THose Perfections which are essential to the Notion of God, with respect to his faculties of working, are likewise three fold: 1. His Power or Omnipotence. 2. His Dominion or right to govern us in this life. 3. His Distributing of future Rewards and Punishments after this life.
- By the Power or Omnipotence of God is meant, an ability of doing all such things, the doing of which may argue Perfection, and which do not imply a contradiction, either in the things themselves, or to the nature and perfection of the Doer. Some things are repugnant to the perfection of God, either Naturally, as that he should be sick or dye; or else Morally, as that he should lye or deceive: Both which imply imperfection. And some other things may imply Contradiction, either directly, or by plain consequence. And of such matters it is not so proper to say, that he cannot do them, as that they cannot be done. As the object of the Understanding, the Eye, and the Ear, is that which is intelligible, visible, audible: So the object of Power, must be that which is Possible. And as it is no prejudice to the most perfect understanding, or sight, or hearing, that it doth not understand what is not intelligible, or see what is not visible, or hear what is not audible; so neither is it to the most perfect Power, that it doth not do what is not possible. Every kind of faculty being necessarily determined to its own proper object.
But as for all Possible things, it is natural and necessary to apprehend of God, that he can do whatsoever any other single thing, or a combination of all other things put together, can perform, and infinitely more; and that without any kind of labour or difficulty: So that his Power must be infinite extensively, with respect to all objects; and intensively, with respect to the acts of it, together with the manner and degrees of them.
That this kind of Omnipotence doth belong to the natural notion of God, may appear,
- By Testimony. It is a frequent title given unto God by the Grecian Philosophers, who style him […], Omnipotent.
And nothing is more frequent amongst the Latines, than the titles of Jupiter Omnipotens, Optimus-Maximus: He is generally acknowledged to be the Creator and Governour of the World, upon which account they call him, Opifex rerum, and Rector mundi. It is an acknowledgment of Tully, Nihil est quod Deus efficere non1 possit, & quidem sine ullo labore. There is nothing which God cannot do, and that without any kind of labour.
- By Reason. If the power of God could be limited or circumscribed, it must either be by something of greater power, which is inconsistent with the notion of his being supreme and soveraign: Or else by the difficulty and repugnancy which there is in the nature of things; which could not be in the first creation of them, because there was nothing then to make any resistance, and since that, there is nothing but what was made by him, derived from him, and is dependant upon him, and therefore must be subject to him. And besides, all such things being finite, must therefore be at a vast distance of inequality from the infinite power of God.
To which may be added, that all his other perfections would be insignificant and ineffectual, if his power of acting, whereby they were to be communicated to inferior natures, were not answerable to them. Meer Knowledg without Power would be but an idle speculation; Wisdom to contrive, without Power to effect, would be but vain and useless. What could his goodness and mercy signifie to us, if he were not able to give any proofs of it. And so likewise for his Justice and Faithfulness, which there would be no reason to fear or to depend upon, if Rewards and Punishments were not at his disposal, and he had not sufficient power to perform what he promises. Nor could there be any sufficient ground for his being acknowledged the supreme Lawgiver. For why should any one take upon him to intermeddle in the affairs of the world, and to prescribe Laws to others, who had no power to dispose of things, and were not able to enforce obedience to his own Laws?
In brief, without the belief of this Attribute, there can be no foundation for Religion, amongst men; because there could be no ground for our Faith or Trust, no reason for our Hope or Fear.
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Besides this absolute consideration of the Divine Power, there is likewise a relative notion of it, respecting that Dominion and Jurisdiction which he hath over reasonable Creatures, his right to govern them in this life; to command, prohibit what he pleases, to reward and punish as shall seem good unto him. And that this doth belong to the natural notion of God, may appear,
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By Testimony. Plato, and Tully, and Plutarch, do often style him, the Lord of2 all things, the Eternal God, Father and Creator of the world, and all things in it. Deo nihil praestantius, ab eo igitur necesse est mundum regi, saith Tully, God is the3 most excellent Being, and therefore is it necessary that he should be the Governour of the world. And in another place, Deorum immortalium numine, omnia regi gubernarique credimus. We believe that God is the Governour of all things.
