These things which followe are taken out of the like place vpon the first to the Corinthians, at the end of the second Chapter.

31 Now must we search out, whether the libertie of the will be taken quite awaie, ²⁷⁵ by meanes of those things which we haue rehersed. But bicause Paule affirmeth, that A naturall man can not knowe those things which be of God: ²⁷⁶ it séemeth a while to be against frée will. For if we be not able, through our naturall power to comprehend spirituall things; how can it come to passe, that we expresse them in our actions: séeing we sée by experience, that there is much more busines and labour in dooing, than in vnderstanding? And not onelie this, ²⁷⁷ but also the predestination, or prescience, séemeth to be a hinderance to it. For it séemeth that this may be inferred; If God hath knowen all things, before they be brought to passe, and can not be deceiued, the libertie of our will is quite gone, and all things happen of necessitie. Also, ²⁷⁸ the power of GOD, wherewith all things be wrought, causeth no small difficulty of this matter: for of such efficacie is the will of God, as Paule to the Romans said; Who is able to resist his will?

Moreouer, the scriptures affirme sinne to be of so great force, ²⁷⁹ as by the same all things in a maner are corrupted and despoiled in vs: wherfore the strength which is left vnto will, is verie féeble, the which is not able to doo as reason hath appointed. Againe, ²⁸⁰ so much is attributed to the grace of Christ by diuine oracles, as without the same it is said, that we are able to doo nothing, which either may be acceptable or gratefull vnto God. And séeing the same is not equallie giuen vnto all men, it is thought that their libertie is destroied; for so much as they haue not this grace in their owne power. ²⁸¹ The Mathematicians also extoll the powers celestiall, and in a maner persuade, that of them doo depend those things which happen; so as there might not séeme to be left vnto vs the perfect libertie of such things as are to come. ²⁸² Finallie, there haue béene such also, who would affirme, that there be definite causes of things to be doone; ²⁸³ the which being ioined one with an other, and tied with a sure knot, there is brought to them a certeine necessitie and destinie, which cannot be withstood.

32 But we néed not stand much vpon that argument, ²⁸⁴ which was taken fro~ the force of knowledge; bicause it expresselie appéereth by those things, which we haue alreadie spoken, that this libertie is not iudged to be in men not yet regenerate, as concerning works, which be in verie déed good, and doo please God: wherfore that kind of reasoning is not to be weakened, séeing it surelie confirmeth the doctrine of the apostle. ²⁸⁵ In the next reason there is a more difficultie and trouble: for there be few, which can perceiue how the prouidence of God, ²⁸⁶ or (as they terme it) his prescience can suffer anie frée choise to remaine in our will. And the place is so difficult and dangerous to be dealt in, as manie of the old writers, in reasoning about this matter, were brought to such a passe, as they iudged altogither, that of those things, which be doone, there ariseth a necessitie: yea, and they supposed, that God himselfe is held with this necessitie. Wherof came a prouerbe, ²⁸⁷ that God also might not withstand necessitie, so as he durst not attempt anie thing against the same.

²⁸⁸ Through this libertie of theirs, the poets went further, and said, that manie things be doone, euen whether the gods will or no. And Homer brought in Iupiter to be sad, and to lament the necessitie, or destinie, by the force whereof he was let from remoouing death, which approched vnto his swéet sonne Sarpedones. And he maketh Neptunus to take verie gréeuouslie⟨…⟩ the chance of his sonne Cyclops; of whom he being stirred vp with a lust to reuenge, would haue driuen Vlysses altogither from home, and complaineth, that this was not granted to him by destinie. And in Virgil, Iuno dooth no lesse outragiouslie bewaile; bicause she had kept wars so long togither with one nation, and yet could not remooue (as she desired) from the coast of Italie the Troian nauie. But we Christians doo not in such sort speake of God: for we haue most certeinlie learned out of the holie scriptures, that there is nothing vnpossible to God; and we are taught by Christ himselfe, that althings are possible vnto God. And our faith, after the example of Abraham, ²⁸⁹ dooth chéeflie cleaue to this persuasion; that God can doo whatsoeuer he hath promised. Neither must we conceiue in our mind, ²⁹⁰ that Christ was either condemned vnto the death, or forced to the crosse against his will, or his father not willing. GOD would these things to be doone, not being led thereto by an ineuitable necessitie; but by a superabundant & excéeding charitie towards men. So the scripture teacheth vs, which saith; ²⁹¹ So God loueth the world, as he gaue his onelie sonne, &c. And vnto the Romans it is written; ²⁹² Which spared not his owne sonne, but gaue him for vs all. Christ himselfe by the same loue, was mooued to die for vs; and he taught vs, ²⁹³ that A greater loue than this can none haue, that one putteth his life for his friends. And thereby he shewed himselfe to haue excéeded the measure of mans loue; bicause he would suffer death for his enimies. And that he willinglie, and of his owne accord tooke death vpon him, he sufficientlie declared; when in the last banket (which, according to the Paschall custome, he kept with his apostles) he said; ²⁹⁴ I haue earnestlie desired to eate this passeouer with you.

