(11) So it is often the case that authoritative magisterial propositions are false literally, and true in the sense in which they were made. That is, [the speakers] meant true propositions by them. That is so in the present case.

(12) To (b) the second [objection], it must be said that every [proposition] like ‘Color is the first object of sight’, ‘Man is the first risible’, ‘Being is first one’, [and] likewise ‘Man is the first rational animal’, ‘The triangle first has three angles’, ‘Sound is the first and adequate object of hearing’, and many other such [propositions], is just false literally, although the [propositions] the Philosopher meant by them are true.

(13) Thus, you must know that just as the Philosopher and others often take a concrete [term] for the [corresponding] abstract [form] and the other way around, [and] likewise sometimes take the plural for the singular and the other way around, so [too] they often take the exercised act for the signate¹¹ act and the other way around. Now an “exercised act” is one that is conveyed by the verb ‘is’, or something like that, which does not just signify that something is predicated of something but [actually] exercises [that predication], by predicating one [thing] of another and saying ‘A man is an animal’, ‘A man runs’, ‘A man argues’, and so on. But a “signate” act is one that is conveyed by the verb ‘to be predicated’ or ‘to be in subject position’ or ‘to be verified’ or ‘to belong to’ and the [other] such [verbs] that signify the same [thing as these do].

(14) For example, in saying ‘Animal is predicated of man’, animal is not predicated here of man. For in this proposition ‘animal’ is in subject position, and [so] is not predicated. Therefore, the act [here] is a signate one. Saying ‘Animal is predicated of man’ is not the same as saying ‘A man is an animal’, for the one is multiple¹² and the other is not. So too, saying that ‘genus’ is predicated of the common [term] ‘man’ is not the same as saying that the common [term] ‘man’ is a genus.¹³ Neither is saying ‘Genus is predicated of species’ or ‘The utterance “animal” is predicated of the utterance “man”’ the same as saying ‘A species is a genus’ or ‘The utterance “man” is the utterance “animal”’. For the first two¹⁴ are true and the second two¹⁵ are false. Yet, despite this, the Philosopher sometimes takes the exercised act for the signate act, and sometimes the other way around. So do many other [writers]. This makes many [people] fall into errors.

(15) It is like this in the present case. For the proposition ‘Man is the first risible’ (taking ‘first’ as the Philosopher takes it in Posterior Analytics I¹⁶) is as false as is ‘A species is a genus’. But nevertheless, the signate act in place of which [this proposition] occurs is a simply true one. For example, ‘Of man the predicate “risible” is first predicated’ is true. In this signate act both ‘man’ and ‘risible’ supposit simply for the intention of the soul. For of this intention of the soul [“man”] there is first predicated [the intention] “risible”, not for itself but for its singulars. This [signate] act should be exercised as ‘Every man is risible and nothing other than a man is risible’.¹⁷ So, in the signate act ‘man’ supposits simply and for an intention. But in the corresponding exercised act, ‘man’ supposits personally and for singular things. For no thing is able to laugh except a singular thing. Therefore, in the signate act the non-complex [word] ‘first’ occurs correctly, but in the corresponding exercised act ‘first’ should not occur. And because ‘first’ means the same as “being predicated universally of something and of nothing but what it is predicated of”,¹⁸ therefore two exercised acts should correspond to such a signate act.¹⁹

(16) It is like this [too] for ‘Sound is the first and adequate object of hearing’. For it is literally false, because ‘sound’ either supposits for a singular thing or for a common thing. If [it supposits] for a singular thing, then [the proposition] is false because each [of its] singulars is false. If [the term supposits] for a common thing, then it is still false because, according to these [people], no common thing is apprehended by sensation. Therefore, [the proposition] is simply false literally.

(17) Nevertheless perhaps, among those who speak in general and understand correctly, by this [proposition] a signate act is understood, and it is: ‘Of sound there is first predicated being apprehensible by hearing.’ For that predicate is first predicated of this common [term ‘sound’], not for itself but for [its] singulars. For in such a proposition, where the common [name] ‘sound’ is in subject position and the predicate ‘apprehensible by a power of hearing’ is predicated, ‘sound’ does not supposit for itself and simply but rather supposits for singulars. For example, in ‘Every sound is apprehensible by a power of hearing’, the common [name] ‘sound’ is in subject position, although not for itself but rather for singulars. So in the signate act ‘sound’ supposits simply and for the intention of the soul. But in the exercised act both [terms]²⁰ supposit personally and for singulars — that is, for their significates.

