§ 71. Original sin, however, is at the same time so really the personal guilt of every individual who shares in it that it is best represented as the corporate act and the corporate guilt of the human race, and that the recognition of it as such is likewise recognition of the universal need of redemption.

Conf. Aug. ii.: Quodque hic morbus seu vitium originis vere sit peccatum damnans et afferens nunc quoque aeternam mortem his qui non renascuntur.—Apol. Conf. i.: Quodsi has tantas vires habet humana natura … quorsum opus erit gratiâ Christi? Ibid. ii.: Quia igitur … omnes sunt sub peccato … ideo data est promissio iustificationis propter Christum. —Conf. Basil. viii.: Atque haec lues, quam originalem vocant, genus totum sic pervasit, ut nulla ope nisi divina per Christum curari potuerit.—Conf. Gall. xi.: Credimus hoc vitium vere esse peccatum, quod omnes et singulos homines, ne parvulis quidem exceptis adhuc in utero matris delitescentibus, aeternae mortis reos coram Deo peragat.—Conf. Belg. xv.: Credimus quod peccatum originis ita foedum et execrabile est coram Deo, ut ad generis humani condemnationem sufficiat.—Art. Smalc.: Si enim ista (sc. hominem posse naturalibus viribus mandata Dei servare) approbantur, Christus frustra mortuus est, cum nullum peccatum aut damnum sit in homine pro quo mori eum oportuerit.—Conf. Bohem. iv.: Necessum esse ut omnes norint infirmitatem suam, quodque se ipsos modo nullo servare possint, neque quicquam habere praeter Christum, cuius fiducia sese redimant ac liberent.—Epitom. Artic., p. 575: Affirmamus quod hanc naturae corruptionem ab ipsa natura nemo nisi solus Deus separare queat.—Reiicimus … dogma quo asseritur peccatum originale tantummodo reatum et debitum esse ex alieno delicto … in nos derivatum.—Solid. Decl., p. 639: Et propter hanc corruptionem … natura aut persona hominis lege Dei accusatur et condemnatur … nisi beneficio meriti Christi ab his malis liberemur.—Melanchth., Loc., p. 94: Propter quam corruptionem nati sunt rei. 1. In not a few of these symbolical passages, and in many theologians the doctrine of original sin appears to imply that the sinfulness innate in all men, just in so far as received from an external source, is yet in every case the individual’s own guilt; a guilt indeed which involves eternal punishment as its due, so that the greatest possible accumulation of actual sins could add nothing to the penal desert which attaches to everyone on account of this so-called disease. Nor can we regard it as other than natural that the doctrine in this form has been repudiated by many who, to avoid recognizing as guilt anything that lies wholly outside a man’s own action, prefer to describe original sin as an evil.

The doctrine, however, is given this incredible turn and acquires its repellent and offensive tone only when, alike against the nature of things, and in opposition to a true and generally recognized principle,¹¹ original sin is divorced from actual sin. Yet this is not to be understood in the sense that original sin is not guilt until it breaks forth in actual sins, for the mere circumstance that there has been no opportunity for and no outward incentive to sin cannot enhance the spiritual status of man; it is to be understood rather as implying that in the individual original sin is the sufficient ground of all actual sins, so that only something else outside of him, and not anything new within him, is needed for the generation of actual sin. Original sin is purely a thing received only in the degree in which the individual is not yet spontaneously active, and it ceases to be such in the degree in which that activity is developed. Up to that point, and in that measure, it is rightly termed originated,¹² as having its cause outside the individual. None the less, as every predisposition in man attains by exercise to proficiency and thereupon grows, so, by the exercise due to the voluntary action of the individual, is there growth in congenital sinfulness. But this growing increment, similar in character to what was originally inherited, namely, a persistent inward ground of sinful actions, though on the one side a result of actual sin, is yet in this respect, as an intensified sinfulness, always anterior to the actual sins emanating from it, and is therefore original sin, though no longer merely ‘originated’ but individually committed; it is, in fact, like the sin of our first parents which is usually designated by the term originating original sin,¹³ since it brings forth and increases sin in oneself and others. Since, then, this later sinfulness which has issued from the individual’s own action is one and the same with that which was congenital in origin, it follows that, just as the supervening sinfulness has arisen within him from voluntary acts based upon the original sinfulness, so the latter, which in fact falls more and more into the background in comparison with the former, and which always forms his starting-point, does not continue in him, and therefore would not have arisen through him, apart from his will. We are thus justified in calling it the guilt of the individual. From this point of view it may doubtless be said that the foregoing can hold good of human beings only in so far as they themselves have acted, but not in the same sense of children or the unborn. Here certainly there is a distinction not to be overlooked. Since, however, it is an accepted fact that actual sin proceeds unfailingly from original sin, then wherever human life exists, actual sin has its root within, and the link in virtue of which original sin is guilt exists also in the immature, even though as yet it has not manifested itself in time. So that of them it may be said that they will be sinners because of what is already within them. That they are not such in the same sense and degree as those in whom actual sin has become permanent has probably never been seriously questioned, more especially as the reference here is exclusively to guilt. But this difference does not touch congenital sinfulness, and so far as the confessional passages which refer to children are chiefly bent on bringing this out, we can altogether adopt them as our own.

