For a fuller explanation of the preceding statement some objections must be raised. For from various sources diverse reasons theological as well as philosophical, of which I shall cite a few, are adduced to prove that every quantity may be a thing other than substance; for, if they could be solved, the remaining reasons would easily be refuted. But it is argued thus: if any quantity could not be an absolute thing other than a substance, then as the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ, so similarly some quantity is converted into the body of Christ.
Again, as the bread is converted into the body of Christ, so the substance of the bread will be converted into the body of Christ and consequently the quantity of the body of Christ will begin to be under the species of bread by virtue of the sacrament; from which it follows that the body of Christ would be a quantum both locally and circumscriptively in the sacrament of the altar by virtue of conversion; which is false.
Again, if any quantity were not a thing distinct from substance, a quantity would not remain in the sacrament of the altar, as the substance of the bread does not remain there, which is false.
Again, no accident is really the same as a substance; but every quantity is an accident, which is proved to be in accordance with the intention of the Saints and the philosophers by their testimony. For the blessed Augustine says in the De Trinitate, Book V., Chapter V.: “In created and also in changeable things it remains that that, which is not said according to substance, may be said according to accident; for all are accidental to those, which can be either lost or diminished, both magnitudes and qualities; and that which follows in relation to anything, as friendships, relationships, services, likenesses, equalities, and if anything else of the kind; both situations and conditions, both place and times.”
Again, the same writer in the same book in Chapter X.: “In things,” he says, “which are great by participation of magnitude, to which it is one thing to be, another to be great; as a great house, a great mountain, a great mind; in these things, therefore, magnitude is one thing, that which is great from the same magnitude is another; and certainly this, which is a great house, is not magnitude.”
Again, Aristotle posits nine categories as accidents, among which he enumerates quantity. From all of these statements it follows that magnitude is an accident and consequently it is a thing distinct from substance.
Again, this, which is contrary to the common opinion of the Doctors, is not, therefore, to be received as if a Catholic opinion. It is also contrary to experience; for, since a corporeal substance may be divided without the conversion of anything into that, it is effected of a less quantity without the loss of any of its part; which could not be, if quantity were not another thing really distinct from substance.
Again, in diverse substances differing in species there is a quantity the same in species; for there is not a longitude or a latitude other than species in a handful of air and of fire; which would not be true if longitude were not really distinct from substance. It is also thus shown that no quantity may really be the same as quality; for according to the philosopher, quality is not a quantum except through accident; but if quality were really the same as quantity, then it would be a quantum per se without addition.
Again, it is naturally impossible for one body, which is a quantity, to be at the same time with another body which is quantity; for dimensions mutually expel one another. But quality is at the same time with a substance. Therefore, if some quantity were really not distinct from quality and some quantity were really distinct from substance, two quantities would naturally be at the same time, and so two solidities or depths, and two longitudes and two latitudes would be at the same time; indeed many more than two; since for whatever reason whiteness would have its proper quantity, for the same reason taste would have its own, and heat its own, and humidity its own, and dryness its own; and thus of others. And so as many bodies would be long, wide, and thick as there are qualities at the same time, and so in the sacrament of the altar there would be many bodies at the same time. If this is conceded, it is possible to inquire how those qualities remaining in the sacrament of the altar remain at the same time, whenever they are moved. From this none of them is in another as if in a subject, nor are all in any one subject, if quantity may not be the only one and the subject of them; so then it is obvious that by virtue of the preceding and other arguments, it is necessary to posit a quantity differing from substance and quality.
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