Of contemplation, and what Felicitie is therein.

23 Eustratius in expounding of Aristotle, (who in the tenth booke of his Ethiks affirmeth contemplation to be the chéefest perfection of our felicitie) saith, that There be some which are not men exercised in ciuill and politike administration, but altogether giuen to contemplation, and these separate themselues from domesticall and ciuill cares, and do flie from companie and societie; yea, and they studie all that they can, to be seuered euen from their owne flesh, whereof it coms to passe, that to the obteining of felicitie, there néedeth not (as Aristotle would) the goods of the mind, for the teaching, counselling, and ruling of others; nor the goods of the bodie, for defending of their countrie; nor yet the goods of fortune, for reléeuing, succouring, and helping of the poore: and that onlie it is inough to applie the mind to vnderstanding and contemplation. And he saith, that these men haue a hard felicitie, bicause they be as it were at war with nature, not séeking in déed to destroie the bodie or flesh; but prouide this, that those things may be no impediment to their contemplation. And therefore, since this is a more priuate life, it néedeth not manie things. But he saith, that Aristotle spake not of these men, which he testified when he saith, that By nature a man is ciuill: and they which are of this sort, vnlesse they minister to their elders and parents those things which be necessarie, and also vnto their posteritie, wife, frends, and citizens, they haue a maimed and vnperfect felicitie, although they be furnished with manie good things. And the diminishing of their felicitie is either more or lesse, according as they shall more or lesse want those good things which we haue recited. It belongeth therefore vnto a happie man, to haue a care of all those things, which I haue recited; which if he may commodiouslie doo, he hath inough, and may be content; otherwise he shall not be counted happie.

These things I thought good to rehearse out of the doctrine of Eustratius; to whose opinion I subscribe not. For in that he will haue anie man so to liue alone, that he should giue himselfe onlie to contemplation, and be hidden from the companie of other men, forsaking the duties of charitie, and other vertues toward them, is both against philosophie and diuinitie. For the philosophers crie out generallie, that men are not borne to themselues; and declare that it is mans nature to helpe others, and in like manner to be holpen of others. Moreouer, there wants no testimonies of the holie scriptures, whereby such a kind of life is condemned. ¹²⁹ Paule said; that None ought to seeke their owne, but that all should be doone to the edification of our neighbours. And God commanded in the lawe, that the parents should be honored; which precept in verie déed commandeth the maintenance of them. And the parents are commanded, ¹³⁰ that they should diligentlie and earnestlie instruct their children. Neither are there lawes wanting of wedlocke, o⟨…⟩ defending and preseruing of fréends, and of the poore. Yea and Paule vnto Timothie said; He that hath cast awaie the care of his owne, ¹³¹ and especiallie of his owne houshold, hath denied his faith, & is woorse than an infidel. Wherfore it is not lawfull for anie man to choose to himselfe so solitarie a life, as he will set apart the care of other men. True indéed it is, that Aristotle treateth seuerallie of ciuill life and function, & also of life contemplatiue; but yet not for this purpose, that any man should wholie addict himselfe to one of these liues: but to the intent, that whosoeuer aspireth to felicitie, may knowe, that he is not able to obteine the same, except in an excellent sort he be partaker of both these estates of life.

¹³² Two properties doubtlesse there be of our nature; for nature it selfe hath made vs both men of vnderstanding and ciuill. Wherefore in our actions we must answere to both conditions; namelie, that when they happen vnto vs in our actions, we may execute them as we ought, and according to vertue. Againe, that when anie leisure serueth vs, or that by anie chance we are let from dooing of things, then we to be occupied with great pleasure in the contemplation of diuine and humane things; that so these actions, which in kind séeme to be diuers, may helpe one another. For if a man be exercised in morall and ciuill vertues, in gouerning of a familie & common-weale, to the intent he may haue the more readie and quiet mind in the helping and succoring of his fréends, it so coms to passe, that he returneth the more apt to contemplation. And on the other side, when anie man, by reason of his leisure, shall be in earnest contemplation of diuine and humane things, he is afterward thought to be much the readier to doo other affairs. This we knowe did Tullie, Cato, Pompeius, Lucullus, and such like singular men among the Ethniks. And we read in the holie scriptures, that Christ our sauiour did somtimes withdrawe himselfe vnto the mountaines, and woods, that he might praie and meditate of diuine things; but within awhile he returned to the people, and was all manner of waies a helpe vnto mankind. The verie same thing did Iohn Baptist, Elias, and other the prophets. Yea, and the same Iesus our Lord first taught his apostles in the wildernes; afterward he sent them out into Iudaea, to preach & to heale them that were sicke. So then let there be two kinds of life, but yet not in such sort, that anie man should perpetuallie be addicted to anie one of them.

That vertue is not the cheefest good; and wherein the same agreeth with it.

24 Among some of the philosophers vertue was taken to be the chéefest good, ¹³³ which Aristotle refelled on this wise; It behooueth that the chéefe good be perfect, But vertue is not perfect, Therefore it must not be counted the chéefest good. The maior proposition appéereth: for if it be not a perfect chéefe good, our desire resteth not therein, but will desire moreouer some other chéefe good. The minor proposition; namelie, that vertue is not perfect, is prooued; bicause it is an habit, that is, a power not in act: & it may oftentimes be in the subiect without the action therof, as a thing that manie waies may be stopped; as by sléepe, & by taking awaie of the occasion, if matter be wanting, and when afflictions, sicknes, and misfortunes doo disquiet vs. This opinion, which placeth the chéefest good in vertue it selfe, is of all other that we haue hertofore recited most néere vnto truth, and therefore it hath had great and graue patrones. But how it draweth néere vnto the truth, hereby we easilie gather; that there is none more certeine nor surer preparation vnto felicitie than vertue: for from the habit of vertue procéedeth that action, which is affirmed by Aristotle to be verie felicitie: vertue therefore is the néerest power or facultie vnto felicitie. ¹³⁴ But whie the same cannot be the chéefest good, & felicitie it selfe, it is cause inough, that it is referred vnto a further end. For to what purpose doo we procure vnto our selues the habits of vertues, but that we may the more easilie and redilie doo well? Wherefore, since that vertue is directed vnto action, action shall be better and more to be desired than it.

