After these there must be a discussion of a diverse mode of predicating quantity according to diverse categories. Whence, this must be understood, although ‘per se’ be taken in diverse modes in different places by the philosophers. Whence Aristotle in one place holds that only the necessary are ‘per se,’ and in another place holds that wood is white ‘per se,’ although it may however be contingently white; yet one mode of acceptation suffices for the thesis. ‘Per se’ is taken in one way when the predicate does not connote or signify something, but that something similar may be connoted or may be allowed to be understood through a subject. And indeed when a subject is purely absolute and connotes nothing and does not enable one to understand something, and the predicate is connotative and enables one to understand something else, then such a proposition is not said to be ‘per se.’ And in thus accepting ‘per se’ always for this, that the proposition may be ‘per se,’ it is required that the proposition can not be false with the constancy of the subject; that is, if ‘to be’ is called ‘to exist’ in relation to a subject significatively assumed, as it is possible that this may be true, ‘Sortes is,’ though this appears false, ‘Sortes is a man.’ And, therefore, this consequence is good: ‘Sortes is,’ therefore, ‘Sortes is a man.’ And similarly it follows: ‘man is,’ therefore, ‘man is an animal.’
And in accepting ‘per se’ thus, this is not ‘per se,’ ‘quality is a quantum’; nor is that ‘per se’ ‘substance is a quantum,’ but that, ‘quantity is a quantum’ is ‘per se.’ And the reason for this is according to the philosopher; for this name ‘quantum’ connotes that part of a thing is outside of part. But nothing such connotes or enables one to understand this name ‘quality,’ nor this name ‘substance’; but this name ‘quantity’ thus enables one to understand that part is separate from part, as this name ‘quantum.’ And by virtue of this, this is ‘per se,’ ‘quantity is a quantum,’ and no such is ‘per se,’ ‘substance is a quantum,’ ‘quality is a quantum,’ ‘whiteness is a quantum,’ ‘man is a quantum.’
On the contrary, it is possible that this may be true, ‘quality is,’ while this appears false, ‘quality is a quantum.’ Similarly it is possible, that this may be true, ‘man is,’ while this appears false, ‘man is a quantum.’ For if the omnipotence of God could preserve the substance of man present in the same mode in the species of bread in which He may preserve the body of Christ present in the subject of the bread, and yet that substance would be nowhere locally and circumscriptively and at the same time with this could destroy every absolute accident existing in man; then this would be true, ‘man is,’ and this would be false, ‘man is a quantum.’ And in the same mode the omnipotence of God would preserve any substance and any quantity, no matter how much any such might be false: this, ‘substance is a quantum’; this, ‘quality is a quantum.’ And to that extent do the philosophers and the Saints say that ‘substance is a quantum through accident’; and similarly, ‘quality is a quantum through accident’; but this is ‘per se,’ ‘quantity is a quantum’; and likewise this, ‘length is a quantum’; and so of others. For it is impossible that this be true, ‘length is,’ while this appears false, ‘length is a quantum’; and similarly of others. For it is impossible that this may be true, ‘length is,’ while this appears false, ‘length is a quantum’; and similarly of others. It is impossible that this may be true, ‘quantity is,’ while this appears false, ‘quantity is a quantum.’ But it does not follow from this, therefore, that quantity is an absolute thing other than substance and quality; but it is shown that this is possible, ‘quantity is not the same absolute thing as substance and quality,’ which I concede to be possible. And supposing that substance as well as quality be in the nature of things; as no matter how much this may be in a way true, ‘a thing having part separate from part is as much substance as quality’; yet this is possible, ‘no thing having part separate from part is substance or quality.’ And if it be said that these are really distinct, one of which can be without the other; but it is possible that substance may be, though quantity does not exist; there substance and quality are really distinct.
I say that there is a fallacy of a figure of speech in any such mode of arguing; for this reason, that the purely absolute is changed into the connotative; as this, ‘those are really distinct, one of which can be, while the other does not exist.’ ‘Man’ can be, though ‘musician’ does not exist; therefore, ‘man’ and ‘musician’ are really distinct. And similarly this, ‘those are really distinct one of which can be without another.’ But ‘God’ can be, though ‘making happy’ does not exist. Because these obtain at the same time; for ‘God is,’ and yet ‘making happy is not’; therefore, ‘God’ and ‘making happy’ are really distinct. But in what mode there is a fallacy of a figure of speech in such a mode of arguing pertains to logic; and I have spoken elsewhere of this; therefore, I now pass on for the sake of brevity.
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