Part Third. The Doctrine of the Christian Life

46. The individual believer within the Christian community does not appropriate to himself the call to the kingdom of God and reconciliation or acceptance as a child of God, without at the same time experiencing these effects of grace as motives to a corresponding personal activity.¹ Thus, conversely, in the religious estimate of our whole life-work, which corresponds to these motives, we recognise everything good in us as the effect of divine grace.² The agreement of these impulses with the purpose of God and their similarity in different individuals is effected and assured by the Holy Spirit in the community.³ That is to say, the impulse to right conduct, i.e., to fulfilling the task belonging to the kingdom of God, and the impulse to the practical proof of sonship with God, have their criterion in the knowledge of God as our Father which is given us in Christianity. The Christian knowledge of God, however, springing from positive revelation, is congruent with God’s knowledge of Himself. Hence, seen from the divine point of view, the development of the Christian community, resulting from the exercise of love in accordance with this knowledge of God, is a part of the divine self-revelation (§ 13, 2). From these considerations it appears that the common Spirit through which the members of the community win their like knowledge of God, and hence their like impulses toward the kingdom of God and toward sonship with God, is God’s Holy Spirit.⁴

47. Practical proof of sonship with God in spiritual freedom and dominion over the world, and labour for the kingdom of God, fill out the Christian life, which, in contrast with the implied [vorausgesetzt] sinful state, is a new creation of God.⁵ It is as certain that these two activities stand in reciprocal relation to one another (§ 37, 3) as that the ends and motives in both cases have the same supramundane level. The correlation of these activities, the first religious and the second ethical, is evident in the fact that the religious duty of dominion over the world calls for the same effort of the will as the ethical duty belonging to the kingdom of God, and that this latter includes in itself religious elevation above the world. The unity of this double life-purpose is evident in the joy or blessedness springing out of them both.⁶ This is the feeling of religious-ethical perfection.⁷ In so far, then, as blessedness is expected in the Christian life, the possibility is therein admitted of that perfection which, in the two directions of striving after the kingdom of God and its righteousness and of exercising freedom over the world, is set before us as our task.

48. It is, of course, true that the series of obligatory actions in which we can represent to ourselves our life-work remains always incomplete, because in thought such a series can be carried on endlessly, and also because its individual parts can be crowded closer and closer together. In reality, therefore, it is not the consideration of the actual continuance of sin,⁸ but this external quantitative conception of the Christian’s life-work, which is the ground of the traditional assertion that incompleteness of good works is unavoidable, and the possibility of Christian perfection therefore out of the question. Nevertheless, in spite of the unavoidable incompleteness of human conduct, the fact that we are called to personal perfection must be maintained, since it conforms to the qualitative judgment of the religious-ethical life as of something complete in its kind [ein Ganzes in seiner Art]. Now the conception of a whole signifies that the component parts of an organic existence are in a special way united by a common end. In accordance with this conception, Christian perfection consists in the accomplishing of the ethical life-work,⁹ and in the developing of ethical and religious character.¹⁰ In this it is included that one will act for the end of the kingdom of God in a special ethical calling,¹¹ and will show his sonship with God and his dominion over the world in the special conditions of life in which he is placed.

49. The striving against and suppression of selfish impulses and habits are included in sanctification or the formation of Christian character.¹² The task here is not the rooting out of any impulse or affection, but its ennobling and purification by the opposing force of moral principles (§ 72). This task cannot and should not be accomplished by special thought or special ascetic practices, before the beginning of right action or the attainment of the positive virtues. The similar attempt of monasticism to avoid certain temptations to sin by a separation from the fundamental institutions of human society is also a mistake. For evil inclinations and habits are rendered ineffective only by the development of contrasting good inclinations and habits, while virtues are produced only by the reaction of dutiful or righteous action upon the will itself.¹³ Therefore the Christian duty of perfection is recognized alongside of the continual consciousness of sinfulness, in the command to strive for the common good with the idea that as a member of the Christian community one is no longer alive to sin.¹⁴ This is also the intended purpose of all righteous and effectual repentance, to which in the process of sanctification one is the more inclined the more sensitive one becomes to the effect of sin upon oneself.¹⁵ Such repentance, however, is not attained when one dulls the perception or observation of one’s own special sins by putting them in the uncertain light of the unmeasured common sin. In the constant readiness for real repentance the change of heart prescribed by Jesus becomes the stamp of the whole life.¹⁶