To which I shall add that testimony of a Heathen King, Nebuchadnezzar, in that (Dan. 4. 34, 35) Remonstrance which he published to all people, nations, and languages, that dwell in all the earth, viz. that Gods dominion is an everlasting dominion, and his kingdom is from generation to generation, and all the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing before him. And he doth according to his will, in the armies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, what dost thou?
And as this was their declared opinion, so was their practice suitable to it; by owning that to be their Duty which they supposed to be agreeable to his Will, and which would render them acceptable to him.
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By Reason. If we consider those several titles which can give right to Dominion amongst men, we shall find them all to concur in God. Now men claim a right of Government, either by Conquest, or Purchase, or Compact, or by having others born in a state of subjection under them, or by their having oblig’d others with any special bounty or favour; but above all these, there is another ground of subjection, which men cannot pretend to, namely, the giving of Being to a thing. And this must needs, above all other claims, be the greatest imaginable right, for the government and disposal of that thing, according to the pleasure of him that made it. It is he that made us, (says the Psalmist) (Psal. 100. 3) and not we our selves; and therefore we are his people, and ‘tis reasonable that we should be under his dominion and government.
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The distribution of future Rewards and Punishments to men, according as their lives and actions have been in this world.
That this likewise doth belong to the natural notion of God, may appear,
- By Testimony. From all kind of Heathen Writers. Nothing hath been more universally believed in all places and times, not only amongst the civilized Nations, the Grecians and Romans; but likewise amongst such as were most wild and barbarous.
All sorts and Professions of men, of any special eminence, as Princes, Statesmen, Souldiers, Philosophers, Poets, Artists, have had great impressions upon their minds concerning a future state. And it may be reasonably presumed (as Tully observes),4 that those who do so much excel others in their parts and their virtue, are not generally mistaken in their judgments about a natural truth.
Whereas several other opinions and Doctrines, which at some times have prevailed, have afterwards been rejected; this hath still kept up in its vigor and authority, amidst all the various revolutions of Government and Religion, of Nations and Churches.
The most ancient Philosophers amongst the Grecians, who reduced that people to civility, were Thales, Pherecides, Pythagoras; the last of whom was for a long time of so great authority, that no others were counted learned but such as were his followers. And each of these have most expresly asserted this Doctrine. And besides there are many other testimonies to this purpose, cited out of Plato, Empedocles, Plutarch, together with Homer, Euripides, Sophocles, for the Grecians; the ancient Druids amongst the Gauls; the Brachmans amongst the Indians, who are all mention’d as bearing witness to this truth, by Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, and others.
And as for the Latines, I shall mention only two testimonies; That of Tully, Permanere5 animos arbitramur, consensu nationum omnium. We do believe that the Souls of men do abide after death, by the consent of all Nations. And that of Seneca, Cum de animarum aeternitate6 disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos babet, consensus omnium, aut timentium inferos, aut colentium. When we dispute about the immortality of the Soul, the general consent of men, either fearing or worshipping the infernal powers, is of no small moment with us.
That common practice amongst the Heathen, of worshipping their departed Heroes, doth suppose a general belief that their Souls did remain after death, and were advanced unto a higher state of happiness and power.
In brief, all the attestations amongst them, concerning the Souls immortality, are founded in their belief of the necessity of this principle, That there must be a future state of Rewards and Punishments.
Though it must be granted, that this state as to the manner of it, is by them described in such a Poetical way, as is more fit to amuse and make impression upon the vulgar, than to satisfie the reason of the judicious.
They tell us, that good men shall after their death be received into the Elysian Fields and gardens, which are always flourishing and pleasant, where men shall be continually exercised in such kind of employments as are most suitable to their inclinations; Some in Combats, Running, Wrestling; Others in Philosophical Discourses; others in Dancing or Musick; where such kinds of Actions or Things, whether in themselves worthy, or meerly innocent, in which good men during the time of their lives, did find any special pleasure, should be enjoyed by them in the utmost perfection.