33 By these places we perceiue, that the Lords death was throughlie foreknowne, and vnderstood, and did in no respect infringe the libertie, either of Christ, or of the father. Therefore Cicero, otherwise a verie learned man, is greatlie to be woondered at: ²⁹⁵ against whom Augustine, in his fift booke De ciuitate Dei, especiallie in the ninth & tenth chapters, earnestlie disputeth concerning this question. The controuersie dependeth vpon this, that in the latter booke De diuinatione, all things are refelled, which were brought by Quintus, Ciceros brother, in the former booke. And Cicero indeuoreth by all meanes, to ouerthrowe all predictions of things to come, and of the prescience of God. Therefore Augustine affirmeth, that the Astrologians had reasons, which were better to be borne withall, than his: bicause, though they attribute ouermuch vnto the starres, yet they take not awaie all diuination and prescience. ²⁹⁶ And a certeine Physician (as the same Augustine declareth in his booke of confessions) being a graue man, and one that detested Astrologie; when he was demanded, how it came to passe that Mathematicians did prophesie so manie truths, he durst not (contrarie vnto all histories and experience) denie euerie diuination; but he answered, that a certeine destinie was spred ouer things: and he affirmed, that it was not incredible, but that reasonable soules did after a sort féele it. Surelie there is nothing to be found more repugnant, ²⁹⁷ than of the one side to affirme God to be; and on the other side to take from him the prescience of things to come. The prophet Esaie would these things to be so firmelie knit togither, as he said; Shew vs what things shall come to passe, ²⁹⁸ and we will declare you to be gods. But that Cicero had small knowledge, and no good iudgement of God; it appéereth by his booke, which he intituled De natura deorum: wherein, disputing vnder the person of Cotta, he striueth vtterlie to take awaie the nature of God.

And surelie, it is to be lamented, that so notable a man is to be charged with that, which the psalme of Dauid ascribeth vnto fooles: for there it is written; ²⁹⁹ that The foolish man hath said in his hart, There is no God. Vpon what occasion he appointed those parts in the dialog vnto Cotta, which was a bishop; I doo not well vnderstand: vnlesse perhaps he considered, that none in a maner are to be found, which both more fréelie speake, and woorse doo estéeme of God, than they doo, to whose trust are committed ceremonies and holie things. And bicause it was not hidden to Tullius Cicero, that it is a verie odious thing to professe an opinion, whereby God should be denied: therefore, when he had disputed as much as he thought good; in the end of his booke he shewed his opinion, yet in the behalfe of Lucius Balbus; and so, as he saith to Velleius, that the opinion of Cotta is to be allowed. Cicero was a man verie studious, as well of all kind of learning, as speciallie of the ciuill lawe. And whereas he thought, ³⁰⁰ that the state of mans dooings should be ouerthrowne, if frée will were denied: and he not knowing by what meanes this libertie might be reteined, with a prescience of things to come; he rather yéelded, that Gods wisedome should be taken from him, than that we should be depriued of the fréedome of our will.

Wherevpon it may be gathered, into what darknesse and obscuritie of things the sinne of the first man hath driuen mankind: for what a madnes is it to go about to throwe GOD, the creator of all things, out of the fortresse of his wisedome, ³⁰¹ that thou maist preserue man? This is that ouer selfe-loue, which euerie-where in the scriptures is condemned: we would that all things should perish, rather than our selues. This dooth not godlinesse require. Wherfore we, which be taught by the spirit of God, declare that both must be confessed; namelie, that both God dooth foreknow all things, and also that the fréedome of our mind (as we haue shewed before) must be reteined. So doo the holie scriptures instruct vs, wherein we read; ³⁰² Whom he foreknew, them hath he predestinate to be made conformable to the image of his sonne: and that We were chosen by God before the foundations of the world were laid. ³⁰³ In them doo we learne, that The heares of our head euerie one are numbered: ³⁰⁴ that The little sparrowes light not without the will of our heauenlie father. And séeing we iudge, that God dooth all things rightlie and iustlie; we cannot thinke that he dealeth without reason and vnderstanding.

34 But go to, let vs more néerelie consider the maner of Ciceros reasoning. ³⁰⁵ If (saith he) things to come are certeinlie knowne before, things among themselues shall haue some certeine order: and forsomuch as nothing is doone without a cause, of necessitie also it shall be granted, that there is an order and knitting togither of causes. Whereby will come to passe, that all things, which be doone, be doone of necessitie; by which meanes iust and wholsome lawes shall perish: and no admonitions or rebukings will be left, neither can there be anie place for religion or praiers. Wherefore thou must choose, whether of these two euils thou wilt: either that there is diuination, and prescience of God; or else to maintaine the frée power of mans will. Both togither cannot be had, they be repugnant one with another, as he thinketh. Wherefore vnto him it séemeth altogither necessarie, that one of these be mainteined and defended; and that the other be refused, as false and vnprofitable. Which deliberation being taken, ³⁰⁶ as Augustine no lesse wittilie, than godlie said; Cicero, otherwise a verie prudent man, while he coueteth to make vs frée, maketh vs impious and wicked persons, who should rob God of the knowledge, which he hath of things to come.

And we must diligentlie marke, that his arguments make no lesse against the foretellings of our prophets; than they impugne the diuinations of the Ethniks, whereof he at that time disputed. Wherefore thus I thinke best to answer his curious reasons. Let vs grant him what he would; to wit, that for the establishing of Gods prescience, we agrée that there is a certeine and determinate order before GOD, ³⁰⁷ as well of things, as of causes. But that which he bringeth in at last; namelie, that all things will therefore come to passe of necessitie; that will we denie. For though there be an order of causes appointed, yet dooth it not followe therof, that there cannot be som causes found among them, which may kéepe their libertie, or (as they call it) their contingence. And in this point Cicero séemeth to erre more than the Stoiks: for he, ³⁰⁸ to saue the libertie of man, would that all order of causes, and foreshewing of things to come, should be vtterlie taken awaie; which things take so sure hold of the nature of God, that the same being spoiled of them, it cannot séeme to consist. But the Stoiks, bicause they would take nothing from the nature of GOD, ³⁰⁹ doo bring in their destinie: and that our entire and perfect will may haue a place, they altogither remooue the same from the order of causes ioined togither.

