§ 74. There is no difference of worth between men in regard to sin, apart from the fact that it does not in all stand in the same relationship to redemption. 1. In harmony with what has been said above, all actual sins must rank as equal not only in respect of their nature and character, but also of their origin; for every such sin is a manifestation of the universal sinfulness, and represents a victory, though but momentary or partial, of flesh over spirit. The determining power of the God-consciousness, which in sin is obstructed, may of course be greater or less. Now if it is greater, then on the one hand the spiritual life in which it is found as such must be stronger, and in such a life, by reason of that strength, sin is increasingly in process of disappearing, and is therefore less. On the other hand, however, we may affirm that if the spiritual strength is greater, the resistance of the flesh that overcomes it must be stronger, and therefore the sin greater. Since, therefore, from different points of view we get opposite results as to the one and the same case of sin, we must either regard all sins as equal, because from opposite points of view each is at once greater and less; or we must first combine the two points of view, whereupon we find that the determination of the sinful quality of single moments becomes feasible only by reference to the condition of the acting subject as a whole, i.e. his state as one in which sinfulness is on the increase or on the wane—which, within the sphere of the Christian consciousness, means by reference to the individual’s state of grace, precisely as our proposition affirms. Apart from this, however, and each moment being taken by itself, it remains true that what gives a moment the character of sin is the self-centred activity of the flesh, whereas the content of the sin does not enable us to differentiate; for all activities of the flesh are good when subservient to the spirit, and all are evil when severed from it. The same result follows when we note that the amount of sin is greater, the slighter the outward solicitations which need to be overcome. For these, too, are not the same for everyone; to a more experienced subject a particular solicitation may be insignificant which to others is strong and urgent. Doubtless, therefore, there are greater and lesser sins, though for us they are so only with respect to the efficacy of redemption; and, accordingly, Church teaching has rightly excluded from this sphere the doctrine of the equality of all sins.⁴ Taken by itself, however, the doctrine might possibly be defended. Hence most of the ordinary classifications of sin, disregarding as they do the relationship to redemption, assert a distinction among sins as concerns their form and appearance, but do not assert a difference in their proper quality as sins.

2. Surveying the diversities of actual sin with a view to arranging them in distinct groups, we encounter at the outset the two principal forms which are associated with the two main elements of original sinfulness;⁵ thus actual sin may be either more an expression of appetite or more a positive obscuration, i.e. a vitiation, of the God-consciousness. We cannot wholly separate the two, for the one ever evokes the other; thus when in any social group, some definite form of appetite breaks out predominantly, it is presently followed by a transformation of the God-consciousness as a means of cloaking the discordance. So Paul⁶ explains how each of the two aggravates the other; and if we imagine the two at their climax—the superstitious frenzy that heaps up all the products of idolatrous error, and the passionate frenzy of unbridled lust—and if each of them inevitably seems equally deserving of condemnation, it is clear that they must have been equal in their original action and reaction upon each other.

As regards the division into outward and inward sins, what was said above⁷ with a view to setting aside this distinction might be open at most to the following objection. The external accomplishment of an act of sin occupies a divisible portion of time, and for the most part can be resolved into a succession of moments. Now just as it is obvious that, if a reaction of the God-consciousness takes place during that time, a different quality emerges, so the sinful quality of an action—other things being equal—is the more aggravated the longer the interval in which no such reaction supervenes. What follows from this, however, is simply that there are some sinful acts that point to a greater power of sin than others; but in no sense does it follow that anyone is incapable of committing acts of the same sinful quality, though not of the same kind as these. On the other hand, it remains true that in every individual there are inward stirrings, sinful or akin to sin, which never take shape as outward sins because at bottom and even inwardly they are the workings of others’ thoughts and excitations rather than his own, and thus belong to the communal life rather than to the individual himself. But there will be no one whose life exhibits these only, and when we discount them the distinction between outward and inward sins is seen to be fortuitous rather than essential.

Again, when a distinction is drawn between intentional and unintentional sins, it is customary to regard the former as in general the greater. But this is wrong. Unintentional sins, so far as they are really actions and not mere consequences,⁸ are sins either of ignorance or of impetuosity. But if the ignorance is due to a defective estimate of the ethical significance of our actions generally, or the impetuosity due to a passionate tendency of one kind or another; and if, on the other hand, a transient incapacity during an instant peculiarly unfavourable to one’s resisting a sensuous impulse can be thought of as a completely isolated moment having no subsequent results; then intentional sins of the latter type will be lesser than unintentional sins of the former type. If, accordingly, sometimes the one class may be greater, and sometimes the other, the two, considered in themselves, are equal.

