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(Nec Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus,) &c.
And let me tell you freely, that, though I will not say, That Aristotle meant the mischief his Doctrine did, yet I am apt to think, that the Grand Enemy of God’s Glory made great use of Aristotle’s Authority and Errors, to detract from it.
For as Aristotle, by introducing the Opinion of the Eternity of the World, (whereof he owns himself to have been the first Broacher) did, at least in almost all Mens Opinion, openly deny God the Production of the World: So, by ascribing the admirable Works of God, to what he calls Nature, he tacitly denies him the Government of the World. Which suspicion, if you judg severe, I shall not, at more leisure, refuse to acquaint you, (in a distinct Paper) why I take divers of Aristotle’s Opinions relating to Religion, to be more unfriendly, not to say pernicious, to It, than those of several other Heathen Philosophers.
And here give me leave to prevent an Objection, that some may make, as if, to deny the receiv’d Notion of Nature, a Man must also deny Providence; of which Nature is the Grand Instrument. For in the first place, my Opinion hinders me not at all from acknowledging God to be the Author of the Universe, and the continual Preserver and Upholder of it; which is much more than the Peripatetick Hypothesis, which (as we were saying) makes the World Eternal, will allow its Embracers to admit; and those things which the School-Philosophers ascribe to the Agency of Nature, interposing according to Emergencies, I ascribe to the Wisdom of God in the first Fabrick of the Universe; which He so admirably contrived, that, if He but continue his ordinary and general concourse, there will be no necessity of extraordinary interpositions, which may reduce him, to seem as it were to Play After-Games; all those Exigencies, upon whose account Philosophers and Physicians seem to have devis’d what they call Nature, being foreseen and provided for in the first Fabrick of the World; so that meer Matter, so ordered, shall in such and such Conjunctures of Circumstances, do all that Philosophers ascribe on such occasions to their almost Omniscient Nature, without any knowledg of what it does, or acting otherwise than according to the Catholick Laws of Motion. And methinks the difference betwixt their Opinion of God’s Agency in the World, and that which I would propose, may be somewhat adumbrated, by saying, That they seem to imagine the World to be after the nature of a Puppet, whose Contrivance indeed may be very Artificial, but yet is such, that almost every particular motion the Artificer is fain (by drawing sometimes one Wire or String, sometimes another) to guide, and oftentimes over-rule, the Actions of the Engine; whereas, according to us, ‘tis like a rare Clock, such as may be that at Strasbourg, where all things are so skilfully contriv’d, that the Engine being once set a Moving, all things proceed according to the Artificers first design, and the Motions of the little Statues, that at such hours perform these or those things, do not require, like those of Puppets, the peculiar interposing of the Artificer, or any Intelligent Agent imployed by him, but perform their functions upon particular occasions, by vertue of the General and Primitive Contrivance of the whole Engine. The Modern Aristotelians and other Philosophers would not be tax’d as injurious to Providence, though they now ascribe to the ordinary course of Nature, those regular Motions of the Planets, that Aristotle and most of his Followers (and among them the Christian School-men) did formerly ascribe to the particular guidance of Intelligent and Immaterial Beings, which they assign’d to be the Movers of the Coelestial Orbs. And when I consider, how many things, that seem Anomalies to us, do frequently enough happen in the World, I think it is more consonant to the respect we owe to Divine Providence, to conceive, that as God is a most free, as well as a most wise Agent, and may in many Things have ends unknown to us: He very well foresaw, and thought fit, that such seeming Anomalies should come to pass, since he made them (as is evident in the Eclipses of the Sun and Moon) the Genuine consequences of the Order, He was pleas’d to settle in the World; by whose Laws the Grand Agents in the Universe were impower’d and determin’d, to act according to the respective Natures he had given them; and the course of things was allowed to run on, though that would infer the happening of seeming Anomalies, and things really repugnant to the Good or Welfare of divers particular Portions of the Universe. This, I say, I think to be a Notion more respectful to Divine Providence, than to imagine, as we commonly do, that God has appointed an Intelligent and Powerful Being, called Nature, to be as his Vice-gerent, continually watchful for the good of the Universe in general, and of the particular Bodies that compose it; whilst in the mean time, this Being appears not to have the skill, or the power, to prevent such Anomalies, which oftentimes prove destructive to multitudes of Animals, and other Noble Creatures, (as in Plagues, &c.) and sometimes prejudicial to greater Portions of the Universe, (as in Earth-quakes of a large spread, Eclipses of the Luminaries, great and lasting Spots on the Sun, Eruptions of Vulcan, great Comets or new Stars that pass from one Region of Heaven to another.) And I am the more tender of admitting such a Lieutenant to Divine Providence, as Nature is fancied to be, because I shall hereafter give you some Instances, in which it seems, that, if there were such a thing, she must be said to act too blindly and impotently, to discharge well the Part she is said to be trusted with.