50. The Christian perfection which corresponds to the personal example of Christ Himself¹⁷ separates itself into the religious functions of sonship with God and dominion over the world, i.e., trust in the fatherly providence of God, humility, patience, prayer, and into the ethical functions of dutiful action in one’s calling and the development of the ethical virtues.¹⁸ In this coherence of the spiritual life the individual attains to the value of a whole which is superior to the worth of all the world as the order of a partial and naturally conditioned existence.¹⁹ In this is included independence toward all special authority.²⁰ This attainment of the Christian religion is the end actually aimed at in all religions (§ 8), namely, the assuring of the value of our spiritual life, in spite of its limiting complication with nature or the world, by means of the appropriation of the divine life or of the evident divine purpose.

51. Faith in the fatherly providence of God is the Christian view of the world in an abbreviated form.²¹ In this faith, although we neither know the future nor comprehend perfectly the past, yet we judge our temporary relation to the world according to our knowledge of the love of God, and according to the assurance which this knowledge gives us of the value of every child of God in comparison with the world, which is directed by God in accordance with His final purpose, i.e., our salvation.²² From this faith springs that confidence which in all its degrees is equally removed from the gnawing anxiety which might arise from our relation to the superior power of nature, and from dull indifference or bold recklessness or Stoic imperturbability, because no one of these is an expression of constant spiritual freedom. In particular, faith in providence furnishes a standard by which the first impression of misfortunes as limitations of freedom or as divine punishments is transformed into a recognition of their significance as blessings, i.e., as means of education or probation.²³ In this judgment of evil, he who trusts in providence gives evidence of his dominion over the world, as well as of his redemption from the guilt and the power of sin and his reconciliation with God. But not less clearly does faith in providence illumine the experiences of prosperity or happiness as gifts of God, which call for thankfulness to Him, and purification or moderation of our sense of self.²⁴

52. Humility is that tone of feeling which springs from the knowledge of the fatherly leading of God, and either accompanies this knowledge, or, as a constant readiness to acquiesce in all the dispensations of God, takes the place of the conscious exercise of trust in His providence. As a distinctively religious virtue it is again that power of self-possession which leads us to view both unpleasant and agreeable experiences as dispensations of God, and therefore in such a way that we are neither cast down nor unduly lifted up by them.²⁵ The humility of the Christian does not spring out of a constant consciousness of his sin, neither is it indifferent to it. Rather, it involves a more lively sense of God’s grace in view of sin, and accordingly a hesitation to regard our moral and religious convictions, however well intended, as God’s cause, or to defend them as such. The religious man is unconscious of his own humility,²⁶ and still less is it an object of observation and exhaustive judgment on the part of others, as it does not manifest itself directly in any moral property or mode of action.²⁷ Least of all does it find its necessary manifestation in ceremonial-legal ascetic actions, although from the first, in accordance with a dualistic view of the world, a low estimation of the natural conditions of human life has been accepted as a specially clear proof of humility toward God.²⁸

53. Patience under the hampering limitations of the world,²⁹ arising from the judgment of faith in providence through the feeling of humble submission to God’s fatherly leading, accepts deserved evils as divine punishments and also as means of training, undeserved evils as tests, or perchance also as the honour of martyrdom. Patience is fundamentally always a determination of the will; but it may take the form of a tone of feeling and so unite itself closely with humility, when the original determination of will becomes extended in order to meet a like continuance of special worldly limitations. Since, however, in the Christian view of the world the difference in value of misfortune and of prosperity is a relative matter, patience as a religious virtue has room for exercise not only in experiences which appear at first as direct limitations, but also proves itself of value, in connection with humility, as a moderation of the sense of self in experiences of prosperity, which tend to make one effeminate and dependent on the world.

