‘Tis easie to observe in the Speculation of natural things themselves, how unsafe ‘tis not only to affirm, but in divers Cases also reject opinions, before men have any thing near a competent Historical Information of what belongs to the Subject they take upon them peremptorily to judge of. And therefore it must in reason be thought much more unwary to be forward to resolve upon Negative Propositions about things which we our selves acknowledge to be above the reach of Human Reason, which since they are, ‘twill become us at least to forbear a rude and insulting way of rejecting the opinions of Learned Men that dissent from us about such things; since the sublimity of the Subject should make mistakes about them the more easie to be pardon’d, because they are difficult to be avoided; and our own sharing in the disability of penetrating such abstruse things, should keep us from being over-confident, that we also may not be mistaken, and incline us to tolerate other mens opinions about matters wherein we our selves have but opinion, not science.
Pyr.
But have not you formerly advised us not to suffer our selves to be impos’d upon by proofless Assertions, even about privileg’d things?
Arnob.
I did so, and do so still: but there is a great deal of difference between believing a proofless affirmation about things which the affirmer does not know to be true, and framing Negative Conclusions against Opinions, which, for ought we yet clearly know, may be true: and therefore my present advice is very consistent with my former: for here I counsel only, either a suspension of Judgment, when there appears no proof on either side sufficient to sway the Intellect; or such a wary and unprejudic’d assent to opinions that are but faintly probable, that the mind may be ready to receive, without either obstinacy, or surprise, any better argument that shall conclude the contrary of the opinion we favour’d before.
Eugen.
But methinks ‘tis hard to avoid the framing of Conjectures, even about those sublime Subjects, concerning which we can frame but conjectures, and those often very slight ones.
Arnob.
I confess an absolute suspension of judgment is a very uneasie thing, nor do I strictly require you should entertain no conjectures; but only that we should consider that we may be easily mistaken in them, and by further information see cause to lay them down, and perhaps exchange them for contrary ones: my thoughts of this matter may be perchance somewhat illustrated by supposing that we four were walking in a High-way, and discover’d as far off as our eyes could reach, some erected and moving body of human stature; tho we should by its shape and walking safely enough conclude that ‘twere no other animal than a man, yet what manner of man he were, as old, or young, handsome, or ugly; we should not be able to discern, and consequently, could have no sufficient ground to determine. And as if I should affirm him to be a young man or handsome, you may justly censure me of rashness; so if because I cannot prove my conjecture, you should resolutely deny that he is a young man or handsome, I should think you guilty, tho not of an equal, yet of a censurable unwariness, because, for ought you know to the contrary, he may be what I guess’d him to be. And tho we are naturally so uneasie under fluctuation of mind, that for my part I confess (and it may be you may be subject to the same Infirmity) I should scarce forbear resembling in my thoughts the man we speak of to some body or other that I knew, yet I should justly think that Conjecture to be very fallible, and both expect that when I should come to have a nearer and clearer view of him, I might see cause to dismiss my first Idea for that which this new and better prospect would afford me, tho it were quite differing from that I had formerly entertain’d, and should represent him, that my forward thought perhaps resemble, to a young man of my acquaintance with black curl’d hair, and a ruddy complexion, to be pale and wrinckled, with grey hair curl’d like a pound of Candles. The Application, I suppose, I may spare.
But Gentlemen, I would not be understood in the preceding Discourse, as if I were against all framing of Negative Propositions about privileg’d Things; my design being but to dissuade from hasty ones: For sometimes ‘tis much more easie and safe to deny things, than to affirm them to belong to a Subject that surpasses our Reason. And the observation may be of use, especially in two cases; one, when the Negative we assert is grounded not upon Axioms taken from the usual course of Nature, or upon Propositions dubious, or remote from the first Principles of knowledge, but upon either Catholick and Metaphysical Axioms, or else upon Truths manifestly flowing from some clear, tho inadequate notion we have of the nature of the things we treat of. The other Case is, when we have a clear and sufficient proof by Revelation, or otherwise, of the positive Attributes of the things we contemplate; for then we may safely deny of that Subject any other thing that is really inconsistent with that positive Attribute. Upon which account it is, that tho we do not fully comprehend what God is, yet knowing by the clear Light of Nature (and if we be Christians) believing it upon the account of Revelation, that he is a Being Intelligent and infinitely perfect, we may safely deny against Epicurus, Vorstius, and Mr. Hobbs, that he is a Corporeal Substance, as also that he is Mortal, or Corruptible.
Pyrocl.
I shall not trouble you, Arnobius, to inlarge upon your last Advice, but willingly receive the […]avour of your next.
Arnob.
Which shall be this:
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