I shall add, that the Doctrine, I plead for, does much better than its Rival comply with what Religion teaches us, about the extraordinary and supernatural Interpositions of Divine Providence. For when it pleases God to over-rule, or controul, the establish’d course of things in the World, by his own Omnipotent Hand, what is thus perform’d may be much easier discern’d and acknowledg’d to be miraculous, by them that admit, in the ordinary course of Corporeal Things, nothing but Matter and Motion, whose Powers Men may well judg of; than by those who think there is besides, a certain Semi-Deity, which they call Nature, whose Skill and Power they acknowledg to be exceeding great, and yet have no sure way of estimating how great they are, and how far they may extend. And give me leave to take notice to you, on this occasion, that I observe the Miracles of our Saviour and his Apostles, pleaded by Christians on the behalf of their Religion, to have been very differingly look’d on by Epicurean and other Corpuscularian Infidels, and by those other Unbelievers who admit of a Soul of the World, or Spirits in the Stars, or, in a word, think the Universe to be Governed by Intellectual Beings, distinct from the Supream Being we call God. For this later sort of Infidels have often admitted those matters of Fact, which we Christians call Miracles; and yet have endeavour’d to solve them by Astral Operations, and other Ways not here to be specified: Whereas the Epicureàn Enemies of Christianity have thought themselves oblig’d, resolutely to deny the matters of Fact themselves; as well discerning, that the things, said to be perform’d, exceeded the Mechanical Powers of Matter and Motion, (as they were managed by those, that wrought the Miracles,) and consequently must either be deny’d to have been done, or be confess’d to have been truly Miraculous.
But there may hereafter be occasion,2 both to improve the things already said, and add others, to satisfie Theological scruples about our Hypothesis.
I formerly told you, that ‘twas not only to the Glory of God, (as that results from his Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, express’d in the World) that I suspected the Notion of Nature, that I am examining, to be prejudicial, but also to the Discovery of his Works. And you will make no great difficulty to believe me, if you consider, that, whilst Men allow themselves so general and easie a way, or rendring accounts of things that are difficult, as to attribute them to Nature; shame will not reduce them to a more industrious scrutiny into the Reasons of Things, and curiosity itself will move them to it the more faintly: Of which we have a clear and eminent Example, in the Ascension of Water in Pumps, and in other Phaenomena’s of that kind, whose true Physical Causes had never been found out, if the Moderns had acquiesced, as their Predecessors did, in that imaginary one, that the World was Govern’d by a Watchful Being, call’d Nature, and that she abhors a vacuum, and consequently is still in a readiness, to do irresistibly whatever is necessary to prevent it: Nor must we expect any great Progress, in the discovery of the true Causes of natural Effects, whilst we are content to sit down with other, than the particular and immediate ones.
‘Tis not that I deny, that there are divers things, as the number and situation of the Stars, the shapes and sizes of Animals, &c. About which, even a Philosopher being ask’d can say little, but that it pleased the Author of the Universe to make them so; but when we give such general Answers, we pretend not to give the particular Physical Reasons of the things propos’d, but do in effect confess we do not know them. To this I add, that the veneration, wherewith Men are imbued for what they call Nature, has been a discouraging impediment to the Empire of Man over the inferior Creatures of God. For many have not only look’d upon it, as an impossible thing to compass, but as something of impious to attempt, the removing of those Boundaries which Nature seems to have put and setled among her Productions. And whilst they look upon her as such a venerable thing, some make a kind of scruple of Conscience, to endeavour so to emulate any of her Works, as to excel them.
I have staid so long, about removing the first of the two scruples I formerly propos’d against my present attempt, that, not to tire your Patience, I shall in few words dispatch the second, which is, That I venture to contradict the sense of the generality of Mankind: To which I answer, That in Philosophical Inquiries, it becomes not a Naturalist to be so solicitous, what has been, or is believ’d, as what ought to be so; and I have also elsewhere, on another occasion, shew’d, how little the sense of the generality of Men, ought to sway us in some Questions: But that which I shall at present more directly reply, is, First, That ‘tis no wonder, Men should be generally prepossest with such a Notion of Nature, as I call in question, since Education (especially in the Schools) has imbued them with it from their Infancy, and even in their maturer years they find it taken for granted, and imployed not only by the Most but by the Learnedst Writers, and never hear it call’d in question by any; and then it exceedingly complies with our Innate Propensity, to think that we know more than we do, and to appear to do so. For to vouch Nature for a Cause, is an Expedient, that can scarce be wanting to any Man, upon any occasion, to seem to know what he can indeed render no good reason of.
