‘Tis no very difficult Task to justifie this Advice; but I may do it the better, if you give me leave to frame and premise a Distinction, for want of which I have observed a want of Clearness in several Discourses, where the term Modus has been employed: for sometimes we would deny so much as a possibillity, that one thing can belong to, or be truly said of another; as when we say we understand not how one Creature can create another; or how there can be a Line that is neither straight, nor crooked; or a finite (whole) number that is neither even nor odd. But most commonly we mean by our not understanding the Modus of a thing, that we do not clearly and distinctly conceive after what manner the Property or other Attribute of a Subject belongs to it, or performs its operations. The first kind of Modus may, for distinctions sake, be called a possible Modus; and the other, an actual modus. Now in both the foregoing Acceptions of the term Modus, we may find Instances fit for our present purpose. For we cannot imagine, How a short Line or other finite Quantity can be endlesly divisible, or (on the contrary) how Infinite Parts should make but a Finite Total: and yet Geometry constrains us to admit, That it is so. But tho there be but few Instances of this kind, yet of the other sort of our Nescience of the Modus of things, there may be found more Instances than we could wish there were; for even in natural and corporeal things the eager disputes of the acutest Philophers, and the ingenuous Confessions of the most judicious and moderate, sufficiently manifest, that as yet we know not the manner of operating whereby several Bodies perform what we well know they bring to pass. And not to enter into those nice and tedious Disputes of the cause of the Cohesion of the parts of matter in the smallest, most principal, and most primary Bodies, perhaps without going out of our selves, the way whereby the Rational Soul can exercise any power over the humane body, and the way whereby the Understanding and the Will act upon one another, have not yet been intelligibly explain’d by any. And the like I may say of the Phaenomena of the Memory, especially in those in whom that faculty is eminent. For ‘tis a thing much more fit to be admired, than easie to be conceived, how in so narrow a compass as part of a Human Brain, there should be so many thousand distinct Cells or Impressions as are requisite to harbour the Characters or Signatures of many Languages, each of them consisting of many thousand differing Words, besides the Images or Models of so many thousand Faces, Schemes, Buildings, and other sensible Objects, and the Ideas of so many thousand Notions and Thoughts, and the distinct Footsteps of almost innumerable multitudes of other things: and how all these shall in so narrow a compass have such deep and lasting Impressions made for them, and be oftentimes lodged so exactly in the order wherein they were at first committed to the memory (and that perhaps many years before) that upon a sudden command of the Will, or a slight casual Hint, a whole set of Words, Things and Circumstances will in a trice, as it were, start up and present themselves even in the very Series, order and manner that so long before belong’d to them. And I doubt not, but that besides those abstruse things, about the Modus, of which the more candid Philosophers have confessed their Ignorance, there would many others have been taken notice of, if we did but as seriously and impartially inquire into the Nature of all the things we are pleased to think we know. And when I reflect on the yet depending Disputes between Philosophers and Mathematicians about the nature of Place and Local Motion, which are things so obvious and familiar to us, I should, tho I had no other Inducements, be inclin’d to think, that we should find difficulties enough in many other Subjects wherein we do not now take notice of any, if we particularly studyed their nature; and that our acquiescence in what we have learned about many things proceeds not from our greater knowledge of their nature, but from our having exercised less curiosity and attention in considering it.
And if in things Corporeal, that are the familiar objects of our Senses, we are often reduc’d to confess our Ignorance of the Modes of their inexisting or operating, I hope it will not be denyed, that to a Being wholly unapproachable by our Senses, natural Theology may be allowed to ascribe some things whose Modus is not attainable by our understanding: As the Divine Prescience of future Contingents; which as ‘twere impious, to deny as to the truth of the thing; so I fear ‘tis impossible to explicate as to the Modus of it.
Eugen.
If it were at this time proper for me to meddle with things of that kind, I should not much scruple to say in favour of the Christian Religion, that divers Tenents granted both by Christians, Jews, and Heathens, as parts of natural Theology, to me seem as difficult to be connived, as divers of those Mysteries that for their unintelligibless are fiercely opposed in Reveal’d Theology. I will not take upon me to judge of others; but for my part I confess, I do not much better understand, how an Intellect and a Will and Affections are distinctly inexistent in God, in such sort as they are wont to be attributed to him, than how in him there can be a Trinity; stated, not as some Schoolmen explicate, or rather darken it, but as the Gospel delivers it: I can as little explain by any thing in Nature, how God, who is an immaterial Substance, can move Matter, as how he can create it: nor would it at all satisfie me to tell me, that a Rational Soul moves a Human Body; for I do not allow, that it gives any motion to the Body, but only guides that which other Agents have put the parts of it into. And tho it did produce motion in the Body, my scruple would yet remain; for the Cartesians themselves confess, that the power the Soul has of so much as determining the motion of the Body belongs to it, not upon any Physical Account, but by the particular Appointment and immediate Power of God, who would have that Power one of the Conditions or Properties of the Union of the Soul and Body. So that to me, who desire to have it explained how an immaterial Substance can move Matter, and consequently, how God can do it, it will be no satisfaction to say, that the Rational Soul can move the Body ‘tis joyned to, since that Power is referred merely to God’s Appointment: And the question is, how God himself can be conceived to move matter.