2. Now if the sinfulness which is prior to all action operates in every individual through the sin and sinfulness of others, and if, again, it is transmitted by the voluntary actions of every individual to others and implanted within them, it must be something genuinely common to all. Whether, in fact, we regard it as guilt and deed or rather as a spirit and a state, it is in either case common to all; not something that pertains severally to each individual and exists in relation to him by himself, but in each the work of all, and in all the work of each; and only in this corporate character, indeed, can it be properly and fully understood. Hence the doctrinal statements that deal with it are not to be regarded as utterances of the individual consciousness, which fall to be treated rather under the doctrine of actual sin, but are utterances of the corporate consciousness. This solidarity means an interdependence of all places and all times in the respect we have in view. The distinctive form of original sin in the individual, as regards its quality, is only a constituent part of the form it takes in the circle to which he immediately belongs, so that, though inexplicable when taken by itself, it points to the other parts as complementary to it. And this relationship runs through all gradations of community—families, clans, tribes, peoples, and races—so that the form of sinfulness in each of these points to that present in the others as its complement; and the aggregate power of the flesh in its conflict with the spirit (it being the source of everything in human action which is incompatible with the God-consciousness), is intelligible only by reference to the totality of those sharing a common life, and never fully in any one part; and whatever of that power appears in the single unit, whether personal or composite, is not to be attributed to, or explained by, that unit alone. The like holds good also of time. What appears as the congenital sinfulness of one generation is conditioned by the sinfulness of the previous one, and in turn conditions that of the later; and only in the whole series of forms thus assumed, as all connected with the progressive development of man, do we find the whole aspect of things denoted by the term, ‘original sin.’ Moreover, the interconnexion of places and that of times condition each other and indicate dependence on each other. And every man will readily testify that it is only in relation to the totality of things that either the idea of the sinfulness of individuals or his sense of sharing it becomes to him certain and adequate. It is precisely in virtue of this connexion, in fact, that the individual is the representative of the whole race in this regard, for the sinfulness of each points to the sinfulness of all alike in space and time, and also goes to condition that totality both around him and after him.

In this view, moreover, the various expressions used to denote original sin—all of which have a relative truth—most readily find their mutual reconciliation. Thus it can be called guilt¹⁴ with perfect accuracy only when it is regarded simply as meaning the totality of the whole race, since it cannot in similar fashion be the guilt of the individual, so far at least as it has been engendered in him. It is called corruption of one’s nature¹⁵ as contrasted with the original perfection, inasmuch as the latter in its true development has to some extent been subverted by original sin; original defect,¹⁶ inasmuch as it is the source of all individual perversions of the relation between the spirit and the several functions of our sensuous life; original disease,¹⁷ inasmuch as on its account an element of death is lodged in every action of the spiritual life; original evil, inasmuch as in the individual it is a persistently operative cause of impediments to life which is independent of his own action. How difficult it is to describe original sin—I will not say wholly, but even partially—as punishment¹⁸ need hardly be emphasized, not only because punishment is always something inflicted while sin can never be inflicted, so that punishment in the person who suffers it must always be that which is not sin; but also because in every sin for which original sin is supposed to be the penalty original sin itself is always presupposed, and thus in the last resort the punishment would precede the sin.

3. Were the phase of consciousness denoted by the concept of original sinfulness thus far developed not a corporate feeling, but one personal to the individual, it would not have necessarily bound up with it the consciousness of a universal need of redemption; for each individual would think himself thrown primarily on his own particular group for the increase of his spiritual strength. Hence the denial of the corporate character of original sin and a lower estimate of the redemption wrought by Christ usually go hand in hand. Nor would the connexion of the two things be stronger if the original sinfulness could exist in us without our being conscious of it, since the consciousness of sin would either not emerge in us at all, or would do so only in consequence of each actual sin as it occurred, and be referred to that alone. In such case the individual would primarily be thrown upon his own resources, falling back from his weaker moments to his assumed stronger moments. This, however, is possible only where the God-consciousness has not evolved at all, or where the disposition towards it has not been aroused by communication—only in a sphere, that is to say, outside Christianity and Christian teaching. It is only when the God-consciousness has been attained that we acknowledge its pre-eminence among the elements of consciousness and strive for its supremacy; and when this takes place, the antagonism of the flesh, as a permanent factor determinative of the actuality of individual sins, must also become a fact of consciousness. Of this antagonism we only gain a clear understanding when we regard it as belonging to our consciousness as universalized to represent that of the human race; hence we must either abandon all our struggle for the supremacy of the God-consciousness or else recognize our need of a succour lying outside the sphere of that universalized self-consciousness; which means that for us there will either be a surrender to the absolute futility of any such struggle, or a presentiment of such succour. We can now see the appropriateness of linking the first consciousness of sin, due to the accession of the God-consciousness, with the first presentiment of redemption. And how the two have been conjoined in the Protestant Church from the outset is made clear by the passages cited. Equally clear is the connexion between the conviction that powers beyond the existing corporate human consciousness cannot be set in motion on our behalf and in our midst, and the resolve to do one’s best (with that consciousness but without redemption properly so called) to overcome, even if only partially, the antagonism of the flesh.