35 But here let vs ioine issue with him, that we may stedfastlie denie, that the knowledge of GOD dooth nothing at all hinder our will; although it comprehend the things which are to come: for neuer shall the will of man bring anie thing to effect, vnlesse GOD haue both foreknowne it, and wild it to be brought to effect. When he shall knowe before hand, that to morrowe I will either runne or read; indéed I shall runne and read, yet not driuen thereto of anie necessitie, but (as they speake) contingentlie: for as farre as belongeth to my selfe, I might doo neither one nor other. But if thou vrge further, and saie; Yet neuerthelesse thou shalt doo it, in such sort as God knew that thou shouldst doo it. I grant: but thereof it followeth not, that I could not otherwise doo; bicause we doo not alwaies that which we can doo: nay rather, manie things might be doone, which in no wise be doone. ³¹⁰ And in that I shall read or runne, it procéedeth altogither of my owne choise: for of all things it is most in our power, to will, or not to will. Wherfore when they saie; Bicause God knew before, that thou wouldest read or runne; Therefore of necessitie thou shalt read: we must demand of them againe, whether vnder the name of necessitie, they meane a compelled and a repugnant will.

³¹¹ For if this be their mind, that we vtterlie denie: bicause it may be, that God foreknew that I would doo some thing, and that neither vnwillinglie, nor with a constrained mind; but that I would doo it willinglie. But if by necessitie, they meane that this should in anie wise be doone of me, we will not denie it: for so much as the controuersie now is, not of the thing which is doone, or is not doone; but the disputation betwéene vs is onelie of the maner and forme of dooing. ³¹² Neither (as he thought) are admonitions, lawes, rebukings, or religious praiers taken awaie: these things doubtles will be of force, and that more frequentedlie than he could persuade himselfe; bicause God not onelie hath mans safetie in his foreknowledge, but also he comprehendeth in his vnderstanding, the waies and meanes, whereby he will helpe them. Wherefore if we shall perceiue our brother to haue néed of the remedies, which we haue héere mentioned, we must boldlie vse them: for they haue so farre foorth appéered, as God before hand knew, and would, that they should be profitable. Neither must we desist from our dutie, although it may be, that all mortall men would affirme that we labour in vaine. For we must followe the lawe prescribed vnto vs, and not the secret prescience of God, whereof we haue no suertie what he hath decréed of things to come.

And séeing the prescience of God is not the nature, or (as they terme it) the essence or being of our mind; we must giue iudgement of the actions which procéed from the same, according as they ought to be estéemed by the nature of the mind and will; and not by that which is placed out of the same. Wherefore, séeing the nature of will is, that it is mooued, neither vnwillinglie nor by constraint; it cannot be excluded from it by anie outward means. ³¹³ It may sooner be abolished not to be at all, than that the violent action can be taken there from: euen as thou maist easilier ridde anie of vs from being men, than when we be men to make vs that we shall not be furnished with a reasonable soule; for it followeth immediatlie, that the soule being abandoned of reason, he cannot anie longer be a man.

36 But if thou demand yet further, whether it be a matter of necessitie, that I shall read to morrowe; séeing God hath this foreknowen: ³¹⁴ we answer, that vpon condition, or supposition, some necessitie may be granted; but not perfect and absolute. Wherefore with that necessitie, which we grant, the choise of frée will may verie well agrée. Moreouer, Aristotle in his Ethiks, disputeth, and that learnedlie (as he dooth all other things) whether the casting foorth, which is doone in the sea, when shipwracke is at hand, is to be appointed among things voluntarie. And although he there confesseth a certeine action, that is mixed with willingnesse and vnwillingnesse: yet neuerthelesse he concludeth, that those kind of actions belong vnto the voluntarie sense; séeing for that time, wherein the shipmen be in danger, they will them, and altogither make choise of them. And if so be that notable Philosopher doubted not to place willingnesse in this kind of action, wheras men by a certeine force are tried to constraine themselues, to choose that thing, which otherwise (if that chance had not béene) they would neuer haue doone; then how much rather shall not we take willingnesse from our vsuall and common actions, when we perceiue our selues, of our owne accord, and with a mind most willing, to doo and indeuour those things, which we thinke good; although we doubt not, but God did long before vnderstand of the same?

And that the necessitie of this kind which we haue taught to be by supposition, doth not ouerthrowe the frée power of our will; ³¹⁵ Chrysostome doth plainlie shew, while he writing vpon the first epistle to the Corinthians, & interpreting these words; It behooueth that heresies be, that they which be tried among vs, ³¹⁶ may be made manifest, saith: Not vnlike this forme of spéech Christ vsed, when he said; ³¹⁷ It is necessarie that offenses doo come, but wo be vnto that man by whom they shall happen. Also he said to his apostles, that It behooued Christ to haue suffered, and so to enter into his glorie. ³¹⁸ All these things in holie matters are so to be expounded, as when they be called things of necessitie; yet nothing must be taken awaie from the nature of mans will. ³¹⁹ And this among the Schoole-men is woont to be called, A necessitie not of the consequent, but of consequence.

37 There be some which commonlie saie, that doubtles these distinctions helpe vs nothing at all; if God haue knowen before hand of things, those shall in anie wise come to passe. Yes verelie, they are profitable vnto vs, and that not meanlie: for bicause thereby we vnderstand, that mans will is not compelled; but that willinglie and without compulsion it desireth whatsoeuer it will. For otherwise I will aske thée againe, whether thou wouldest be saued against the will and consent of God? I suppose not. But if thou wouldest be saued according to his will, he of necessitie is not ignorant of thy saluation: for so it is ordeined, that none willeth that which he is ignorant of. ³²⁰ It happeneth vnto vs verie often, that we togither behold plaiers; yet dare we not saie, that the sight and knowledge which we haue, bringeth anie necessitie to them which plaie: and yet, while we sée them in plaie, it is of necessitie, that they doo plaie. Wherefore, as that necessitie infringeth not the nature of their will; euen so the excellencie of God compelleth not the will of man.