The most important division of sins in the present reference is unquestionably that of mortal and venial sins; yet as these terms do not themselves involve a rigorous antithesis, it is difficult to say what the distinction really means. Some thinkers ascribe to them the very sense which is indicated in our proposition as constituting the only tenable distinction;⁹ in which case we should have to discuss only how far the idea of punishment must have a place in the definition or not. Certainly, such interpretations make it quite clear that otherwise the distinction rests solely on the relationship of the acting subject to redemption. But this agreement seems once more to vanish when it is likewise asserted that even those who have been brought within the scope of redemption can commit mortal sins, but that the redemptive link is thereby severed¹⁰— a view the possibility of accepting which cannot be discussed here.

As, however, the possibility of restoring the redemptive tie must not be excluded, we are brought back, on the one hand, to the older definition, according to which only those non-venial sins are absolutely mortal in the interval between which and death no restoration of the redemptive link takes place;¹¹ while, on the other, we must now make a distinction amongst venial sins themselves, since even mortal sins under certain conditions become venial; and thus the intrinsic distinction is lost. If to this we add the fact that the sin against the Holy Spirit is thought by many to be a sin which renders impossible any restoration of the link with redemption, then, instead of a simple antithesis we get the following gradation. Sins in themselves venial are those of the forgiven which can hardly be avoided in the present life,¹² and always carry their remission with them;¹³ moreover, all the sins of the unforgiven become venial should the unforgiven be converted, as also all intentional sins of the redeemed, should they return to grace. Mortal sins again, strictly so called,¹⁴ are those of the two last-named groups should the connexion with redemption not be respectively effected or restored; while the only absolutely mortal sin—assuming that the exegesis is correct—is that against the Holy Spirit. Obviously, however, the difference between sins in themselves venial (requiring as they do repentance and prayer for pardon) and the mortal sins of the forgiven (which become venial if by repentance the forgiven again attain to the temporarily lost state of grace), is the less pronounced the shorter the interval between the lapse and the recovery. Indeed, in the light of the qualification ‘against conscience,’ this difference might be traced back to that between intentional and unintentional sins. Since, however, even in the state of grace the power of the will always lags behind the intelligence even though the knowledge of the sinfulness of one’s ordinary states becomes deeper, it follows that intentional sins will occur which, being as they are associated with progress, cannot bring about a complete lapse from grace. Ignoring this aspect of progress, some rashly contend that the regenerate can no longer sin knowingly—‘knowing’ implying at all events the lowest degree of ‘intentional’; whereas all we are entitled to say (on the analogy of what was said regarding the relationship of the individual man to his nature) is that he cannot by a single act (an act, moreover, not exempt from the influence of divine grace) wholly dispossess himself of this state of grace. In the last resort, accordingly, there is no essential distinction except that which is based upon the relations of the acting subject to redemption. As regards the sin against the Holy Spirit, that no doubt would form a species by itself; but as long as the interpretation of the passages upon which the conception rests¹⁵ is in dispute, Dogmatics must leave the ascertainment of the facts to the exegetes—just as it must leave to the pastoral office the handling of the case where a man believes himself guilty of the sin, and cannot presume to decide either what the sin is or in whom it is found. In general, however, it must repudiate the suggestion that there may be a sin which, though repented of in view of redemption, yet cannot be forgiven, as setting a limit to the universality of redemption.