I am not ignorant, ¹³⁵ that they which are woont to hold with the Stoiks, haue béene accustomed to obiect against the Peripatetikes, saieng that they, while they appoint vertue to be the chéefest good, doo not vnderstand it, as it is in the power, and lieth without act; but doo take the same as it is ioined with hir action: & so laugh Aristotle to scorne, which obiected not against them, but an idle vertue, and seuered from right action. This answer at the first sight séemes vnto some to be iust, and likelie to be true: but if the thing be more narrowlie considered, and that we shall more diligentlie looke into the same, it is rather a shift, than a true dissoluing of the argument; bicause whether they will or no, action, and vertue, from whence it procéedeth, are distinguished [one from another:] for they be conteined in sundrie Predicaments, and are manie times seuered one from another. For vertue, when it is an habit, belongeth vnto qualitie; but the act which it worketh, is comprehended vnder the Predicament of action. But how they be seuered one from another, I thinke no man that diligentlie considereth the matter, is ignorant: for he which is indued with knowledge or wisedome, dooth neither contemplate alwaies, nor yet is alwaies occupied about those things which he knoweth. Wherevpon it commeth to passe, that they which comprehend two for one, and distinguish them not, doo easilie swarue from the marke, wherevnto they should haue an aime; and in stead of an absolute and perfect doctrine, doo followe that which is confused and not plaine. This Aristotle perceiuing distinguished and seuered one of them from another, and when he séeth that one of them is referred to the other, he denieth that that which tendeth to another end can be the chéefe: which reason of his opinion is so euident, as I thinke nothing can be more manifest than the same. But they which cannot confute the reason, doo returne the argument vpon Aristotle himselfe, who denieth that felicitie is therefore placed in vertue, bicause vertue may easilie & manie waies be hindered.

¹³⁶ If this argument (saie they) like thée so well, neither canst thou indéed defend the most perfect action to be the chéefest good; bicause the same also is as manie waies subiect to impediments, as thou didst obiect against vertue. For he which sléepeth dooth not contemplate; neither can he doo the same, which is vexed with gréeuous torments; and he cannot endure anie perils, which liueth in quiet & peaceable commonweales. Wherefore thou that saiest that vertue, for these causes, is not the chéefest good; thou shalt also saie, that the most perfect action must not be accounted for felicitie. A shew indéed of truth this hath, which is obiected, but it maketh no matter at all; bicause the Peripatetikes will easilie grant, that the same most perfect action, which they saie is felicitie, is not continued so as it cannot be broken off; but so long as it is, they would not grant it to be no felicitie, and much lesse will they yéeld that the same is referred to a better end. Both which things cannot be said of the habit which is vertue. For the same, as it is in a man that sléepeth, or is vexed with most painfull gréefes, can neither he called felicitie, nor yet can make him blessed in whose mind it is: for the habit may remaine, when the action is taken awaie; but an action being let from breaking foorth, neither is it, nor yet remaineth it. And besides this, an habit, while it yet remaineth hindered, who séeth not that it is still referred vnto action, when as it inclineth the mind and desire therevnto. Moreouer, that should be accounted our felicitie, which approcheth most néere vnto the diuine felicitie; but God, séeing he is not onelie perfect, but euen perfection it selfe, hath felicitie in act, not in power; in verie déed, not in habit; therfore our felicitie also shall be an action: which notwithstanding is requisite to be lesse than the blessednes of God, which therefore happeneth; bicause his act cannot faile him, but ours is verie oftentimes broken off.

25 After those things, ¹³⁷ which we haue now spoken, must their cauill also be confuted, which laugh at the argument, brought as touching the impediments, whereby the action of vertue is repressed, that it cannot be effectuall. Ye feigne (saie they) that the worke of vertues perteineth to the bodie; but it is not so: bicause the whole action of vertue is in the soule, and therein it standeth full and whole: the goods of the bodie, or instruments of fortune belong nothing thervnto. And without doubt, a poore man may be liberall, by wishing to giue vnto them to whom he thinketh méete to be giuen. Againe, in the middest of torments, and in the verie flames themselues, feare dooth shine the more, and becommeth more glorious. According to which opinion Seneca vnto Lucillus, the seuentie epistle writeth manie things, and among others saith; Vertue hath also place in the bed: ouercome thou thy sicknes with a valiant courage, bicause, if others that be present, shall perceiue thée to be couragious, great, and vpright in torments, they will woonder at the brightnes of thy vertue; and thou, whilest thou art so vexed, shalt rightlie instruct them, and thorough vertue shalt not onelie helpe thy selfe verie much, but them also. What maner of things these be, now will we more narrowlie consider. They declare, that the action of vertue is whole, full, and perfect in the mind: that we denie. For if we shall declare the nature of an habit, the same is nothing else, than a qualitie brought in by long exercise, by the benefite whereof the powers of the mind and bodie are made more readie and fit to occupie themselues. Neither dooth vertue in the mind alone expresse hir action. They which saie that vertue dooth beare rule in eating, drinking, fleshlie desire, and such like; those also will saie, that the action of that vertue is expressed in the bodie also, not in the soule onlie. So it may be lawfull to saie, as touching fortitude, liberalitie, and manie other vertues; to shew that the bodie and goods of fortune were not giuen by God vnto mankind. Howbeit, these men perhaps persuade themselues, that the nature of man is fulfilled, and made perfect in the soule onelie: which how far it is from the truth, your selues without me may perceiue.