And to this first part of my Answer, I shall subjoin this second. That the general custom of Mankind, to talk of a Thing as a real and positive Being, and attribute great matters to it, does but little weigh with me; when I consider, that, though Fortune be not any Physical thing, but a certain loose & undetermin’d Notion, which a Modern Meta-Physician would refer to the Classis of his non Entia, yet not only the Gentiles made it a Goddess, (Nos te facimus, Fortuna, Deam, Coeloque locamus,) which many of them seriously Worship’d, but eminent Writers, in Verse and in Prose, Ethnick and Christian, Ancient and Modern, and all sorts of Men, in their common Discourse do seriously talk of It, as if it were a kind of Antichrist, that usurped a great share in the Government of the World; and ascribe little less to It, than they do to Nature. And not to speak of what Poets, Moralists and Divines tell us of the Powers of Ignorance and Vice, which are but Moral defects: Let us consider what things are not only by these Men, but by the generality of Mankind seriously attributed to Death, to which so great and fatal a Dominion is assign’d; and then if we consider too, that this Death, which is said to do so many and such wonderful things, is neither a Substance, nor a Positive Entity, but a meer Privation; we shall, I trust, the less believe, that the Feats ascribed to Nature do infer, that there is really such a Physical Agent as is suppos’d.
And now having, as I presume, clear’d our Enquiry, as far as ‘tis yet necessary, [and ‘twill be further done hereafter] from those Prejudices, that might make the Attempt be censur’d before it be examin’d, I proceed to the Inquiry it self; wherein I shall endeavour (but with the brevity my want of leisure exacts) to do these six things. First, To give you a short account of the great Ambiguity of the word Nature, arising from its various acceptions. Secondly, To shew you, that the Definition also, that Aristotle himself gives of Nature, does not afford a clear or satisfactory Notion of it. Thirdly, To gather from the several things, that are wont to be affirmed of, or attributed to, Nature, the received Notion of it, which cannot be well gathered from the Name, because of its great ambiguity. Fourthly, I will mention some of those Reasons, that dissuade me from admitting this Notion of Nature. Fifthly, I shall endeavour to answer severally the chief things, upon which Men seem to have taken up the Idea of Nature, that I disallow. And, Sixthly, I shall propose some of the chief Effata or Axioms, that are wont to be made use of, concerning Nature in general, and shall shew, how far, and in what sense I may admit them.
And here it may be opportune, to prevent both mistakes and the necessity of interrupting the Series of our Discourse, to set down two or three Advertisements.
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When any where in this Tract I speak of the Opinions of Aristotle and the Peripateticks, as I would not be thought to impute to him all the sentiments of those that will be thought his followers, some of which seem to me to have much mistaken his true meaning; so (on the other side) I did not conceive, that my Design oblig’d me to inquire anxiously into his true sentiments, whether about the Origine of the Universe, (as whether or no it were selfexistent, as well as Eternal) or about less important Points: Since, besides that his expressions are oftentimes dark and ambiguous enough, and the things he delivers in several passages do not seem always very consistent; it suffic’d for my purpose, which was to question Vulgar Notions, to examine those Opinions, that are by the generality of Scholars taken for the Aristotelian and Peripatetick Doctrines, by which, if he be mis-represented, the blame ought to light upon his Commentators and Followers.
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The Rational Soul or Mind of Man, as it is distinct from the sensitive Soul, being an immaterial Spirit; is a substance of so Heteroclite a kind, in reference to things so vastly differing from it as mere Bodies are, that since I could neither, without injuring it, treat of it promiscuously with the Corporeal Works of God, nor speak worthily of it, without frequently interrupting and disordering my Discourse by Exceptions, that would either make it appear intricate, or would be very troublesome to you or any other that you may think fit to make my Reader; I thought I might, for others ease and my own, be allow’d to set aside the considerations of it in the present Treatise: And the rather, because all other parts of the Universe being, according to the receiv’d Opinion, the Works of Nature, we shall not want in them Subjects more than sufficiently numerous, whereon to make our Examen. Though I shall here consider the World but as the great System of things Corporeal, as it once really was, towards the close of the sixth day of the Creation, when God had finish’d all his material Works, but had not yet Created Man.
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