54. Prayer, whether as thanksgiving or as petition, is the conscious and intentional exercise both of faith in God’s providence³⁰ and of humility. It is also, as thanksgiving, the proof of patience, and, as petition, the means of gaining or of strengthening patience. In these respects prayer is the proof which the individual gives before God and for himself of his condition of reconciliation, and is also the means by which he establishes himself in the same. As the united act of the community, it has still other characteristics (§ 79).

55. The answer to prayer for special material blessings, which seems to be assured without any limit,³¹ is nevertheless limited by the reservation that the petition must accord with God’s providence over us,³² and that the one who prays must be engaged in the fulfilment of the divine commands.³³ And finally the value of the petitions addressed to God is made independent of the test of their direct and continuous fulfilment by the fact that, if we know that God hears us, we know also that we have the blessings which we have desired of him.³⁴

56. The ethical task of the kingdom of God is performed as the universal task of the Christian community, only when all the duties of the narrower circles of life conditioned by nature (married life, family life, social life, national life) are done according to the special principles of each, under the inspiration of love to one’s neighbour as their final motive. For the whole is never realized except in the particulars that compose it. If the opposite were true, and one could fulfil Christian duty outside the natural conditions of life, that which is of universal force would be changed into a false particularity, into something peculiar.³⁵

57. Conduct in the narrower and naturally conditioned circles is subordinated to the common end of the kingdom of God and brought into direct relation to the same, when the regular activity incumbent upon each one in these circles is exercised in the form of one’s ethical calling (§ 50, 2) for the common good.³⁶ The purpose to serve the common good, with which the work of every special civic calling should be undertaken, does not exclude personal interest in its success or the gaining of property; this latter becomes a motive to self-seeking, however, unless in this moral conception of our calling it is balanced by the common ends. Accordingly, fidelity to one’s calling is also following the example of Christ.³⁷ Moreover, by this appreciation of ethical callings, as parts of the kingdom of God, the temptations to self-seeking, which as such belong to each calling in its separate existence,³⁸ are overcome, and the Catholic idea is disproved that one lives a spiritual life only in separation from worldly callings.³⁹

58. The significance of marriage as the union of two persons of different sexes into one (monogamy), which is set forth in the Old Testament and recognised by Christ as the original arrangement of God,⁴⁰ not only implies that in marriage husband and wife are of equal honour [Werth], and that their union is indissoluble during earthly life,⁴¹ but approves itself also in the fact that in this relation the self-sacrificing power of Christian love [Nächstenliebe] can and should make the highest and most blessed proof of itself.⁴² When, nevertheless, love is demanded of the husband and obedience of the wife,⁴³ this is because of that difference in the nature of the two sexes which leads the wife to subject herself to her husband as the representative of their mutual union.

59. Since the exalted exercise of Christian love in marriage is further continued in the care and training of children by their parents, the relation of these children to Christianity is already assured by their birth from Christian parents.⁴⁴ The children, also, during their bringing up fulfil their Christian duty in that obedience to parents which is in general becoming.⁴⁵ The children of a household are, moreover, as brothers and sisters put into a position to develop, on the one side, a consciousness of mutual rights, and on the other, to form especially close friendships with one another. In both these respects their relation serves as a school for the necessary participation of each one in the public community of rights, and in common ethical intercourse. For the real efficiency of the latter depends precisely upon the filling out and establishing of the ethical individuality of each one through the winning of friends.

