BEsides what hath been already suggested concerning the first foundations to be laid, in order to a discourse about Natural Religion, I shall in the next place offer to consideration these seven following Propositions, as being very proper to prevent or obviate the Cavils of Sceptical captious men.
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Such things as in themselves are equally true and certain, may not yet be capable of the same kind or degree of Evidence as to us. As for instance, That there was such a man as King Henry the Eighth, that there are such places as America, or China. I say these things may in themselves be equally true and certain with those other matters, That we now see and are awake, That the three Angles in a Triangle are equal to two right ones. Though for the first of these we have only the testimony of others, and humane tradition, whereas for the other we have sensitive proof, and Mathematical demonstration. And the reason is because all Truths are in themselves equal, according to that ordinary Maxim, Veritas non recipit magis & minus. And therefore nothing can be more irrational than for a man to doubt of, or deny the truth of any thing, because it cannot be made out, by such kind of proofs of which the nature of such a thing is not capable. A man may as well deny there is any such thing as Light or Colour, because he cannot hear it; or sound, because he cannot see it, as to deny the truth of other things because they cannot be made out by sensitive or demonstrative proofs. The kinds of Probation for several things being as much disproportioned, as the objects of the several senses are to one another.
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Things of several kinds may admit1 and require several sorts of proofs, all which2 may be good in their kind. The Philosopher hath long ago told us, that according to the divers nature of things, so must the Evidences for them be; and that ‘tis an argument of an undisciplined wit not to acknowledge this. He that is rational and judicious will expect no other kind of Arguments in any case than the subject-matter will bear. How incongruous would it be for a M[…]atician to perswade with eloquence, to […] all imaginable insinuations and […] that he might prevail with his hearers to believe that three and three make six. It would be altogether as vain and improper in matters belonging to an Orator to pretend to strict Demonstration. All things are not capable of the same kind of Evidence. Though the Conclusions in Mathematicks, by reason of the abstracted nature of those Sciences, may be demonstrated by the clearest and most unquestionable way of Probation to our reason, yet it is not rational to expect the like proof, in such other matters as are not of the like nature. This he himself applys to Moral things, which being not of such simple abstracted naturès, but depending upon mixed circumstances, are not therefore capable of such kind of Demonstrative proofs. ‘Tis a saying of Jamblicus, That demonstrations are not to be expected3 in matters concerning God and divine things. Nor is this any greater prejudice to the certainty of such things, than it is that God is invisible. And thus likewise it is, for the same reason, with many particular conclusions in Natural Philosophy. And as for matters of Fact, concerning Times, Places, Persons, Actions, which depend upon story and the relation of others, these things are not capable of being proved by such scientifical Principles as the others are. Now no sober man can deny but that several things in Moral and in Natural Philosophy are in themselves as absolutely and as certainly true, and as firmly believ’d by us, as any Mathematical principle or conclusion can be. From whence I infer this, That it is not, ought not to be, any prejudice to the Truth or Certainty of any thing, that it is not to be made out by such kind of proofs, of which the nature of that thing is not capable, provided it be capable of satisfactory proofs of another kind.
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When a thing is capable of good proof in any kind, men ought to rest satisfy’d in4 the best evidence for it, which that kind of things will bear, and beyond which better could not be expected, supposing it were true. They ought not to expect either sensible proof, or demonstration for such matters as are not capable of such proofs, supposing them to be true. Because otherwise nothing must be assented to and believed, but that which hath the highest Evidence: All other things being to be looked upon, as uncertain and doubtful, and wholly excluded from all possibility of being known. And at this rate, men must believe nothing at all in story, because such things cannot be demonstrated; and ‘tis possible that the rest of Mankind might have combined together to impose upon them by these relations. And how abhorrent such Sceptical Principles must needs be to common reason, I need not say. Those who will pretend such kind of grounds for their disbelief of any thing, will never be able to perswade others, that the true cause why they do not give their Assent is because they have no reason for it, but because they have no mind to it. Nolle in causa est, non posse praetenditur.
And on the other side, when we have for the proof of any thing, some of the highest kinds of Evidence, in this case it is not the suggestion of a meer possibility, that the thing may be otherwise, that ought to be any sufficient cause of doubting.
To which I shall only add, that we may be unquestionably sure of many things as to their existence, and yet we may not be able to explain the nature of them. No man in his wits can make any doubt, whether there be such things as Motion, and Sensation, and Continuity of Bodies: And yet these things are commonly esteemed inexplicable. So that our not being able to see to the bottom of things, and to give a distinct account of the nature and manner of them, can be no sufficient cause to doubt of their being.