And as this shall be the state of such as have been Virtuous, so those who have been Wicked shall be thrust down into the infernal Regions, into Prisons and dark Caverns, where Furies are appointed for their tormentors, who shall inflict upon them various kinds of punishments, according to the nature and quality of the Crimes of which they have been guilty.
And though such kind of enjoyments wherein these Heathen placed their future happiness, be not altogether so sensual as the Turkish Paradise, yet are they too earthly and gross for any rational man to rest in as his chief felicity. And must, even to the judgment of meer reason, seem altogether despicable in comparison to the Christians Heaven; which consists in the raising of our natures to the highest perfection of which they are capable, in a perpetual vision and fruition of the Supreme Good.
It must be granted, that the principal evidence for this Doctrine concerning a future state of Rewards and Punishments, is to be derived from Scripture, especially from the New Testament, where ‘tis said that life and immortality is brought (2 Tim. 1. 10) to light by the Gospel.
Not but that there is evidence for it, both from the Old Testament, and from the light of Nature. ‘Tis true indeed, that Temporal things are more expresly insisted upon in the promises and threats of the Old Testament, upon account of the grosness and dulness of the people of the Jews, who being more immersed in sensible things, were therefore more easie to be wrought upon by such considerations. But that these things were not then intended for the chief motives of Religion, may appear from the Histories concerning such Religious persons as lived in those first ages. Amongst whom, there were but very few (if any) that did attain to any such perfect felicity in respect of worldly things, but that they might very well apply to themselves the words of old Jacob, and say with him, Few and evil have the days of my life been. And if God had intended these temporal enjoyments, for the chief felicity which that Religion was to entitle them unto; those very histories upon record, where these promises are mentioned, concerning the sufferings of the best men in those times, must needs have been a disparagement and confutation to these promises themselves.
But besides the testimonies to this purpose from Scripture and revelation, it is not imaginable that in a point of so great moment, and so universal consequence as this is, God should have left himself without a witness unto all the Nations of the world; but that all men should be endowed with such natural capacities and notions, as being improved by consideration, will afford sufficient evidence for the belief of this great and fundamental Principle.
As for such men who live under the sense of guilt, whose interest it is that there should be no future account; It cannot be otherwise expected from such, but that they should be willing to disbelieve this. And from hence it is, that some of the ancient Philosophers have employed their learning and subtilty, to dispute themselves into some kind of doubt and uncertainty about it. And yet the generality even of these, have been forced to acknowledg it much more probable than the contrary. And as for the vulgar sort of people, who are guided by the more simple dictates of nature, these have in all Ages and Nations submitted themselves to this doctrine, and professed a firm belief of it. And though vulgar opinion be but a very bad Topick, about such matters as may gratifie men in their ease and sensual appetites; yet in such other opinions as are cross to their worldly interests, it may argue such things to be from some natural impression upon their minds, which they must believe, and cannot otherwise chuse.
The Arguments I would make use of to this purpose, may be reduced to these three general heads:
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The suitableness of this Principle, to the most natural Notions of our minds.
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The necessity of it to the government of mens lives and actions in this world.
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The necessity of it for the vindication of Divine Providence.
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I begin with the first, The suitableness of it to the most natural Notions of our minds, and those kind of impressions which belong to us, as we are reasonable Creatures. We see by experience, that all other things (so far as we are able to judg) Minerals, Plants, Beasts, &c. are naturally endowed with such principles as are most fit to promote the perfection of their natures, in their several kinds. And therefore it is by no means credible, that Mankind only, the most excellent of all other Creatures in this visible world, for the service of whom so many other things seem to be designed, should have such kind of principles interwoven in his very nature, as do contain in them meer cheats and delusions. And therefore whatsoever those things are, which the generality of mankind, especially the most wise and the most considerate part of them, do agree in, ought to be allowed for highly credible; otherwise it must follow, that we are framed with such kind of Faculties, as in our most cautious exercise of them, are more likely to seduce us and expose us to error, than to direct and lead us to the truth.