A poore man (say they) may be liberall, while he desireth to giue vnto them, to whom he thinketh it méet to be giuen. But I would faine learne of these Stoiks, whether they that be indued with vertue, and being hindered, doo desire to worke by it; for what cause they desire this? Doo they it not for blessednes sake? This if they shall denie, they will declare themselues to be vnwise in desiring of those things which they refer not vnto the chéefest good. But if they will grant, that they wish those works for felicitie sake, it shall be lawfull to saie that felicitie is perfectlie gotten, not in vertue, but in action. I will easilie grant, that vertue shineth, and is more glorious in the midst of flames, and in most cruell torments; and him that with a valiant courage suffereth these things, I will extoll with praises among good and wise men; but yet so, as I will denie him, in the meane time, to inioie whole and perfect felicitie. He shall verie well by his example instruct and teach others, yet shall he not perfectlie and all maner of waies be blessed. These things be so verie true, as euen they, which professe the Stoicall discipline, must whether they will or no yéeld vnto this opinion. For Cicero in his fift booke of Tusculane questions, at the beginning saith; If vertue be not of such strength, that it can defend it selfe, I feare me least we are not so much to leane to the hope of a blessed life, vpon confidence of vertue, as it may séeme that we haue more néed to praie for it. Verelie I my selfe, when I consider those chances, wherein fortune hath excéedinglie exercised me, I begin to mistrust this opinion, and otherwhiles also stand in great feare of mans weakenes and frailtie. For I feare least that when nature gaue vnto vs weake bodies, and with them ioined vncurable diseases, and intollerable gréefs; it also gaue minds agréeable to the gréefs of the bodies, and seuerallie intangled with the vexations and troubles therof. But herein I reforme my selfe, that I iudge of the strength of vertue according to other mens nicenes, and peraduenture according to mine owne, not according to vertue it selfe, &c. How he doubted, and in a manner became of this opinion, he plainelie expressed in these words: and it maketh no matter, that he saith he reformed himselfe, bicause that is vncerteine: and, he addeth this word Peraduenture, which is a token of doubting.

Moreouer, what is so certeine, as that Cicero himselfe in his fourth booke De finibus disputed against Cato, who had before in the third booke extolled the opinion of Zeno and the Stoiks to the heauens? Yea and the Stoiks as in vertue alone they boasted, that they were blessed, ¹³⁸ yet did they not repose themselus in that alone; but called the powers of the bodie, the purenes of the senses, dignities, riches and such like ⟨…⟩; that is, Things comming naturallie without anie other beginning: which Cicero calleth Things produced, promoted, principall, aduanced aboue other. With the sense of which words if we would vrge the Stoiks, we shall say, that they attribute more vnto this kind of things, than the Peripatetiks; as they which doo name those things principall, and aboue others; whereas the Peripatetiks call them indéed good things, but yet of the lowest degrée, and which are not of much account, being compared with iust and honest things; and therefore, as the time serues, to be contemned, and not much to be desired. I knowe indéed that the Stoiks doo call these things principall and chéefe, while they be compared with their contraries; not when they be compared with vertues: but yet by these their new and made words they attribute verie much to this order of things, when they call these things, Commodities, things to be preferred, & of chéefe regard; and their contraries ⟨…⟩: as who should saie Discommodities, and things reiected. Wherefore, though the Stoiks would contend with the Peripatetiks in talke, yet in reason and in the thing it selfe they agrée with them. The Stoiks delight in a magnificall kind of speach, and onlie in words bring in an vnsensiblenes of passion, which when they come afterward to the matter, all men féele by experience, that it is quite differing from our senses, and from our tried customs, and also verie far from the strength of our humane nature.

26 And I doo not thinke, that I should lightlie passe ouer those things, which I cited a little before, out of the fift booke of Tusculane questions; If (saith Cicero ) vertue had not helpe inough in it selfe, that then we must make our praiers for the same. What is this we heare? As though if vertue were sufficient in it selfe, is there nothing then to be wished for, or to be desired of God; as if we had all things consisting in our own selues? Shall Tullie on this wise, in making more of vertue than is requisit, take awaie godlines, which is the chéefe vertue of all others, by abolishing the inuocatio~ of God? Trulie euen thus did the Stoiks thinke. ¹³⁹ For Seneca writeth, that Iupiter can doo no more than a good man. Wherefore the Stoiks vsed no lesse magnificall kind of speach, than their doctrine was altogither differing from religion. Which I doo not therefore saie, as though I endeuoured to pronounce Aristotles opinion to be godlie and religious; but to giue warning, that the Stoiks are not so to be estéemed, ¹⁴⁰ as though in praising of their vertues, they drew verie néere (as some thinke) vnto the christian doctrine. Yet will I beare more in this behalfe with the Stoikes, than with the Epicures; bicause they speake in a maner alwaies that which is agréeable to their owne opinion, whereas the Epicures manie times affirme things not agréeable to their owne rules. Bicause Epicurus accounteth gréefe for the chéefest euill, he also placeth pleasure of the bodie, or voidnes of sorrowe to be the chéefest good. If he be tormented, or descend into Phalaris bull, and tell me how swéete this is, as he boasteth that His wise man will saie, without doubt he shall speake most inconstantlie, and such things as no maner of waie accord in themselues.

Let these words so glorious and woorthie of memorie be left vnto the Stoiks, which so boast of their vertues, as they thinke that a wise man indued with them, shall neuer bée without happines. Neither can they persuade their mind, that séeing felicitie dooth euermore accompanie vertues, it will then forsake them, and that it will staie vpon the threshold, wherein they enter into the prison; as though it may not be lawfull for it to enter into a sorrowfull place, nor (as said Theophrastus ) to ascend vpon the rocke or whéele of torment. Theophrastus, no doubt, was far wiser than Epicurus. For he which sawe, that by the Peripatetiks doctrine, was required vnto ciuill felicitie, whereof we now intreate, both the goods of the bodie, and the goods externall; the verie same man vnderstood, how vnpossible it was, that euen the wisest man should be blessed in torments & miserie. But Epicurus, who was delighted with such a chéefe good, as we haue now declared, will speake things neither méete nor agréeable to his purpose, while he speaketh so magnificallie, and vseth such glorious sentences. But yet this is no maruell; for he contemned Logike, which is the right meanes of disputing: but of this thing we haue spoken enough.

