Besides the former reason, it can be concluded from other reasons, that substance can be a quantum without a distinct quantity added to it; for it requires no less virtue to preserve two substances created to make and constitute one substance without all the absolute accidents inhering in it, when they do not make or constitute one whole substance, than when they constitute one whole substance. as when two bodies of water are taken, say, A and B, it requires no less virtue to preserve A and B in distinct places without all the absolute accidents inhering in them, when they do not make one total body of water than when they make parts of one water. But the omnipotence of God can separate A and B from all their accidents and preserve A and B in distinct places; as A here, and B at Rome, if it pleases Him. For, if the omnipotence of God could separate the one water at Rome from its every accident, and another here existing from its every accident, it is not necessary that God should transfer that water, which is at Rome, even here, or this water even to Rome; nor would it be necessary that He should transfer them to some intermediate place; but He might be able to preserve that there and this here. Therefore, with equal facility, if it should please Him, if A and B should be joined together and constitute one water, the omnipotence of God might be able to preserve A and B in distinct parts of a place, although He could separate A and B from all their absolute accidents. If this is posited, that total substance would have parts separate in situation, and A and B would be their own parts which were separate in situation; and consequently that total substance would be a quantum and yet without a quantity really distinct from the substance itself.
The argument is confirmed; for there appears to be no contradiction to the statement that God might be able through His infinite power to preserve that substance and destroy the accidents, as He voluntarily and freely created the whole water of the ocean under its accidents. But, if this is posited, God would never be necessitated to transfer the part of the ocean, which is in the West, even to the other part, which is in the East, or the opposite; or to transfer both parts to some intermediate place. For it does not appear to be in accord with theological statement that God would be necessitated to this; therefore, God might be able in the nature of things to preserve the whole water of the ocean and destroy every absolute accident inhering in it and yet preserve other waters, which are in the East and the West, where they were before. If this is done, that whole water would have parts separate without water added to it, and consequently would be a quantum without a quantity added.
Again, when subject and accident have parts corresponding to themselves so that the distinct parts of the substance correspond to the distinct parts of the accident, it requires no less power to preserve the parts of an accident by destroying the subject without local change of the accident or some part of it, than to preserve the parts of the substance without local change by destroying an absolute accident. But a material substance and an accident are at the same time, so that the distinct parts of an accident correspond to the distinct parts of a substance. For one part of an accident is in another part of a substance; so that distinct parts of an accident are in distinct parts of a substance, as is obvious through this which was proved before; namely, that material substance has substantial parts separate in situation. For God can preserve an absolute accident in the same place and situation by destroying the substance, as is obvious in the sacrament of the altar; therefore, there is no contradiction involved in the statement that God preserves a substance in the same place by destroying whatever absolute accident inheres in it. If this is done, that substance will be circumscriptively in a place, as before, and consequently will be a quantum without a quantity added to it.
Nor is it necessary maliciously to misrepresent by saying that it is contrary to the faith to say that the substance of the bread is corrupted in the sacrament of the altar; for this is not my statement but it is the statement of the Catholic doctors. Whence, the gloss says on the De Consecratione, Distinction II., ‘Quia corpus.’ The gloss above the word ‘convertuntur’ says: “It well states: they are converted or transubstantiated, or pass over” (supply: earthly and mortal things into the substance of Christ); “but they do not become or begin to be; for nothing becomes or begins to be the body of Christ; yet it can be conceded that the body of Christ becomes and is formed from the bread, as a crystal becomes from water, yet it is not a crystal. But it is safer not to concede this; and wherever the bread is found, the body of Christ either becomes or is produced from the bread. It is thus understood: it becomes, that is, it passes over into the body of Christ, as later this, ‘Panis’: the body of Christ either becomes from the bread, that is, it is under the species of bread, or it lies concealed or begins to be or to lie concealed, where it was not before consecration; for if the bread should become the body of Christ, there would be added to it on each single day something which was not before, and thus it would be constantly augmented.” And the gloss adds: “Do not understand, therefore, that any augmentation may be assumed from such conversion, nor in the same mode in which food is converted into flesh; but there is corruption there, that is, the substance of the bread and of the wine ceases to be there, yet there is no generation.”
Again, the gloss on the De Consecratione, Distinction II., ‘Ante benedictionem’: “Although the words may be uttered successively, yet the consecration does not become successively; but the bread is corrupted in one instant; namely, in the last instant of the utterance of the words; and, although the bread becomes the body of Christ, yet the corruption of it is instantaneous.”
Again, the gloss in the same distinction of the Chapter, ‘Panis est,’ says that “the substance of the bread ceases to be in the subvening consecration,” et cetera, in the same place. Therefore, it is not contrary to the Catholic faith to say that the substance of the bread is corrupted or destroyed in the sacrament of the altar. Therefore, since God may preserve an accident in the same place by destroying a substance, it is not impossible for Him to preserve a substance in the same place by corrupting an accident, and thus a substance will be a quantum without such an accident.
Again, if God could destroy a half of any absolute accident informing one half of that wood and could preserve the other half of the accident informing the other half of that substance, these two parts of the substance would be separate and yet one of these would be lacking every accident informing it. From this it follows that a part of a substance can be separate from a part of a substance without an accident informing it, and consequently a substance could be a quantum without a quantity added to it.
Again, it involves no greater contradiction (to say) that a substance having parts really distinct created to be separate locally may be without a whole accident added to it in a whole divisible place, so that the whole may be in a whole place and a part in a part, than that some substance lacking every such part may be in some divisible place so that a whole may be in a whole place and a whole in each part. But an angel, lacking every integral part without every absolute accident added to it, can be a whole in any divisible place and a whole in each part; therefore, it is not a contradiction that some substance having parts created to be separate locally may be a whole in a whole divisible place and a part in a part without some quantity added to it. From this it follows that it will be circumscriptively in a place without a quantity added to it. This reason is confirmed.
It involves no more of a contradiction that a corporeal substance is in a place in a mode consistent with itself without any thing added to it than that an incorporeal substance is in a place in a mode consistent with itself without an entire thing added. But the proper mode of being in a place consistent with a corporeal substance is to be in a place circumscriptively, as the proper mode of being in a place consistent with an incorporeal substance is to be in a place definitively; but an incorporeal substance can be in a place definitively without any absolute thing added to it. Therefore, it involves no contradiction that a corporeal substance is in a place circumscriptively without an entire absolute thing added to it; and so there is a quantum without an entire absolute thing added to it. Therefore, as it appears, it involves no cotradiction that any substance may be a quantum without every absolute accident added to it.
← Chapter XXV That a Substance Can Be a Quantum Without Any Absolute Thing Really · Contents · Chapter XXVII That the Same Conclusion, Which Was Stated Before, Seems to →