-
But I add further, There never yet was any such person, who had any full and abiding conviction upon his mind, against the Existence of God. Mentiuntur qui dicunt se non sentire esse Deum, nam etsi tibi affirment interdin, noctu tamen & sibi dubitant. They lye who say that they believe there is no God (saith Seneca) though they may profess this somewhat confidently in the day-time, when they are in company, yet in the night and alone they have doubtful thoughts about it. ‘Tis their wish, but not their opinion. The interest of their guilt doth make them desire it. But they are never able with all their endeavours wholly to extinguish their natural notions about it. Witness those continual fears and terrors, whereunto such kind of men are above all others most obnoxious.
The second Objection was, That if the consent of Nations be a sufficient evidence to prove the Existence of God, it may as well prove Polytheism and Idolatry, for which the like consent may be pleaded.
To this two things may be answered:
-
Though the Unity of the Godhead, and the unfitness of worshipping him by Idols, be discoverable by the light of nature; yet these things are not so immediate, and so obvious to every ones understanding as the Being of God is, but will require some deeper consideration, and some skill in the rules of reasoning. Now it could not be reasonably expected, that either the generality, or any considerable number of the Vulgar, should attain to such a degree of knowledg as their own natural reason, duly exercised and improved, might have furnished them with. Partly by reason of the prejudice of Education, which must needs incline them to acquiesce in what is delivered down to them, as the belief or practice of their Forefathers; and consequently hinder them from an impartial enquiry into the nature of things: But chiefly for want of sufficient leisure to apply themselves to the business of contemplation, by reason of their being immersed in the affairs of the World, either pleasures, ambition, riches, or else being wholly taken up with cares, about providing the necessaries of life for themselves and their families; which must needs much divert them, from the serious consideration of things, and hinder them from the improvement of their natural light to all the due consequences of it.
-
The most considering and the wisest men in all Ages and Nations, have constantly differed from the Vulgar in their thoughts about these things, believing but one supreme Deity, the Father of all other subordinate Powers: —Hominum sator atque Deorum.
Whom they called Jupiter or Jove, with plain reference to the Hebrew name Jehovah. And to this one God did they ascribe several names, according to those several virtues they suppos’d to be in him, or benefits they expected from him. Bacchus, and Neptune, Nature, Fortune, Fate: Omnia quidem Dei nominasunt, varie utentis suâ potestate, saith Seneca. So likewise Pythagoras,8 Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, &c. And they advise men, to worship this God not so much by Images, or by Sacrifices, as by inward goodness, by endeavouring to be like him; as I shall shew more largely afterwards. Now though the opinion of the Vulgar, with the consent of the Wise, may be of great Authority; yet being separated from or especially opposed unto, their opinion, who are best able to judg, it must needs signifie but little.
If the question should here be proposed, How comes it to pass, that mankind should thus consent and agree in the notion of a Deity, and to what ground or cause may it be ascribed?
To this I shall suggest something by way of answer, both Negatively, and Positively.
-
Negatively, from what hath been said it may appear, that this belief doth not proceed from any particular infirmity, or occasional prejudice in the judgment, because it hath been so constant and universal amongst Mankind. And besides, there is not the least probability for those things which are assigned as the grounds of this Prejudice, namely, Fear, Policy, Stipulation.
-
Not Fear, or a certain jealousie of the worst that may happen. For though it must be granted natural to the minds of men, to be possessed with an awe towards such things as are able to hurt them; yet ‘tis much more probable, that the fear of a supreme Being, is rather the consequence and Effect of such a belief, than the Cause of it. For this reason, Because the Notion of a Deity doth comprehend under it infinite Goodness and Mercy, as well as Power and Justice; and there is no reason why Fear should dispose a man to fancy a Being that is infinitely Good and Merciful.
-
Not Policy or the device of Statists, to keep mens Consciences in awe and oblige them to subjection. 1. Because the greatest Princes and Politicians themselves, have in all ages been as much under this conviction of a Deity, and the lashes of Conscience, as any other persons whatsoever; which could not be, had they known this business of Religion to have been a device or state engine, whereby their Subjects were to be imposed upon. 2. Because this belief is amongst the more rude and savage Nations, such as in all other regards are ignorant and wild and utterly destitute of all common Policy.
-
Not Stipulation or mutual agreement, for the same reason; Because ‘tis amongst those barbarous and savage people, who decline all kind of commerce with others. Nor is it imaginable, how such kind of persons should agree together to promote any opinion, who are wildly separated from one another, by Seas, and Mountains, and Desarts; and yet not at so great a distance in their Habitations, as in their Customs and Manners.
From all which it may appear, That this Opinion or Belief which is so general amongst men, doth not arise from any prejudice or partiality upon their minds; But rather the doubting or questioning of these things, which belongs but to few. There is reason enough to believe, that this may be founded in prejudice. Nor is it difficult to determine whence their prejudice doth arise, namely, from the vitious inclinations of men, which will corrupt and byass their judgments. When once men are immersed in sensual things, and are become slaves to their Passions and Lusts, then are they most disposed to doubt of the Existence of God. Whereas on the contrary, the more just and honest any man is, the more willing and careful he is to walk up to the dictates of his natural light, by so much the more firmely are such persons convinced of this Truth. ‘Tis the Conscience of Guilt which makes it the Interest of some that there should be no God. And consequently being desirous to have it so, this makes them studious how to find out some doubt and obscurity about it.