But I shall endeavour to manifest this more particularly, by these three considerations.
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This principle is most suitable to the general apprehensions of mankind, concerning the nature of good and evil.
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To those natural hopes and expectations which the generality of good men have, concerning a state of future happiness.
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To those natural fears and expectations which the generality of wicked men are possessed with, concerning a future state of punishment and misery.
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This Principle is most suitable to the general apprehensions of Mankind, concerning the nature of good and evil. All men heretofore have agreed, that there is such a thing as the Law of Nature, whereby things are distinguished into good and bad; according to which, the actions of men are determined to be either virtuous or vicious. And as the one of these doth in the essence of it imply comeliness and reward, so doth the other denote turpitude and punishment; these things being implied in the very definitions of virtue and vice. And from hence it will follow, That as there is some superiour power who hath put this Law into our natures, so will he take care to enforce the observance of it, by rewarding and punishing men accordingly. This being implied in the nature of a Law.
If there be nothing in the naked essence of things that makes them to differ, but what doth meerly arise from Custom and positive Laws; why then Custom and Law would be able to render it a very virtuous and commendable thing, for a man to be ingrateful, a breaker of compacts, a false witness, a perjured person; which is so monstrous a position, that the common reason of mankind will abhor it, upon the first proposal. Nothing is more obvious, than that there is an universal desire amongst men, of seeming honest: The most impudent and profligate wretch being loth to be esteemed what really he is. The very sin of hypocrisie, so general amongst men, doth give a large testimony to the beauty of goodness, and the deformity of vice. Nor is there any account to be given, why there should be impressed upon the nature of men such a value for the one, and dislike for the other, if there were not in the things themselves, something suitable to those contrary affections.
We see by experience, that there is such a kind of rest and acquiescence in the mind, upon the discovery of truth, and the doing of virtuous actions, as belongs to natural bodies when they are in their proper places; which may argue these things to have some peculiar suitableness to the soul of man, and that the opposites to them do offer violence to some natural principle belonging to it.
- This principle is most suitable to those natural hopes and expectations, which the generality of good men have concerning a state of future happiness. From whence doth arise that confidence and courage, whereby those of meanest quality and abilities (if otherwise virtuous persons) can support themselves in their sufferings for that which is good; which doth necessarily suppose in them a strong and even a natural belief and perswasion of such a future state, wherein their sufferings shall be considered and rewarded.
Besides that, there is a strong aversion amongst men, against a dark state of annihilation, which no man can think of without great regret of mind: And likewise a natural desire in all men after a state of happiness and perfection. And no natural desire is in vain. All other things have somewhat to satisfie their natural appetites. And if we consider the utter impossibility of attaining to any such condition in this life, this will render it highly credible, that there must be another state wherein this happiness is attainable; otherwise mankind must fail of his chief end, being by a natural principle most strongly inclined to such a state of happiness as he can never attain to; as if he were purposely framed to be tormented betwixt these two passions, Desire and Despair; an earnest propension after happiness, and an utter incapacity of ever enjoying it; as if nature it self, whereby all other things are disposed to their perfection, did serve only in mankind to make them miserable. And which is yet more considerable, the better and the wiser any man is, the more earnest desires and hopes hath he after such a state of happiness. And if there be no such thing, not only Nature, but Virtue likewise must contribute to make men miserable; than which, nothing can seem more unreasonable, to those who believe a just and a wise providence.
- This principle is most suitable to those fears and expectations which the generality of wicked men are possessed with, concerning a future state of misery. Witness those natural suggestions of conscience in the worst of men, that upon any wicked actions (though never so private) are oftentimes startling of them, with the apprehensions of another Judicature and Tribunal, before which they shall be called to an account for the closest sins. All that secret regret, and those inward smitings, Laniatus & Ictus, which are so often felt in the minds of men, upon the commission of any great sin, do argue some common intimations, even in the light of Nature, of another Judgment after this life, wherein they shall be accountable for such actions as men do not punish or take notice of.