- The mind of man may and must give5 a firm assent to some things, without any kind of hesitation or doubt of the contrary, where yet the Evidences for such things are not so infallible, but that there is a possibility, that the things may be otherwise. (i. e.) There may be an indubitable certainty, where there is not an infallible certainty. And that kind of certainty which doth not admit of any doubt, may serve us as well to all intents and purposes, as that which is infallible. A man may make no doubt, whether he himself were baptized, whether such persons were his parents, of which yet he can have no other Evidence than Tradition, and the Testimony of others. Who is there so wildly Sceptical as to question, whether the Sun shall rise in the East, and not in the North or West, or whether it shall rise at all: Because the contrary is not impossible, and doth not imply any Contradiction? Suppose that in digging of the Earth amongst some ancient ruins, a man should find a round flat piece of Metal, in the exact shape of an old Medal, with the Image and Inscription of one of the Roman Emperours. Or suppose he should dig up a large stone, of the shape of an ancient Tomb-stone, with a distinct Inscription upon it, of the name and quality of some person said to be buried under it. Can any rational man doubt, whether one of these were not a piece of Coyn, and the other a Grave-stone? or should a man be bound to suspend his assent and belief of this, barely upon this ground, because ‘tis possible that these might have been the natural shapes of that particular Metal and Stone, and that those which seem to be letters or figures engraven or embossed upon it, may be nothing else but some casual dents or cavities, which by the various motions and temper of the matter did happen to them, amongst those many millions of other figures which they were capable of? Who would not think such a man to be strangely wild, and irrational, who could frame to himself any real scruples from such Considerations as these? Why, ‘tis the same kind of absurd dotage that Scepticks in Religion are guilty of, in suspending their assent meerly upon this ground, because some Arguments for it do not so infallibly conclude, but that there is a possibility things may be otherwise. He that will raise to himself, and cherish in his mind, any real doubts, according to the meer possibility of things, shall not be able to determine himself to the belief or practice of any thing. He must not stay within doors, for fear the house should fall upon him, for that is possible: nor must he go out, lest the next man that meets him should kill him, for that also is possible. And so must it be for his doing or forbearing any other action. Nay I add further, that man is sure to be deceived in very many things, who will doubt of every thing, where ‘tis possible he may be deceived.
I appeal to the common judgment of Mankind, whether the humane nature be not so framed, as to acquiesce in such a Moral certainty, as the nature of things is capable of; and if it were otherwise, whether that Reason which belongs to us, would not prove a burden and a torment to us, rather than a priviledg, by keeping us in a continual suspense, and thereby rendring our conditions perpetually restless and unquiet? Would not such men be generally accounted out of their wits, who could please themselves, by entertaining actual hopes of any thing, meerly upon account of the possibility of it; or torment themselves with actual fears, of all such evils as are possible? Is there any thing imaginable more wild and extravagant amongst those in Bedlam, than this would be? Why, Doubt is a kind of fear, and is commonly styled formido oppositi, and ‘tis the same kind of madness for a man to doubt of any thing, as to hope for, or fear it, upon a meer possibility.
- ‘Tis sufficient that matters of Faith6 and Religion be propounded in such a way, as to render them highly credible, so as an honest and teachable man may willingly and safely assent to them, and according to the rules of Prudence be justified in so doing. Nor is it either Necessary or Convenient, that they should be established by such cogent Evidence, as to necessitate assent. Because this would not leave any place for the vertue of Believing, or the freedom of our obedience; nor any ground for Reward and Punishment. It would not be thank-worthy for a man to believe that which of necessity he must believe, and cannot otherwise chuse.
Rewards and Punishments do properly belong to free Actions, such as are under a mans power, either to do or forbear; not to such as are necessary. There is no more reason to reward a man for believing that four is more than three, than for being hungry or sleepy; Because these things do not proceed from choice, but from natural necessity. A man must do so, nor can he do otherwise.
I do not say, That the Principles of Religion are meerly probable, I have before asserted them to be Morally certain. And that to a man who is careful to preserve his mind free from prejudice, and to consider, they will appear unquestionable, and the deductions from them demonstrable: But now because that which is necessary to beget this certainty in the mind, namely, impartial Consideration, is in a mans power, therefore the belief or disbelief of these things is a proper subject for Rewards and Punishments.
There would be little reason for the Scripture so much to magnifie the Grace of Faith, as being so great a vertue and so acceptable to God, if every one were necessitated to it, whether he would or no. And therefore God is pleased to propose these matters of belief to us in such a way, as that we might give some Testimony of our teachable dispositions, and of our obedience by our assent to them. Ut sermo Evangelii7 tanquam lapis esset Lydius, ad quem ingenia sanabilia explorarentur, as the Learned Grotius speaks concerning the Doctrine of the Gospel, whereby God was pleased as with a Touch-stone to prove and try what kind of tempers men are of, whether they are so ingenuous as to accept of sufficient Evidence, in the confirmation of a holy Doctrine. And the Scripture doth in several places make use of the word Faith, according to this notion of it, as it consists in a readiness of mind to close with and give assent unto things upon such evidence as is in it self sufficient. To which purpose is that expression of our Saviour to Thomas, Blessed are they that have not seen and yet have believed, Joh. 20. 29. Signifying it to be a more excellent commendable and blessed thing for a man to yield his assent, upon such evidence as is in it self sufficient, without insisting upon more; It denotes good inclinations in men towards Religion, and that they have worthy thoughts of the Divine power and goodness, when they are willing to submit unto such arguments in the confirmation of a holy doctrine, as to unprejudiced persons are in themselves sufficient to induce belief. It was this disposition that was commended in the Bereans, for which they are styled […], more (Act. 17. 11) ingenuous, teachable and candid, more noble than others, Because they received the word with all readiness of mind. (i. e.) Were ready and willing to assent to the Gospel, upon such evidence as was in it self sufficient to convince reasonable and unprejudiced men.