(18) There is a plain example of the above from theology. For ‘A complete intellectual substance that does not depend on [any] other suppositum²¹ is first a person’ is true for the same reason that ‘Man is the first risible’ is true. For the one has the same structure as does the other. I ask then: Does the subject of this proposition supposit personally and for singulars? In that case it is false, because each [of its] singulars is false. [This] is clear by induction. Or does it supposit simply and for a common form? In that case it is false, because no common form is — either first or not first — a person. For the notion of a person is inconsistent with every common [entity], even according to them.

(19) It is the same for ‘The singular is first one in number’, ‘The individual is first distinguished from the common’, and so on for many such [propositions] that are literally false, and yet the corresponding signate acts are true.

(20) Thus the error of all those who believed there to be something in reality besides the singular, and that humanity, which is distinct from singulars, is something in individuals and belongs to their essence, led them into these and many other logical errors. But it is not the logician’s job to consider this, as Porphyry says in [his] prologue.²² Rather, the logician only has to say that simple supposition is not [a term’s supposition] for its significate. When the term is a common one, [the logician] has to say that simple supposition is for something common to its significates. But whether what is common is [something] in reality or not, that is not his business.

(21) To (c) the third [objection], it must be said that an utterance is predicated of an utterance, and likewise an intention of an intention, not for itself but for a thing. Therefore, by a proposition like ‘A man is an animal’, even though an utterance is predicated of an utterance or an intention of an intention, it is not denoted that the one utterance is the other, or that the one intention is the other. Rather, it is denoted [by the proposition] that what the subject stands or supposits for is what the predicate stands or supposits for.

(22) But suppose it is still objected against what was said above that ‘Pepper²³ is sold here and at Rome’ is true, and yet no singular [of that proposition] is true. [The proposition] is not true except insofar as ‘pepper’ supposits simply. And [the term] does not supposit for an intention.²⁴ Therefore, simple supposition is not for an intention.

(23) [To this] it must be said that the proposition is simply false if it has a coupled extreme,²⁵ because each [of its] singulars is false. It is also false according as [the term ‘pepper’] has simple supposition, because no one wants to buy the general pepper, whether that is in external reality or in the soul. Rather everyone means to buy some singular thing that he does not have.

(24) But the proposition is true if it is a copulative [proposition], namely, [with the sense] “Pepper is sold and pepper is sold at Rome”. For both parts are true for different singulars. Thus ‘Pepper is sold here and at Rome’ is not more true than ‘A singular pepper is sold here and at Rome’.

Translation by Paul Vincent Spade, CC BY 4.0. Source: Indiana University ScholarWorks. Changes: format conversion only (PDF to Markdown; footnotes, italics and paragraph numbers kept; margin line numbers and page headers dropped).

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Footnotes

1. The odd phrase simply means “the worthiest creature of them all.” ↩

2. It goes without saying that it does not have material supposition here. ↩

3. See n. 195 above. ↩

4. Again, material supposition is not a real alternative here. ↩

5. See n. 195 above. ↩

6. And that something else is presumably the universal or common nature man. ↩

7. Again, see n. 195 above. ↩

8. Ditto. ↩

9. Because it is not true that the utterance ‘man’ is the utterance ‘animal’, or that the intention “man” is the intention “animal.” ↩

10. That is, for angels, which are nobler than human beings. ↩

11. ‘signate’ = signato. The sense is just “signified.” ↩

12. That is, equivocal. The equivocal one is ‘Animal is predicated of man’, for the reason given in Ch. 65, para. 2. ↩

13. The common term ‘man’ is a species, not a genus. But that makes no difference for the success of the example. ↩

14. Rather, the first of each pair. ↩

15. Rather, the second of each pair. ↩

16. See n. 195 above. ↩

17. In other words, it should not be exercised as ‘Man is the first risible’. ↩

18. As it stands, the second part of this is trivially true. What Ockham means is something more like “being predicated universally of something, and of nothing but that.” ↩

19. As in the example earlier in the paragraph, ‘Every man is risible and nothing other than a man is risible’. ↩

20. That is, ‘sound’ and ‘apprehensible by a power of hearing’. ↩

21. ‘Suppositum’ is used here in the metaphysical sense, for an entity in which other entities inhere (for example, accidents in a substance, matter and form in the composite), but which does not itself inhere in any other entity. The term comes from the theology of the Trinity and the Incarnation. ↩

22. That is, it is not the job of the logician to solve the problem of universals. See Porphyry, Isagoge, Paul Vincent Spade, tr., (Stillwater, OK: Translation Clearing House, 1986), p. 1 lines 14–23. ↩

23. To get the force of this example, you have to realize that ‘pepper’ is not a mass noun here. It means “a pepper.” ↩

24. The intention is not sold both here and at Rome. ↩

25. That is, if it has the compound predicate ‘sold here and [sold] at Rome’. ↩