But it now remains to show that all these reasons do not sufficiently agree that there may be some quantity really distinct from substance and quality.
For when it is first deduced to this inconsistency, that some quantity is converted into the body of Christ, it can first be said that the opposite of that is not found in sacred scripture; for I have never read either in the Sacred Scriptures or in the canonical law or in any authorized work that quantity is not converted into the body of Christ. For they make no mention at all whether a quantity may be converted into the body of Christ or may not be converted, as they make no mention whether a quantum may be converted into the body of Christ; although some, whom one is permitted to contradict because they mutually condemn one another, may assert that a quantity is not converted into the body of Christ.
In the second place, although it might be found that a quantity is not converted into the body of Christ, it would not be necessary to concede that quantity is a thing other than quality and substance; for the mode of signification might be able to preclude such a predication, ‘a quantity is converted into the body of Christ,’ as according to many writers. Although ‘humanity’ may not be a thing really distinct from ‘man’; yet this could be conceded, ‘man is white,’ and this may be denied, ‘humanity is white’; not because ‘humanity’ may be some thing really distinct from ‘man,’ but because this name ‘humanity’ and this name ‘man’ have another mode of signification; namely, grammatical or logical. For it ought to be shown elsewhere how possible it may be that predication may be false, without a distinction of the things introduced by virtue of diverse modes of signifying ‘gramaticales’ or ‘logicales.’
In the third place, it might be able to be said that no matter how much this will be conceded, that ‘a quantity is converted into the body of Christ’; yet this happens, that this may be true, ‘a quantity is converted into the body of Christ’; while this appears true, ‘the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ.’ And frequently those may be denied by writers, which are through accident; although according to the virtue of signification they may not be under obligation to deny them. Wherefore, no matter how much some quantity may not be a thing really distinct from the substance of the bread, yet these two stand at the same time: ‘the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ,’ and ‘no quantity is converted into the body of Christ.’ Just as according to many writers and appointed Catholic doctors ‘fundament’ and ‘relation’ are not distinct things and consequently ‘whiteness’ and ‘likeness’ are not things really distinct; yet these two stand at the same time: ‘whiteness is,’ and ‘likeness is not.’ But, notwithstanding that some quantity may not be a thing really distinct from substance, how can this be true, ‘the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ,’ while this appears false, ‘quantity is converted into the body of Christ,’ can be explained thus. Although some quantity may not be a thing other than substance, yet this name ‘quantity’ connotes that one part is outside of another or that one part is separate from another part. But this name ‘substance’ does not connote that one part is separate in situation from another part; and by virtue of which I do not see that it involves a contradiction that this may be true, ‘the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ,’ while this appears false, ‘the substance of the bread having part outside of part or separate from part is converted into the body of Christ.’ On the contrary, it can be false, while another appears true; for it can implicate a fallacy; namely, ‘one part of the bread is separate in situation from another part.’
Whence, if God, who can make all things, should make some substance of bread to be somewhere precisely in that mode, in which the body of Christ is under the species of bread, so that that substance of that bread would be nowhere locally or circumscriptively; then this would be true, ‘this thing is substance,’ and this false, ‘this thing is a substance having part separate from part.’ And so, if God could then convert that substance into the body of Christ, which I do not think a Christian ought to say could not be done by God, this would be true, ‘the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ,’ and this is false by virtue of a false implication, ‘the substance of the bread having part separate from part in situation was converted into the body of Christ’; and consequently the opposite of it is true, ‘the substance of the bread having part separate from part was not converted into the body of Christ.’ From which this follows, ‘a quantity is not converted into the body of Christ.’ Therefore, it is obvious that, although this may in a mode be true, ‘the substance of the bread’ is in a mode ‘the substance of the bread having part separate from a part’; yet this could be true, ‘the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ,’ while this appears false, ‘the substance of the bread having part separate from part is converted into the body of Christ’; and consequently while this appears true, ‘the substance of the bread having part separate from part is not converted into the body of Christ,’ which negative could be true, while the first also appears true by virtue of this cause of reality; namely, ‘the substance of the bread does not have part separate from part’; and so it can easily be said that although this may in a mode be true, ‘some quantity is not a thing distinct from the substance of the bread’; yet this could be true, ‘the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ,’ while this appears true, ‘a quantity is not converted into the body of Christ.’ And the whole cause is; because, although this may be in a way true, ‘the substance is really the same as some quantity’; yet this could be true, ‘the substance of the bread is really not the same thing as a quantity’; as, although this may in a mode be true, ‘the substance of the bread is a substance having part separate from part’; yet this could be true, ‘the substance of the bread is not a substance having part separate from part’; for it follows from this possible, ‘the substance of the bread does not have part separate from part,’ even while this appears true, ‘the substance of the bread is.’