Some brall at vs, and saie, that this similitude is farre from the question proposed; bicause none at anie time doo behold plaiers, which be not, and plaie not indéed. Whereas it is ascribed to God, that he hath had a knowledge before hand, of all our doings euen from the beginning: when as yet, neither we, nor anie of our actions appéered to be. To these men I might answer, that vnto God all things are no otherwise present, than they which doo plaie are conuersant in the fight of them which behold. ³²¹ Let euerie one therefore take héed to himselfe, that he cast not the causes of his sinnes vpon God; and when such a kind of cogitation entreth into his mind, let him haue respect vnto lust, voluptuousnesse, wrath, hatred, and other perturbations of the mind, wherewith he is sore diseased; and out of these fountaines let him séeke for the causes of his sinnes. ³²² Neither must there be much credit giuen vnto the Peripatetiks in this matter, which denie, that God hath vnderstanding of particular affaires; least they should séeme to thinke, that the mind of God were abiect & vile, if he should drawe his knowledge from fraile and transitorie things. This thing is not agréeable vnto our documents: for we doo beléeue, that God of himselfe hath a perfect knowledge of all things; neither that he hath anie néed to challenge knowledge else-where to himselfe.

³²³ 38 And whereas touching the third point, it was iudged, that the power of God is a hinderance to our will: the argument is neither perfect nor strong. For, although that God by his infinit power, wherewith he is indued, ³²⁴ doth what his pleasure is; yet doth he suffer the state and nature of things to stand whole: neither doth he violate them, or wrest them anie other waie, than the condition of them doth beare. Wherfore it is said in the booke of Wisdome; that God doth mightilie reach euen from one end to another, and doth pleasantlie dispose all things: or (as the Gréeke text saith) ⟨…⟩, that is, Profitablie. Which might not be said, if by the high power of God the natures of things were disturbed. The summe is, that God doth here moderate his power in ruling of the world, that he may fitlie applie his action vnto all maner of things. In the fourth place sinne séemed to be a hinderance to the libertie of the will; ³²⁵ as if it so weakened the powers of man, that after a sort they might be able to doo nothing anie more. But there néedeth not now manie words about this matter; bicause there hath béene plentie inough spoken in those things which we haue declared, how much our libertie hath béen diminished by reason of sinne; and that speciallie as touching verie perfect and good actions, which might be acceptable and well pleasing vnto God. Besides, it hath béen declared, that our libertie is not by this means vtterlie taken awaie; but rather, that there is as yet a great deale of it remaining.

39 Moreouer, concerning the powers celestiall, there shalbe no great néed to intreate; ³²⁶ séeing the Astronomers doo glorie in their owne bookes, that The wise shall beare rule among the starres. But and if so be that these things, which they pronounce, might not be escaped, all their gaines would fall awaie: for no man would bestowe cost vpon the skill of those things, which he thought he should not be able, neither to auoid, nor change, either by indeuour or studie. Which thing without controuersie would ensue, if so be they should ascribe a méere necessitie vnto their foreshewings. By this meanes all praiers, pietie, and worshipping of God would be taken awaie: for who would praie to God for obteining of anie thing, if he were alreadie persuaded, that the same should not be granted vnto him? Wherefore Augustine said; ³²⁷ They which thus thinke, doo great wrong vnto heauen: for there they beléeue is a court appointed, ³²⁸ wherein are notable acts decréed, which cannot be auoided: the which if it were in the earth, it should néeds be taken awaie. How much lesse must we thinke, that the same is doone by God in the celestiall parts? I beséech you what iudgement would be left, if so be we did all things vpon constraint?

This matter some excuse, saieng, that fro~ heauen is onelie signified what shall come to passe: yet that we be not thereby driuen by anie necessitie. And they bring foorth a place out of the booke of Genesis, ³²⁹ wherein it séemeth to be spoken; that The starres be put as signes. But that place is to be vnderstood concerning seasons, winds, ³³⁰ raines, tempests, and such like sort. But how can they affirme, that in heauen they sée certeine signes of things to come? They shall hardlie prooue it, especiallie touching mans affaires. ³³¹ For what answer can they make of twins, which being conceiued at one time, and haue all one aspect of the heauens; yet (as experience teacheth) the chance and successe of them is altogither differing?

³³² Augustine, in his fift booke De ciuitate Dei, and second chapter, is woorth the reading; where he writeth, ³³³ that sometime there happened two brothers to be like affectioned, that when one sickened, the other also was diseased: and when the one recouered, the other was also eased. Concerning which thing Hippocrates being demanded of his opinion, ³³⁴ made answer, that he thoght them to be twins; and that therefore they had the temperature or complexion of their bodie all of one nature. ³³⁵ But Possidonius the Mathematician did ascribe the whole cause vnto the starres; bicause in their natiuitie they occupied all one aspect of the heauens. But what (saith Augustine ) will these men saie of twins, and innumerable liuing creatures, which are borne in houres and moments alike; and yet atteine to such diuersitie of fortunes? ³³⁶ And Augustine witnesseth, that this example was taken out of Cicero; the which neuerthelesse we read not in his books at this daie extant, vnlesse perhaps he found the same in his booke De fato, which remaineth amongst vs all torne, mangled, and diminished.