Arnob.
I know not whether upon the same Grounds which I do not disallow, I may not add, that whereas by many ‘tis looked upon as an inconceivable thing that God should see mens Thoughts, to me it appears as little intelligible how he can know their outward Actions: For since we have no way of discerning the particular motions of Mens Bodies, but by some of our Senses, especially our sight; and since those Sensations themselves necessarily require Organs duly constituted, that is, made up of divers parts, fram’d and joyn’d after such a determinate manner, I see not how we can explain the Perception of visible Objects without an Eye, or so much as any Corporeal Organ, or Substance; especially since ‘tis, and that very justly, asserted, that the Deity is not united to any portion of matter, as the Human Soul is to the Human Body. And to these Instances, others to the same purpose might be added, but that I think it fitter to mind you, that of those it already mention’d amongst us, there are some that I presume you will judg referable to that which I lately called a possible Modus; since it seems, toto genere, as they speak, inexplicable, how the Attribute inexists in the Subject, and after what manner the Cause can produce the Effect ascribed to it.
Tim.
I know you too well, Gentlemen, to suspect, you mean, by this, to deny to God either the power of moving matter, or that of perceiving all its motions.
Arnob.
You may well take that for granted, and you may remember, that to prevent mistakes, I was careful in proposing my Advice to except those things for which there is some positive proof competent in its kind.
Pyrocl.
One may then, without surprising you, ask what kind of proofs those may be?
Arnob.
A full Answer to that Question would take up too much of that little time that is allowed us before it grow dark, to go thorow the Advices that yet remain unspoken of. But yet to comply with you as far as my haste will permit, I shall name two or three kinds of positive proofs, that may be employed on such occasions as we speak of. And first, if there be an effect that we discern must proceed from such a Cause, or Agent, we may conclude that such a Cause there is, tho we do not particularly conceive how, or by what operation ‘tis able to produce the acknowledg’d effect: Thus, tho a man otherwise of a good Judgment, being wholly a stranger to the Mathematicks, cannot conceive how a skillful Astronomer can many years before hand fore-tell Eclipses to a day and hour, and perhaps to a few minutes; yet when the success does, as it often happens, verifie such Predictions, he will be satisfied, that the maker of them had the skill to foreknow the things foretold in them. And so the generality of Learned Men among us, who are not so much acquainted with that part of Navigation, which some Moderns have by a Greek Name called Limen-Euretica, or the Art of steering to Harbours, cannot well conceive how a Ship, that is, for instance, in the vast Atlantick Ocean above a thousand miles from any shoar, should be so directed as to arrive just at a little Harbor not Cannon-shot over, which perhaps neither the Pilot, nor any other in the Ship ever saw. And yet as little as we can distinctly conceive how such an Art of finding Ports can be framed, we scruple not to allow there is such an one, because Navigators to the East and West Indies, could not without the Guidance of such an Art find the remotest Ports they are bound for.
A second sort there is of positive proofs consisting of those Consequences that are clearly and legitimately inferr’d from any manifest acknowledg’d, or already demonstrated Truth. To this sort belong divers Mathematical Propositions and Corollaries, which tho being nakedly proposed they seem incredible to the generality of Learned Men, and sometimes to Mathematicians themselves, are yet fully assented to, because they clearly follow from either manifested or demonstrated Truths. Thus many cannot conceive how ‘tis possible there may be a million, for instance, of Circles, (or as many more as you please) whose Circumferences shall each of them come nearer and nearer to one another, and to a straight Line assign’d, and yet none of them either touch, much less cut, either any other Circle, or that Line but in one and the same point. And yet this is one of the odd Propositions that Geometers have rightly deduc’d as Corollaries from the sixteenth of Euclid’s third Element. And tho we cannot clearly conceive how two Lines, that at their remotest ends are but little distant from each other, should perpetually incline towards each other without ever concurring; yet Geometricians, that is, the rigidest Reasoners that we know of, have been compell’d admit this in the Linea Conchoides of Nicomedes, to name no more. But tho, (not to touch the same strings too often) I thought fit to mention these Instances; yet whether you judge them sufficient or no, you will allow that which may be taken from the endless divisibility of a Line: For tho, if I misremember not, Sophronius told me, he took notice to you how unable we are to have a satisfactory apprehension, how a short line as well as a long, can be divided into more and more parts without any stop; yet Geometricians generally admit this, because it may be clearly deduc’d from some Geometrical Truths, and particularly from the incommensurableness of the Side and Diagonal of a Square: And if you will allow me to have once more recourse to Divine Prescience, I may add another acknowledg’d instance by representing, that Philosophers have admitted that, because they judged it clearly to follow from the infinite Perfections of God; tho, how he can foresee Contingency the most judicious and modest of them did not pretend their Reason was able to conceive.
Timoth.
To these two kinds of positive proofs mention’d by Arnobius, I doubt not but he will give me leave to add Divine Revelations, if competently attested ones can be produc’d; and therefore I will not by going about to evince this, spend any of the time he reserves for the remaining Rules, to which he may, for me, advance assoon as he thinks fit.
Arnob.
I accept the Liberty you offer me, Timotheus, to proceed to my next Advice; which is this.
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