60. Justice [Das Recht] is the ordering of mutual or concerted actions which have reference either to personal ends (private justice), or to such common ends (public [state-, criminal-] justice) as are of narrower range than the ethical end of the kingdom of God. Inasmuch as judicial law directly controls actions alone, actions which are in accordance with law are not necessarily and always the expression of a corresponding disposition; indeed, judicial law is always accompanied by compulsion to enforce rightdoing in the case of those otherwise disposed. But since justice, when completely understood, is the means by which ethical freedom attains its ends, and therefore is an ethical product, the right ethical disposition includes necessarily a disposition to uphold law, and in the community we habitually reckon upon such a disposition on the part of each one.⁴⁶

61. Therefore, while the legal constitution of a people or a state is in itself a matter of indifference to Christianity, regarded either as worship or as the praxis of the kingdom of God,⁴⁷ yet the state is recognized as an arrangement of God, and obedience to judicial authority prescribed as a religious duty.⁴⁸ For the system of justice [Rechtsgemeinschaft], being a necessary means to the assurance of ethical freedom, is thus an indispensable condition of the possibility of Christian fulfilment of the duties of the kingdom of God in all the spheres of ethical association.⁴⁹

62. Accordingly, while active participation in the state, even in so far as it springs out of patriotism and a universal sense of justice, is not an activity which belongs directly to the kingdom of God, yet (in accordance with § 61) it is not only compatible with the Christian life, but the two activities have a necessary reciprocal relation to one another.⁵⁰ For, on the one hand, the Christian will find it incumbent upon him to promote the legal authority of the state for the very purpose of gaining room for striving after the kingdom of God. On the other hand, the education of a Christian people to humanity, which is demanded by the welfare of the state, is founded upon an effort to realize the kingdom of God, and must be regulated by an insight into the morality suitable to it, an insight which a statesman in a Christian nation cannot afford to be without.—In such measure as this disposition pervades the different nations, it will strengthen regard for their mutual rights. So long, however, as statecraft has to defend the rights of a people or a state against hostility from other nations, while it is never justified in the use of criminal means to this end, it is yet not bound by the same rules which hold for the legal and ethical action of the individual Christian in his relation to the state and in intercourse with other men.

63. The conceptions of virtue and duty arise in this form from philosophical ethics. The use of these conceptions, however, cannot be avoided also in Christian ethics, because the material of both conceptions is included in the right apprehension of the Christian life. Ethical virtues, and actions regulated by the conception of duty, are the products of a will directed toward the highest purpose. The difference between the two is that actions in accordance with duty proceed forth from the will, while virtues are acquired in the will itself; the former have relation to intercourse or association with others, and the latter belong to the individual as such. When, however, actions also are judged virtuous their relation to others is here not considered, but their relation to the distinctive energy of the doer himself. When on the other hand it is declared also a duty to become virtuous, this conception of duty with reference to itself is a transformation of the usual conception of duty which is likely to cause confusion. That is to say, such an expression is in part an unnecessary circumlocution with regard to personal rights, e.g., that of self-preservation or of the choice and maintenance of the ethical calling, and in part an expression, permissible in pedagogics, of the necessity of acquiring virtues on the part of the one who is yet immature.

64. In reality dutiful actions and the acquiring of virtues are separate from one another neither in time nor space. On the one hand, the very way in which virtues are acquired is by constant dutiful action (§ 49, 2); on the other hand, virtues are exercised as well in the formation of the right conceptions of duty as in the execution of these conceptions.⁵¹ And as they are exercised they are established or acquired in ever higher degree. This is not the description of a self-contradictory and thus falsely conceived and impossible process. The ethical will is a force whose effect upon others and whose effect upon itself stand in an inseparable reciprocal relation to one another. For the ethical development of the individual will as such, apart from social intercourse with other persons, is utterly inconceivable.