3. A like result follows from a closer study of those gradations of human states relatively to sin which, taken directly from passages of Scripture, or indirectly from popular exposition, have passed into Dogmatics. Thus the state of freedom,¹⁶ in contrast to that of bondage, is taken to be that in which (conceived in its ideal form) only sin in itself venial is to be found, this being due to a link with redemption so stable and vital that unintentional sins in such a life always are less grave than any intentional sin. The very term ‘bondage,’ however, as applied to the state in which sin is predominant implies that the man, by reason of his inward recognition of the God-consciousness, is not fulfilling the demands of the flesh with entire acquiescence. But if we reflect that freedom, as a consequence of the link with redemption, can grow only out of a state of bondage, we can see how freedom, in its gradual development through exercise, will still continue to exhibit traces of bondage. From the state of bondage, again, it is customary to distinguish as still worse the states of self-assurance, hypocrisy, and hardening. But if there should supervene a state worse than bondage, the inward recognition just referred to must needs have been utterly stifled. Yet, since even in the state of freedom it momentarily falls silent, when sins of impetuosity are done, such silence could only serve to introduce an altogether distinct state if it could be regarded as continuous, and the inner voice as irretrievably extinguished; and this is in fact the sense of the term hardening¹⁷—a state which manifests itself most distinctly in a conscious and fixed will not to give effect to the God-consciousness. This condition, however, can never be more than approximated to, for the disposition to the God-consciousness is a constituent element of human nature,¹⁸ so that, even in such a vitiation of that consciousness as ascribes human vices to the gods, the soul is never wholly without a dim sense of the presence of something incompatible with the God-consciousness. But were we to assume that that consciousness is dead beyond recall,¹⁹ and thus that the hardened soul is altogether impervious to grace, we should be placing a particularistic limitation on the sphere of redemption. The consciousness of the divine law, accordingly, cannot be wholly wanting except when the God-consciousness has not developed, i.e. at a period prior to the state of bondage. If in the individual soul the development is obstructed by the power of the sensuous, this may be a state of brutishness; but that, too, would belong to the state of bondage, for the obstructive element is identical with that which impedes the efficacy of what has already developed. The states of self-assurance and hypocrisy,²⁰ lying between the two extremes of freedom and hardening, do not stand in markedly different relations to these extremes, nor are they at all mutually exclusive; they really belong to the state of bondage, and are compatible with all its various degrees, except the bondage present to a minor extent in the state of freedom. Here too, then, we ultimately have only the antithesis of freedom and bondage, and these in turn simply reflect the two diverse relations to redemption.

4. The distinction amongst sins which our proposition sets forth as the only essential one, if we also take account of the relationship of actual sin to original sinfulness, can be most definitely expressed as follows. The actual sin of those who have been brought into permanent connexion with the power of redemption is no longer ‘originating’ in themselves, or, through their ill-doing, in others. It has been vanquished by the energy of the God-consciousness implanted in them personally and spontaneously, so that where it still shows itself it is seen to be on the wane, and has no further contaminating power. Hence the sins of the regenerate are such as do not obstruct the spiritual life either in themselves or in the community. On the other hand, the sins of the unregenerate are always ‘originating,’ not only in the individuals themselves, since every sin adds to the force of habit and thus to the vitiation of the God-consciousness, but also beyond themselves, since like instigates like, and the vitiated God-consciousness spreads and establishes itself by communication to others. Thus whatever element of spiritual life may exist in a society still outside the sphere of redemption, and may seek to expand and rise from lower stages to higher, whether in political life or in science and art, has its progress constantly thwarted by such sin, and dragged back into the whirlpool, so that the sin may be truly said to be detrimental to the spiritual life of the community, or in other words to rob the community of spiritual life. If we incline to abrogate this antithesis, and assume merely a difference between a larger freedom in some and a lesser freedom in others without reference to a definite point of demarcation at which a bondage characterized by a mere presentiment of freedom passes into a freedom merely showing traces of bondage, we shall thereby be abandoning the attitude of at least the stricter type of Christianity, and our position, in virtue of its Pelagian tendency, would at last merge in naturalism, for once that antithesis has been surrendered, redemption would come to have no distinctive inner effect whatever. Such effect, however, is so palpably present everywhere in Holy Scripture as an ultimate fact of consciousness, that it is unnecessary to go back to particular expressions and formulæ, such as ‘being buried in the death of Christ,’ or ‘the new creature,’ or in the contrast between the carnal and the spiritual man. If, however, we thought of. describing the latter contrast as one between a state in which sin still persists and a state in which everything is sin, we should thereby warp the facts, since there is no hard-and-fast distinction between the two; and, besides, it would be unduly harsh to stigmatize as sin everything noble and beautiful that has developed in heathenism. Here we can only seek to supply what is defective in that statement of the antithesis. We say then, in harmony with what was argued above, that in all good works of the regenerate there remains some form of venial sin, but it is, so to speak, merely the shadow of sin, that is— if we consider the inward state as a whole—the not-willed but actually repudiated after-effect of the force of habit, which can only be overcome by degrees. On the other hand, in the sins of the natural man, which as such are not yet forgiven, there is always the now deeper and now fainter shadow of the good, namely, an acquiescent presentiment or imagining of a state free from inward conflict; only a shadow, it is true, because these imaginings never take practical shape or become permanently effective. So, too, in heathenism the communal life, principally because of the vitiated God-consciousness with which it was necessarily bound up, was never able to produce anything higher. Similarly in the unenlightened man who has only an outward connexion with Christianity we may indeed trace many a Christian feature, which nevertheless is not in him a thing of living power, but merely the reflection of what is present as a reality in others.