- Affirmatively. It is a known Rule, That the Cause must be as universal as the Effect is. If this belief have been one and constant in all places and times, then must the cause of it be so likewise. And what is there imaginable that hath a fairer pretence to this, than the very nature of our minds, which are of such a frame as in the ordinary exercise of their faculties, will easily find out the necessity of a supreme Being. And it seems very congruous to reason, that he who is the great Creator of the world, should set some such mark of himself upon those Creatures that are capable of worshipping him, whereby they might be led to the Author of their Being, to whom their worship is to be directed; as is observed in a late Discourse,9 wherein there are many other things to this purpose.
Such kind of Notions as are general to mankind, and not confined to any particular Sect, or Nation, or Time, are usually styled […], Common Notions, […], Seminal Principles; and Lex nata, by the Roman. Orator, an innate Law, in opposition to Lex scripta, and in the Apostles phrase, the Law written in our hearts. Which kind of Notions, though they are of themselves above all other matters most plain and perspicuous, yet because Learned men do somewhat differ in their apprehensions concerning the first rise and original of them, I shall therefore take this occasion to suggest briefly, that which to me seems the most easie and natural way for the explaining of this, namely, by comparing the inward sensation of our minds and understandings, with that of our outward senses.
It hath been generally agreed upon, and we find it by sufficient experience, that the acts of our minds are reducible to these three kinds.
-
Perception of such single objects as are proposed to them, which is called simple Apprehension.
-
Putting together such single objects, in order to our comparing of the agreement or disagreement betwixt them, by which we make Propositions, which is called Judging.
-
The discerning of that connexion or dependence which there is betwixt several Propositions, whereby we are enabled to infer one Proposition from another, which is called Ratiocination, or Discourse.
Now as there is an universal agreement in the sensation of outward objects; The Eye and the Ear of all sensitive Creatures, having the same kind of perception of visible and audible things. Those things which appear Green, Blew, or Red to one, having the same appearance to all others. So must it be with the understandings of men likewise, which do agree in the same kind of Perception or simple Apprehension of intelligible objects.
And as in making of Propositions, or compounding our Apprehensions about sensible things, we determine that the Green in this object is like the Green in that other, and unlike the Yellow or Blew in a third; That it is more, or less, or equal, to something else, with which we compare it: So likewise is it for compounding other simple notions belonging to the understanding, By which we judg one thing to be like or unlike, agreeable or disagreeable, equal, or more or less, in respect to something else compared with it.
Now those kind of Apprehensions wherein all men do agree, these are called natural Notions. And of this kind are all those Opinions which have in them such a suitableness to the minds of men, as to be generally owned and acknowledged for true, by all such as apply their thoughts to the consideration of them.
As for such Doctrines as depend meerly upon institution and the instruction of others, men do frequently differ both from themselves, and from one another about them; because that which can plant, can supplant. If meer institution be able to fix such opinions, it may be able to unsettle them again. Whereas no kind of institution will be sufficient to eradicate these natural notions out of the minds of men.
But now, though the understanding have naturally this power belonging to it, of Apprehending, and Comparing, and Judging of things; yet is it not to be expected, either from Infants or from dull sottish people, or from such as are destitute of all the advantages of Education, that they should improve this natural ability, to all the due consequences of it. But in order to this, ‘tis necessary that men should first be out of their Non-age, before they can attain to an actual use of this Principle. And withal, that they should be ready to exert and exercise their faculties to observe and consider the nature of things, to make use of that help which is to be had, by the instruction and experience of those with whom they converse. Nor can this be any just exception against the naturalness of such notions, that they are promoted by the experience and instruction of others; Because mankind is naturally designed for a Sociable life, and to be helpful to one another by mutual conversation. And without this advantage of discourse and conversation, whereby they communicate their thoughts and opinions to one another, it could not otherwise be, but that men must needs be strangely ignorant, and have many wild and gross apprehensions of such things as are in themselves very plain and obvious, and do appear so to others.
For the better understanding of this, let us suppose a person bred up in some deep Cavern of the Earth, without any instruction from others, concerning the state of things in this upper surface of the World: Suppose this person, after he is arrived to a mature age, to be fetched up from this solitary abode, to behold this habitable World, the Fields, and Towns, and Seas, and Rivers, the various revolutions of Seasons, together with the beautiful Host of Heaven, the Sun, and Moon, and Stars: It could not otherwise be, but that such a Person must at first view have many wild imaginations of things. He might conceive those useful and beautiful contrivances of Houses and Towns, to spring up and grow out of the Earth, as well as Trees; or else that Trees were made and built by men, as well as Houses. But supposing him to be a man, he must be endowed with such a natural faculty, as upon further consideration and experience will quickly satisfie him, That one of these was natural, and the other artificial; And that the buildings were framed to that elegance and convenience by the Art and Skill of men.
It would not at first seem credible to him, that a large Tree should proceed from a small Seed or Kernel: That an Egg should produce a Bird. And as for Man himself, he would not be able to have any conception of his true Original; how it could be possible, that a young Infant should be bred in his Mothers womb, where it should continue for so many months inclosed in a bag of water, without breathing; yet upon experience these things would appear to him unquestionable, and of Natural Evidence.
From what hath been said, it will follow, That such things are evident by natural light, which men of a mature age, in the ordinary use of their faculties, with the common help of mutual Society, may know and be sufficiently assured of, without the help of any special Revelation. And when it is said that the Notion of God is natural to the soul, the meaning of it is, That there is such a faculty in the soul of man, whereby upon the use of reason he can form within himself a setled notion of such a first and supreme Being, as is endowed with all possible perfection. Which is all I shall say as to this first Argument. I shall be briefer in the rest.
← Book 1, Chapter 3. Some Propositions necessary to be premised for the removing · Contents · Book 1, Chapter 5. 2. Arg. From the Original of the World →