¹⁴¹ 26 Let vs now sée what the holie scriptures saie herevnto: trulie they make no mention of vertues, when they shew the felicitie of man. In the psalme, wherin is rehearsed the opinion of the common sort, which thought him to be happie that hath abundance, and who is replenished with infinite store of the goods of this world; we are otherwise persuaded by the voice of God. ¹⁴² For it is added; Blessed is the people whose God is the Lord. Here an act is shewed, not a power; ¹⁴³ Blessed is the man that feareth the Lord; ¹⁴⁴ blessed is the man that walketh in the lawe of the Lord. Further, that euen the good habits of the mind may be somtime idle and vnprofitable, hereby it is euident; ¹⁴⁵ that Paule warneth vs to take héed, that we receiue not the grace of God in vaine. And Paule aduiseth Timothie, To stir vp the gifts of God, which were in him, by laieng on of hands by authoritie of the eldership. Séeing then the gifts of the spirit, which are more excellent than morall vertues, are referred vnto action, that others may be holpen and instructed, (otherwise we should not become the better for them) this must be iudged much truer, and more certeine as touching humane vertues. Where it is said of Aristotle, that Calamities and miseries doo let, that men cannot be counted happie; if this should be considered by it selfe, ¹⁴⁶ as it is said without anie distinction, it agréeth not with the holie scriptures. For they which suffer for Christ, are in great penurie, and are troubled with gréeuous punishments; yet doo they enioie that blessednes, which in this life is possible to be atteined vnto: ¹⁴⁷ bicause their sinnes are not imputed vnto them, and their soule and bodie are then excéedinglie renewed toward the attainment of eternall life. Howbeit, séeing the felicitie of this life is not yet full, but begun; therefore we will grant it, that the saints, which be so afflicted, are not in perfect and absolute blessednes; séeing they looke shortlie to haue the same, wherein they shall féele none of these miseries. For the oracles of God saie; ¹⁴⁸ God shall wipe awaie all teares from the eies of his saints, neither shall there be mourning nor lamentation anie more: for these former things are parted awaie. Wherfore we saie with Aristotle, that betwéene perfect and full felicitie, and miseries and calamities there is no agréement, which neuertheles disagréeth not with that felicitie, which we haue here begun.

And Paule sawe the displeasures of this life to be so repugnant vnto perfect blessednes, and that they could not abide togither, as he said vnto the Corinthians; If the dead rise not againe, ¹⁴⁹ we are more vnhappie than all men. And if that Christ pronounced them blessed, which mourne, and which suffer persecution for his name; ¹⁵⁰ that must not so be vnderstood, as though we should be blessed, bicause we wéepe, and sigh, and suffer persecution; but bicause we wait for better things hereafter, and are saued by hope. Neither doo I denie, but that in the middest of the troubles of the flesh, God will giue maruellous comforts to them that be his: which I persuade my selfe passeth all the delights of ciuill happines. Yet commeth it not to passe thereby, that perfect felicitie is ioined with these calamities. After this maner did Paule comfort the soldiers of Christ; ¹⁵¹ The things (saith he) which we suffer in this life, are not equall and of like value with those things, which at length shall be reuealed in vs, when we reigne together with Christ. But Aristotle was constreined to iudge as he said, bicause he was ignorant of the blessednes to come, and sawe that the ciuill happines, which he treated of, was obscured and diminished by aduersities and afflictions. And vnto him were vnknowne those heauenlie comforts, which God, aboue the power of nature, bringeth to the confessors of the truth, euen in the verie torments. Wherefore, if as touching this matter, the Stoiks séeme somewhat to disagrée from vs, this they did vnaduisedlie; séeing they also knew nothing of the life to come, neither had they euer triall of the consolations of God in the midst of miseries and death.

Of the causes of Felicitie.

27 Now that we haue largelie inough disputed as touching the nature of felicitie, we will inquire of the cause therof. Aristotle reckoneth vp fiue causes, which may be gathered into two; for either they be inward, or outward. They are reckoned inward, bicause discipline, custome, and exercise doo procéed from vs. But the outward causes are thought to be God and fortune. ¹⁵² Betwéene custome and exercise this is the difference, that custome is referred vnto vertues, which are bred by often and continuall actions. But exercises and labours are to be applied to a sure obteining and kéeping of riches, honour, and health; in which things manie (as it hath bin said) haue placed felicitie. And first as touching discipline, it belongeth vnto them, which haue thought that vertues are learned by applieng of doctrines. Wherefore if there be néed of discipline, it must be learned; if of custome, we must not desist from honest actions; if it be ascribed to exercise, there must of necessitie be no labour spared; if it be expected of God, he must be praied vnto; but if of fortune, since we are able to doo nothing concerning it, all must wholie bée committed vnto the same. The Stoiks, and especiallie Epictetus, distinguish all things which are found either to be in vs, or not to be within vs. By those things that are in vs, they vnderstand the things which we can rule by our counsell, and obteine by our strength: and those things that are said to be not within vs, are the same that we haue not in our power; as nobilitie, health, and riches.

Whether God be the cause of felicitie, Aristotle in his first booke of his Ethiks speaketh verie ambiguouslie, ¹⁵³ & bringeth a conditionall proposition, but absolues not the argument. If anie gift (saith he) be of God, felicitie shall be giuen of him. And he sheweth a reason of the conclusion, bicause the same hath the chéefest place among all humane things. But to the making vp of the argument, there may be added a double minor proposition: that the felicitie of the godlie, and ours is all one; But manie things are giuen vnto men by God, therefore must felicitie be expected from him. And that manie things are giuen vnto men by God, we doubt nothing at all, who doo also extoll his prouidence in euerie thing: and since from him, as from the chéefe good, and fountaine of goodnes, is deriued whatsoeuer is good, we doo not once imagine, that this doth flowe without his pleasure, will, and election. ¹⁵⁴ But there bée some, and those indéed Peripatetiks, which doo déeme far otherwise of the prouidence of God: for they thinke that his prouidence, as touching particular things, stretcheth not lower than the moone; bicause so far, all things are done constantlie, and in singular order. But, as touching the things which are beneath the moone, they make prouidence to be onlie of generall things, not of particular. Wherfore they should take this for the minor propositio~; But no gifts are distributed by God vnto men, neither therfore is felicitie giuen. And they saie, that gifts are not giuen by God vnto men, not bicause they acknowledge him not to be the first efficient cause, from whence all good things doo arise; but they take the word of giuing or bestowing from election, will, and frée choise. The good things, which we haue, and felicitie, they will grant doo depend of God, and of the motion of the heauen, and that they cannot otherwise be had; but they thinke that those be not giuen by him, by a certeine distribution which he considereth of, or which he giueth by a frée disposition. For they thinke that God dealeth necessarilie, and by a naturall impulsion.

