But the argument is conducted, especially in the earlier part of the treatise, and as relating to its more obscure topics, in the prescribed scholastic form, the method of reasoning, and the technical expressions frequently recurring in it, being such as have no place even in the most scientific treatises in our own age.” In one respect, indeed, the works of the ancient schoolmen bear a strong resemblance to our later literature, inasmuch as there is very little in the speculations of the modern sceptic which may not be found in the writings of those middle-age churchmen. In some instances the polemic may have secretly sympathised with the freedom of thought which he affected to condemn; but in general, the atheist, the infidel, and the heretic, were imaginary foes, conjured up that the militant ecclesiastic might indulge, as in a species of tournament, in such displays of his skill as should secure to him the honours of a victory.
That there should have been men during the middle age disposed to bestow a laborious attention on such a system of dialectics, is not surprising; but Wycliffe was a man of earnest piety, of an impassioned temperament, and with a mind eminently practical, was intent through life on bringing about great practical reforms. Nevertheless, if we may credit the testimony of enemies in his favour, even that of the most bitter among them, we must believe that no man of his age was more deeply learned, or more thoroughly skilled in the science of the schoolmen. According to Knyghton, a contemporary and an adversary,— As a theologian, he was the most eminent in his day; as a philosopher, second to none; and as a schoolman, incomparable. He made it his great aim, with learned subtlety, and by the profundity of his own genius, to surpass the genius of other men.”^ Instances, indeed, are not wanting, in which the speculative and the practical, the abstract and the
[The following passage is the first in the treatise, and may be taken as a specimen of the obscurity]
[which attaches very generally to the metaphysical portion of the work—an obscurity which renders]
[it impossible that a literal translation should convey to a modern reader any intelligible meaning.]
[ALiTH1A. Licet dixit insipiens in corde suo, non est Deus, tamen videtur supponendum,]
[omnium hominum Deum esse, quia aliter tibi nemo negaret aliquid, vel aliquam veritatem esse,]
[cum negando illud statim concederet ejus oppositum. Quia si aliquid est, illud vel est finitum vel]
[infinitum, sive sic, vel illud, vel causa illius, est Deus, cum supponitur omne quod est prima causa]
[non causatum ab alio, esse Deum. Et extendo hoc nomen aliquid ad omne eus, vel per se, vel]
[aggregatum, vel affirmativam, aut negativam, vel possibilem veritatem.]
[PsRUDIS. Preecipui Logici multipliciter sic instarent, non claudit contradictionem formalem,]
[nullem eus esse, cum ex nulla negativa sequatur formaliter affirmativa, non ergo sequitur pro]
[primo loco Deum esse, quia tunc sequeretur formaliter, si nibil est aliquid est. Item stat verita-]
[tem esse cum hoc, quod non sit aliquid, cum veritas potest est quod nihil sit, et tunc non est aliquid.]
[Et tertio possibile est esse processum in infinitum in caussalibus, Lon ergo sequitur, si causa est,]
[tunc prima causa est, cum in ordine causarum homo posset procedere infinite. Sicut enim diviso]
[lumine in suas partes proportionales caussatur a secunda, et sic in infinitum, et sic etiam in infinitis]
[casibus, quibus oportet procedere infinite.”]
[Doctor in theologia eminentissimus in diebus illis. In philosophia nulli reputabatur secun-]
[dus: in scholasticis disciplinis incomparabilis. Hic maxime nitebatur aliorum ingenia subtilitate]
[sclentim et profunditate ingenii sui transcendere.” X sygMon, p. 2644.]
impassioned, have been united in strong proportions in the same men. In Pascal, that purely intellectual concentration which is so necessary to success in the exact sciences, was combined with the imagination of the poet, and with the feeling of the saint. But opposites of this nature meet in something like equal apportionments in the weak, much more frequently than in the strong: and among the reformers it is in the genius of Calvin that we see, in this respect, the nearest reflection of the mind of Wycliffe.
