And here I must take leave to complain, in my own excuse, of the scarce superable Difficulty of the Task, that the design of a Free Inquiry puts me upon. For ‘tis far more difficult than any one that hath not try’d, (and I do not know that any Man hath,) would imagine, to Discourse long of the Corporeal Works of God, and especially of the Operations and Phaenomena’s that are attributed to Nature, and yet decline making oftentimes use of that Term, or Forms of Speech whereof ‘tis a main part; without much more frequent, and perhaps tedious, Circumlocutions; than I am willing to trouble you with. And therefore I hope you will easily excuse me, if, partly to shun these, and to avoid using often the same words too near one another, and partly out of unwillingness to imploy Vulgar Terms, likely to occasion or countenance Vulgar Errors; I have several times been fain to use Paraphrases or other Expressions, less short than those commonly received: And sometimes for one or other of these Reasons, or out of Inadvertence, miss’d of avoiding the Terms used by those, that admit and applaud the Vulgar Notion of Nature: whom, I must here advertise you, that partly because they do so, and partly for brevity’s sake, I shall hereafter many times call, Naturists: Which Appellation I rather chuse than that of Naturalists; because, many, even of the Learned among them, as Logicians, Orators, Lawyers, Arithmeticians, &c. are not Physiologers.

But if on this occasion you should be very urgent to know, what Course I would think expedient, if I were to propose any, for the avoiding the Inconvenient use of so Ambiguous a Word, as Nature: I should first put you in mind, that, having but very lately declar’d, that I thought it very difficult, in Physiological Discourses especially, to decline the frequent of that Term; you are not to expect from me the satisfaction you may desire in an Answer. And then I would add, that yet my unwillingness to be altogether silent, when you require me to say somewhat, makes me content to try, whether the mischief complain’d of, may not be in some measure either obviated or lessen’d, by looking back upon the (Eight) various significations, that were not long since deliver’d of the Word Nature, and by endeavouring to express them in other Terms, or Forms of Speech.

1. Instead then of the Word Nature taken in the first sense, [for Natura Naturans,] we may make use of the Term ‘tis put to signifie, namely, God; wholly discarding an Expression, which, besides that ‘tis harsh and needless, and in use only among the School-men, seems not to me very suitable to the profound Reverence we owe the Divine Majesty; since it seems to make the Creator differ too little by far from a Created (not to say an Imaginary) Being.

2. Instead of Nature in the second sense, [for, That on whose account a Thing is what it is, and is so call’d,] we may imploy the Word Essence, which is of great Affinity to it, if not of an adequate import. And sometimes also we may make use of the Word Quiddity, which, though a somewhat Barbarous Term, is yet frequently imploy’d, and well enough understood, in the Schools; and, which is more considerable, is very comprehensive, and yet free enough from Ambiguity.

3. What is meant by the Word Nature taken in the third sense of it, [for, what belongs to a living Creature at its Nativity, or accrues to it by its Birth,] may be express’d sometimes, by saying, that a Man or other Animal is Born so; and sometimes by saying, that a Thing has been Generated such; and sometimes also, that ‘tis thus or thus Qualifi’d by its Original Temperament and Constitution.

4. Instead of the Word Nature taken in the fourth Acception [for, an Internal Principle of Local Motion] we may say sometimes, that this or that Body Moves as it were, or else that it seems to Move, spontaneously (or of its own accord) upwards, downwards, &c. or, that ‘tis put into this or that Motion, or determin’d to this or that Action, by the concourse of such or such (proper) Causes.

5. For Nature in the fifth signification, [for, the establish’d course of Things Corporeal] ‘tis easie to substitute what it denotes, the establish’d Order, or the setled Course of Things.

6. Instead of Nature in the sixth sense of the Word [for, as Aggregate of the Powers belonging to a Body, especially a Living one] we may imploy the Constitution, Temperament, or the Mechanism, or the Complex of the Essential Properties or Qualities, and sometimes the Condition, the Structure, or the Texture of that Body. And if we speak of the greater Portions of the World, we may make use of one or other of these Terms, Fabrick of the World, System of the Vniverse, Cosmical Mechanism, or the like.

7. Where Men are wont to imploy the Word Nature in the seventh sense [for, the Vniverse, or the Systeme of the Corporeal Works of God] ‘tis easie, and as short, to make use of the Word World or Vniverse; and instead of the Phaenomena of Nature to substitute the Phaenomena of the Vniverse, or of the World.