4. This inherent connexion between the consciousness of a universal original sinfulness and the sense of our need of a redemption is broken and set awry—not without serious detriment to genuine Christian piety—when the idea that original sin ought to be punished is thrust between the two. If punishment be taken to mean, not the intensification of sin itself—which in a teleological form of faith could be regarded only as further guilt and sin, so that here the connexion specified would not be inherent—but the evil that issues from sin or is ordained as its concomitant, then the sense of our need of redemption as mediated solely by a consciousness of penal desert will not be so pure as that described above. This is quite clearly the case where penal desert is affirmed solely in view of the punishment itself, and where it is supposed that the fear of punishment will evoke or at least deepen the felt need of redemption from sin; for in that case the removal of the state of sin is desired, not with a view to freeing the God-consciousness from obstruction and widening its scope, but in order to secure particular states of the sensuous consciousness and avert their opposites. One’s motive for not willing the antagonism of the flesh, and for willing redemption, would then be merely the sensuous consequences of each, and here accordingly piety in the real sense fades out. Again, it might be thought that the matter to be considered is not so much punishment itself as one’s deserving to be punished, and that the feeling to be stimulated is not so much fear of punishment as the dread of deserving it. But here, too, the relation to the sensuous is made the standard for the spiritual, the assumption in this case being that if a given individual is not in himself concerned to make the God-consciousness supreme, he may be induced to do so by the consideration that otherwise he will appear as one unworthy of sensuous well-being. And this view is as great a danger to Christian piety as the other. It is on these grounds that we have not adopted this idea here. From the symbolical passages cited, however, we can see how essential it is for them to deduce the need of redemption from the consciousness of sinfulness, but also how easy it is for us, without breaking that connexion, to set aside the irrelevant idea of the penal desert of original sin. The latter idea will be discussed in its proper place.

§ 72. While the idea that we have thus developed cannot be applied in precisely the same way to the first human pair, we have no reason for explaining universal sinfulness as due to an alteration in human nature brought about in their person by the first sin.

1. This proposition, which is merely precautionary and is not meant to settle anything regarding the way in which sin originated in the first human pair, really assumes that, agreeably to our earlier explanation,¹⁹ we are not required to formulate any doctrine, properly so called, upon the subject. While we can universalize our self-consciousness to represent the consciousness of the whole human race, and thus bring it into connexion with the God-consciousness, yet just because of what in our first parents was definitely and precisely related to the fact that they were not born but created, we cannot include them in that community of consciousness, their consciousness being, so far, the opposite of ours. It is true that if the point at issue were their sin during the further course of their life, the diversity would gradually disappear, but it is otherwise with a sinfulness which we assume to be prior to all action. Hence, since we can have no experience in common with our first parents in this regard, and have therefore no testimony of consciousness on the matter to set forth, we have likewise no relevant doctrine to formulate.²⁰ If, however, we had any knowledge from another source (whether speculative or more historical) as to the relation between sinfulness in them and their nature as created beings, it would of course be necessary to inquire how such knowledge was related to our doctrinal statements; and, so far as such knowledge was not purely historical, but interwoven with our own presuppositions and theories, precautions could then be taken, as is done here, to prevent the Christian from unwittingly framing doctrines incompatible with his faith. After all, our consciousness of sin and its connexion with the longing for redemption will always remain absolutely the same whatever may have been the circumstances of the first pair, unless it be maintained that so long as the begetting and training of children was their ‘task they had not yet sinned; for in that case a still larger area would be excluded from the sphere of our universalized self-consciousness, since the elements of original sinfulness might then have come together only by degrees. If, however, it is assumed that they had already sinned at that stage, their earliest offspring might, like ourselves, have a sinfulness existing prior to all action of their own, and derived from a source outside their own being. And this will sufficiently serve our purpose here, even though we thereby gain no clear idea of how that sinfulness passed, and still passes, from the first pair to their posterity. And, after all, no special importance is attached to this point in our symbolical books, which, while tracing the loss of innocence in all later human beings to the rise of sin in the earliest,²¹ yet in some cases do not enter upon further explanations as to the nature and mode of this influence, and in others actually renounce the problem.²²

2. On the other hand, the question how sin originated in our first parents after their God-consciousness had developed is, though not a question arising directly out of the interests of Christian piety, nevertheless a most natural one. Obviously we cannot answer it in their case with the same assurance as we answer it in our own by propositions elaborated here. To begin with, we cannot frame any clear idea of how in them the sensuous functions gained power before the spiritual; for the first pair must from the outside have stood upon a level similar to that on which, in those who are born, the spirit already is a power. If, then, we are to regard the God-consciousness as evolving in them from within or by means of a communion with God which we cannot adequately figure to ourselves, no reason can be given why it should have developed more potently and rapidly as an inactive consciousness, but more tardily and feebly as impulse to action. And the less so because, in the case of such a development from within, we have no grounds whatever for assuming an unequal growth of intelligence and will such as we might find where the two factors received unequal stimulus—the one by communicated ideas, the other from customs already prevalent. Nor can we imagine any one-sided tendency—except that of sex—inherent in the first pair in this or any other respect, since otherwise the profusion of diverse characters which experience now reveals could not have developed from them as being an epitome of human nature. Since, then, in the nature of things, analogy fails us here, all turns upon the endeavour to elucidate the genesis of sin in the first pair apart from an already existent sinfulness. But whether we take the narrative of the first sin literally or ascribe to it a universal significance, the attempt seems doomed to failure. The prevalent interpretations are that man sinned through the seductions of Satan²³ and by a misuse of his own free will.²⁴ In the present instance these two factors cannot well be separated completely, for sin is always a misuse of free will. On the other hand, the more we ascribe to the action of Satan, the more nearly the temptation approximates to magic or mere compulsion, and the human act and therefore also the sin are correspondingly less. But again, the less the temptation of Satan, the less is it possible to explain the facts apart from a sinfulness already present, since misuse of free will by itself is no explanation, but forces us to assume something else as prompting it. Then if we fall back directly upon the suggestions of Satan, these again could not have taken effect unless there was something already present in the soul which implied a certain readiness to pass into sensuous appetite; and any such inclination toward sin must therefore have been present in the first pair before their first sin, else they would not have been liable to temptation. Nor does it avail to break up the first sin into a number of elements with a view to finding some infinitesimal part as its germ;²⁵ for when what we have to deal with is a definite act, we must seek for something that will explain the act as a whole. And this we can never find as long as we assume an inner state in which there was no spontaneous activity of the flesh, and the God-consciousness alone held sway; for in that case no sinful appetite could ever have arisen in the pair themselves, nor could Satan have made them believe that God had forbidden something out of jealousy, but their trust in God must already have been extinguished. But if such trust had ‘died out, they must already have lost the image of God,²⁶ and sinfulness must already have been present, whether in the form of pride²⁷ or otherwise. Our last resource would then be to explain the first sin as due to such a misuse of freedom as had no ground whatever in the first man’s inward being, i.e. to say that he chose the evil without a motive. But either this must have taken place prior to his having had any exercise in the good at all, since even the briefest exercise would have induced a facility which, in the absence of conflicting motives, would necessarily have proved operative, in which case his sin must have been his first free act—the least admissible of all positions; or else there was an impossibility that repetition of actions should produce any facility in the first pair, and this again would imply that no confirmation in good and no increase in the power of the God-consciousness was possible for them²⁸—an idea that conflicts with every view of man’s original perfection.