Wherefore we must note, that Aristotle in the place aboue mentioned, neither affirmeth nor denieth that felicitie is giuen of God. He affirmeth it not, bicause he saith, that this worke belongeth to another treatise; namelie, to the metaphysicks, or treatise of supernaturall things, wherein is treated of the prouidence of God, without which doctrine, this question can not be defined. Neither yet doth he denie felicitie to be giuen of God, least he should fall into an absurditie. For it séemes to be contrarie to reason, that the rest of the gifts should be giuen by God, and felicitie not to be giuen by him. Wherefore he teacheth it vnder a condition, namelie, If other things be had from God, felicitie likewise doth procéed from him: but he affirmeth nothing at all. But I sée not how fitlie he putteth ouer this treatise to another place; for if this definition doo depend of prouidence, might he not in the meane time haue borowed so much of his metaphysicall treatise, as should haue béene sufficient for the explaning of his mind? This he did as touching the soule, and tooke from his treatise of natural things so much as serued vnto morall doctrine, and saith, that The soule as we shall shortlie sée, hath diuers parts. So likewise might he here haue written of this, although he had not here purposelie prooued it, but taken it from some other treatise; that God by his prouidence dooth giue manie gifts vnto men; than the which gifts séeing felicitie is far more excellent, it is méet that the same also should belong vnto it. Howbeit, dissembling this, he passed it ouer, and saith it belonged to an other treatise. But I beséech you, what more conuenient place had there béene, séeing in that booke he was to treate of maners and vertues, the vnderstanding whereof dependeth altogither of the knowledge of felicitie? Now was it time to affirme thereof simplie, that he might no lesse haue expected the same of God, than other gifts. Now then, when he speaketh on this wise, he séemeth to shunne the hatred of vngodlines, but deserued no praise for a plaine and sincere confession. If he had ment well and honestlie, he should not haue vsed these ambiguities. But what should he haue doone? He could not by philosophie know any thing of the will of God towards men; for whatsoeuer we knowe thereof, we are all wholie beholding for it vnto the holie scriptures, and especiallie to the gospell.

28 When Aristotle had after a sort denied, that felicitie commeth from God, in that he would not confesse it; this neuertheles he granteth, that it is a thing most diuine, that is, most perfect, which also God inioieth. For he, although not as men be, yet after a certeine maner of his owne, is blessed. here Eustratius added [of his owne] that God dooth giue felicitie, but not without the meanes which we haue rehearsed, I meane learning, ¹⁵⁵ custome and exercise. And vndoubtedlie, there be certeine things giuen vnto vs by God, without anie labour or indeuour of vs. For when did euer anie man labour that he might be borne wittie, noble, or of a sound bodie, or of a perfect complexion? Assuredlie no man. As for other things, God so giueth them, as we should atteine vnto them by certeine means. Howbeit this must be dilligentlie considered, that if we will thinke well and godlie of the matter, euen the verie meanes are giuen vnto vs by GOD himselfe: for no man shall be mooued to receiue sound doctrine, nor to take in hand a good custome nor a profitable exercise, ¹⁵⁶ vnlesse he be stirred vp by God. If felicitie haue those thrée things, for causes and certeine principles, it may soone be common vnto manie; except those which haue not their senses perfect, which be féeble, and borne lame, and for that cause cannot atteine vnto felicitie. For there be some, which be borne fooles, and of an ill temperature of the bodie; and therefore they which be deafe, dumbe, or which be ouercome with great gréefes & weakenes, cannot learne good arts and litterature, neither are they fit for exercises; nor yet to procure vnto themselues good manners. And doctrine is not admitted for morall vertues sake; but bicause of the faculties & sciences which be contemplatiue, in which things for the most part felicitie dooth consist. And bicause it is said, that felicitie is common vnto manie; hearers & readers be incouraged to thinke, that if they fall from it, it must be imputed to their own default which would not learne and accustome themselues to good actions, and painfull exercises.

From felicitie he in like manner exempted children; bicause they, in respect of their age, ¹⁵⁷ which in them is verie yoong and tender, cannot execute that action to all intents and purposes. But the reason which he maketh, why they cannot be blessed, let vs examine it as it is produced by Aristotle; There is néed (saith he) vnto felicitie, both vertue, and a perfect life. Touching life, there is no controuersie; bicause as one swalowe maketh not the spring time, so one day maketh not a man happie. Wherefore, if one should become happie, it is requisite that his age be lengthened, and his time produced. There is also required a perfect vertue; for vnlesse it shall take déepe roote, it will soone slip awaie, as hauing small fastening. Bréefelie, Aristotle will that a happie man should be in such a state, as he cannot easilie be remooued therefrom; whervnto all men sée, that a full age and perfect vertue is requisite. This opinion pleased the Pelagians, which placed righteousnes, and the kingdome of heauen in the power of men. Also it pleased the schoolmen; for as the Pelagians denied grace, & said that nature dooth suffice: so these men likewise affirming grace in bare name, haue in verie déed quite taken it awaie, as they which haue made the same common and open to all men, as though it were in euerie man, either to receiue it, or to put it from him. And when they be asked who dooth giue grace to them, which accept it, in such sort as they both desire it, and receiue it, when it is offered to them; they flie vnto frée will: and of all these is Pighius the standerd-bearer.

Wherefore, if either thou aske of Aristotle, or of them; Since felicitie is thus common, as ye say, how coms it to passe, that so few obteine the same? Bicause few (saie they) will learne, few will labour, few will accustome themselues to honest and good exercises. But we will here note a generall and a certeine proposition; To euerie nature or kind there is a purposed end, the which all that be comprehended in it may atteine. And surelie, that which Aristotle answered, as touching them that haue not their perfect senses, be lame, and féeble, why they cannot be partakers of felicitie; namelie, bicause of their naturall defect; that proposition may be vnderstood, when the powers shall be perfect: so doo we answer, that men cannot now by themselues be perfect, bicause nature was corrupted euen from the beginning, and that we haue not the powers as well of the mind, as of the bodie perfect. So that now, when we heare these things, let vs thinke that we heare Aristotle, not Paule, or Christ. Here haue we thrée things that are spoken of felicitie; It is a diuine thing, ¹⁵⁸ it may be obtained by the thrée principall things, which he haue alreadie rehearsed, and it is common in a maner to all men.

