These things being premised, I betake my self to that which was at first proposed as the chief design of this Book, namely, to prove the Reasonableness and the Credibility of the Principles of Natural Religion.
By Religion, I mean that general habit of Reverence towards the Divine nature, whereby we are inabled and inclined to worship and serve God after such a manner as we conceive most agreeable to his will, so as to procure his favour and blessing.
I call that Natural Religion, which men might know, and should be obliged unto, by the meer principles of Reason, improved by Consideration and Experience, without the help of Revelation.
This doth comprehend under it, these three principal things:
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A belief and an acknowledgment of the Divine Nature and Existence.
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Due apprehensions of his Excellencies and Perfections.
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Suitable Affections and Demeanour towards him.
Concerning each of which I shall treat in order.
I. There must be a firm belief of the Divine Nature and Existence. Primus est Deorum culius, Deos credere, saith Seneca. Answerable to that of the Apostle, He that comes to God, must believe that he is. (Heb. 11. 6) Now that this is a point highly credible, and such as every sober rational man, who will not offer violence to his own faculties, must submit unto, I shall endeavour to evince by the plainest Reason.
In treating concerning this Subject, which both in former and later times hath been so largely discussed by several Authors, I shall not pretend to the invention of any new arguments, but content my self with the management of some of those old ones, which to me seem most plain and convincing. Namely, from
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The Universal consent of Nations, in all places and times.
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The Original of the World.
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That excellent contrivance which there is in all natural things.
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The Works of Providence in the Government of the World.
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From the Universal Consent of Nations in all places and times, which must needs render any thing highly credible to all such as will but allow the human nature to be Rational, and to be naturally endowed with a Capacity of distinguishing betwixt Truth and Falshood.
It is laid down by the1 Philosopher as the proper way of Reasoning from Authority, That what seems true to some wise men, may upon that account be esteemed somewhat probable; what is believed by most wise men, hath a further degree of probability; what most men, both wise and unwise, do assent unto, is yet more probable: But what all men have generally consented to, hath for it the highest degree of evidence of this kind, that any thing is capable of: And it must be monstrous arrogance and folly for any single persons to prefer their own judgments before the general suffrage of Mankind.
It is observed by AElian, That the notions2 concerning the Existence and Nature of God, and of a future state, were more firmely believed, and did usually make deeper impression upon the illiterate Vulgar, who were guided by the more simple dictates of Nature, than upon several of the philosophers, who by their art and subtilty were able to invent disguises, and to dispute themselves into doubts and uncertainties concerning such things as might bring disquiet to their minds.
That all Nations of men now do, and have formerly owned this Principle, may appear both from present experience, and the History of other Times and Places. And here I might cite abundance of the best Authors that are extant, concerning the truth of this in all other Ages and Nations. But for brevity’s sake I shall mention only two, Tully and Seneca. Quae gens est, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat3 sine doctrinâ, anticipationem quandam Deorum, quam appellat […] Epicurus. What kind of men are there any where, who have not of themselves this prenotion of a Deity? And in another place: Nulla gens est, neque tam immansueta4 neque tam fera, quae non etiamsi ignoret qualem habere Denm deceat, tamen habendum sciat. Amongst all mankind there is no Nation so wild and barbarous, who though they may mistake in their due apprehensions of the nature of God, do not yet acknowledg his being. And elsewhere: Nulla est gens tam fera, nemo omnium5 tam immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit Deorum timor. There is no Nation so immensely barbarous and savage, as not to believe the existence of a Deity, and by some kind of services to express their adoration of him. So Seneca, Nulla gens6 usquam est, adeo extra leges moresque projecta, ut non aliquos Deos credat. There is no where any Nation so utterly lost to all things of Law and Morality, as not to believe the existence of God.