I. A Considering Person may well be tempted to suspect, that Men have generally had but imperfect and confused Notions concerning Nature; if he but observes, that they apply that Name to several things, and those too such, as have some of them very little dependance on, or connexion with, such others. And I remember that in Aristotle’s Metaphysicks, I met with a whole Chapter expresly written, to enumerate the various Acceptions of the Greek word, […], commonly render’d Nature; of which, if I mistake not, he there reckons up six. In English also we have not fewer, but rather more numerous significations of that Term. For sometimes we use the word Nature, for that Author of Nature, whom the School-men, harshly enough, call Natura Naturans; as when ‘tis said, that Nature hath made Man partly Corporeal, and partly Immaterial. Sometimes we mean by the Nature of a thing, the Essence, or that which the School-men scruple not to call the Quiddity of a thing, namely, the Attribute or Attributes, on whose score it is, what it is; whether the thing be corporeal or not; as, when we attempt to define the Nature of an Angle, or of a Triangle, or of a Fluid Body as such. Sometimes we confound that which a Man has by Nature, with what accrues to him by Birth; as, when we say, that such a Man is noble by Nature, or such a Child naturally forward, or sickly, or frightful. Sometimes we take Nature for an Internal Principle of Motion; as, when we say, that a Stone let fall in the Air, is by Nature carried towards the Centre of the Earth; and, on the contrary, that Fire or Flame does Naturally move upwards towards Heaven.
Sometimes we understand by Nature, the Establish’d course of things, as, when we say, that Nature makes the Night succeed the Day: Nature hath made Respiration necessary to the Life of Men.
Sometimes we take Nature for an Aggregate of Powers belonging to a Body, especially a Living one; as, when Physicians say, that Nature is strong, or weak, or spent; or that in such or such Diseases, Nature left to her self, will do the Cure. Sometimes we take Nature for the Universe, or System of the Corporeal works of God; as, when ‘tis said of a Phoenix, or a Chimera, that there is no such thing in Nature, (i. e.) in the World. And sometimes too, and that most commonly, we would express by the Word Nature, a Semi-deity, or other strange kind of Being, such as this Discourse examines the Notion of. And besides these more Absolute Acceptions, if I may so call them, of the word Nature; it has divers others (more Relative) as Nature is wont to be set in Opposition or Contradistinction to other things; as, when we say of a Stone when it falls downwards, that it does it by a Natural motion; but that if it be thrown upwards, its motion that way is violent. So Chymists distinguish Vitriol into Natural and Fictitious, or made by Art, (i. e.) by the Intervention of Human Power or Skill; so ‘tis said, that water kept suspended in a sucking Pump, is not in its natural place, as that is, which is Stagnant in the Well. We say also, that Wicked Men are still in the state of Nature; but the Regenerate, in a state of Grace: That Cures wrought by Medicines, are Natural Operations; but the miraculous ones, wrought by Christ and his Apostles, were Supernatural. Nor are these the only Forms of Speech, that a more diligent Collector, than I think it necessary I should here be, might instance in, to manifest the Ambiguity of the word Nature, by the many and various things ‘tis applied to signifie; tho’ some of those already mentioned, should be judged too near to be co-incident. Among Latin Writers I found the acceptions of the word Nature to be so many, that I remember, one Author reckons up no less than fourteen or fifteen. From all which ‘tis not difficult to gather, how easie ‘tis for the generality of Men, without excepting those that write of Natural Things, to impose upon others and themselves, in the use of a word so apt to be mis-imploy’d.
On this occasion I can scarce forbear to tell you, that I have often look’d upon it as an unhappy thing, and prejudicial both to Philosophy and Physick; that the word Nature hath been so frequently, and yet so unskilfully imploy’d, both in Books and in Discourse, by all sorts of Men, Learned and Illiterate. For the very great Ambiguity of this term, and the promiscuous use Men are wont to make of it, without sufficiently attending to its different Significations, makes many of the Expressions wherein they imploy it, (and think they do it well and truly) to be either not intelligible, or not proper, or not true: Which Observation, tho’ it be not heeded, may, with the help of a little attention, be easily verified; especially because the Term Nature is so often used, that you shall scarce meet with any Man, who, if he have occasion to discourse any thing long of either Natural or Medicinal Subjects, would not find himself at a great loss, if he were prohibited the use of the word Nature, and of those Phrases whereof it makes the principal part. And I confess I could heartily wish, that Philosophers, and other Learned Men (whom the rest in time would follow) would by common (tho’ perhaps Tacite) consent, introduce some more Significant, and less ambiguous Terms and Expressions in the room of the too licenciously abused word Nature, and the Forms of Speech that depend on it. Or would, at least, decline the use of it, as much as conveniently they can; and where they think they must imploy it, would· add a word or two, to declare in what clear and determinate sense they use it. For without somewhat of this kind be done, Men will very hardly avoid being led into divers mistakes, both of things, and of one another; & such wranglings about Words and Names, will be (if not continually multiplied) still kept on foot, as are wont to be manag’d with much heat, tho’ little use, and no necessity.