And on the other side, it was the want of this disposition which is condemned, Mat. 13. 58. where ‘tis said that our Saviour did not many mighty works in his own Country, because of their unbelief: (i. e.) That prejudice which there was upon them, by their knowledg of his mean parentage and birth, and their ignorance of his Divine commission and high calling, did indispose them for an equal judgment of things, and render them unteachable. And having tried this by doing some mighty works amongst them he would not do many, because of their incapacity of receiving benefit by them.
Wicked men are in the Scripture phrase styled […], filii insuasibilitatis, unperswadable8 men, such as no reason can convince. And else-where they are styled […], which we translate unreasonable9 men. But the word may signifie absurd, contumacious persons, who are not to be10 fixed by any Principles, whom no Topics can work upon, being directly opposite to this vertue of Faith, as appears by the next clause, For all men have not Faith.
Supposing Mankind to be endowed (as all other things are) with a natural principle, whereby they are strongly inclined to seek their own preservation and happiness; and supposing them to be rational and free Creatures, able to judg of, and to chuse the means conducing to this end: Nothing can be more reasonable in this case, than that such Creatures should be under the obligation of accepting such evidence, as in it self is sufficient for their conviction.
- When there is no such evident certainty, as to take away all kind of doubting; in11 such cases, a judgment that is equal and impartial must incline to the greater probabilities. That is no just ballance, wherein the heaviest side will not preponderate. In all the ordinary affairs of life men use to guide their Actions by this Rule, namely, to incline to that which is most probable and likely, when they cannot attain to any clear unquestionable certainty. And that man would be generally counted a fool who should do otherwise. Now let it be supposed, that some of the great Principles in Religion, should not seem to some men altogether so evident as to be wholly unquestionable, yet ought their assent still to incline to the greater probability.
When it is said to be a duty for men to believe any thing, or to acquiesce in such kind of Evidence as is sufficient for the proof of it: The meaning is not, as if there were any moral obligation upon the Understanding, which is proper only unto the Will; but the meaning is, That men should be careful to preserve their minds free from any wilful prejudice and partiality, that they should seriously attend to, and consider the Evidence proposed to them, so as to take a just estimate of it. For though it be true, that the judgments of men must by a natural necessity, preponderate on that side where the greatest Evidence lies; supposing the mind to be equally disposed, and the ballance to be just; yet must it withal be granted to be a particular virtue and felicity to keep the mind in such an equal frame of judging. There are some men, who have sufficient abilities to discern betwixt the true difference of things; but what through their vicious affections and voluntary prejudices, making them unwilling that some things should be true; what through their inadvertency or neglect to consider and compare things together, they are not to be convinced by plain Arguments; not through any insufficiency in the evidence, but by reason of some defect or corruption in the faculty that should judg of it. Now the neglect of keeping our minds in such an equal frame, the not applying of our thoughts to consider of such matters of moment, as do highly concern a man to be rightly informed in, must needs be a vice. And though none of the Philosophets (that I know of) do reckon this kind of Faith (as it may be styled), this teachableness and equality of mind in considering and judging of matters of importance, amongst other intellectual virtues; yet to me it seems, that it may justly challenge a place amongst them; and that for this reason, because the two extremes of it by way of Excess and Defect, I mean the assenting unto such things upon insufficient Evidence which is called Credulity, and the not assenting unto them upon sufficient Evidence, which is called Incredulity or unbelief, are both of them Vices. Now where the Excess and Defect do make Vices, or such things as ought not to be, there the Mediocrity must denote something that ought to be, and consequently must be a Virtue, and have in it the obligation of Duty.
- If in any matter offered to Consideration, the probabilities on both sides be12 supposed to be equal: (In this case, though an impartial judgment cannot be obliged to incline to one side rather than to the other, because our Assent to things must by a Necessity of Nature, be proportioned to our Evidence for them; And where neither side doth preponderate, the ballance should hang even) Yet even in this case, men may be obliged to order their Actions in favour of that side, which appears to be most safe and advantageous for their own interest. Suppose a man travelling upon the Road to meet with two doubtful ways, concerning neither of which he can have any the least probability to induce him to believe that one is more like to be the true way to his journey’s end, than the other; only he is upon good grounds assured, that in one of these ways he shall meet with much trouble, difficulty, danger, which the other is altogether free from: In this case, though a man be not bound to believe that one of them is a truer way than the other, yet is he obliged in prudence to take the safest.
Nay I add further, If the probabilities on the one hand should somewhat preponderate the other, yet if there be no considerable hazard on that side which hath the least probability, and a very great apparent danger in a mistake about the other: In this case, prudence will oblige a man to do that which may make most for his own safety.
These are those preparatory Principles which I thought fit to premise, as a necessary foundation for any debate with captious men about these first grounds of Religion. And they are each of them (I think) of such perspicuity, as to need little more than the bare Proposal of them, and the Explication of their Terms, to evince the truth of them.
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