Aside from the former reasons, some can be adduced based partly on the statements of other Catholic doctors who, however, deny the previous conclusion. For it appears that that proposition follows from the statements of some adversaries, ‘every absolute thing existing under any absolute accident through information so that a whole subject may be under a whole accident and a part under a part,’ can through divine power coexist with the same without information and this inherence, as is obvious. For according to many who say that substance can not be a quantum without an accident inhering in it, the extrinsic respect advening to it can be taken from the extremes remaining. And according to the same the respect of inherence of an accident to a subject is an extrinsic advening respect; therefore, it does not involve a contradiction that a substance and that thing, which they call quantity, remain without respect of such inherence. But if this is posited, the whole substance coexists with that whole quantity which is an accident; therefore, as this quantity has part separate from part so that substance will have part separate from part, and so that substance is a quantum without a quantity informing it. Nor can they say that, when a respect of inherence of a quantity to a substance is removed, the substance will not be present in the quantity so that the whole may be present in the whole quantity and a part in a part.
They can not, I say, thus evade the issue. For according to the same the respect of presentiality of a substance to a quantity is prior to the respect of inherence of a quantity to a substance, and similarly the respect of presentiality of part of a substance to part of a quantity is prior to a respect of inherence of part of a quantity to a part of a substance. This can be proved through this, that it is impossible that there may be a respect of inherence of a quantity to a substance without the respect of presentiality of a quantity to a substance, and consequently without the respect of presentiality of a substance to a quantity; for these mutual presentialities are by nature at the same time according to their principles. But the respect of presentiality can be without the respect of inherence; for a substance is present or can be in many which do not inform it nor inhere in it. But according to these writers a prior can be through divine power without a posterior; therefore, it involves no contradiction that there may be preserved a respect of presentiality of a whole substance to that whole quantity which is considered an accident inhering in it, and a respect of presentiality of a part of a substance to that part of a quantity without a respect of inherence of a quantity to a substance and without a respect of inherence of a part of a quantity to a part of a substance.
If this is posited, a whole substance is present in a whole quantity and a part of a substance is present in a part of a quantity without a respect of inherence; and consequently without this, that a substance may be informed by a quantity. And so this substance will have a part distinct from a part without a quantity informing it, and consequently there will be a quantum without a quantity informing it; for no thing per se one has part outside of part and part separate from part unless it be a quantum.
Again, the respect of presentiality of a substance in relation to ‘ubi,’ according to those writers, does not depend upon the respect of inherence of a quantity to its subject; for, if the respect of inherence of a quantity to this substance is destroyed, still this substance could be present in a place, and for the same reason the respect of presentiality of a part of a substance to a part of a place does not depend on the respect of inherence of a part of a quantity to a part of a substance. And yet according to those writers, everything, which does not depend upon another, can be preserved through divine power without it.
Therefore, the respect of presentiality of a whole substance to a whole place and of a part of a substance to a part of the place could be preserved without the respect of inherence of a quantity to a substance. When this is done, a substance will be present in the whole place and part in a part; and consequently will be circumscriptively in a place, and yet will not be informed by some quantity which may be an absolute thing really distinct from a substance; and so a substance will be a quantum without such a quantity.
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