Besides what hath been already suggested concerning the first foundations to be laid, in order to a discourse about Natural Religion, I shall in the next place offer to consideration these seven following Propositions, as being very proper to prevent or obviate the Cavils of Sceptical captious men.
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Such things as in themselves are equally true and certain, may not yet be capable of the same kind or degree of Evidence as to us. As for instance, That there was such a man as King Henry the Eighth, that there are such places as America, or China. I say these things may in themselves be equally true and certain with those other matters, That we now see and are awake, That the three Angles in a Triangle are equal to two right ones. Though for the first of these we have only the testimony of others, and humane tradition, whereas for the other we have sensitive proof, and Mathematical demonstration. And the reason is because all Truths are in themselves equal, according to that ordinary Maxim, Veritas non recipit magis & minus. And therefore nothing can be more irrational than for a man to doubt of, or deny the truth of any thing, because it cannot be made out, by such kind of proofs of which the nature of such a thing is not capable. A man may as well deny there is any such thing as Light or Colour, because he cannot hear it; or sound, because he cannot see it, as to deny the truth of other things because they cannot be made out by sensitive or demonstrative proofs. The kinds of Probation for several things being as much disproportioned, as the objects of the several senses are to one another.
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Things of several kinds may admit1 and require several sorts of proofs, all which2 may be good in their kind. The Philosopher hath long ago told us, that according to the divers nature of things, so must the Evidences for them be; and that ‘tis an argument of an undisciplined wit not to acknowledge this. He that is rational and judicious will expect no other kind of Arguments in any case than the subject-matter will bear. How incongruous would it be for a M[…]atician to perswade with eloquence, to […] all imaginable insinuations and […] that he might prevail with his hearers to believe that three and three make six. It would be altogether as vain and improper in matters belonging to an Orator to pretend to strict Demonstration. All things are not capable of the same kind of Evidence. Though the Conclusions in Mathematicks, by reason of the abstracted nature of those Sciences, may be demonstrated by the clearest and most unquestionable way of Probation to our reason, yet it is not rational to expect the like proof, in such other matters as are not of the like nature. This he himself applys to Moral things, which being not of such simple abstracted naturès, but depending upon mixed circumstances, are not therefore capable of such kind of Demonstrative proofs. ‘Tis a saying of Jamblicus, That demonstrations are not to be expected3 in matters concerning God and divine things. Nor is this any greater prejudice to the certainty of such things, than it is that God is invisible. And thus likewise it is, for the same reason, with many particular conclusions in Natural Philosophy. And as for matters of Fact, concerning Times, Places, Persons, Actions, which depend upon story and the relation of others, these things are not capable of being proved by such scientifical Principles as the others are. Now no sober man can deny but that several things in Moral and in Natural Philosophy are in themselves as absolutely and as certainly true, and as firmly believ’d by us, as any Mathematical principle or conclusion can be. From whence I infer this, That it is not, ought not to be, any prejudice to the Truth or Certainty of any thing, that it is not to be made out by such kind of proofs, of which the nature of that thing is not capable, provided it be capable of satisfactory proofs of another kind.
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When a thing is capable of good proof in any kind, men ought to rest satisfy’d in4 the best evidence for it, which that kind of things will bear, and beyond which better could not be expected, supposing it were true. They ought not to expect either sensible proof, or demonstration for such matters as are not capable of such proofs, supposing them to be true. Because otherwise nothing must be assented to and believed, but that which hath the highest Evidence: All other things being to be looked upon, as uncertain and doubtful, and wholly excluded from all possibility of being known. And at this rate, men must believe nothing at all in story, because such things cannot be demonstrated; and ‘tis possible that the rest of Mankind might have combined together to impose upon them by these relations. And how abhorrent such Sceptical Principles must needs be to common reason, I need not say. Those who will pretend such kind of grounds for their disbelief of any thing, will never be able to perswade others, that the true cause why they do not give their Assent is because they have no reason for it, but because they have no mind to it. Nolle in causa est, non posse praetenditur.