29 There remaineth fortune, which Aristotle remooueth from the causes of felicitie; bicause it is thought vnwoorthie that it should be admitted to open so excellent a gift vnto men. But before I shew the reason brought by Aristotle, ¹⁵⁹ I will indeuour to declare what fortune is. As it is written in the second booke of naturall philosophie; It is an accidentall cause, and then it commeth in place, when anie thing is ioined to anie man, which is author of the effect following; vnto the producing of which effect, that which is ioined therevnto, worketh nothing, but onlie giueth sometimes an occasion; and the effect may well come to passe without it. This is made plaine by a similitude; If a man, by reason of an ague, become temperate, we will saie that this fell out by fortune: for temperance commeth of the will as of hir own proper cause, which will bridleth the affection of lust. The ague might haue bin the occasion whereby this came to passe, but the cause it could not be. And bicause these things, to wit, the will of temperate gouernement, and the ague, méete by fortune in one and the same man; therefore doth temperance spring by fortune from the ague. But it appeareth plainelie inough, that the feauer is not by it selfe the cause of the temperance; otherwise, all that be gréeued with a feauer, would become temperate. According to this maner of speaking must the sentence of Paule be examined and vnderstood; ¹⁶⁰ Knowledge puffeth vp. Pride, which immediatelie preferreth our owne things aboue other mens, procéedeth from the will; héereby we become vaine and puffed vp. And bicause knowledge giueth an occasion vnto some that this is done, therefore knowledge is said to puffe vp, but yet by fortune; bicause in one selfe man, are ioined together by chance these two things, to wit, the desire of passing and excelling others, and also some knowledge of things. And as these things be ioined together at all aduentures; so doth vaine puffing vp procéed by fortune from knowledge. Also it hapneth, that when vnto that effect, which we desire by it selfe, and by our owne aduise, another effect by chance is ioined therewith; then the same commeth of fortune, not purposelie, whereas we in verie déed sought for another thing. As otherwhile it hapneth vnto them that be diggers, that they in labouring doo finde treasure, when as they onlie intended the trimming of their vines and trées: this I saie happeneth by fortune, when as the digger sought for another matter: neither is the digging the proper and true cause of finding out the treasure; for if a man should affirme this, he must of necessitie auouch, that all diggers doo finde treasures. Adde moreouer, that all the effects of fortune doo verie seldome come to passe, and that contrariwise than falleth out in the true and proper causes, which verie seldome are hindred from bringing foorth their effects. Which things being so, it appeareth, and that manifestlie, that fortune is repugnant to reason and counsell. ¹⁶¹ Wherefore it is not méete to attribute vnto it, that it bringeth foorth felicitie. And so Aristotle concludeth, that séeing felicitie is better deriued from the causes before mentioned, than from fortune, it is méete that wée should determine it so to be; bicause it ought to be in the best maner that it can.

One reason, whereby Aristotle prooueth fortune to be no cause of felicitie is this; The chéefest good ought not to be referred vnto a vile and abiect cause; Felicitie is the chéefest good, & fortune is but vile among the causes; Wherefore blessednes ought not to be reduced vnto fortune, being a cause lesse woorthie than others. And hereof dependeth the force of this argument: for although a noble cause doo otherwhile bring foorth a vile effect (as we knowe that the sunne dooth not onelie bréed a man, but also frogs, fleas, and flies) yet excellent effects cannot procéed but of noble causes. Here we sée, that by euident and most manifest words Aristotle excludeth fortune, as he that would not number the same among the causes of felicitie, and taketh propositions as well out of his booke of naturall philosophie, as also out of his metaphysicks: the verie which certeinlie he might haue doone, in affirming God to be the cause of mans blessednes. So that he excludeth from this number both God and fortune: GOD, as ouer-woorthie and too high; but fortune, as an vnwoorthie and a more vile cause. For it is a most inconstant thing, and hath no substantiall ground-worke: which neuertheles is so excluded, as it can doo nothing about the nature and substance of felicitie; and yet vndoubtedlie it can doo somewhat about those good things which helpe vnto felicitie, & be the instruments therof. But if it be of power, concerning riches, and honours, and such like, which (as it hath béene said) doo not a little further vnto felicitie; why doo they denie them to be the cause thereof? We grant indéed, that these things doo accomplish, and doo seruice vnto felicitie, and doo such seruice, as it may not be without them; but we denie that it dooth properlie cause the same. For it so fareth not, that as the lacke of these things may hinder blessednes; so if they be present, they can performe and bring the same to passe. For thou shalt sée manie men that be noble, rich, strong, and in honours, who neuertheles being wicked, thou wilt not call happie. Which assuredlie should not come to passe, if these things were by themselues causes of happines. But if these kinds of good things be taken awaie from honest and wise men, they suffer them not to be happie, although (as it hath béene said) those things themselues are not the causes of blessednes. But if thou demand, whether the good things of the bodie doo also come from fortune? I may easilie denie it; bicause fortune is affirmed to be one of those causes, which rarelie and seldome comes in action: for scarselie within a hundred yéere it happeneth, that a digger of vine trées, or a ploughman chanceth vpon a treasure. But it is verie often giuen vnto men euen fro~ their birth, to haue a good constitution of their bodie, & haue giuen them sound members, and sufficient strength to accomplish their actions.

30 Another argument is alleged, which is much stronger, and that is taken from the definition of blessednes. And the sense is; bicause felicitie is an action, and that no smal action of the mind, it ought not to be expected of fortune: for the nature of minds and of vertues is otherwise, than it is of fortune. But he saith not absolutelie, that blessednes is an action of the mind; but he added, that it is a certeine kind of action, that is to wit, a most absolute and most perfect action; bicause it procéedeth from a most excellent vertue. Hereof dependeth the force of the argument, that neither the mind of man, nor vertue doo anie action by fortune. He againe confirmeth felicitie not to be of fortune; bicause he said at the beginning, that the end of ciuill facultie is the chéefest good; but no man doubteth, but that the same facultie worketh not by chance, or by fortune. And he prooueth, that therefore the chéefe end of man belongeth vnto that facultie, bicause therein ciuill vertue dooth verie much labour, to the end it may make good citizens. Wherefore, if it vse diligence, it cannot be said to deale by fortune. For counsell, industrie, and diligence are altogither repugnant vnto fortune: for the ciuill art endeuoureth to make good citizens, and to be of excellent conditions, & singular qualities; first by making of good lawes, afterward by giuing of honours and rewards to the kéepers and faithfull obseruers of them; and on the other side, by punishing, and kéeping vnder those which doo transgresse them.

