Part Second. The Doctrine of Reconciliation through Christ

26. The idea of the perfect common good included in the conception of the kingdom of God, and the idea of personal goodness included in our conception of God and in our view of Jesus Christ, lay the foundation in the Christian community for a corresponding idea of evil and sin. Every one judges himself by this idea, in so far as he stands in reciprocal relation to the world, i.e., to that structure of human society which in all conceivable varying degrees is in contradiction to the good as recognized in Christianity.¹

27. The task of the kingdom of God is assigned to the members of the Christian community, their capacity for good in general being presupposed from the revelation of the love of God in Christ, and from its special effect upon them (§ 13). But it must be remembered that the kingdom of God, in so far as the Christian community is active in its realization (§ 5, 3), is in process of growth, and that it is therefore at all points mingled with the opposing currents of the evil springing up on every side from the merely natural impulse of the human will. Therefore, while every one born of Christian parents is born into the community of Christ, he is at the same time put into connection with evil, against which his natural will as such does not contend.² Sins are evil volitions, but they are also the corresponding intentions, habitual inclinations and dispositions, in so far as these are contrary to the intended union of men into the kingdom of God, or are in opposition to the moral law of Christ (§ 6, 4), or run counter to the glory of God³ (§ 11, 2), and not only so but also in so far as they manifest in varying degrees a lack of reverence and a lack of trust in God.⁴

28. The possibility and probability of sinning, and this only, can be derived from the fact that the human will, which is to decide for the recognized good, is a constantly growing power, whose activity also is not from the first accompanied by a complete knowledge of the good. A universal necessity of sinning can be derived neither from the natural endowment of man, nor from the idea that sin is adapted to further his moral development, nor, least of all, from a discernible purpose of God.⁵ The fact of universal sin on the part of man is established, in accordance with experience, by the fact that the impulse to the unrestrained exercise of freedom, with which every one comes into the world, meets the manifold attractions to self-seeking, which arise out of the sin of society. Therefore, it comes to pass that in every one some degree of self-seeking takes form, even before the clearness of common self-consciousness is awakened in him.

29. Sins, in particular, are actions or volitions which, as unmannerliness [Unart], immorality, careless or intentional wrong, crime, come into conflict with increasingly severe social and legal restrictions. For at the same time they oppose the highest law of good. But actions and dispositions which follow an end justifiable in a narrower sphere (§ 57, 3), but follow it in such a way as to come into conflict with higher common ends, are also sins. On the other hand, we recognize various degrees of sin, in a comparison between a single action and a propensity to or a habit of sinning, between a carelessly and a wilfully sinful act, between a character still in the process of development and one already developed, between prudent self-seeking, unbridled passion, vice, insolence, malice. Although all these forms of sin are alike in their opposition to the good, yet they are different in the degree in which they are detrimental to it, and in the possibility still existing of improvement and change.⁶

30. The united action of many individuals in these forms of sin leads to a re-enforcement of the same in common customs and principles, in standing immoralities, and even in evil institutions. So there comes to be an almost irresistible power of temptation⁷ for those who with characters yet undeveloped are so much the more exposed to evil example because they do not see through the network of enticements to evil. Accordingly, the kingdom of sin, or the (immoral human) world,⁸ is re-enforced in every new generation. United sin, this opposite of the kingdom of God, rests upon all as a power⁹ which at least limits the freedom of the individual to good.¹⁰ This limitation of the freedom of the individual by his own sin and by connection with the common condition of the world is, taken strictly, a lack of freedom to good. This, however, outside of the kingdom of God, is the common condition of all men, because even the partial good is only assured in its kind through the existence of the whole.