And here I must take leave to complain, in my own excuse, of the scarce superable Difficulty of the Task, that the design of a Free Inquiry puts me upon. For ‘tis far more difficult than any one that hath not try’d, (and I do not know that any Man hath,) would imagine, to Discourse long of the Corporeal Works of God, and especially of the Operations and Phaenomena’s that are attributed to Nature, and yet decline making oftentimes use of that Term, or Forms of Speech whereof ‘tis a main part; without much more frequent, and perhaps tedious, Circumlocutions; than I am willing to trouble you with. And therefore I hope you will easily excuse me, if, partly to shun these, and to avoid using often the same words too near one another, and partly out of unwillingness to imploy Vulgar Terms, likely to occasion or countenance Vulgar Errors; I have several times been fain to use Paraphrases or other Expressions, less short than those commonly received: And sometimes for one or other of these Reasons, or out of Inadvertence, miss’d of avoiding the Terms used by those, that admit and applaud the Vulgar Notion of Nature: whom, I must here advertise you, that partly because they do so, and partly for brevity’s sake, I shall hereafter many times call, Naturists: Which Appellation I rather chuse than that of Naturalists; because, many, even of the Learned among them, as Logicians, Orators, Lawyers, Arithmeticians, &c. are not Physiologers.
But if on this occasion you should be very urgent to know, what Course I would think expedient, if I were to propose any, for the avoiding the Inconvenient use of so Ambiguous a Word, as Nature: I should first put you in mind, that, having but very lately declar’d, that I thought it very difficult, in Physiological Discourses especially, to decline the frequent of that Term; you are not to expect from me the satisfaction you may desire in an Answer. And then I would add, that yet my unwillingness to be altogether silent, when you require me to say somewhat, makes me content to try, whether the mischief complain’d of, may not be in some measure either obviated or lessen’d, by looking back upon the (Eight) various significations, that were not long since deliver’d of the Word Nature, and by endeavouring to express them in other Terms, or Forms of Speech.
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Instead then of the Word Nature taken in the first sense, [for Natura Naturans,] we may make use of the Term ‘tis put to signifie, namely, God; wholly discarding an Expression, which, besides that ‘tis harsh and needless, and in use only among the School-men, seems not to me very suitable to the profound Reverence we owe the Divine Majesty; since it seems to make the Creator differ too little by far from a Created (not to say an Imaginary) Being.
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Instead of Nature in the second sense, [for, That on whose account a Thing is what it is, and is so call’d,] we may imploy the Word Essence, which is of great Affinity to it, if not of an adequate import. And sometimes also we may make use of the Word Quiddity, which, though a somewhat Barbarous Term, is yet frequently imploy’d, and well enough understood, in the Schools; and, which is more considerable, is very comprehensive, and yet free enough from Ambiguity.
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What is meant by the Word Nature taken in the third sense of it, [for, what belongs to a living Creature at its Nativity, or accrues to it by its Birth,] may be express’d sometimes, by saying, that a Man or other Animal is Born so; and sometimes by saying, that a Thing has been Generated such; and sometimes also, that ‘tis thus or thus Qualifi’d by its Original Temperament and Constitution.
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Instead of the Word Nature taken in the fourth Acception [for, an Internal Principle of Local Motion] we may say sometimes, that this or that Body Moves as it were, or else that it seems to Move, spontaneously (or of its own accord) upwards, downwards, &c. or, that ‘tis put into this or that Motion, or determin’d to this or that Action, by the concourse of such or such (proper) Causes.
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For Nature in the fifth signification, [for, the establish’d course of Things Corporeal] ‘tis easie to substitute what it denotes, the establish’d Order, or the setled Course of Things.
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Instead of Nature in the sixth sense of the Word [for, as Aggregate of the Powers belonging to a Body, especially a Living one] we may imploy the Constitution, Temperament, or the Mechanism, or the Complex of the Essential Properties or Qualities, and sometimes the Condition, the Structure, or the Texture of that Body. And if we speak of the greater Portions of the World, we may make use of one or other of these Terms, Fabrick of the World, System of the Vniverse, Cosmical Mechanism, or the like.
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Where Men are wont to imploy the Word Nature in the seventh sense [for, the Vniverse, or the Systeme of the Corporeal Works of God] ‘tis easie, and as short, to make use of the Word World or Vniverse; and instead of the Phaenomena of Nature to substitute the Phaenomena of the Vniverse, or of the World.
