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THE Perfections belonging to the Divine Will, were before reckoned to be, 1. His Goodness. 2. His Justice. 3. His Truth and Faithfulness.
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His Goodness. By which word is sometimes signified, the notion of Perfection in general; and sometimes it denotes Moral goodness, in opposition to all kind of moral imperfections. Of both which kinds of Goodness, God is the Fountain and Author, the Rule and Measure, from whom all created goodness is derived, and by conformity to whom it is to be estimated. But that more particular sense of this word, according to which it is now to be treated of, doth respect the inclination of the Divine Will toward his Creatures; that propension of his, whereby he is generally disposed to procure their happiness: in opposition to envy or malice, which delights in withholding good from others, or doing mischief to them. And that this Attribute is natural to the notion of God, may appear,
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By Testimony. There being no one perfection about which the generality of men are more agreed than about this, (excepting only the Epicureans), who attribute nothing to God but everlasting happiness and blessedness, which yet cannot be without Goodness. Plato styles him […], the best Being. And his common title amongst the Latins, was Deus Optimus Maximus. And our forefathers in this Nation, seem to have given this very name of God from Good. That is a known and an excellent passage in Seneca, Primus est Deorum cultus, Deos credere; deinde reddere illis Majestatem suam, reddere bonitatem sine qua nulla Majestas. The most fundamental thing in Religion, is to acknowledg the Being of God, and then to demean our selves towards him suitably to the greatness of his Majesty, and to his Goodness, without which there can be no Majesty. And in another place, He that doth not acknowledg the Goodness1 of the Divine nature, doth not take notice of the general custom amongst men, of praying to him in their distress, and making vows both publick and private, which would not be, unless they had this perswasion well fixed within them, that God was ready to hear and to help them, and that he is in his own nature propense to kindness and pity. Nec in hunc furorem omnes mortales consensissent, alloquendi surda numina & inefficaces Deos. Nor is it possible, that all mankind should so unanimously agree together in so great a madness, of praying to such Deities as they did not believe could either hear or help them.
And in another place, Quaedam sunt quae nocere non possunt, &c. Some things2 there are of so benign and helpful a nature, so mild and beneficial, that nothing of evil or hurt can proceed from them: Such is the Deity, who neither can, nor will, do any thing that is mischievous; being as remote from any action, that is injurious to others as to it self.
And elsewhere, Ecce sceleratis sol oritur, & Piratis patent maria. He causeth3 his Sun to shine upon the just and unjust, and the Seas are open to Pirates as well as Merchants. He communicates his bounty to us in our infancy and childhood, when we can have no sense of it: Nor doth he presently withdraw and4 cease his favours towards such wretches, as make a question and doubt concerning the Author of them: Nor is there any person so miserable and wretched,5 who hath not in several respects had experience of the Divine bounty. Hierocles asserts, that God is essentially good; not6 by accident and from external motives and considerations.
- By Reason. It is so plain, so fundamental a notion, that Goodness must belong to God, that I know not how to go about the proof of it. ‘Tis the brightest ray of the Deity, the first and clearest notion we have of God. We may see every day many thousand visible effects of this Goodness in the world. And there are some glimpses and weak impressions of it amongst the Creatures, and therefore much more must it be in the Creator himself.
This is the foundation of all Worship and Religion amongst men, the reason of their Prayers to God, and Praises of him. Without this, his other Attributes would not afford any sufficient ground for our Love and Adoration of him. Knowledg and Power without Goodness, would be but craft and violence. He can by his Wisdom out-wit his creatures, and easily impose upon them; and by his Power he could tyrannize over them, and play with their misery; but that he will not do thus, we are assured by his Goodness. This is so essential to him, that to imagine him without Goodness, were to imagine a God without a Deity, i. e. without that which chiefly constitutes him what he is: Nay, it were to imagine instead of a God, a worse Devil, and more qualify’d to do mischief, than any is now in the world.
- The second Attribute belonging to the Divine Will, is his Justice. By which is meant not only the rectitude of his Nature in general, but more specially his dealing with his creatures according to the desert of their deeds.
And that this Perfection is natural to the notion of God, may appear,
- By Testimony. It is an assertion of Plato, (Theatetus) […], God cannot be said in any kind or respect whatsoever to be unjust, but so far as is possible to be most just. Tully lays it down as a principle, that before men are fit to associate under government,7 they ought to be first convinced, that God is the supreme Governour of the World, and doth take particular notice, Qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, quâ mente, quâ pietate religiones colat, piorumque & impiorum habere rationem; what kind of person every one is, what he doth, and what he thinks, how his heart stands inclined to the duties of Religion, and will deal with every one according to his reality or hypocrisie in such matters.
And that this was the general belief amongst them, may appear by the universal custom of attesting him by solemn Oaths; whereby they did-appeal to him as a Righteous Judg, who would certainly revenge all falshood and injustice.
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From Reason. And that not so much because Justice is a perfection, as because Injustice is so great a blemish and imperfection; especially in the great Soveraign and Judg of the world, who having all power and authority in his hands, can have no temptation or byass imaginable to do any thing that is unjust.
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His Truth and Faithfulness. By which is meant, the congruity of his words to his intentions, especially in respect of any promises which he hath made.
And that this doth belong to the natural notion of God, may be made evident,
- From Testimony. Plato asserts, all8 kind of lying and falshood to be imperfections most odious both to God and man, and that the Divine nature is absolutely free from all kind of temptation to it; so that there can be no imaginable reason why God should falsifie.
Porphyrie in the life of Pythagoras tells us, that it was one of his precepts […], that men should most of all endeavour after truth, because this only can make them like God. And he adds afterwards, that Truth is so great a perfection, that if God would render himself visible to men, he would chuse Light for his Body, and Truth for his Soul.
- From Reason. It is one of the greatest reproaches, and an argument of baseness amongst men, to be counted a Lyar: And therefore must it necessarily be removed from that Being which is supposed to have all possible perfections, and to be the Father of Truth, as the Devil is of Lyes.
That which tempts men to falsifie, is usually either the fear of some evil, or the hope of some advantage. The reason why they break their words, is either because of their rashness and inconsiderateness in making promises, or their forgetfulness in not minding them, or their inconstancy in not keeping to them, or their impotence to perform them. But now the Divine nature being infinitely wise and allsufficient, can have no temptation to be otherwise than true and faithful. His infinite Knowledg and Wisdom doth secure him, from being deceived himself; his Omnipotence doth exempt him, from standing in need of deceiving others; and his Goodness secures us, from the lest suspition of any inclination thereto.
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