Moreover, in what manner diverse quantities can be subjectively in a substance, since two natural bodies can not be at the same time, must now be considered. Whence, it must be observed that body is accepted in a two-fold sense. In one way as an individual existing per se in the genus ‘substance,’ which was not created to be part of another existing per se in a genus; or more universally for all that which can exist naturally per se without this, that it may be part of another or depending on another, which however is composed of parts created to be separate in situation; and it is impossible through nature for two such bodies to be together. But all authors, who posit that two bodies can not be at the same time, speak of such a body; and the previously mentioned gloss speaks of such a body when it says in speaking naturally that body only has weight; but such a body is not primary matter nor substantial form nor any quality.
But in another sense body is taken for all that which is long, wide, and thick through parts intrinsic to it; and thus body is rarely or never accepted. If it be, however, thus accepted, it is not impossible for two such bodies, of which one was created to be the form of the other, to be at the same time; nor is it impossible for many others, which have been created to inform one subject, to be at the same time. And indeed it is not impossible for more such lengths and more solidities to be at the same time; for it is however impossible through nature for more solidities, which can naturally exist, to be at the same time, although they may not be parts of something nor in others as in subjects. Solidities of such a kind are not qualities; for no quality can exist per se by created virtue although it can by divine virtue. If you say that two bodies can not be at the same time, this is by virtue of the repugnance of those dimensions; therefore, no dimensions can be at the same time.
It must be said that not any dimensions resist being at the same time; but only the dimensions which can naturally subsist per se. And such alone can not naturally exist at the same time; but they mutually expel each other from a place, if they be left to themselves, although some dimensions can be at the same time through divine power. But it is not impossible for the remaining dimensions, which were created to inform another and one of which can inform another, to be at the same time.
Nor have I ever read the opposite in sacred scripture. And if you ask in what manner these dimensions more than others resist that they may not be at the same time through nature, it suffices for me at present to reply; because there is no such distinction of thing, which is plain to me, partly through reason, partly through experience. For it is easily established through reason that substance and quality created to inform it do not have any intermediate and distinct thing bearing quality.
From which it is obvious that for this, that substance as well as quality may be extended, it suffices that it have distinct parts really distant created to be separate in situation with an active cause which can effectively produce those parts in distinct places, and thus cause them to be separate locally and preserve the same in the same condition. From this it is necessary to confirm, that the parts of the substance are naturally produced in distinct places by an agent before they may be informed under some absolute accident. It is also obvious through experience, that substance and quality are at the same time in situation; and it is similarly established through experience that, when one body exists per se naturally and enters into some place, some body very similar to it withdraws.
And if you say that it is obvious through similar experience that a body subsisting per se in the accidents in the sacrament of the altar withdraws, it can be said that this is either because a preexisting quality was not created to inform a subject in which it never was produced, or because that body has very similar qualities, or because this is by the will of God, willing that something contrary to the common course of nature may evidently appear to the sense; and this that we may be entitled to merit; for faith does not have merit for him for whom human reason provides experiment.
Whence, many Catholics posit there that many things are done by God alone, that the merit of faith may not be made of no avail, as reduction of substance, creation of a new quantity, and any other of the kind. And concerning this, see Scotus in Book IV., Distinction XII., Questions IV. and VI. And indeed it can be said with equal facility of all these that God has ordained that all things apparent to the sense, which are done about the host when not consecrated, may also be done about the host when consecrated. And indeed those, which can not be done by created virtue, He has arranged to do immediately through Himself.
From the previous statements it can be concluded how those accidents remain at the same time, although they may not be in some one subjectively nor one be the subject of another; for whether this may be able or not to be done by created virtue, there ought not to be doubt but that it can be done by divine virtue.
And in the same way whether that heaviness remaining in the sacrament of the altar can or can not move with itself other qualities with which it is joined, by created virtue, there is no doubt but that this may be able to be done by divine virtue. And, therefore, as certain say that, when the host is moved, the body of Christ is moved at the same time by God alone, so that created virtue can not move the body of Christ, no matter how much the host may be moved. So it can easily be said that, when heaviness is moved, other qualities are moved either by created virtue or by divine virtue. Thus also we can save all transmutations, which we see are made about the qualities remaining in the sacrament of the altar, that those, which can not be made by created virtue, can be done by the virtue of God, as many writers posit about many things.
And so all, which are apparent to the sense, can be equally saved by positing with the approved ancient Doctors, that taste, weight, color, and the other qualities of this kind, in the sacrament of the altar are subsisting per se without a subject; as by positing that all qualities are in a subject and not subsisting per se, although in following the ancient writers it may be reasonable to posit that many changes are done there by the divine virtue, which are posited by others to be accomplished by created virtue. Nor do I believe that anyone ought to be condemned because he attributes to God that which can not be ascribed to a creature.
← Chapter XXXIX Concerning a Diverse Mode of Predicating Quantity According to · Contents · Chapter XLI Concerning the Explanation of Certain Arguments Contrary to the →