This difficulty of representing to ourselves the emergence of the first sin without assuming a foundation for it in a prior sinfulness is immensely aggravated if we consider the circumstances in which the Mosaic narrative exhibits the first pair. For one thing, it is almost impossible to conceive of temptation, or of the abuse of free will, amid such simplicity of life, and where the natural wants were so easily satisfied; since in such a condition of things no single object could have offered an exceptionally strong allurement. And again, it is quite impossible to imagine a direct intercourse with God without an intensified love to God and an increased knowledge of Him which must have preserved our first parents from the influence of foolish illusions. This has indeed been recognized from early times.²⁹ And, indeed, in view of the ease with which sin might have been avoided, the more literally we accept the narrative, the greater is the propensity to sin which must be assumed as already present. Indirectly this appears to be assumed even by those who assert that God did not will to confirm man in good prior to his voluntary obedience.³⁰ For, as such confirmation in good must have been a special work of God, and not something effected by the exercise of powers lodged in human nature, this fact, while presupposing the above-mentioned incapacity to acquire facility through exercise, also presupposes that, without such special divine aid, the spiritual energy in man might quite as readily at any moment have proved too weak to meet a sensuous impulse.

3. With this is connected the fact that, apart from the vitiating power exercised even in our condition of innate sinfulness by actual sin in strengthening inclination by habit, nothing of a peculiar or novel nature took place in our first parents as a result of the first sin;³¹ and that what is represented in our symbolical books as such a result must be assumed to have preceded the sin. The understanding must have been involved in an utterly heathen darkness before it could have credited a falsehood to the effect that God grudged man the knowledge of good, and the will must have lacked the energy to resist even the weakest enticement if the mere sight of the forbidden fruit could exert such power over it. In fact, Adam must have been sundered from God before his first sin; for, when Eve handed him the fruit he ate it without even recalling the divine interdict; and this presupposes a like corruption of his nature; for surely incorrupt nature could not have indulged appetite in express disobedience to the divine command. Nor can it fairly be maintained that this reasoning hangs entirely on a literal interpretation of the Mosaic narrative, for, whatever idea we may have of the first sin, we must always assume the priority of some sinful element; and if we seek to understand that sin genetically, we must follow a method akin to that adopted here. If, however, human nature in the first pair was the same before the first sin as it appears subsequently alike in them and in their posterity, we cannot say that human nature was changed as a result of the first sin, and the statement of our symbolical books to that effect is one we must depart from. No one can be asked to believe that in a single individual the nature of the species could be changed and yet that individual remain the same; for the terms ‘individual’ and ‘species’ lose their meaning unless everything met with in the individual, whether successively or simultaneously, can be understood from and explained by the nature of the species. If an individual belonging to a certain species manifests some attribute incompatible with the definition of the species, then either the definition of the species has been wrong from the start and needs to be corrected, or we were misled as to the identity of the individual. Still less is it possible to suppose that such an alteration of nature should have resulted from an act of the alleged individual as such, since the individual can act only in accordance with the nature of his species, but never can act upon that nature. Hence we cannot well hold to the idea under discussion without conceding a share in the matter to the devil; and if we do this, we find an equal difficulty in avoiding the Manichæan heresy.³² For if it is quite certain that an alteration in a determinate nature cannot be effected by that nature itself, the actual alteration can be apportioned between the man and the devil only in this way, that the element of action is ascribed to the latter, and mere passivity, or receptivity, to the former. But in that case, it must be further admitted that, if the individuals are to remain the same, it is a mere confusion of speech to describe the outcome as merely an alteration of their nature, and that it is more correct to say that the human nature which God originally created was destroyed by the devil through the first sin, when the nature acquired is the work of the devil in the same degree as was the first sin, because the nature created by God so remained purely passive as to allow itself to be completely permeated by the alteration wrought by the devil. To the view that of course in that case the counter-change to be wrought by redemption is once more a subversion of preceding nature, little objection can be taken by those who maintain that the present nature of man is incapable even of appropriating redemption.³³ These things, however—alike the passivity of man in the event by which his nature was subverted, and the power ascribed to Satan of subverting the work of God and putting his own work in its place, so as to bring an entire world of human beings under its partial control—are quite unmistakable approaches to Manichæism. And what is said on the other side in order to nullify this adjunct of the Flacian teaching³⁴ seems to have very little foundation indeed. For, on the one hand, bare possibility is nothing except as there is a transition to actuality, and if man now cannot act otherwise than sinfully and perversely, and such self-determination to evil is the work of Satan, the still remaining work of God, so far as it is actuated by the work of Satan, now subsists only as an instrument of Satan, and is therefore only seemingly the same as it was. On the other hand, if the original work of God consisted not merely in man’s ability to think, speak, and act, but also in the free will that sets these capacities in operation, then if free will is lost, the work of God no longer has any existence. To this difficulty of avoiding on the ordinary line of thought everything of a Manichæan character is probably due the hypothesis which, while admitting a change in human nature in consequence of the first sin, still regards it as operating rather in a bodily way.³⁵ In order to keep clear of the idea that the change, namely, the loss of the power of the God-consciousness, was not prior to the sin, it is not said to have been preceded by any express interdict of God; but in that case it is not blameworthy in the first pair to have been unwilling to acknowledge the authority of obscure sentiments: and the resolve to suppress these, whatever the occasion of it, could not be reckoned sinful. And thus the spiritual vitiation of man following upon the eating of the forbidden fruit, and brought about by the effect thereof upon the body, would have taken place without sin at all, and universal sinfulness would be attributable to evil—a conclusion which, conflicting as it does with the essence of a teleological type of faith, cannot be regarded as Christian, especially as the administration of a material antidote at the right time would have rendered redemption superfluous.