65. The virtues arise out of the various relations in which the rightly disposed will is to be recognized as a whole. When the will subjects the impulses of the individual disposition to the good end, it gains self-control. When it establishes firmly the condition upon which the ethical calling depends (§ 57), whether this results in the limitation or in the strengthening of this calling, it gains conscientiousness. When it orders its regular activity in consistency with its purposes, intentions, determinations, it gains wisdom, discretion, determination, constancy. When, through the motive of love, it directs the good disposition toward the individual persons with whom one is in moral association, it gains kindliness, thankfulness, justice.⁵²

66. The first group of virtues, self-control and conscientiousness,⁵³ is founded on independence and honourableness of character. In the opposite vices, sensuality, intemperance, immoderate ambition, imperious dogmatism, unscrupulousness, untrustworthiness, the will is lacking in the capability of determining itself continuously. Honour is the moral independence of an individual in so far as recognized by other independent individuals. The man without virtue has therefore no moral honour. Moreover, no one gains honour by winning for himself the regard of his companions through yielding to the prejudices or immoralities of a special circle. Finally, honour must not be confounded with that negative regard which is to be accorded to the dignity of the human being, even in the case of those without virtue.

67. The second group of virtues, wisdom, discretion, determination, constancy,⁵⁴ is founded upon clearness and energy of character. For the good end at which one aims is without effect upon one’s character, if one is wavering in his purposes, inconsiderate in his principles, undecided in particulars and changeable as to the whole. In the exercise of conduct which is systematic and also expedient for the moment, prudence alternates with discretion,⁵⁵ the latter estimating the measures to be taken according to one’s own power, the former according to the resistance to be expected from others.

68. The third group of virtues, kindliness,⁵⁶ thankfulness, justice, is founded upon a good disposition or amiability of character. There is at least a lack of virtue, when out of a thoroughly good intention the moral ends of society are treated in a purely impersonal manner, or too impersonally, hence with harshness and want of consideration for the persons to whom one nevertheless wishes to show love. The full comprehensiveness of love appears, when, in kindliness, we gain facility in adjusting our manner of action to the claim which others have upon our love; in thankfulness, we gain the readiness to depend upon the kindliness of others; in justice, we gain the disposition so to bear the lack of kindliness and of thankfulness in others as not to allow ourselves to be led by our perception of it into harshness toward them. Thus justice will not exercise the necessary severity toward others without tempering it with a perceptible measure of kindness.⁵⁷

69. The moral law is so completely expressed in Christ’s precept of love to one’s neighbour (§ 6), that all morally necessary and desirable actions fall within the circumference of this rule. But it has direct reference to the disposition alone, and leaves undetermined all the other conditions by which the necessity for individual benevolent action is to be recognized. To these conditions belong not only the determination of the special ways in which love is to be manifested (§ 72), but also the judgment whether in any particular instance we have to deal with a neighbour in the full sense, or with one who is undeveloped in character and in need of education, or with an enemy (§ 6, 2). And finally it must be determined whether in a special case one ought to act from the disposition of love or refuse to act at all. A safe conclusion as to these conditions must, however, be included, if one is to be able to assure oneself that a special action, or the omission of all action, is in any special instance in accordance with the moral law.⁵⁸ These conditions are, however, so innumerable that they could never be wholly included in any systematic statutory exposition of the moral law.⁵⁹ For a judicial law can be laid down as statutory and exhaustive in its definite commands and prohibitions only because the actions which are neither commanded nor forbidden are permitted, i.e., remain legally undetermined. On the contrary the moral law reckons upon a measure of virtuous independence in the individual, according to which he has to determine what is moral duty in each case (§ 64, 1), namely, whether one is necessitated by the universal moral law to act now in accordance with it, or under the circumstances not to act at all. Under these conditions the moral law perfectly understood becomes the law of liberty.⁶⁰

70. Moral duty, therefore, is the judgment of the virtuous man that in a special case, determined by an estimate of the personal and material circumstances, the moral law requires him to act from the disposition of love. The element of freedom, which is inseparable from this judgment of the necessity of a benevolent act, brings it about that in the same case one individual may be under obligation to act and another not to act. This disparity allowed by the conception of duty has not however the significance of lawlessness. For since it is in his own special moral calling (§ 57) that each one is to work at the common task of the kingdom of God and to fulfil the universal moral law, the greater part of moral duties are thereby determined in advance. The duties of one’s calling are therefore the regular duties of love.⁶¹ And thus the disparity in the duty of different individuals in the same case is explicable from the difference in the moral callings. But those actions which are not provided for by one’s special moral calling are also recognized as necessary or obligatory because one finds them analogous to those of one’s own calling. In these cases one forms the judgment that by means of special circumstances one is called to the exercise of unusual duty.