³³⁷ 40 Moreouer, destinie, which the Stoiks appoint to haue méere necessitie, hindereth not our matter; forsomuch as we admit not the same to be. They seuered it from the wils of men, bicause they thought that all things would go to naught, if togither with other causes they comprehended will vnder destinie. Howbeit, it séemed not good to them, ³³⁸ vtterlie to seuer mans will from destinie; sauing in respect of the first choise, which they would haue to be wholie in our will. But whiles we shall choose anie cause that might be vnder destinie, they would haue it followe of necessitie; that what things soeuer they were, they should be ioined vnto it. Euen as Euripides said vnto Laius, that It was frée for him not to procreate; but when he had procreated, then of necessitie he should suffer euen those things, which Apollo prophesied to be conteined vnder destinie.

³³⁹ But we, as we declared at the first, denie not, but that things are knit togither, as God ordeined, and knew before hand; yet so, as the nature and condition of them remaineth whole and sound. For vnto whom soeuer a thing contingent (as the Schoole-diuines speake) is due, they haue the same: and to whom soeuer necessitie belongeth, with necessitie they be constreined. But in verie déed, grace, which finallie séemeth to resist frée will, dooth not take the same awaie; ³⁴⁰ but rather helpeth and restoreth it. But now we will cease from these matters, least we dispute more curiouslie of them than beséemeth christians. Let euerie one followe their owne vocation; and let vs leaue inquiring, more than is requisite, about the secret and hidden will of God, touching prescience and predestination: and let vs followe that doctrine of God, which is plainlie laid out before vs in the holy scriptures.

¶ Looke another place of the same argument in the addition at the end of this booke. Now we thinke it conuenient to ioine vnto this disputation certeine other discourses; namelie, of Voluntarie and Not voluntarie, and also of mans choise, and such like.

Of Voluntarie and Not voluntarie.

41 Aristotle in his first booke of Ethiks treateth at large of that which is voluntarie, ³⁴¹ and of that which is not voluntarie: the reason whereof is, bicause praise, dispraise, pardon, and sometimes mercie be voluntarie. The argument is taken from the consequents. Praises and dispraises serue vnto morall knowledge; for as commendable maners and actions are to be desired, so those which are blame-woorthie are to be auoided. Howbeit, such praises and dispraises cannot be iudged of, vnlesse we knowe whether they be doon with a willing or vnwilling mind. Further, he added another cause; to wit, that this doctrine is a part of the ciuill facultie, wherto belongeth the making of lawes. And lawes set foorth rewards and punishments to the obseruers and transgressors of them: it is néedfull therefore that they knowe which be voluntarie things, and which be not voluntarie. ³⁴² For men that be vnwilling, doo not obteine rewards; and they which sinne by compulsion, should not suffer punishments. Some wrest this reason of lawe-makers herevnto, as though they ought to regard this, that they command not those things, which of necessitie must be doon, nor those things, which are vnpossible to be doone; but onlie those, which be in our owne power: and that therefore it behooueth them to knowe what is the nature of voluntarie and not voluntarie. I knowe in verie déed, ³⁴³ that this is the definition of lawe; that It is a reason commanding honest things, and calling backe from things that be dishonest. But that which these men auouch, to wit, that it commandeth things which be possible, I would onelie grant it as touching ciuill laws, but not of diuine laws: for those require things that be vnpossible, especiallie in respect of the state of nature, corrupt & defiled. Howbeit, Aristotle vsed not this reson; he onlie touched these things which I haue mentioned of punishments & rewards. ³⁴⁴ But whie did he speake of the affects, since those be not voluntarie, but are naturallie planted in our minds? The Gréek scholies answer; that, albeit as touching substance and root they be of nature, yet may they some kind of waie be called voluntarie, insomuch as by vse & exercise they may be inlarged or repressed. Or else we will answer, that Aristotle made mention of both, of affects I meane and of actions; but voluntarie must onelie be referred to the actions. The which thing being doone, it will also belong vnto the vertues, which are conuersant in the affections: for those also are gotten by actions, which when they be right and commendable, must be accounted voluntarie. Morouer, whie dooth Aristotle saie, that somtime pardon, somtime mercie must be shewed? Bicause we doo not alwaies take mercie on them whom we pardon; for a man in defending himself, killed him which set vpo~ him; he did it not willinglie, he is forgiuen, but we take not pitie on him.

³⁴⁵ 42 But how the knowledge of that which is Voluntarie and Not voluntarie, may helpe to moderate the punishments which laws appoint, it may many waies be shewed. They which haue committed anie thing against their wils, or of compulsion, are not punished: And in the ciuill lawes there be verie manie titles, which prouide remedie in the case of ignorance or compulsion: euen as they doo likewise concerning those things which be doone for feare, and by craftie collusion, and touching them which be vnder 25. yéeres of age, &c. Also he that is taken with madnesse or frensie is forgiuen; yea and a mad man, although he kill his father; shall not be punished. The lawes of God quit the hewer of wood, ³⁴⁶ which by chance and not willinglie shall kill an other, bicause perhaps the axe might flie out of the helue, and certeine cities were appointed for refuge. Also Plato in his ninth booke of laws, sheweth that manie things are to be forgiuen, where the will did not consent. So as it greatlie auaileth lawe-makers and iudges of the lawe, bicause of giuing punishments and rewards, to knowe what is doone voluntarie, and what is not doone voluntarie. We will speake first of Not voluntarie: for in this matter the priuation séemeth to be better knowen, than the thing it selfe. By darknesse is the light better knowen, and sicknesse dooth make the goodnes of health the more manifest. ³⁴⁷ This definition of Not voluntarie appéereth by the reckoning vp of the parts thereof, so that it is rather a diuision than a definition; albeit that iust and full diuisions haue sometime the place of a definition. And we then chéeflie vse them, when that which is common to the parts, can not be expressed by anie one certeine point thereof. Howbeit we must vnderstand, that it is called Not voluntarie, of these two formes or kinds, which be of one signification: for euen that which is doone violentlie and vnwittinglie, is not voluntarie. And we prooue, that the diuision of these two parts is rightlie made: for Voluntarie, which is contrarie to Not voluntarie, standeth of two things; of knowledge, and desire. First we must knowe that which we must desire, then are we stirred vp therevnto by a motion of the desire. But either of these two may be hindred: ignorance taketh awaie knowledge, and violence letteth the desire. For good cause therefore be these two put contrarie to that which is voluntarie. Violence is defined what it is after this maner; It is a vehement inforcing, which either not at all, or verie difficultlie can be abidden. But some man will maruell, how two things may be set against one: for against Voluntarie is set that which is doone by violence, and also that which is doone vnwittinglie. Herevnto we answer, that there is but one set against one: constraint or Not voluntarie, is set against willingnesse or voluntarie. But this vnwillingnesse or not voluntarie, is afterward distributed into two parts: for it is one thing that is doone by violence, & an other which is doone by vnskilfulnes.