Let vs now bréefelie examine these things by the holie scriptures, ¹⁶² how much they agrée with them, or how much they dissent from them. Aristotle speaketh doubtfullie of God, whether he be the authour of felicitie or no. But we constantlie affirme that he is; I will (saith God vnto Abraham) be thine exceeding great reward. ¹⁶³ And least we should suspect that this is naturallie true, but not at the will and election of God himselfe, there followeth there the making of a couenant, wherby he chose to himselfe a certeine people; and he couenanted that he would be the God of those that beléeue. And Moses, who verie well vnderstood, that felicitie consisteth herein, that God might be vnderstood and séene, desired this of God, when he said; Shew me thy face, ¹⁶⁴ which also he obteined. And Dauid sang; ¹⁶⁵ Pleasures are at thy right hand for euermore. And Christ our sauiour, who is our God; ¹⁶⁶ Come (saith he) vnto me all that labour and are heauie loden, and I will refresh you. And he said speaking of his shéepe; They heare my voice, ¹⁶⁷ & I giue them eternall life. Let this be a full persuasion to euerie one of vs, that our felicitie is to be expected and desired of God himselfe. As for the exercises, customes, and doctrines which Aristotle mentioneth, in our opinion also must not be contemned; naie rather they are commanded vs in euerie place of the scriptures: yet not so, that they should be the causes of our felicitie. ¹⁶⁸ For we be fréelie iustified, not of works; and eternall life is granted fréelie vnto vs.

But there be certeine means, whereby God dooth lead vs vnto him, and to the felicitie which we desire: and these means we haue from God himselfe. Wherefore it was vpon good cause said by Paule; ¹⁶⁹ It is God which giueth vnto vs both to will and to performe. But as for fortune much lesse than Aristotle did, doo we commit blessednes therevnto; as we that thinke, that all our dooings are gouerned by the counsell and will of God, so as without his will, not so much as one heare can fall from our head. ¹⁷⁰ And we thinke this of all other to be most false, which is commonlie said of the Ethniks, that Euerie wise man frameth to himselfe his owne fortune. Aristotle denieth that children can be happie, but we on the other side affirme them to be happie, séeing Christ said; Suffer them to come vnto me, ¹⁷¹ & he imbraced them with great fauour, & with singular clemencie. We know indéed, that they as yet cannot be workers of excellent actions, but yet by Christ both originall sin is forgiuen them, and a waie vnto eternall life is opened to them. Neither doo we grant vnto him, that they can not be called happie, which are afflicted with great mischances; since it may be, that they which are trulie blessed, doo suffer gréeuous things for the name of Christ: neither doo those hard and horrible things, which they indure, ouerthrowe that blessednes, which we men may haue while wée liue héere.

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Footnotes

1. The matter or subiect of felicitie. The definition of felicitie. ↩

2. How Aristotles definition agreeth with the holie scriptures. Psal. 118. and 127. 1. Psal. 111, 1. and 127, 1. Psal. 1, 2. Psal. 32, 1. Iohn. 2. ↩