31. It is true that the full extent of the existence and guilt of sin appears only from a comparison of the same with the task of the kingdom of God (§ 26). Yet its character, as contrary to the destiny of man, to the freedom of the will and to the commands of God, is made evident in all the preceding grades of moral development through a self-condemnation, which arising everywhere as an act of the individual, grows into a common conviction. The kernel of all individual as well as common condemnation of evil is the feeling of guilt, as an expression of the individual accountability included in the freedom of the will. This feeling of guilt is a witness to the fact that even the single sinful act does not by any means come to an end with the act, but continues to work as a disordering or perversion of moral freedom, and to the further fact that the consciousness of an opposite destiny, which consciousness is necessary to freedom, maintains itself in spite of the sinful action and desire. The feeling of guilt, in the form of this unavoidable judgment of condemnation, springs from the conscience,¹¹ the presence of which in every man is to be counted upon as long as he has a measure of free-will in connection with his sin. To be sure, the feeling of guilt as such has not the power to undo the sin, or to limit the continuance or increase of the sinful propensity. On the other hand, it is in many cases the occasion of a stubborn maintaining of the propensity, or of an increased rejection of, or, at least, aversion to the authority of God. In yet worse cases, through the growth of the sinful propensity, the conscience itself is weakened, and the feeling of guilt in extreme wickedness is practically lost. Yet it is not consistent with regard for human worth to admit even in those apparently most hardened the complete absence of this manifestation, and thus the impossibility of repentance.

32. By evils we mean natural events which, proceeding partly from the course of nature, partly from the operation of man, limit the exercise of our freedom in the attainment of our purposes. In part evils are, directly or indirectly, the result of sin. But the view of the prechristian world, which regarded great common misfortunes as divine punishments, and therefore as necessarily the result of unusual transgression against the gods, and the corresponding principle that all evils without exception are consequences of personal sins and are divine punishments, are in part out of harmony with experience and in part contrary to the view of the world set forth by Christ.¹² For, in general, the estimate of evil by different men varies according to their strength of will or their habit, and is therefore subjectively conditioned. And on the other hand, Christianity teaches us to recognize that through our very devotion to our faith we necessarily draw suffering upon ourselves, which is the result of our coming into collision with actual historical forces (§ 18, 6). The Christian view of the world differs therefore from the heathen and Jewish manner of judgment, in that tenderness of feeling which prevents us from considering a man’s personal sufferings as divine punishments.¹³ Thus finally it follows that the Christian regards death, even though it may have entered the world as a universal decree in consequence of the first sin of man,¹⁴ not as a punishment of his personal sin, nor as at all the specific hindrance to his communion with God, and to salvation, and therefore not as the greatest evil.¹⁵

33. Speaking strictly, the misfortunes which come upon any one can only be determined by himself to be divine punishments for sin, when he so reckons them to himself because of a feeling of guilt. This is true both in case one has through redemption attained to trust in God (§ 51), and also in case of defiance toward God. Still worse indeed is the condition of a sinner who regards deserved misfortunes as an injustice, or who connects with his experience no thought of a divine government of the world. So far the analogy holds between the punishments inflicted by God and those decreed by human law. In both cases the lessening of privilege consequent upon the unjustifiable extension of it is seen in evident misfortunes. But punishment in the religious relation to God, apart from external misfortunes, is the lessening or loss of the communion with God designed or desired. Accordingly, the continuance of unforgiven guilt, whether felt more or less strongly or even not at all, is to be regarded as divine punishment in the fullest sense, as the real condemnation, in so far as it is connected with that lack of trust in God which gives expression to separation from God (§ 27, 3).

34. As a member of the Christian community one is called to the kingdom of God as man’s highest good and highest common duty (§ 5), because this is the final purpose of God Himself (§ 13). At the same time, however, by the very recognition of this calling, there comes an increase of the feeling of guilt, and of the separation from God which arises from our own sin and our connection with the common sin. Thus Christianity seems to require of us a self-contradictory judgment of ourselves, but at the same time it does away with this contradiction in bringing the certainty of a God-given redemption.

35. Redemption in Christianity has not only an exclusively inner significance, but also a universally religious significance. It follows, from the first particular, that we are not to understand by redemption, as in the Old Testament, the removal of social misfortune, especially political dependence upon foreign nations, to say nothing of the establishment of economic prosperity.¹⁶ From the second particular it follows that redemption does not refer directly to the setting aside of the condition of sin which dominates the individual.¹⁷ For while this condition is common to all, it is also something distinctive in each individual, and can therefore be contended against and set aside directly only by means of individual opposition in the form of voluntary determination, after one has experienced for himself religious redemption. This religious redemption denotes in Christianity forgiveness of sins or pardon, through which the guilt which separates man from God is removed, provided that with the feeling of guilt is joined neither indifference to nor defiance of God.¹⁸