71. Yet the network of ordinary (belonging to one’s calling) and extraordinary duties of love does not extend so far as to cover all the voluntary expressions of the good character. It is a question, therefore, whether all that action to which one gives the benefit of being considered morally allowable, and which one is thus accustomed to withdraw from the direct application of the conception of duty, is to be regarded (1) as altogether morally indeterminable, or (2) as still to be forced under the severity of the conception of duty, or (3) as perhaps to be morally regulated in some other way. The first case is improbable, because the coherence of the good character would not admit of the morally indifferent nature of a large range of its activities. The pedantic rigorism of the second case is not to be recommended for the very reason that we must be able to assure to ourselves our moral freedom as such, when in the conception of duty it encounters a legal necessity. We must, for instance, be able to preserve our freedom in that we follow no imperative duty in the choice of our special calling; in that we are not under obligation to marry any particular person or to marry at all; or that we are not in all cases under obligation to defend our calling against hostile attacks. In these respects one exercises rather only rights, which one may ignore or may exercise in a choice which is not amenable to any conception of duty. However, the way in which this exercise is morally measurable will become clear when the other realm of what is morally allowable is taken into consideration. This is, namely, the realm of recreation, partly as rest from the exertion of work, partly as sensuous and intellectual enjoyment, i.e., as luxury over and above the indispensable needs of life,⁶² partly as social entertainment and amusement, and partly as a combination of both. The occasion for rest from moral activity and for enjoyment is furnished by the dependence of our spiritual life upon bodily conditions. The occasion for social amusement in bodily and mental exercise is furnished by the intellectual necessity for individual artistic self-expression which exists along with the necessity for moral association. Thus it corresponds more to the dignity of man to seek his recreation from useful toil in the exchange of all possible artistic activity than in sitting still by himself. This content of recreation is therefore originally of such a nature as not to come under direct subordination to the moral conception of duty. Only when health is impaired is one led to recreation from a sense of duty to oneself or to one’s usefulness in one’s calling. Nevertheless, recreation is limited indirectly and negatively by duty. The kind and duration of recreation is to be so regulated that one will not be less fitted for the fulfilling of one’s calling after the recreation than before. When one is thus less fitted, recreation is contrary to duty and morally unallowable. Hence, since the regulation of recreation by the conception of duty does not reach further, the third case holds good, inasmuch as the maintenance of virtue must accompany the whole extent of recreation, and especially that of social recreation. In all cases the same conscientiousness, self-control, discretion, kindliness, thankfulness and justice are to be maintained, and all amusement and all entertainment is unallowable which interferes with the exercise of these virtues. Thus it follows that in this realm the same thing is to one allowable and to another unallowable, according as these virtues are therein exercised or not. Finally, it is evident that even in the exercise of personal rights as discussed above virtue must co-operate as the moral standard.

72. The duties of love arising from the universal loving disposition may be divided according to the varieties of the application of this kindliness; and hence there result special principles, which make easier the decision as to a particular obligation. Kindliness manifests itself either in the positive kindly regard for other persons, or in the support of their justifiable ends, or in forbearance with the defects in their virtue. In the first case there result the principles of modesty and sincerity; in the second the principles of rectitude, readiness to serve, benevolence, truthfulness; in the third the principles of compatibility and placability.