And these natural fears do usually seize upon all kind of men promiscuously: Even those who are most potent, who by their own Will can give Laws to Nations, and command mighty Armies; yet cannot they avoid these checks and lashes of conscience, but that they will seize upon them, and shake them as well as the poorest meanest Subject. Nor can such as are most obstinately wicked, who with their utmost study and endeavour, apply themselves to the suppressing and disbelief of these notions, so wholly stifle them, but that they will be continually rising up in their minds and pursuing of them.
Now as there is no man whatsoever, that is wholly freed from these fears, of future misery after death; so there is no Creature below Man, that hath any fears of this kind. And if there be no real ground for this, then must it follow, That he who framed all his other Works with such an excellent congruity, did yet so contrive the nature of Man, the most noble amongst them, as to prove a needless torment and burden to it self.
If it be said, That these notions may proceed from such principles as men have derived from Institution and the teaching of others, but that they do not imply a necessity of any such natural impressions.
To this it may be answered, That it is sufficient to denominate them Natural notions, if they have such a suitableness to the minds of men, as makes them to be generally owned by all those who apply their thoughts to the consideration of them: And that they have such a natural suitableness, may appear, because Institution cannot so easily eradicate these notions, as it can fix them. Now if the meer teaching of others were it self sufficient to impress these notions, without any such peculiar congruity in the things themselves, it would be as sufficient to deface them again: Especially considering the advantage on this side, from that natural repugnancy which we have to any thing which brings disquiet to our minds. And nothing is more troublesome in this kind, than the fear which follows upon guilt.
But now, though there have been several men of no mean abilities, in several Ages, who have made it their business to root out of the minds of men all such troublesome notions about a future state, endeavouring to perswade themselves and others, That as there was a time before they were born into the world, when they were not; so at their dying or going out of it, they shall exist no more. And yet, though it be their interest to believe this, though they make it their study and business to perswade themselves and others of it; it may reasonably be doubted, whether ever yet there hath been so much as one person, that hath hereby become absolutely free from these fears: But for the most part, those who would have them esteemed vain and imaginary, without any foundation in nature, these are the persons who are most assaulted with them. Hi sunt qui trepidant, & ad omnia fulgura pallent.
So powerful and unconquerable are these impressions, and therefore Natural.
- The second Reason I proposed to speak to, was from the necessity of this Principle, to the right government of mens lives and actions in this world, and the preserving of society amongst them.
Nothing can be more evident, than that humane Nature is so framed, as not to be regulated and kept within due bounds, without Laws; and Laws must be insignificant, without the sanction of Rewards and Punishments, whereby men may be induced to the observance of them: Now the temporal Rewards and Punishments of this life, cannot be sufficient to this end; and therefore there is a necessity, that there should be another future state of happiness and misery.
All the Rewards and Punishments of this life are to be expected, either from the Civil Magistrate, who by virtue of his Place and Calling is obliged to the duty of distributive Justice: Or else from Divine Providence, according to that most usual course which we find by experience to be observed by him, in his dispensation of these temporal things. Now neither of these can afford sufficient motives, for the government of mens lives and actions.
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Not all that may be expected from the Civil Magistrates, because there may be many good and evil actions which they cannot take notice of; and they can reward and punish only such things, as come under their cognizance. And if this were the only restraint upon men, it could be no hinderance from any such mischiefs or villanies which men had the opportunity of committing secretly. Nor would it extend to those, who had power and strength enough to defend themselves from the Law, and escape the penalty of it, but that such might without any kind of check or fear follow the inclinations of their own appetites: Nor would it afford any remedy in the case of such wicked Magistrates as should invert the order of their institution, proving terrors to well-doers, and encouragers to those that do ill.