36. The forgiveness of sins or justification [Gerechtsprechung (Rechtfertigung)], which guarantees the existence of the Christian community (§ 38), is, as a divine purpose of grace, a matter of free judgment. That is to say (without taking up at present the conditions to be considered in §§ 39–44), sinners are given by God the right to enter into communion with Him, and into co-operation with His own final purpose, the kingdom of God, without their guilt and their feeling of guilt forming a hindrance thereto.¹⁹ The freedom and independence of this divine judgment consist in this, that on the part of men so situated no moral work (merit), which might call forth this judgment of God or actually establish it, is conceivable. On the contrary, this judgment needs only religious faith,²⁰ or confidence in the free grace or righteousness of God (§ 16, 5), in order to become actual and effective.

37. With the forgiveness of sins, pardon, justification, coincide the more specific conceptions of reconciliation with God and adoption as His children. These merely add something individual. Thus in reconciliation the forgiveness of sins appears no longer merely as the purpose of God, but also as the result purposed. According to the conception of reconciliation with God the individual has in faith and trust appropriated to himself the final purpose of God (kingdom of God), and given up his enmity against God.²¹ In adoption (acceptance as children of God) the gracious purpose of the judgment of forgiveness or justification is carried into effect, so that God places Himself in the relation of Father to the believer, and gives him the right to the full confidence of a child.²² These effects of divine redemption, however, find practical application only on the condition that the believer takes at once an active part in the recognized purpose of the kingdom of God, and has given up the following of selfish ends and inclinations, whether intentional or habitual.²³

38. The forgiveness of sins, or reconciliation, as the common fundamental condition of the Christian community is as essential to its peculiar character as is the fact of its being called to realize the kingdom of God, or as is the impulse to this work implied in this calling, and it is within the community that the individual member appropriates to himself this gift of forgiveness.²⁴ It is a going back to the point of view of the Old Testament religion, or a falling back into the Catholic conception of the matter, to preach forgiveness of sins merely to individuals as such, in relation to their personal feeling of guilt and their need as thus measured, or as a good ever yet to be attained.²⁵

39. Forgiveness of sins cannot be inferred as necessary from any universally established conception of God.²⁶ As the positive fundamental condition of the Christian community, it is rather to be gained from the positive Christian conception of God. Therefore its validity (§ 38) is made dependent upon the peculiar work of Christ (§ 19).

40. Redemption or forgiveness of sins is not assured to the Christian community by Christ’s making as Prophet and thus as the Revealer of God (§ 20) a universal promise to that effect, which is just what He did not do.²⁷ But rather He Himself beforehand, and the earliest witnesses after Him, connected this result with the fact of His death. And this takes place in so far as His death is capable of comparison with the Old Testament sacrifices,²⁸ which in accordance with the grace of God were offered for the whole Israelitish community, partly to indicate their own entrance into the covenant with God, and partly to serve in yearly repetition for the forgiveness of sins, i.e., to maintain the integrity of the covenant.²⁹

41. The death of Christ has the value of the covenant-offering and the universal sin-offering, not because of the fact that His enemies put Him to death, but because of the fact that He obediently yielded Himself to this fate as in the providence of God a certain result of His special mission.³⁰ This significance of the death of Christ is also expressed in the double fact that in the completing of His life-work He represented both the priest and the sacrifice.³¹ Therefore we may regard His death as a sacrifice offered for the purpose of bringing forgiveness to His community only in so far as we connect Him with the offering of the sacrifice, or with the priestly self-devotion which fills His whole life-activity.³²

42. The obedience of Christ to His calling can be interpreted as a gift to God or as a sacrifice and priestly service, because His righteous life, His patience and His truth [Wahrheitreden] were the result not only of His divine mission but also of His free consecration of Himself to God. For by this obedience to His calling He maintained the special fellowship of love between God and Himself.³³ Now this obedience to His calling He rendered not only for His own sake, but at the same time necessarily for the purpose of bringing mankind into the same relation toward God as their Father which He occupied.³⁴ For this very purpose He accepted with patience and resignation to God’s will increased sufferings and even death as a proof of His fellowship with God. And finally He did all this in such a way as to prove the genuineness of His fellowship with God, and the possibility of a similar fellowship for all. In these respects, therefore, He, as the royal Priest, represented the community before God for the purpose of its complete establishment.³⁵