3. Sundrie opinions of the philosophers as touching felicitie. ↩

4. Simple ends and conioined ends. ↩

5. Eustratius. ↩

6. A similitude. ↩

7. Why men doo seeke diuers kinds of life. ↩

8. Such princes, such people. ↩

9. Godlie king Edward the sixt. ↩

10. Sardanapalus. ↩

11. Tyberius. ↩

12. Heliogabalus. ↩

13. Xerxes. ↩

14. A definition of gladnes. ↩

15. Ioie defined. ↩

16. Whence pleasure doth spring. ↩

17. The pleasures of the senses are mixt. ↩

18. Naturall necessitie being satisfied, pleasure seaseth. ↩

19. How the name of pleasure is vnderstood by Aristotle. ↩

20. Wherein Aristotle and Plato differ concerning pleasure. ↩

21. The generall word of pleasure. ↩

22. The definition of pleasure. ↩

23. That pleasure is no motion. ↩

24. How long pleasure may continue. ↩

25. Whie new things so greatlie delight. ↩

26. That pleasure differeth in kind. ↩

27. The first diuision of pleasures. ↩

28. The second diuision of pleasures. ↩

29. The third distinction of pleasurs. ↩

30. The fourth distinction of pleasures. ↩

31. What pleasures must be auoided and why. ↩

32. How greatlie the grosser pleasurs hurt vs. ↩

33. Cicero his words as touching the euils which rise of pleasures. ↩

34. Whether the pleasures that arise of contemplation or iust actions do hurt. ↩

35. Whether the pleasures which must be shunned be verie pleasures. ↩

36. Whie these kind of-pleasures which hurt and are to be shunned are desired of manie. ↩

37. Who be most inclined to the pleasures of the bodie ↩

38. Why these pleasures were giuen by God vnto men. ↩

39. Augustine. ↩

40. What pleasures are not to be auoided, and why. ↩

41. Whether pleasure for life, or life for pleasure is to bee wished. ↩

42. How Aristotles opinion agreeth with the scriptures. ↩

43. Matt. 7, 13. ↩

44. Esaie. 7, 13. ↩

45. Iohn. 8, 34, ↩

46. 2. Pet. 2, 19.
    ↩

47. Psal. 48, 12. ↩

48. Ierem. 5, 8. ↩

49. Psal. 32, 10. ↩

50. Osea. 4, 9. ↩

51. Matt. 2, 3. ↩

52. 1. Cor. 6, 13.
    ↩

53. Matt. 22, 30. ↩

54. That pleasure is not strange from felicitie. ↩

55. Whether all pleasures haue felowship with felicitie. ↩

56. The contrarietie of pleasures betweene the vulgar sort. ↩

57. How these things concurre with the holie scriptures. Phili. 4, 4. ↩

58. verse, 15. ↩

59. Acts. 5, 41. ↩

60. The definition of honour. ↩

61. The causes of honour. ↩

62. Augustins definition of glorie. ↩

63. Quintilians definition of glorie. ↩

64. Whether honour be his that giueth the honour, or of him that is honoured. ↩

65. Whether one good mans testimonie be sufficient vnto perfect honour. ↩

66. Whether honour be alwaies ioined with iust deeds. ↩

67. Whether there should be a desire of honour in good or euill men. ↩

68. 1. King. 2, 30
    ↩
69. 1. Tim. 5, 17.
    ↩

70. We obeie Gods commandements, when we honor anie man woorthie thereof. Rom. 12, 10. verse. 3. verse. 17. ↩

71. Phili. 2, 29. ↩

72. In honouring of the good, we obteine rewards, and by contemning, punishments. Exo. 20, 12. ↩

73. 1. Tim. 1, 12.
    ↩

74. Wherein honors profit them that doo well. ↩

75. That the faithfull in the daie of iudgement shall haue the cheefest good. Matt. 25, 34. ↩

76. That honor for it selfe sake must not be desired. ↩

77. That wee must not be too carefull for honor. ↩

78. That the honor be not greater than the worthines of the person. ↩

79. Acts. 12, 23. ↩

80. The right waie to come by honors. ↩

81. That is to saie, vertuous actions. ↩

82. Matth, 6, 2. ↩

83. Ambition. ↩

84. Simonie. ↩

85. 4. King. 4, 12.
    ↩

86. That honors gotten must be wel vsed. ↩

87. The dutie of them that doo giue honor. ↩

88. How these things agree with the holie scriptures. ↩

89. Matth. 23, 8. ↩

90. Luke. 21. Mat. 6, & 10 Iohn. 16. Mark. 13. Phil. 2, 7. ↩

91. Rom. 4, 16. ↩

92. Matt. 13, 57. Marke. 6, 4. ↩

93. Matth. 5, 16. ↩

94. A distinction of good things. ↩

95. The goods of the mind. ↩

96. A distinction of the goods of the mind. ↩

97. The good things of the bodie distinguished. ↩

98. Outward good things distinguished. ↩

99. A resolution ↩

100. Riches are remooued from felicitie. ↩

101. ⟨…⟩. ↩

102. Reasons why riches be not the cheefe good. ↩

103. The scriptures testifie that riches be violent. Luke. 16, 9. 1. Tim. 6, 20. ↩

104. 1. Tim. 6, 9. Luk. 12, 20.
     ↩

105. Matt. 19, 21. ↩

106. That outward goods belong not to the nature of felicitie. ↩

107. Whether felicitie haue need of the inferiour good things. ↩

108. Riches naturall and artificiall. ↩

109. Of riches Looke more part. 3. chap 11. Art. 15. ↩

110. Beautie required to felicitie. ↩

111. ⟨…⟩. ↩

112. 1. Sam. 10, verse. 23.
     ↩

113. Nobilitie required to felicitie. ↩

114. ⟨…⟩. ↩

115. Store of good children required to felicitie. ↩

116. What helpe true friends bring to felicitie. ↩

117. What the holie scriptures teach touching outward good things Psal. 127, 4. ↩

118. Genesis. 22, vers. 17, &c. & 2. Kin. 2, 4 ↩

119. 1. Kin. 3, 13.
     ↩

120. Matth. 1. Luke. 3. ↩

121. Rom. 9, 4. ↩

122. Leui. 21, 18, 19, &c. ↩

123. Eccl. 10, 18. ↩

124. Prou. 17, 16. ↩

125. Matt. 19, 21. ↩

126. Matt. 19, 29. ↩

127. 1. Cor. 1, 26.
     ↩

128. Esaie. 56, 4. ↩

129. 1. Cor. 10, verse 24.
     ↩

130. Exo. 20, 12. ↩

131. 1. Tim. 5, 8.
     ↩

132. Two properties of our nature. ↩

133. That vertue is not the cheefest good. ↩

134. Why vertue is not the cheefest good. ↩

135. An obiection of the Stoiks. ↩

136. Another obiection. ↩

137. Another obiection, that the action of vertue is onlie in the mind, ↩

138. That the Stoiks reposed not themselues in vertue alone. ↩

139. That the Stoiks opinion is far from religion. ↩

140. That the Stoiks are more to be borne withall, than the Epicures. ↩

141. What the holie scriptures teach hereof. Psal. 49, 6. ↩

142. Psal. 32, 12. ↩

143. Psal. 112, 1. ↩

144. Psal. 119, 1. ↩

145. That good habits may be vnprofitable. 2. Cor. 6, 1. 1. Tim. 4, 14 ↩

146. Whether calamities doo hinder men from happines. ↩

147. Psal. 32, 1. ↩

148. Esaie. 25, 8. Apoc. 21, 4. ↩

149. 1. Cor. 15, ver. 13, & 19
     ↩

150. Matth. 5, 4. vers. 4, & 10. ↩

151. Rom. 8, 18. ↩

152. The difference betweene custome and exercise. ↩

153. Whether felicitie be of God. ↩

154. The opinion of the Peripatetiks as touching prouidence. ↩

155. How God dooth giue some things without a meane and some by meanes. ↩

156. That felicitie is common vnto manie. ↩

157. Children excluded from felicitie by Aristotle. ↩

158. Three things spoken of felicitie. ↩

159. A plaine declaratio~ what fortune is. ↩

160. 1. Cor. 8, 1.
     ↩

161. That fortune is not the cause of felicitie. ↩

162. How these things agree with the holie scriptures. ↩

163. Gen. 15, 1. ↩

164. Exo. 33, 13. ↩

165. Psal. 15, 12. ↩

166. Mat. 11, 28. ↩

167. Ioh. 10, 28. ↩

168. Rom. 3, 24. ↩

169. Phil. 2. 13. ↩

170. Luke. 21, 18. ↩

171. Mar. 10, 14. ↩