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And, as for the Word Nature taken in the eighth and last of the fore-mention’d Acceptions [for, either (as some Pagans styl’d Her) a Goddess, or a kind of Semi-Deity] the best way is not to imploy it in that sense at all; or at least as seldom as may be, and that for divers Reasons, which may in due place be met with in several Parts of this Essay.
But though the foregoing Diversity of Terms and Phrases may be much increas’d, yet I confess it makes but a part of the Remedy, I propose, against the future mischiefs of the confus’d Acception of the Word Nature, and the Phrases grounded on it. For besides the Synonymous Words, and more literal Interpretations lately propos’d, a dextrous Writer may oftentimes be able to give such a Form (or, as the Modern Frenchmen speak, such a Tour) to his manyways variable Expressions, as to avoid the necessity of making use of the Word Nature; or sometimes so much as of those shorter Terms, that have been lately substituted in its place. And to all this I must add, that though one or two of the eight fore-mention’d Terms or Phrases, as Quiddity and Cosmical Mechanism, be Barbarous or Ungenteel; and some other expressions be less short than the Word Nature: Yet ‘tis more the Interest of Philosophy to tolerate a harsh Term, that has been long received in the Schools in a determinate sense, and bear with some Paraphrastical Expressions, than not to avoid an Ambiguity that is liable to such great inconveniences as have been lately, or may be hereafter, represented.
There are, I know, some Learned Men, who, (perhaps being startled to find Nature usually spoken of so much like a kind of Goddess,) will have the Nature of every thing, to be only the Law that it receives from the Creator, and according to which it acts on all occasions. And this Opinion seems much of kin to, if not the same with, that of the famous Helmont, who justly rejecting the Aristotelian Tenent of the Contrariety or Hostility of the Elements, will have every Body, without any such respect, to act that which ‘tis commanded to act. And indeed this Opinion about Nature, though neither clear nor comprehensive enough, seems capable of a fair Construction. And there is oftentimes some resemblance between the orderly and regular Motions of inanimate Bodies, and the Actions of Agents, that, in what they do act, conformably to Laws. And even I sometimes scruple not, to speak of the Laws of Motion and Rest, that God has establish’d among things Corporeal, and now and then, (for brevities sake, or out of Custom) to call them, as Men are wont to do, the Laws of Nature: Having in due place declar’d, in what sense I understand and imploy these Expressions.
But to speak strictly, (as becomes Philosophers in so weighty a matter) to say that the Nature of this or that Body, is but the Law of God prescrib’d to it, is but an improper and figurative Expression. For, besides that this gives us but a very defective Idea of Nature, since it omits the general Fabrick of the World, and the Contrivances of particular Bodies, which yet are as well necessary as Local Motion itself, to the production of particular Effects and Phaenomena’s; besides this, I say, and other imperfections of this Notion of Nature, that I shall not here insist on, I must freely observe, that, to speak properly, a Law being but a Notional Rule of Acting according to the declar’d Will of a Superior, ‘tis plain, that nothing but an Intellectual Being can be properly capable of receiving and acting by a Law. For if it does not understand, it cannot know what the Will of the Legislator is; nor can it have any Intention to accomplish it, nor can it act with regard to it; or know, when it does, in Acting, either conform to it or deviate from it. And ‘tis intelligible to me, that God should at the Beginning impress determinate Motions upon the Parts of Matter, and guide them, as he thought requisite, for the Primordial Constitution of Things: and that ever since he should, by his ordinary and general Concourse, maintain those Powers, which he gave the Parts of Matter, to transmit their Motion thus and thus to one another. But I cannot conceive, how a Body, devoid of understanding and sense, truly so call’d, can moderate and determine its own Motions; especially so, as to make them conformable to Laws, that it has no knowledg or apprehension of. And that Inanimate Bodies, how strictly soever call’d Natural, do properly act by Laws, cannot be evinc’d by their sometimes acting Regularly, and, as Men think, in order to determinate Ends: Since in Artificial things we see many Motions very orderly perform’d, and with a manifest Tendency to particular and pre-design’d Ends; as in a Watch, the Motions of the Spring, Wheels and other parts, are so contemperated and regulated, that the Hand upon the Dyal moves with a great Uniformity, and seems to moderate its Motion, so as not to arrive at the Points, that denote the time of the day, either a minute sooner, or a minute later, than it should do, to declare the hour. And when a Man shoots an Arrow at a Mark, so as to hit it, though the Arrow moves towards the Mark, as it would if it could and did design to strike it, yet none will say, that this Arrow moves by a Law, but by an External, tho’ well directed, Impulse.