We must accordingly adhere to the position that the idea of a change in human nature entailed by the first sin of the first pair has no place among the propositions which rank as utterances of our Christian consciousness. The less we found cause at a previous stage³⁶ to ascribe a high degree of religious morality and religious enlightenment to the first pair before their first sin, and the less we are able to explain the first sin as proceeding from a perfectly sinless condition, the more decisively does every reason disappear for admitting that a change in human nature was then produced. The grounds of our renouncing that idea will be all the stronger because it cannot be clearly presented to the mind, and on the one hand merely begets the Manichæan heresy, while on the other it drives many Christians, from mere dread thereof, into the Pelagian heresy, in that they will rather deny the universal incapacity of all men apart from redemption for good than derive that incapacity from such a change. The untenable character of the theory of a change, moreover, becomes specially evident when we go back to the rigid formulæ in which the older dogmaticians gave unqualified expression to the confessional view.³⁷ Thus the very first statement, namely, ‘the person corrupts the nature,’ brings out clearly the fact that, in the act in question, if the nature corrupted in consequence of it was good, the person cannot have been good, for good cannot corrupt good; but if the nature was already bad, its corruption had not been brought about by the action of the person. Similarly on the other alternative: if the person no longer was good (since in corrupting the nature it acted wrongly), while the nature was good still, since it required to be corrupted, then all wrong action on the part of all later individuals must be explicable apart from the hypothesis that their nature had to be corrupted beforehand. In that case all corruption would fall under the third formula, namely, that persons corrupt themselves and one another; which manifestly is an adequate description of all the sin that ever appears amongst men. Here, however, the nature is kept out of the matter altogether; whereas, if it is assumed that the nature had already been corrupted, there can be no talk of its corrupting the person, since the person must necessarily have within itself the corruption of the nature. Finally, if the second formula, namely, ‘the nature corrupts the person,’ is meant to refer to the propagation of original sinfulness, then, while it is true that individuals can only be as their nature is, they are nevertheless such from the first; and the form of expression is faulty, since they must have been uncorrupt before they could be corrupted. This, in turn, gives rise to fresh doubts about the first formula, for it is inconceivable that the individual person should do more to the nature than the nature to it. Were we to admit, however, and to admit as universally true that the nature corrupts the individual, then since the nature has no existence save in the totality of individuals, a fourth formula would emerge, namely, that the nature corrupts itself; a statement by the use of which hardly anyone could indicate the thoughts he really had in his mind.

