However, that the principal thesis may appear more obvious, I desire now to prove, besides those former statements, that a substance can be a quantum without any absolute thing really distinct added to it. For it was shown before that the divine power can make and preserve a whole substance without a whole absolute accident inhering in it. It was also proved that, if it should have pleased the divine will, it is possible to preserve in the future any substance now extended and present under its accidents and to separate or destroy or annihilate all the accidents; and the divine power is not compelled by virtue of this to transfer a substance from place to place or to change it locally.
From which I deduce such a proposition: that the divine power can preserve however freely or contingently, this substance, which is now a quantum, unmoved locally as regards itself as a whole and each substantial part of it, and it may destroy a whole quantity really distinct from this substance and inhering in the substance. On the contrary also, and without reason, it seems to curtail the divine power to say that, if God wills to preserve in being a substance prior naturally with every accident inhering in it and to destroy an absolute accident inhering in it, it is necessary for God necessarily to change the substance locally and to transfer it from one place to another.
Since we may also frequently see that a natural agent destroys any accident of the same subject without the destruction and local change of a subject; it must not, therefore, be said that it may be impossible for the divine power, to which all things are completely subjected, to destroy a whole quantity which is an absolute accident inhering in this wood, without the destruction of that wood and without local change of the same. When this has been done, it is necessary to say that this substance is a quantum, since it may have part outside of part, as before; for unless the parts of that substance could be separate, as before, there could not be a whole substance in a whole place and part in part, as before, before the destruction of the accident. and consequently this substance would be moved locally, which is contrary to the thesis.
This substance is, therefore, a quantum and it is posited that no accident, which is an absolute accident, inheres in it; for according to the thesis every such is destroyed through the divine power; therefore, this substance is a quantum without a quantity, which may be an absolute accident inhering in it.
However, if that event is posited, it can not as yet be concluded that this substance may remain a quantum; for it is manifest from this statement, this whole substance is preserved in being through divine power, that no part of it is corrupted or destroyed; therefore, the same substantial parts remain which were before.
I ask concerning those parts; whether they are separate locally in situation; (if this is conceded, the thesis is maintained, since it may have been proved before that every thing per se one having parts separate in place and situation is a quantum;) or whether these parts are not separate in place and situation, which can not be granted; for it would follow from this that they would be changed locally. For if they are not now separate locally and were formerly separate locally and one is not converted into another, since both may truly remain, it is necessary that one of them be changed locally.
Again, I take one part of that substance, say, A, and I ask, whether A coexists with that part of the place with which it previously coexisted, or does not coexist with that part of the place. If A does coexist with that part of the place; for the same reason another part of that substance coexists with another part of the place with which it coexisted before. From which it follows that the whole substance coexists with the whole place and part with a whole part; and consequently, this whole substance has parts separate from parts in situation; as parts of a place, with which they coexist, are separate in situation. But if A does not exist with that part of a place with which it coexisted before; therefore, that part is changed locally; for everything, which is present in a thing at first and remaining afterwards is not present in that place, is necessarily transferred from place to place; since it may not be outside a place and so a part would change the place, which is contrary to the thesis.
Nor is it sufficient to say that this substance is not in a place unless through a quantity which is an accident of that substance; and, indeed, when a quantity is destroyed, that substance is neither in a place nor is it changed locally; for that is not stated catholicly. For according to the Holy Fathers and the authorized Doctors, and it is satisfactory according to the intention of the canonical scriptures, an angel is in a place and is transferred from one place to another, in as much as it may not be a quantum but indivisible lacking all the parts created to be separate locally.
Therefore, it would be much more suitable for a substance having parts created to be separate locally to be in a place and to be changed locally, although it may not have a quantity which may be an absolute accident really distinct from it and inhering in it. On the contrary, no matter how much a substance may be separate from every accident, thus far it will be in a place unless it were placed outside of the world. And not only the whole substance will be in a place, but indeed each part of it will be in a place. And then I ask about this part A; whether it is in the place in which it was before, and is held intent, or is in another place and consequently is changed locally, which is contrary to the thesis.
Nor is it sufficient to say that this substance is not in a place circumscriptively but definitively; for to say this is to concede the thesis. For if the prior case is posited; from this very statement that this substance is in a place definitively, it will be in a place circumscriptively. The reason for this is; because if that substance is in some place definitively; from this it follows that A, which is part of that substance, may be in a place definitively. Then I ask, whether or not A is in that part of a place definitively. If it be granted that it is, for the same reason another part will be in another part definitively; from which it follows that these parts are separate locally and in situation. But every whole having parts separate locally is in a place circumscriptively. Therefore, this whole substance is thus in a place circumscriptively. But if it be granted that A is not definitively in a place or in that part of a place in which it was before, either this is because it is elsewhere definitively and consequently is changed locally, or because it is not anywhere, which can not be conceded, since even an angel must be placed somewhere; however, if this is granted, it follows that it is changed locally, from which it is not definitively nor circumscriptively in the place in which it was before; and yet in the nature of things it really remains.
So, therefore, since the divine power may be able to preserve a substance in the same place and destroy every accident inhering in it, which is an absolute accident, there is no contradiction involved in the statement that a substance may be a quantum without a quantity, though an accident inhere in it.
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