(1) But many kinds of objections can be raised against the above [claims].
(2) First, as follows: ‘Man is the worthiest creature among creatures’1 is true. I ask which kind of supposition ‘man’ has [there]. Not personal, because each singular [of the proposition] is false. Therefore, it has simple supposition.2 But if simple supposition were for an intention of the soul, [the proposition] would be false, because an intention of the soul is not the most worthy of creatures. Therefore, simple supposition is not for an intention of the soul.
(3) Moreover, (b) ‘Color is the first3 object of sight’ is true. But if ‘object’ [there] has personal supposition, each singular [of the proposition] is false. Therefore, [the term] has simple supposition.4 But if it supposited for an intention of the soul, [the proposition] would be false, because no intention of the soul is the first object of sight (for no intention is seen). Therefore, simple supposition is not for an intention of the soul.
(4) Likewise, ‘Man is the first5 risible’ is true. And [it is not true] for a singular thing or for an intention of the soul. Therefore, [it is true] for something else.6
(5) The same [thing] can be argued for ‘Being is first7 one’ [and] ‘God is first8 a person’. For each of them is true, and [it is] not [true] for a singular thing or for an intention of the soul. Therefore, [it is true] for something else. Yet the subject has simple supposition. Therefore, simple supposition is not for an intention of the soul.
(6) Moreover, (c) an utterance is not predicated of an utterance, and an intention is not [predicated] of an intention. For in that case every proposition like ‘A man is an animal’ would be just false.9
(7) To (a) the first of these, it must be said that the opinion of those who say that in ‘Man is the most worthy of creatures’ the subject has simple supposition is just false. Indeed, ‘man’ in this [proposition] has personal supposition only.
(8) Neither is their reasoning valid. Instead it counts against them. For they prove that if ‘man’ had personal supposition, [the proposition] would in that case be false, because each [of its] singulars is false. But this reasoning counts against them. For if ‘man’ stands simply in this [proposition], and not for any singular, therefore [it stands] for something else. Consequently, that would be the most worthy of creatures. But that is false, because in that case it would be nobler than any man.
(9) This plainly does count against them. For a common [entity] or a species is never nobler than its singular, because, according to their manner of speaking, the inferior always includes its superior and more [besides]. Therefore, the common form, since it is a part of this man, is not nobler than this man. So if the subject in ‘Man is the most worthy of creatures’ supposited for something other than a singular man, [the proposition] would be just false.
(10) Therefore, it has to be said the ‘man’ [in this proposition] supposits personally, and [that the proposition] is literally false, because each [of its] singulars is false. Nevertheless, it is true according to the meaning of those who maintain [the proposition]. For they do not mean that a man is nobler than any creature in general, but that he is nobler than any creature that is not a man. And this is true among corporeal creatures, although it is not true for intellectual substances.10