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Not all that may be expected from common Providence: For though it should be granted, that according to the most usual and general course of things, both virtuous and vicious actions are rewarded and punished in this life; yet there may be many particular cases, which this motive would not reach unto; namely, all such cases where a mans Reason shall inform him, that there is far greater probability of safety and advantage by committing a sin, than can be reasonably expected (according to his experience of the usual course of things in the world) by doing his duty. Suppose the case of the three Children, or of any other called to Martyrdom, who may be threatned with torments and death, unless they will blaspheme God and renounce their Religion; if it appear to them very probable (suppose a hundred to one), that upon their refusal, their persecutors will really execute what they threaten: And if on the other side, it prove very improbable (suppose ten thousand to one) that they shall be delivered by a Miracle: In such cases, it is not to be expected, that the consideration of the ordinary course of Providence in the dispensation of Rewards and Punishments, should be sufficient to restrain a man from any kind of Blasphemy or Villany whatsoever.
But the thing I am speaking to, will more fully appear, by consideration of those horrid mischiefs of all kinds, that would most naturally follow from the denial of this Doctrine.
If there be no such thing to be expected as happiness or misery hereafter, why then the only business that men are to take care of, is their present well-being in this World. There being nothing to be counted either good or bad, but in order to these: Those things which we conceive to be conducible to it, being the only duties; and all other things that are cross to it, being the only sins. And therefore whatever a man’s appetite shall incline him to, he ought not to deny himself in it (be the thing what it will) so he can have it, or do it, without probable danger.
Suppose it be matter of gain or prosit he is disposed to; if he can cheat or steal securely, this will be so far from being a fault, that it is plainly his duty, that is, reasonable for him to do. Because it is a proper means to promote his chief end.
And so for other cases of anger, hatred, revenge, &c. According to this principle a man must take the first opportunity of satisfying these passions, by doing any kind of mischief to the person he is offended with; whether by false accusation and perjury, or (if need be) by poysoning or stabbing of him; provided he can do these things so, as to escape the suspition of others, and humane penalties.
Now let any man judg, what Bears, and Wolves, and Devils, men would prove to one another, if every thing should be not only lawful, but a duty, whereby they might gratifie their impetuous lusts; if they might either perjure themselves, or steal, or murder, as often as they could do it safely, and get any advantage by it.
But these things are so very obvious and undeniable, that the most prophane Atheistical persons do own the truth of them. And upon this they are willing to acknowledg, That Religion and the belief of another life, is a very politick invention, and needful for the well-governing of the world, and for the keeping of men in awe, from the doing any secret mischiefs. Which (by the way) is a concession of no small advantage to the honour of Religion, considering that it proceeds from the greatest professed enemies to it. Whereby they grant, that it is fit these things should be true, if they are not; or at least, that it is fit that the generality of men should believe them to be true. And though themselves pretend to believe otherwise, yet are they not so far out of their wits, as to be willing that those with whom they converse, their Wives, and Children, and Servants, should be of the same opinion with them; because then they could have no reason to expect any safety amongst them. What security could any man have of his Estate, or Honour, or Life, if such with whom he is most familiar and intimate, might think themselves at liberty to do all the secret mischiefs to them which they had the opportunity to commit?
But there is one thing more, which those who profess to disbelieve this principle, should do well to consider; and that is this, That there is no imaginable reason, why (amongst those that know them) they should pretend to any kind of honesty or conscience, because they are wholly destitute of all such motives as may be sufficient to oblige them to any thing of this nature: But according to them, that which is called Virtue and Religion must be one of the most silly and useless things in the world.
As for the principle of Honour, which some imagine may supply the room of Conscience. This relates only to external reputation, and the esteem which we have amongst others; and therefore can be of no influence, to restrain men from doing any secret mischief.
From what hath been said it will follow, That those who have any regard to their own safety, ought to abandon all kind of society with such pernicious persons, who according to their own principles, must take all opportunities of doing any mischief to others, which they are able to effect with any advantage to themselves.
Now if this be so (as I have proved), that the nature of man is so framed, as not to be effectually perswaded and wrought upon, without the consideration of such a future state; if it be necessary, to add everlasting motives, as the Sanctions of that Law, by which the Humane Nature is to be governed; this must render it highly credible, that there is such a state, because it must needs be very unworthy of God, to conceive of him, that he hath contrived the nature of one of his best and most noble Creatures after such a manner, as to make it incapable of being governed without falshood and deceit. The necessity of this principle to the government of mens lives and actions, is the ground of that saying amongst the Rabbins, That Paradise and Hell are two of the seven Pillars upon which God is said to have founded the World. As if it could not be upheld without such a support.