The first and second books of the Trialogus, are the least extended, and the least valuable. The third and fourth books embrace more than three-fourths of the whole treatise, and abound in matter more or less interesting to every sincere Protestant.
Book
The first book is wholly occupied with arguments to prove the being of a God, and with other speculations relating to the Divine perfections, and to the mysteries of the Divine nature. The first chapter is designed to show that “God is the first cause of all things;” the second exhibits him as taking necessary precedence of all things; and in the third he is set forth as the great reality, whose nature is such, that our thoughts can never rise to the conception of any higher excellence. “The fourth chapter is intended to demonstrate that God is, whatever it is better to be than not to be;” and this conclusion being established, all the Divine perfections are deduced from it, inasmuch as it is manifestly better that the Divine nature should be just, wise, omnipotent, and the like, than that it should be devoid of such perfections. In the sixth chapter it is maintained that the reasoning which is thus satisfactory as leading to sound conclusions in regard to the Divine perfections, is no less so as serving to show “the Lord of all to be a Trinity:” and in the remaining chapters of this book, an attempt is made to demonstrate the doctrine of the Trinity from the light of nature, and to exhibit the old philosophical doctrine concerning ideas,” as in harmony with the prevailing notions of the schoolmen in respect to the manner of the Divine existence.
In this preliminary portion of the work, we find none of the opinions peculiar to Wycliffe, as a reformer, except that in two instances he
censures the conduct of some men in making an undue use of the authority of tradition; and the following passage on the sufficiency and excellence of the Scriptures, may be regarded as of the same complexion. It is plain, that all error in the knowledge of the Holy Scriptures, by which weak men do so falsify and debase them, proceeds from ignorance of grammar and logic. And unless Go shall assist us in respect to the understanding of these rudiments of faith, the faith of the Scriptures will be too little estimated. The opinion, that if there be any truth, it is in the Scripture, which is often inculcated by Augustine, is manifestly just. Nothing, indeed, is to be named as subtle in grammar, in logic, or in any other science, but the same may be found in more excellence in Scripture.”
The most curious portion of the metaphysical speculation found in this book, consists in the attempt made in some sense to explain, as well as to prove, the doctrine of the Trinity, by natural reason. Psuedis accounts it great presumption” in any man to pretend that such articles of faith may be demonstrated by the light of nature. Phronesis maintains that the different opinion of Alithia on that subject is not liable to such a charge; and having spoken at some length on the subordination of the light of nature to the light of faith, and on the agreement of the one with the other, he reminds Psuedis of the doctrine of Plato in respect to a trinity of some kind in the Divine nature, and then endeavours to show, not only that the doctrine of Plato is according to reason, but to show also, and on strictly metaphysical grounds, why the Divine Trinity is described as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
In pursuance of this argument it is said, that the potentia” of the Divine nature, in the sense in which that term is used by the speaker, is God the Father; the “notitia,” or power of self-knowledge in the Divine nature, is God the Son; and the quietatio”—the repose—the calm rest of the Divine essence, is God the Holy Spirit. Care is taken to explain the purely metaphysical sense in which the term person is used in relation to such a subject; but to the above properties of the Divine existence that name is applied, and these three persons are described as being co-eternal and co-equal. These refinements are pushed so far, that in the sense of causation” or procession, but not in the sense of “divinity,” God is said to be “the cause of God;” not, however, in any such sense but that it is still true that these three persons are one first cause, as they are one God, and not three causes, as they are not three Gods.”
In another place, the mind of man is viewed as consisting eminently in “memory, reason, and will;” and these are not only regarded as a
[Chap. vill. 23..]
kind of trinity in man, but as a species of revelation in man concerning the Trinity in the Divine nature. To the modern metaphysician, reasoning of this nature will appear as singularly open to objection, and many of the objections to which it is exposed were strongly urged against it even in those times; but such is the potency of circumstances and fashion, even in respect to such matters, that this method of treating theological subjects long retained its hold upon the learned, and is only partially superseded even in our own day.