43 And as touching violence, ³⁴⁸ Aristotle saith that the beginning of the motion thereof must be outward: for those things which be mooued by an inward beginning, are mooued naturallie, not violentlie. But some cut off the latter particle which Aristotle hath in that place, so as that which suffereth or dooth, bringeth not anie helpe to that beginning. Howbeit, those which so saie are deceiued: for as we perceiue of a wracke that is made in a great tempest, the beginning thereof is outward; namelie, there be winds, waues, and stormes: but the wracke would not be, vnlesse that the shipmen themselues would take out of the ship those things which are to be cast awaie. And they which vnder a tyrant, are forced to doo things that be shamefull, they haue the beginning of their actions from without; namelie, the commandement of the tyrant: but yet those things would not be doone, if they themselues would not yéeld to the dooing of them. Wherefore it appeareth, that these things haue their beginning outwardlie; yet neuerthelesse that they bring some helpe therevnto. Others thinke, that [Dooing] is there added in vaine: for if the beginning be an outward motion, then should it be enough if he were named a sufferer: for that which is mooued, suffereth, but doth not. We answer; It maie well be, that the selfe same things which are mooued violentlie, ³⁴⁹ maie also haue a dooing, as instruments: for a staffe mooued by vs, doth also mooue a stone. And in some thick throng, where men be pressed, when a man is there choked, he is crushed by those which stand about him; so as they are said to thrust against him, although they thrust not of their owne accord, but are driuen by others, and inforced by the rest of the companie. The examples brought by Aristotle are such, as one of them is of a liuing creature, when against our wils we be caried awaie by men, in whose power we are. Another is of things which haue no life, as when we be caried with the wind whither we would not, which oftentimes happeneth to them that be sailers. If anie shall demand, whether voluntarie & without constraint, be all one: we will answer, ³⁵⁰ that without constraint extendeth further than voluntarie. For without constraint, agréeth euen to things that be without life, but so doth not voluntarie. Neither is it required, that the first beginning should be a motion in vs: for our knowledge commeth of an outward obiect, albeit that the same motion, wherewith the sense is brought to passe by the obiect, is of another order. The beginning whereof Aristotle spake, is the cause; yet not anie cause ye will, but onlie the efficient cause. And that is vnderstood to be the same, which is enough to mooue by it selfe.

44 There is mooued a question, as touching certeine actions, which séeme to be as it were meane, ³⁵¹ and it is doubted whether they be voluntarie or not voluntarie. And the question propounded may either be simple, or of two parts. It is simple, if thou shalt saie; Whether be those things voluntarie, which are doone for the feare of greater euils, rather than the obteining of some good & honest thing? And they declare that such a thing happened vnto Socrates, who would not obeie the thirtie tyrants, which required of him to kill a certeine citizen of Athens: which he would not doo, when neuertheles they threatned him, that they would kill his father and children. And this they sought, to the intent they might make him to be a companion and partaker of their most cruell purposes. The question also (which liketh me better) might be of two parts; namelie, whether those things be voluntarie things, which are doone for feare of greater euils; or for the obteining of some honest thing, which otherwise would not be doon. As if a lie be spoken, which in his owne nature is filthie; it is doubtfull whether it be voluntarie or not voluntarie, when it is made for the defense either of his owne life, or the life of another man. Also adulterie is a shamefull thing, which no man of himselfe should choose: but if one, for the slaieng of a tyrant, should, to win fauor with the tyrants wife, haue carnall copulation with hir, that by hir he might haue a readie waie to kill the tyrant; the question is, whether that adulterie should be called voluntarie. And all we knowe what great paines merchant men doo take, what things the ambitious sort, and those which delight in pleasure, doo endure, that they maie enioie their ends. And they would not abide those things which they doo, vnlesse it were for their commoditie. Wherefore it is doubted, whether those things be voluntarie. But if anie man doo doubt which be called great euils, ³⁵² let him looke on those things which be their contraries, & he shall sée that there be greater good things; namelie, life, chastitie, libertie, and godlines: and he shall perceiue that death, breach of chastitie, ³⁵³ bondage, vngodlinesse, and such like, are the great euils: which things be so gréeuous, as manie times some shamefull things are committed for the auoiding of them.