4. If, accordingly, no change in human nature took place in the person of the first pair as a result of their first sin, and what is alleged to have developed from that sin must be assumed to have been in existence before it; and if this does not apply merely to the case of some particular first sin, but a like situation emerges (whatever the nature of that sin may have been) in the case of every individual; then the universal sinfulness that precedes every actual sin in the offspring is to be regarded not so much as derived from the first sin of our first parents, but rather as identical with what in them likewise preceded the first sin, so that in committing their first sin they were simply the first-born of sinfulness. It is true that our confessional books adopt the derivation in question,³⁸ but in such matters we are the less obliged to follow them because our consciousness of universal sinfulness, as set forth above,³⁹ is something inward and immediate, while that derivation of it gives a purely external account on which the inward in no way depends, and by which it cannot in any way be reinforced. But it is solely on that inward experience that our consciousness of the need of redemption depends; hence the derivation referred to is in no sense an element of our faith. And as even the confessional books for the most part do not engage in any detailed discussion as to the nature and manner of that derivation,⁴⁰ we could not but feel a difficulty if the derivation occurred in Scripture in conjunction with statements of faith properly so called. But the classical passage usually cited in its support⁴¹ shows nothing of the kind. The apostle refers to the origin of sin only with a view to elucidating the doctrine of the restoration of life through Christ, and the point of comparison is simply that each originates in and emanates from one. It is true that the apostle sets forth sin as dependent upon its first occurrence, and thus as something continuous, so that the whole continuous process of sin was introduced along with Adam’s sin, and if Adam had been able to refrain from sin, we too could have refrained. Then if we take also the previous statement, namely, that death passed upon all men for that all sinned themselves, and observe how Paul, while he certainly distinguishes between the sin of Adam and that of those who had not sinned after the likeness of Adam’s transgression, yet, though including all in one condemnation, describes Adam’s contribution thereto as a small thing in comparison with what Christ had done for the removal of sin; we see that all this signally agrees with the idea that corporate sin is the corporate act of the human race, originating in the first human beings, and can be taken away only by the activity of Christ, which likewise extends to all mankind. In similar fashion Paul contrasts Adam and Christ in another reference;⁴² just as again he testifies that sin arises in us, and that our mind can be defiled, in the same way as in the case of Eve;⁴³ whence it follows that in going back to the first man for an explanation of sinfulness, we gain nothing of special importance, and that in the passages cited the sole concern was to give due weight to the relation between the earlier and the later dispensation.

We can thus readily dispense with all those artificial theories which for the most part tend only to lay stress upon the divine justice in imputing Adam’s sin to, and exacting its penalty from, his posterity. To have done with them is all the more satisfactory because they (e.g. those which assert that all mankind, as embraced in Adam’s being,⁴⁴ participated in his sin) rest upon a particular theory of the origin of individual souls, while, within our limits, we have neither grounds nor materials for propounding any such theory. Or else (e.g. those which most arbitrarily interpret God’s command as a covenant made in the person of Adam with the entire human race, the legal consequences of violating which fall also on his posterity) they bring man’s relation to God and God’s imputation of sin under the category of a merely external legal relationship, a view which has had a most detrimental effect upon interpretation of the work of redemption. This view is carried to its extremest point when people assume what has often been asserted and is widely current, though quite arbitrary and wholly groundless, that, had our first parents only withstood their first temptation successfully, no second would have been imposed upon them, and they, and we as well, would have remained for ever exempt from all temptation. The truth is rather that the temptation given in the Mosaic narrative is a most trifling one, representing the simplest and most primitive conditions; and it is in the nature of things that the more variously the powers of man came to be drawn upon, and the more complicated his circumstances became, the more dangerous must his temptations have been; while again, it seems the very acme of inconsistency to say that the Redeemer could be tempted in His earthly life, but that, if Adam and Eve had been victors in their first conflict, they would have become proof against all temptation. And indeed it is glaringly and intrinsically incompatible with all that we can learn of the divine ways, to suppose that to such an extent God should have made the destiny of the whole human race contingent upon a single moment, the fortunes of which rested with two inexperienced individuals, who, moreover, never dreamt of its having any such importance.

5. If then, on the one hand, we discard the view that a change took place in human nature itself, but, on the other, still maintain that an incapacity for good is the universal state of men, it follows that this incapacity was present in human nature before the first sin, and that accordingly what is now innate sinfulness was something native also to the first pair. This we admit; yet it must be so construed as to be compatible with the equally inherent original perfection of man, and in such a way that the state of the first human pair is understood to have been throughout analogous to our own, as described above.⁴⁵ In no sense, therefore, are we substituting for the idea of a longer or shorter state of perfectly active piety, the idea that the first free act after the awakening of the God-consciousness was sin—a conception already negatived by what has been said above.⁴⁶ The truth is rather that the awakening of the God-consciousness implies also the initiation of the good, which in turn could not remain without consequences⁴⁷ that proved operative even after the first sin. In that case, however, there must have come for our first parents a time when their sensuous nature on one side or another would gain such strength that it could win the mastery as easily as lose it. For, while we cannot be expected to form a vivid idea of the first man in his necessary diversity from us, yet there are two points in which he resembles us, and to which in him, too, we can fasten the rise of sin. Thus there was in the first pair, if not the idiosyncrasies of personal constitution, yet the idiosyncrasies of sex; and, again, while we cannot conceive of the will lagging behind the intelligence precisely as it does in ourselves, yet they were subject (in their simple life possibly in a less degree) to changes of mood amid which such shortcoming of will-power showed itself intermittently on various sides. In the light of all this, the origin of sin and the consciousness of it become quite intelligible.