8. And, as for the Word Nature taken in the eighth and last of the fore-mention’d Acceptions [for, either (as some Pagans styl’d Her) a Goddess, or a kind of Semi-Deity] the best way is not to imploy it in that sense at all; or at least as seldom as may be, and that for divers Reasons, which may in due place be met with in several Parts of this Essay.

But though the foregoing Diversity of Terms and Phrases may be much increas’d, yet I confess it makes but a part of the Remedy, I propose, against the future mischiefs of the confus’d Acception of the Word Nature, and the Phrases grounded on it. For besides the Synonymous Words, and more literal Interpretations lately propos’d, a dextrous Writer may oftentimes be able to give such a Form (or, as the Modern Frenchmen speak, such a Tour) to his manyways variable Expressions, as to avoid the necessity of making use of the Word Nature; or sometimes so much as of those shorter Terms, that have been lately substituted in its place. And to all this I must add, that though one or two of the eight fore-mention’d Terms or Phrases, as Quiddity and Cosmical Mechanism, be Barbarous or Ungenteel; and some other expressions be less short than the Word Nature: Yet ‘tis more the Interest of Philosophy to tolerate a harsh Term, that has been long received in the Schools in a determinate sense, and bear with some Paraphrastical Expressions, than not to avoid an Ambiguity that is liable to such great inconveniences as have been lately, or may be hereafter, represented.

There are, I know, some Learned Men, who, (perhaps being startled to find Nature usually spoken of so much like a kind of Goddess,) will have the Nature of every thing, to be only the Law that it receives from the Creator, and according to which it acts on all occasions. And this Opinion seems much of kin to, if not the same with, that of the famous Helmont, who justly rejecting the Aristotelian Tenent of the Contrariety or Hostility of the Elements, will have every Body, without any such respect, to act that which ‘tis commanded to act. And indeed this Opinion about Nature, though neither clear nor comprehensive enough, seems capable of a fair Construction. And there is oftentimes some resemblance between the orderly and regular Motions of inanimate Bodies, and the Actions of Agents, that, in what they do act, conformably to Laws. And even I sometimes scruple not, to speak of the Laws of Motion and Rest, that God has establish’d among things Corporeal, and now and then, (for brevities sake, or out of Custom) to call them, as Men are wont to do, the Laws of Nature: Having in due place declar’d, in what sense I understand and imploy these Expressions.

But to speak strictly, (as becomes Philosophers in so weighty a matter) to say that the Nature of this or that Body, is but the Law of God prescrib’d to it, is but an improper and figurative Expression. For, besides that this gives us but a very defective Idea of Nature, since it omits the general Fabrick of the World, and the Contrivances of particular Bodies, which yet are as well necessary as Local Motion itself, to the production of particular Effects and Phaenomena’s; besides this, I say, and other imperfections of this Notion of Nature, that I shall not here insist on, I must freely observe, that, to speak properly, a Law being but a Notional Rule of Acting according to the declar’d Will of a Superior, ‘tis plain, that nothing but an Intellectual Being can be properly capable of receiving and acting by a Law. For if it does not understand, it cannot know what the Will of the Legislator is; nor can it have any Intention to accomplish it, nor can it act with regard to it; or know, when it does, in Acting, either conform to it or deviate from it. And ‘tis intelligible to me, that God should at the Beginning impress determinate Motions upon the Parts of Matter, and guide them, as he thought requisite, for the Primordial Constitution of Things: and that ever since he should, by his ordinary and general Concourse, maintain those Powers, which he gave the Parts of Matter, to transmit their Motion thus and thus to one another. But I cannot conceive, how a Body, devoid of understanding and sense, truly so call’d, can moderate and determine its own Motions; especially so, as to make them conformable to Laws, that it has no knowledg or apprehension of. And that Inanimate Bodies, how strictly soever call’d Natural, do properly act by Laws, cannot be evinc’d by their sometimes acting Regularly, and, as Men think, in order to determinate Ends: Since in Artificial things we see many Motions very orderly perform’d, and with a manifest Tendency to particular and pre-design’d Ends; as in a Watch, the Motions of the Spring, Wheels and other parts, are so contemperated and regulated, that the Hand upon the Dyal moves with a great Uniformity, and seems to moderate its Motion, so as not to arrive at the Points, that denote the time of the day, either a minute sooner, or a minute later, than it should do, to declare the hour. And when a Man shoots an Arrow at a Mark, so as to hit it, though the Arrow moves towards the Mark, as it would if it could and did design to strike it, yet none will say, that this Arrow moves by a Law, but by an External, tho’ well directed, Impulse.

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