73. Kindly regard for others includes the negative regard for the dignity of the human being and the sparing of the possessions of others of whatever kind, these being antecedent conditions of love and maintained even by the order of public justice.⁶³ For in and of itself this negative regard can be exercised in connection with complete indifference toward others, and of itself leads therefore to no moral fellowship. The principles of modesty and sincerity, however, point to such a regard for another that in action and speech we enter into moral fellowship with him. Modesty is the right limiting of the sense of self, arising from the fact that we recognise in another the worth of the fellowship to be entered into with him.⁶⁴ Sincerity is the right expression of the constant spirit of appreciation of others [Gemeinsinn] which recognizes the value of another to the purpose for which we enter into fellowship with him.⁶⁵

74. The kindly support of the justifiable purposes of others includes righteous deportment in all relations to them which are governed by contract. For since the administration of justice is the means to the assured exercise of moral freedom, the disposition to uphold justice is included in the disposition of love (§ 60), and guides our duties to others by the principle of rectitude.⁶⁶ Rectitude has reference, it is true, to those relations with others which depend upon mutual advantage, while on the contrary, the trait of unselfishness, or the surrendering of our own advantage in the assisting of others, is necessarily involved in readiness to serve, benevolence and truthfulness. Yet this distance between the principle of rectitude and these other principles is lessened by the fact that the principle of rectitude includes equity in dealing with those who are under legal obligation to us and can lay claim only to our rectitude. Equity is of course no measure of our duties of love, but it recognizes the fact that our relations to others, while ordered for the time being only by contract, is not exhausted by legal justice, but that he who is temporarily under legal obligation to us possesses at the same time human dignity and moral freedom, which may at any moment give us occasion to exercise the duties of love. The real duties of love arise, however, only when there is no question of mutual right involved, when therefore unselfishness is possible. This is the case when the justifiable ends of others are supported by readiness to serve in the rendering of personal assistance,—by benevolence in the sharing of property,—by truthfulness in the sharing of knowledge.⁶⁷

75. Benevolent forbearance with the want of virtue in others expresses itself in the principles of compatibility in existing intercourse, and of placability when this intercourse has been interrupted by strife. Both are distinct from a weak indulgence toward wrong, in that they are connected with sincerity.⁶⁸ Moreover, right action, in accordance with these and the preceding principles, with the exception of rectitude, is limited by the consideration as to whether the kind and degree of the formation of moral character in others allows moral fellowship with them at all, or to what extent.⁶⁹ The exercise of rectitude is, however, always imperative.

76. Perfection, which, on the foundation of the grace of God and in conformity to the redemption through Christ, consists in the exercise of religious and moral virtues and in the performance of the duties of love regulated by our moral calling (§ 50), is necessarily accompanied by a feeling of blessedness (§ 47). But in so far as individuals have succeeded in attaining this height of Christian character-building, and in maintaining it in the conflict with their own sin and with patience under external limitations, they will, because of their increased sensitiveness of feeling, be the very ones to judge themselves full of defects and imperfection. Therefore, these will be the very ones to refuse to organize an association of the perfect, so as to form a narrower circle of the same within the community of worship.⁷⁰ But Christian faith, certain of eternal life (§ 45) through the reconciliation in Christ, and maintaining this blessing in the exercise of righteousness as well as in sanctification (§ 47, 2), rests upon the hope that the perfecting of the kingdom of God as the highest good will be realized upon conditions which extend beyond this world of experience (§ 8).

77. Christ and the apostles looked forward to the coming of this end and of these conditions in the near future; following the Old Testament prophets, they looked for the divine judgment of the world as an event upon this earth perceptible to the senses, by means of which the way was to be prepared for the dominion of Christ over the kingdom of God on earth.⁷¹ This epoch was to be introduced by the resurrection of the believing dead and the visible reappearance of Christ Himself.⁷² This special form of future expectation has not maintained itself in the church, though still held in sectarian circles. The hope cherished in the church gives up the expectation that this earth will be the scene of Christ’s dominion, while it holds fast the practical truths of the divine judgment, and of the separation of the blessed and the lost, as well as the final attainment of the highest good in the case of the former.⁷³ Since a consistent eschatological theory cannot be gained from New Testament data, the hints of the New Testament as to the condition of the blessed and of the lost lie beyond the possibility of a clear presentation.⁷⁴ The important thing, however, is not the satisfaction of curiosity, but the assurance that no one is blessed except in union with all the blessed in the kingdom of God.

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