How detestable things are oftentimes doone for the scaping of death, may easilie be knowen. Cato slew himselfe, bicause he would not come in subiection. Regulus, least he should breake his faith, returned vnto his death to Carthage. Virginius rather slew his daughter, than he would suffer hir to liue violated and a bond-woman. And manie such like things haue the holie scriptures. ³⁵⁴ Lot rather offred his daughters to be defloured; than he would suffer his ghests to haue iniurie doone vnto them; on the other side, his daughters rather defiled themselues by incest with their father, ³⁵⁵ than that the world shuld want [posteritie.] Abraham to shun death commanded Sara to saie that he was hir brother, ³⁵⁶ and put hir chastitie in open danger. In like maner Iudith, with the danger of hir chastitie, ³⁵⁷ went to Holophernes for the deliuerance of hir people. We dispute not here whether these things were well or wickedlie doone, but we onelie séeke whether they ought to be called voluntarie, or not voluntarie. And there is a great difference betwéene wicked men, which either to flatter tyrants, or else bicause they be delighted in shamefull and euill works, offer themselues of their owne accord to doo these things: and betwéene others which for honestie sake cannot be induced to commit these things, vnlesse there be laid before their eies great and most gréeuous calamities, or else great rewards. And thou maist heare of some, which hauing proposed some great good vnto themselues, will saie, that for the obteining thereof, they are constrained to attempt anie thing. And on the other part it is also said of manie (that whereas they cruellie oppresse the people, and beare rule for their owne sakes onelie) they are constrained by tyrants to doo that which is wicked. And at this daie there be a great sort which fall awaie from the christian truth, being constrained by the most cruell persecution of tyrants. There is also brought a similitude of the casting foorth of things from a ship, which is doone when the tempest of weather constraineth; not that this serueth anie thing at all vnto maners, but that by the euidence of the matter, that which is now in question, may the better appéere.

45 These actions, which we haue rehearsed, are mixed actions: ³⁵⁸ for in respect that they may be omitted, and are not of such necessitie as they must in anie wise be doone, they séeme to be Voluntarie; but in respect no man could choose them for themselues, they séeme, Not voluntarie; but rather drawe néere to the nature of those things that be voluntarie, bicause in them is a certeine comparison of euill things. Two euils are proposed; to wit, either pouertie with the losse of goods, or else with those goods a present death: the will chooseth the lesse euill, and coueteth to auoid the greater. Therefore when the will doth his part in those actions, these things cannot choose but be called voluntarie. Besides this, Aristotle in his Rhetoriks admonished, that the lesse euill hath the consideration of the good, and is greatlie to be wished for, since that which is desired, is good: and there is no doubt, but it is the will that chooseth the end. But the end of these actions whereof we dispute, is applied to the consideration of the time. For since the safetie which the mariners wish, cannot be had, except by casting their goods into the sea, the will doth choose that casting of them awaie. Wherefore the time in all this matter must be considered, I meane not that time which is past, or to come, (for before that chance, no man would choose these doings; & afterward when the mariners haue escaped, they are sorie and discontented in their mind for those things which were cast awaie:) but the matter must be iudged of, according to the present time, while it is doone. And therefore, since there is then made a choise, and that the matter is called into deliberation, and that the originall of the dooing is in the dooer of it, who either may doo it, or maie not doo it; those things are said to be voluntarie. As touching the action, we cannot iudge in generall, but we must haue a respect to the circumstance of the time. And yet simplie these things are called, Not voluntarie, bicause for themselues no man would desire them: but neuerthelesse, since they be not considered simplie, but are to be desired in this respect, and he that desireth them, is not without knowledge (for he knoweth what he doth) and his will or desire wherby he chooseth these things is present) therfore be they actions Voluntarie. For all things must be iudged of according as they be doone; and doone they cannot be, but at a certeine time, and therefore they must be iudged according to that time, and not as they are apprehended by reason, for so are they, Not voluntarie. For while they be considered of simplie, they are set aside from the consideration of time. Neither is it to be doubted, but that herein commeth the consent of the will: for those things would not be doone, vnles the will would giue hir assent. True indéed it is, that no man would those things for their owne sakes, but for some other thing: but yet this causeth not, but that they be Voluntarie. If they were violent, the dooer would not inferre anie inforcement therevnto: but the originall of the doing and of the assenting therevnto is in him that is the dooer, and therefore may choose whither he will doo it or no. Séeing therfore these be called relatiues and are referred vnto the will; they must not be iudged of simplie, but according to the respect they haue vnto the will. Wherfore since the will (as hath béene declared) hath place in those things, they must be called, Voluntarie.