- The third and last Argument, I proposed to speak to, was from the necessity of this principle to the vindication of Divine Providence. Nothing is more universally acknowledged, than that God is Good and Just; That well-doing shall be rewarded, and evil actions punished by him. And yet we see, that his dispensations in this life are many times promiscuous and uncertain, so that a man cannot judg of love or hatred, by all that is before him. The worst of men are sometimes in the best condition, If in this life only we had hope, we should be of all men (1 Cor. 15. 19) most miserable, saith the Apostle, speaking concerning those primitive times of persecution, when the better any man was, the more was he exposed to suffering. Nor is it thus only in the case of particular persons, or in the success of private differences betwixt men and men; but likewise for some of those decisions that are made by the Sword, in the publick contests of Princes and Nations; these may sometimes be so stated, as to the event of them, as may in the judgment of wise and good men seem unequal, and not according to justice and the right of the cause.
Now the greater uncertainty there is as to the present affairs of this world, by so much greater is the certainty of a future Judgment. It is true indeed, that virtue may be said to be a reward to it self, and vice a punishment; in regard of that satisfaction, or that regret of mind which doth accompany such things. But these are not such kind of rewards and punishments, as Lawgivers are to take care of; by which they are to excite those under the government, to overcome the labours and difficulties that they may sometimes meet with in doing their duty, and to restrain others from wicked actions.
It would seem a wild extravagant Law, which should propose by way of Reward, that those who had upon account of Religion or Virtue, undergone any great dangers and troubles, should for their reward be put again to undergo more and greater. That they who had been guilty of Robbery, should by way of punishment be obliged to commit Murder.
Besides those Moral advantages or mischiefs, which are properly the effects of Virtue and Vice; there is likewise some Physical Good or Evil, that may be expected as the reward and punishment of them.
Would it become a just Governour, to permit his rebellious Subjects, those who contemn his Laws, to persecute such as were obedient to him, with all kind of scorn and violence, stripes, imprisonment, torments, and death it self; and that for this very reason, because they were willing to do their duties, and to observe the Laws? Would it be a reasonable excuse for such a Ruler to say, That one of these had received sufficient, punishment in the very commission of such crimes; and that the other had a sufficient reward, both in the doing of his duty, and in his suffering for it? What could be more inconsistent with the rules of Justice, and the wise ends of Government?
What could be a greater disparagement to Divine Providence, than to permit the calamities and sufferings which good men undergo in this world, many times upon the account of Religion, to pass unrewarded; and the many mischiefs and prophanations, which wicked men take the advantage of committing by their greatness and prosperity in this world, to go unpunished?
What great glory would it be, to preside over this material World, Stars and Meteors, Sea and Land, Plants and Beasts, to put these things into such a regular course as may be suitable to their natures, and the operations for which they are designed; and in the mean space to have no proportionable regard, either for those that reverence the Deity, or those who contemn him?
‘Tis very well said to this purpose by a late Author, That not to conduct the course7 of Nature in a due manner, might speak some defect of Wisdom in God; but not to compensate Virtue and Vice, besides the defect of Wisdom in not adjusting things suitably to their qualifications, but crosly coupling Prosperity with Vice, and Misery with Virtue, would argue too great a defect of Goodness and of Justice. And perhaps it would not be less expedient (saith he) with Epicurus, to deny all Providence, than to ascribe to it such defects: It being less unworthy of the Divine Nature, to neglect the Universe altogether, than to administer humane affairs with so much injustice and irregularity.
And therefore ‘tis necessary for the vindication of Divine Providence, that there should be a future state, and Day of Accounts, wherein every man shall be forced to acknowledg, that verily there is a reward for the righteous, doubtless (Psa. 58. 11) there is a God that judgeth the earth.
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