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Footnotes

1. Actio pugnans cum lege Dei (Melanchthon, l.c.) might also denote such a movement, as yet entirely inward. ↩

2. Hence, the Christian consciousness can least of all be satisfied with theories like that of Reinhard (Dogmatik, § 75): Peccatum est quaevis aberratio a modo tenendae verae felicitatis. ↩

3. Calvin, Inst. ii. 3.3: Omnibus ejusmodi portentis obnoxia est unaquaeque anima. ↩

4. Conf. et Expos. simpl.* viii.: Fatemur etiam peccata non esse aequalia, licet ex eodem corruptionis et incredulitatis fonte exoriantur. Melanchth., Loc. Th.* p. 126: Ac stoicae illae disputationes execrandae sunt, quas servant aliqui disputantes omnia peccata aequalia esse. ↩

5. Apol. Conf. i. (from Hugo of St. Victor): Originale peccatum est ignorantia in mente et concupiscentia in carne. ↩

6. Rom. 1²¹⁻²⁶. ↩

7. In section 2 of the foregoing paragraph. ↩

8. In the latter case they would not be sins at all, and in view of this some qualification must be applied to the principle found in Melanchth., Loc. Th., p. 117: Nihil est peccatum nisi sit voluntarium. Haec sententia de civilibus delictis tradita est … sed non transferendum est hoc dictum ad doctrinam Evangelii de peccato. ↩

9. Melanchth., op. cit., p. 332: Haec mala in renatis sunt … sed quia persona accepta est … fiunt huic personae haec mala venialia peccata; and p. 123: actualia peccata quae in non renatis omnia sunt mortalia. The most definite statement of this view is found in Baumgarten, Theol. Str. ii. 484: Since, however, we do not admit this, namely, that mortalia and venialia are to be distinguished by a discrimen objectivum, but rather take the relationship of the person concerned to the reconciliation brought by Christ as the ground of distinction, etc. ↩

10. Melanchth., op. cit., p. 124: Necesse est autem discernere peccata quae in renatis in hac vita manent ab illis peccatis, propter quae amittuntur gratia et fides. ↩

11. Augustine, de Corr. et Grat. 35: Ego autem id esse dico peccatum ad mortem, fidem quae per dilectionem operatur deserere usque ad mortem. ↩

12. Augustine, de Spir. et Litt. 48: non impediunt a vita aeterna iustum quaedum peccata venialia, sine quibus haec vita non ducitur. ↩

13. Baumgarten, loc. cit.: For, although we say that they are called venialia because they always carry remission with them … ↩

14. Melanchthon, loc. cit.: Est igitur actuale mortale in labente post reconciliationem actio interior vel exterior pugnans cum lege Dei facta contra conscientiam. p. 276: nec potest stare cum malo proposito contra conscientiam fides. ↩

15. Matt. 12³¹, Luke 12¹⁰. ↩

16. Rom. 6¹⁸⁻²² 8². ↩

17. Reinhard’s explanation in Dogm. § 88, ‘Conditio hominis qui diutius peccando tandem desiit propositis ad virtutem incitamentis moveri,’ requires to be brought closer to the standpoint of religion, but even so would come to the same thing. ↩

18. Augustine, de Spir. et Litt. 48: Nam remanserat utique id, quod anima hominis nisi rationalis esse non potest; ita ibi etiam lex Dei non ex omni parte deleta per iniustitiam. ↩

19. This is certainly not implied either in Heb. 3⁸⁻¹³ (taken in relation to Ex. 17⁷) or in 2 Cor. 3¹⁴. ↩

20. Cf., amongst others, Reinhard, loc. cit. ↩