Now, while the first appearance of sin in the first pair, due to that original sinfulness, not only was in itself a single and trivial event, but in particular was without any transforming influence upon human nature, yet the growth of sin in consequence of the increase of the human race by ordinary generation had its origin in the first emergence of sin, and therefore in the original sinfulness itself. And in its relation to redemption this is to be understood in the sense that without the entrance into all mankind of an element free from that sinfulness, nothing could be expected but that the disposition to the God-consciousness inherent in human nature should be constantly vitiated in its action, and everything that was developing spiritually in man ever dragged downwards under the dominion of the flesh. Finally, as regards the Mosaic narrative: in accordance with the limits which we have assigned to Dogmatics, that science cannot be expected to determine how the said record is to be interpreted, and whether it purports to be history or allegory. Without encroaching upon the work of exegesis or criticism, however, we can use the story, as the early theologians did,⁴⁸ in illustration of the universal process of the rise of sin as something always and everywhere the same, and it is in this illustrative quality that, for us, the universal significance of the narrative resides. There we find in Eve, on the one hand, a clear representation of the independent activity and revolt of the sensuous element that develops so readily upon any external incentive by way of opposition to a divine command, and likewise a clear view of how there comes to be conjoined therewith an all too easily effected vitiation of the already developed God-consciousness. On the other hand, in Adam we see how easily sin is assimilated by imitation even without any overpowering activity of sense, and how this presupposes some degree of forgetfulness of God, traceable possibly to mere lack of thought. If, moreover, we bring the story into connexion with the ideas of original perfection and original sinfulness as formulated here, by connecting the earlier state with the later, it sets before us in general how outside the sphere of redemption the good develops only alongside what is bad, and how this good includes that knowledge of the distinction between good and evil which is essential to the development of man. It is plainly indicated in the story that that knowledge was not bestowed prior to the sin, and this can easily be extended into the view that man could only have remained without sin as long as he remained without that knowledge.

6. If, accordingly, for the contrast between an original nature and a changed nature we substitute the idea of a human nature universally and without exception —apart from redemption—the same; and if, for the contrast between an original righteousness that filled up a period of the first human lives and a sinfulness that emerged in time (an event along with which and in consequence of which that righteousness disappeared), we substitute a timeless original sinfulness always and everywhere inhering in human nature and co-existing with the original perfection given along with it—though in such a way that from the concomitance and development of the two there could issue no active righteousness properly so called, but at best a vacillation between vitiated spiritual efforts and increasing and fully matured sin; if, finally, for the antithesis between an original guilt and a transmitted guilt we substitute the simple idea of an absolutely common guilt identical for all; then the confessional formulæ in which this doctrine in its relation to the succeeding one is most succinctly expressed may be qualified and supplemented as follows. In the first place, we certainly admit a universal imputation of the first sin, an imputation resting upon the belief that to whatever human individual had fallen the lot of being the first, he, too, would have committed the sin. So, too, had the actually first man been one of those born later, he would have added his quota to the deterioration above described, and therefore bears the guilt thereof as does any other. Further, in the doctrine of the Church the first sin of the first man, and that only, is called ‘originating original sin,’ and the sinful constitution of all other men ‘originated original sin ‘—the bent and inward disposition thus bearing the name of’ sin’ equally with the act itself; but we transfer this to the relation between each earlier generation and the one immediately succeeding it, and maintain that the actual sin of the earlier is always the originating original sin for the later, while the sinfulness of the later generation since it produces the actual sins thereof, is also original sin, while yet as dependent upon the sin of the earlier it is originated, and thus is originated original sin as well. Finally, we make good another defect by applying the distinction of ‘originating’ and ‘originated’ also to actual sin in its relation to original sin. On the one hand, we use this distinction to set forth the interrelationship of all who are living at one time, the actual sin of those who play a more vigorous and stimulating rôle being the originating, that of the more passive the originated; on the other hand, the collective sin of each generation is in turn originating with respect to the sinfulness of the succeeding one, just as that collective sin itself is rooted in the original sin originated by the earlier. In this compact group of ideas sin in general, and original sin in particular, are seen to be the corporate action and the corporate guilt of the whole human race.

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Footnotes

1. 62, 1; § 64, 1 and 2. ↩

2. 8, 2. ↩

3. ↩

4. Phil. 2¹³, cf. 4¹³. ↩

5. Cf. Conf. Belg. xiv., the two statements: Adeo ut ipsi (homini) tantum exigua illorum (donorum omnium quae a Deo acceperat) vestigia remanserint: and, Nulla enim intelligentia nec voluntas conformis est divinae, nisi quam Christus in illis fuerat operatus. ↩

6. Solid. declar. ii. p. 656: ita ut in hominis natura post lapsum ante regenerationem ne scintillula quidem spiritualium virium reliqua manserit aut restet, quibus ille ex se ad gratiam Dei praeparare se, aut oblatam gratiam apprehendere aut eius gratiae capax esse possit. This, however, as may be readily discerned, is cancelled (so far at least as it conflicts with our statement) by what follows (p. 771): Hoc Dei verbum etiam nondum ad Deum conversus externis auribus audire aut legere potest. In eiusmodi enim externis rebus homo adhuc aliquo modo liberum arbitrium habet, ut … verbum Dei audire vel non audire possit. ↩

7. Solid. declar., p. 643: Repudiantur … qui docent … hominem ex naturali nativitate adhuc aliquid boni … reliquum habere, capacitatem videlicet … in rebus spiritualibus aliquid inchoandi operandi aut cooperandi. ↩

8. Enchirid. xii.: Quamdiu itaque natura corrumpitur inest ei bonum quo privetur … quocirca bonum consumere corruptio non potest nisi consumendo naturam. ↩

9. Matt. 22³⁷⁻³⁹, supplemented by John 13³⁴ and Col. 3²³. ↩

10. We must accordingly adhere to the quite general statement in Melanchthon, Loc. theol. (De lib. arb.): Non potest voluntas exuere nascentem nobiscum pravitatem, nec potest legi Dei satisfacere.—(De pecc.): Peccatum originis est in natis ex virili semine amissio lucis in mente et aversio voluntatis a Deo et contumacia cordis ne possint vere obedire legi Dei. ↩

