After this it remains to show that not only a substance can be a quantum without a quantity added to it, but also that a substance is a quantum through its substantial parts without every quantity which may be another absolute thing really distinct from a substance and a quality.
In the first place it is settled thus: that, which can be accomplished through fewer, is needlessly accomplished through more; for this is a principle which ought not to be denied, that no plurality ought to be posited, unless it can be demonstrated through reason or through experience or through the authority of that one who can not be deceived or err. But from this a substance can be a quantum and similarly a quality can be a quantum without such a quantity distinct from a substance and a quality. It can be demonstrated neither through reason nor through experience, that there may be another such quantity. Neither is this found expressed by any author who can not err; for it is not found to have been revealed by God. Therefore, it is not necessary to posit such a quantity; and so it would be posited needlessly; for all, which can be saved through such a thing, can be saved without it through this, that a substance has substantial parts really distinct created to be separate locally, which parts of the substance as well as of the qualities, as they are brought into being, so they become separate by virtue of an efficient and a final cause. For by the same virtue by which different parts of a substance and of qualities proceed from non-being to being, they also take on being in distinct places. And, indeed, as nothing is necessarily required aside from an efficient, formal, final, and material cause; nor is it previously demanded for this, that a substance and parts of a substance may be brought from non-being to being; so nothing aside from the previous causes is necessarily acquired for this, that one part of a substance be outside of another part or separate from another part. For it appears wonderful that one accident later than a substance and the parts of it might be able to make one part of a substance to be outside another part, and yet the essential causes of a thing would not be able to make this without such an accident; for such an accident is not required for a separation of some things, since two substances may be able to be separate, even if they were separated from all the accidents. And such an accident is not required for this, that some parts which may contribute some whole, since there may appear to be no reason why parts naturally prior to every accident can not constitute a whole, the parts of which were created to be without such an accident.
From all these statements it is gathered that a quantity of the genus ‘accident’ is neither required for the local separation of those which are created to constitute one substance; nor required for the constitution of the whole, since it may be later than the whole, and so separate parts can constitute another substance without such an accident. From this it is obvious that all things, which can be saved by the assumption of such a quantity, can be equally well saved without it. For it will be so saved that the parts of the substance and the qualities informing the substance are separate locally, and that the substance as well as the qualities are quanta; for they have part outside of part without such a quantity through this, that essential causes produce a substantial thing and a quality and produce parts of a substance and of qualities in distinct places, as if there be posited such a quantity following a substance already produced. For who could prevent God from producing one substance or quality without every accident distinct from substance and quality; and who could prevent God from placing one part of that substance and quality outside of another without the dissolution of that substance and quality without another absolute thing really distinct, if He be able to do this with such a distinct mediating thing? For this seems to limit too much the divine power to say that, although one thing having parts really distinct was produced by God, God could not be able to make them separate locally, except by giving to them a new thing or unless He break asunder or destroy the unity of them.
Again, that a substance may be a quantum through its substantial parts intrinsic in it, I show thus. That, which is circumscriptively in a place through its intrinsic parts, is a quantum through its intrinsic parts; for it was shown before that every thing, which is circumscriptively in a place, is a quantum. But every material substance is circumscriptively in a place through its substantial parts; for, as was shown before, every material substance, which is extended, is present in a place through its essential parts, so that a whole substance is present in a whole place, and a part of a substance is present in a part of a place. But any such is in a place circumscriptively, and so every such substance is a quantum through its parts intrinsic in it.
Nor is it sufficient to say that a substance does not have parts except through quantity which is a thing distinct from substance; for a substance does not depend on any accident of its own, and consequently the parts of a substance do not depend upon the parts of an accident. Therefore, if quantity may be an accident of substance, the parts of a substance do not depend either upon a quantity or upon parts of a quantity; and so substance does not have parts through quantity. Which conclusion is confirmed, for a thing has ‘being’ and ‘being distinct’ through the same; therefore, through that through which there are parts of a substance, through that those parts are also distinguished. But the parts of a substance are not through quantity; therefore, they are not distinguished through quantity; therefore, substance does not have parts through quantity, which is a thing other than substance.
Again, if quantity be a thing other than substance, then it does not make a part of a substance to be separate from a part of a substance, unless it be an efficient or final cause. But the causality of an efficient or final making parts to be separate does not prevent that thing from being a quantum through its parts intrinsic to it; for then, since God as an efficient and final cause may make the parts of any quantity at all to be separate, no quantity could be ‘quantum’ or ‘having part outside of part’ through its parts.
From this it is obvious that no matter to what extent one other quantity might be added to that substance, which has part outside of part, that substance would still be a quantum through a thing itself and its intrinsic parts. as parts of a substance are locally separate from themselves and through nothing else except through their intrinsic causes, say, efficient and final.
Nor is it sufficient to say that quantity, which is an accident, is a formal cause by which a substance is a quantum, as whiteness is a formal cause why something is white. This does not obtain; for it was shown before that every thing one numerically having part separate locally or in situation from part is a quantum. Therefore this, through which a thing is neither one numerically nor through which parts of a thing are separate in situation, is not a formal cause why that thing is a quantum. But a quantity, which is an accident, is not that formally through which a substance is one numerically; for through the same a substance is and is one numerically. But no accident is a formal cause why its subject is or will not be; therefore, the formal cause why its subject is one. Nor, indeed, is quantity a formal cause through which the parts of substance are separate locally, as something is white through whiteness; for then as it is impossible that some may be white without whiteness, whether they be separate from one another and be certain wholes existing per se or may be parts constituting some whole, so it would be impossible that those things, which are merely separate in situation through quantity, which is an accident, as a body is white through whiteness, could be separate in situation or in place without such a quantity; even if they were mutually separate and were whole quanta not making one whole, which is false.
For the omnipotence of God may be able at first to divide a piece of wood into two parts and place one of them at Rome and the other here, and afterwards separate them from all their absolute accidents. When this has been done, they would be separate locally and yet would not have such a quantity; for they are separate from that per casum. From which it is obvious that parts of a substance are not separate through such a quantity, as a body is white through whiteness.
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