43. If we now compare the fact of the existing community of Christ to which we ourselves belong with His purpose in its foundation and with the priestly significance of His life and suffering even unto death, there appears clearly in His death, i.e., in the completion of His life from the point of view of sacrifice, a pointing to the analogy between it and the Old Testament types. For the universal meaning of the symbolic actions performed by the ministering priest, in order to the acceptance of the sacrifice by God, is rightly interpreted by Peter, when he says, in speaking of Christ, that thereby believers are led to God,³⁶ are brought near to Him in the sacrifice.³⁷ This bringing near of men is necessary in the case of the community to be founded by Christ, because they are originally separated from God by their sin and feeling of guilt. Therefore, the sacrificial act of Christ’s priestly completion of His life-work serves to bestow upon the new community the divine forgiveness of sins, just in so far as He as their intentional representative changes this separation of man from God into fellowship with Him as their Father.

44. Christ’s victory over the world through patience in the suffering made necessary by His calling is not only a mark of His Godhood in His office of revealer (§§ 23, 24), but is also the mark of the completeness of His work as priestly representative of the community to be brought to God through Him. The same obedience of Christ to His calling, which fills all His life and is perfected in His death, is thought of from two contrasted points of view, from that of His royal prophetic office, the representing of God to men (§§ 20–24), and from that of His royal priesthood, the representing of men (as His community) before God (§§ 40–43). Of these two sides of His calling (or offices) the latter is, it is true, subordinate to the former. But in this double value of His life Christ is the mediator of the highest conceivable fellowship between God and man.³⁸

45. The peculiar nature of the community founded by Christ does not conform to the value of His life as the representative and revealer of God and therefore Himself God,³⁹ for in this relation Christ stands in contrast to the community. But the character of the community, reconciled to God and of every individual in it who appropriates to himself justification through faith in Christ,⁴⁰ corresponds rather to Christ’s position as representative of the community in relation to God and the world. As His dignity as Son of God is peculiar to Him for the very reason that He sacrifices His life for the sake of the community,⁴¹ so the adoption as children belongs to the members of His community as a result of the reconciliation with God (§ 37, 2). As His patience in suffering and death establishes His dominion over the world for the sake of His believers, so faith in Christ includes in itself spiritual dominion over the world,⁴² i.e., eternal life or spiritual freedom.⁴³ sumus sacerdotes et reges, quicunque in Christum credimus (1 Pet. ii. 9).—Quod ad regnum pertinet, quilibet Christianus per fidem sic magnificatur super omnia, ut spirituali potentia prorsus omnium dominus sit, ita ut nulla omnino rerum possit ei quidquam nocere, imo omnia subjecta ei cogantur servire ad salutem (Rom. viii. 28; 1 Cor. iii. 21-23).—Potentia haec spiritualis est: quae dominatur in medio inimicorum et potens est in mediis pressuris. Ecce haec est Christianorum inaestimabilis potentia et libertas. Nec solum reges omnium liberrimi, sed sacerdotes quoque sumus in aeternum, quod digni sumus coram deo apparere, pro aliis orare, et nos invicem ea, quae dei sunt, docere. —Per sacerdotalem gloriam apud deum omnia potest, quia deus facit, quae ipse petit. Ex iis clare videre potest quilibet, quo modo christianus homo liber est ab omnibus et super omnia, ita ut nullis operibus ad hoc indigeat, ut justus et salvus sit, sed sola fides hoc largitur abunde.”—In this interpretation of the freedom founded on faith we find the specific difference between Catholicism and Protestantism. Catholicism prescribes in its place the “timor filialis,” the continued anxiety lest one offend God by transgression. This anxious fear before the law-giver corresponds to the whole Catholic system, and holds men in slavery beneath the structure of supposed guarantees of salvation, which reach their culmination in an infallible pope. The Protestant, on the other hand, lives in reverent trust in God our Father, which imparts courage to strive after the righteousness of God, and needs no other guarantee than the grace of God revealed in the man Christ Jesus (Rom. v. 15).

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