11. Melanchth., Loc., p. 110: Itaque semper cum malo originali simul sunt actualia peccata. ↩

12. Peccatum originis originatum. ↩

13. Peccatum originis originans. ↩

14. Reatus. ↩

15. Corruptio naturae. Another interpretation of this phrase will be referred to later. ↩

16. Vitium originis. ↩

17. Morbus originis. On morbus and vitium, cf. Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes, iv. 13, Ern. ↩

18. Apol. Conf. i.: Defectus iustitiae originalis et concupiscentia sunt poenae. ↩

19. Cf. § 15. ↩

20. Cf. § 60, i. ↩

21. Conf. Aug. ii.; Apol. Conf. i.; Conf. Helv. viii.; Conf. Belg. xv.; Art. Smalc. i. ↩

22. Conf. Gall. x.: Nec putamus necesse esse inquirere, quinam possit hoc peccatum ab uno ad alterum propagari. ↩

23. Conf. Belg. xiv.: verbis et imposturis diaboli aurem praebens. Cf. Gerh., Loc. Th., t. iv. p. 294 sq. ↩

24. Augustin., Enchirid. 30: Homo libero arbitrio male utens et se perdidit et ipsum. ↩

25. Luther, on Gen. 3³, finds the beginning of sin in the fact that Eve tampers with God’s word, and adds to God’s command the word ‘perhaps ‘; as if that would have been a sin unless the emergent wanton appetite had not lain behind it. Others, like Lyra, insist rather upon the sensuous pleasure itself, and regard the act of looking at the tree as the beginning of the sin; but here a like criticism applies. ↩

26. Non est anima ad imaginem Dei, in qua Deus non semper est (Ambros. Hexaëm. vi. 18). ↩

27. Augustin., d. Gen. c. Man. ii. 22: Videmus his verbis per superbiam peccatum esse persuasum. ↩

28. Origen. in Matth. x. 11: Πάλιν τε αὖ οὐκ ἂν, ἀστείας καὶ ἀμεταβλήτου φύσεως ὢν ἀπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀπέστρεφεν ἄν, μετὰ τὸ χρηματίσαι δίκαιος ἐκ τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀδικίαν. ↩

29. Augustin., de corr. et grat. xii.: Adam et terrente nullo et insuper contra Dei terrentis imperium libero usus arbitrio non stetit in tanta non peccandi facilitate. ↩

30. See Gerhard, Loc. Th., t. iv. p. 302. ↩

31. Conf. Helv. ix.: Post lapsum intellectus obscuratus est, voluntas vero ex libera facta est serva.—Conf. Belg. xiv.: Homo se ipsum verbis diaboli aurem praebens … a Deo, qui vera ipsius erat vita, penitus avulsit totamque naturam suam corrupit. ↩

32. Cf. § 22. ↩

33. Solid. Decl. ii., p. 656. ↩

34. Solid. Decl., p. 648: Asserimus id ipsum esse Dei opus, quod homo aliquid cogitare loqui agere operari potest … quod vero cogitationes verba facta eius prava sunt … hoc originaliter et principaliter est opus Satanae. ↩

35. Reinhard, Dogm., §§ 75–80. ↩

36. Cf. § 61. ↩

37. Quenstedt, Syst. Theol., p. 913: Tribus autem modis fit peccatum quando persona corrumpit naturam, ut factum ab Adamo et Eva, quando natura corrumpit personam, ut fit in propagatione peccati originis, quando persona corrumpit personam, ut fit in peccatis actualibus. ↩

38. Conf. Aug. ii.; Apol. Conf. i.; Conf. Helv. viii.; Conf. Belg. xv.; Art. Smalc. i., etc. ↩

39. ↩

40. The Conf. Gall. x. says explicitly: Nec putamus necesse esse inquirere quinam possit hoc peccatum ab uno ad alterum propagari. Similarly Calvin, Instit. ii. 1, 7: Neque in substantia carnis aut animae causam habet contagio: sed quia a Deo ita fuit ordinatum, ut quae primo homini dona contulerat, ille tam sibi quam suis haberet simul et perderet. From which we see clearly that Calvin’s main concern is to repudiate explanations which might have links of connexion with non-Christian views. ↩

41. Rom. 5¹²⁻²¹. ↩

42. 1 Cor. 15²¹⁻²². ↩

43. 2 Cor. 11³. ↩

44. Ambros., in Rom. v.: Manifestum in Adam omnes peccasse quasi in massa.—Ex eo igitur cuncti peccatores quia ex ipso omnes sumus.—Hieron., in Hosea vi. 7: Et ibi in paradiso omnes praevaricati sunt in me in similitudinem praevaricationis Adam. ↩

45. Cf. §§ 60, 61, 68. ↩

46. Cf. § 67, 2. ↩

47. Hugo of St. Victor, Opp. iii. 181: Paradisus est locus inchoantium et in melius proficientium, et ideo ibi solum bonum esse debuit, quia creatura a malo initianda non fuit, non tamen summum. This implies, of course, that as soon as sin appeared, the state of Paradise must have come to an end altogether. ↩

48. Augustin., de Gen. c. Man. ii. 21: Etiam nunc in unoquoque nostrum nil aliud agitur, cum ad peccatum delabitur, quam tunc actum est in illis tribus, serpente, muliere, et viro. ↩