§ 70. The sinfulness that is present in an individual prior to any action of his own, and has its ground outside his own being, is in every case a complete incapacity for good, which can be removed only by the influence of Redemption.
Conf. Aug. 2: Docent quod—omnes homines secundum naturam propagati nascuntur … sine metu Dei sine fiducia erga Deum et cum concupiscentiâ, quodque hic morbus seu vitium originis vere sit peccatum damnans et afferens nunc quoque aeternam mortem his qui non renascuntur per baptismum et spiritum sanctum.—Apol. Conf. i: hic locus testatur nos non solum actus sed potentiam seu dona efficiendi timorem et fiduciam erga Deum adimere propagatis secundum carnalem naturam … ut cum nominamus concupiscentiam non tantum actus seu fructus intelligamus sed perpetuam naturae inclinationem. —Conf. Gall. ix.: Affirmamus quicquid mens humana habet lucis mox fieri tenebras cum de quaerendo Deo agitur, adeo ut sua intelligentia et ratione nullo modo possit ad eum accedere. Item … nullam prorsus habet ad bonum appetendum libertatem, nisi quam ex gratia et Dei dono acceperit.—Expos. Simpl. viii.: Peccatum autem intelligimus esse nativam illam hominis corruptionem … qua concupiscentiis pravis immersi … nil boni ex nobis ipsis facere imo ne cogitare quidem possumus.—ix.: proinde nullum est ad bonum homini liberum arbitrium nondum renato. —Conf. Angl. x.: Ea est hominis conditio, ut sese naturalibus suis viribus ad fidem convertere et praeparare non possit. Quare absque gratia Dei quae in Christo est ad facienda quae Deo grata sunt nihil valemus.—Repetit. Conf.: Et haec depravatio est carere iam luce Dei seu praesentiâ Dei quae in nobis fuisset, et est aversio voluntatis nostrae a Deo … et hominem non esse templum Dei sed miseram massam sine Deo et sine iustitia. 1. This idea of a sinfulness present from the first in every human being is in perfect accord with what has been set forth above. For if, even in the life of the man who has been received into fellowship with the redeemed, there is in the strict and precise sense no moment in which the consciousness of sin, as something present and operative, would not form an essential part of his self-consciousness were this latter clearly and fully realized,1 then a sinfulness which is not completely overcome even by the power of redemption must for that very reason be regarded as in itself literally infinite. And if the disposition to the God-consciousness is thereby obscured and vitiated,2 then man, just because his God-consciousness, though the best thing in him, is thus polluted and untrustworthy, must be wholly incapable not only of developing, but even of consciously aspiring to, such inner states as would harmonize with the proper aim and object of the said disposition. Hence, as Christian piety traces everything at all connected with the God-consciousness either to sin or to grace,3 everything in our inner states that is not sin must be attributed to our share in redemption, and this redemption must be regarded as the only thing that can remove the incapacity referred to.
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We admit then unreservedly this incapacity for good—good being understood here solely as that which is determined by the God-consciousness—between the limiting points of willing and doing,4 within which all self-activity proper must fall. Yet we must not magnify our congenital sinfulness to such an extent as would involve the denial of man’s capacity to appropriate redemption, for that capacity is the very least that can be predicated of that disposition to the God-consciousness which is inherent in man’s original perfection.5 In the light of such a denial nothing would remain of those higher gifts which constitute the prerogative of human nature, and in which everything that distinguishes man from brute must have some share; these gifts would in fact be so utterly extinct that we should have literally to say that man has been born without human nature—an assertion that contradicts itself as soon as it is made. Again, were we to affirm that the capacity for redemption has been lost,6 we should come into conflict with our very belief in redemption. The capacity to appropriate the grace offered to us is the indispensable condition of all the operations of that grace, so that, without it, no improvement of man would be possible; or else to render such improvement possible, we should have to make another assumption—namely, such a new creation of man, he remaining absolutely passive, as alone could produce the capacity in question. But in that case this creative act might equally be applied to the whole process, and man’s complete sanctification effected in the same way, so that redemption would become superfluous. For these reasons the incapacity spoken of is only to be referred to our personal activity in the narrower and proper sense, and not to our receptivity; and if anyone chooses to speak of vital inward receiving as the beginning of co-operation, we should not admit unconditionally that original sin debars man from all initiative and co-operation in spiritual things.7 In fact, however, the work of this vital receptivity is not really initiation; there must be first of all a drawing-near of what is to be received, and similarly the said working is, strictly, not a co-operation at all, but a yielding of the self to the operation of grace. Our statement, moreover, has in its favour all the invitations of the Redeemer, which in reality were appeals to this receptivity; and no less the universal practice of the heralds of God’s kingdom, who invariably called upon men to receive the grace of God. In fact, even if we start from the assumption of a constantly increasing deterioration of mankind, we must nevertheless acknowledge with Augustine that some element of the original good must still survive in human nature.8
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Even within the sphere of voluntary action, however, thinkers have always taken care to confine the incapacity in question to what Christian piety regards as alone good in the strictest sense. This again takes for granted that there is a distinction of praiseworthy and blameworthy which is quite independent of a man’s relationship to redemption; in fact, just as the unredeemed may have in themselves that which is commendable, so the redeemed are conscious of having acquired it without the aid of grace. Now this whole phase of life may very appropriately be described as ‘civil righteousness’—the expression taken in a broad sense. For, to begin with, all that lies nearest to what is determined and effected by the God-consciousness has a communal reference, and evidence that might be brought forward against this will always be merely apparent; while, again, the mind of the civil community cannot apply the standard of the God-consciousness to the human actions and inward states that bear upon the communal interest, but can at most demand a spirit of patriotism in its highest purity and perfection. This spirit, however, while capable of evoking the most consummate self-renunciation in the individual, is merely the self-love of the nation or the country as a composite person, and may be conjoined with animosity and injustice of all kinds towards those who are outside the group, unless the reverse is dictated by the group’s own selfish interest or love of honour—and these, again, are but self-love. Hence the very best elements of this side of life, so far as they subsist independently of the power of the God-consciousness, can rank only as the mind, wisdom, and righteousness of the flesh. Still, far too much is conceded, and an important aspect of Christian piety greatly obscured, when the incapacity is restricted to the so-called works of the First Table of the Decalogue on the ground that it is these alone which man cannot perform apart from redemption, and that the works of the Second Table are identical with that civil righteousness of which man is capable even without the aid of God’s Spirit. The truth is rather that the latter works, in any sense in which the Christian can regard them as fulfilling the divine law,9 are in no sense external or carnal; they are truly spiritual works, and are possible only in virtue of an efficacious and purified God-consciousness, so that in this respect no distinction can be drawn between duties towards God and duties towards our neighbour.10