46 By two reasons haue these mingled actions béene prooued hitherto to be voluntarie. ³⁵⁹ First, bicause they must be estéemed according to the nature of the time present, wherin they be doone; secondlie, for that they be in the power of the dooer. For vnlesse the will should mooue the instrumentall parts, in verie déed they would not be doone. There is a third reason taken from praise and dispraise; Bicause men are somtime praised, and sometime dispraised in the suffering of these vile and shamefull things; Therefore dooth this appéere to be voluntarie: for praise and dispraise speaketh not but of things voluntarie. And Aristotle saith; that Men are sometime praised or dispraised herein, bicause they are not so alwaies, as we shall perceiue: for otherwhile praise is not giuen to these men, but pardon is granted them; but on the other side (saith he) they be dispraised. That same particle [On the other side] signifieth two things: either men will not abide reprochfull things, for the loue of great and excellent things; or else they suffer indéed such things, but yet for light and vnworthie causes: in which causes they are reprehended. Aristotle onelie mentioned one of these, the other he kept in silence. ³⁶⁰ These great good and honest things, for the which men must indure gréeuous and hard haps, are iudged to be our countrie, our parents, children, wife, iustice, and such like. Zopyrus the Persian, as Herodotus reporteth, mangled his owne nose, his eares, and his lips, that he might betraie the citie of Babylon vnto his king Darius. Vlysses (as it is said of Homer ) suffered his bodie to be beaten, and to be deformed with stripes, and apparelled himselfe in vile clothes, and in that habit, as if he had béene a runnagate seruant, went vnto the Troians, and entring into the citie, throughlie spied out the same. But on the other side, all men dispraise Dolo, bicause he reuealed the secrets of his owne countrie, that he might not be constrained to abide anie torments. ³⁶¹ But it is to be considered, that when it is said, we must sometime suffer shamefull things, that must not be referred vnto wickednesse, or vnto horrible crimes; for those things must not be committed for anie maner of vtilitie or honor: but it is onelie said, that those things should sometime be suffered, which haue some gréefe and reproch. As if a magistrate should be bidden to run like a seruant through the common stréets, or to weare openlie a womans garment: if great preferment, and lawfull commoditie be laid before him, he will not refuse these things. So then, they must be verie great matters, for the which the like should be doone, if a man will be praised for the same. I doo not allow the examples of the Scholies: for when they shew, that these vile things must be suffered, they teach that a lie must be made, or else that there must be carnall companie with a tyrants wife, to the intent hir husband may be slaine. For these be sinfull things, neither (as I haue said) dooth Aristotle speake of them: neither yet can such things be commended, sith that praises doo agrée with vertues, and dispraises with vices. There be some found of so abiect and vile a mind, as they ought for iust cause to be dispraised; sith for a iust and honest matter they will not suffer anie thing at all. So are soldiers dispraised, which forsake their station, and they that without constraint doo yéeld vp castles and strong holds. And in like maner are they dispraised, which are readie to doo anie thing, rather than they will be compelled to paie anie summe of monie.

47 And it appéereth euidentlie inough, whie Aristotle said; that Sometime praise dooth followe the suffering of gréeuous things, bicause this commeth not to passe continuallie. ³⁶² For sometimes, neither praise nor dispraise doo in that respect happen vnto them which suffer reprochfull things, but they are pardoned. And this happeneth, when [by reason of these things] a man dooth that which becommeth him not: as when tyrants doo threaten those things, or else they shall light vpon vs, vnlesse we suffer such reproches, as are beyond the power of mans nature: there Aristotle saith, that we pardon him. It is offered vnto men, that they shall be burned, or be cut in sunder: there, if they yéeld, either in disclosing of secrets, or in suffering of anie vile thing, they are pardoned. And some thinke, that in those cases it is lawfull to make a lie. Aristotle addeth, that neuerthelesse there be certeine things, ³⁶³ wherevnto no man ought to suffer himselfe to be compelled: he ought rather to abide anie thing, & when he yéeldeth, he shall not be pardoned nor excused. Wherefore our martyrs be in the right opinion, who haue determined rather to indure anie thing, than to depart from godlinesse. Aristotle bringeth an example out of the tragedie of Euripides; for Alcmaeon was not pardoned, in that he killed his mother; bicause she was lead vnto so great a wickednesse vpon a verie light or rather ridiculous cause. Since these actions, whereof we treat, be mixed (as we haue said) of Not voluntarie & Voluntarie: when Voluntarie beareth rule, either praise or dispraise followeth them; but if Not voluntarie haue the ouerhand, and that a man may séeme to haue doone the thing against his will, he is forgiuen. For those actions which be mixed, are so composed of two things; as either the one or the other of those things, whereof they be compounded, may surmount or ouercome. And rightlie dooth Aristotle make exception of gréeuous crimes, which shall not be pardoned: for who will forgiue him which condemneth an innocent, which committeth adulterie, which betraieth his countrie, which for the sharpenesse of torments denieth godlinesse? These things can or ought by no meanes to be excused. Anaxarchus, bicause he would not pleasure the tyrant, when he was beaten in a morter with iron pestles, said: Beat on hardlie Anaxarchus bag. So far was it off that he would change his will, or yéeld vnto torments. And Zeno in his torments bit off his owne toong, least through the force of gréefe he should be constrained to bewraie the conspiratours. Wherefore there be foure kinds of men, which Aristotle speaketh of; the first is, of them which are commended in their suffering of gréeuous things; the second, of them which are dispraised; the third, of them which obtaine pardon; the fourth is, of them which obteine no pardon.

48 Aristotle sheweth of two difficult and hard things which happen, ³⁶⁴ in suffering or in not suffering of gréeuous and cruell things for an honest cause. The first belongeth to the facultie of iudging; bicause we are oftentimes ignorant what things ought to be suffered for anie cause: whether anie thing must be suffered in the goods of the mind; whether in the bodie, or in the goods of fortune; and againe, what maner of things they ought to be that we should suffer, or that we should not suffer. And rightlie dooth Aristotle saie, that this is sometime hard to be iudged: for otherwhile, this difficultie dooth not happen. For all men knowe, that wickednesse is not for anie cause to be suffered. But Achilles doubted, whether he should rather haue wished for long life (but yet without glorie) by lurking at home; or else for famous glorie, togither with short life, by warfaring at Troie. Also a sonne will doubt, whether he ought to hold his peace; or to betraie his father, whom he knoweth to rob his countrie, to enter into the treasurie by secret passages in the earth, and from thence to steale awaie the common treasure. In like maner Dauid will doubt, whether he ought to counterfet himselfe to be a foole; or rather suffer himselfe to be slaine of a barbarous king. The cause is hard to be iudged: for sorrowfull things are to be compared with dishonest things; neither is it easie for all men to discerne betwéene these things. And vertue consisteth in matters difficult. Therefore from hence come praises; or else, if we flie from vertue to vices, dispraises. Héere dooth varietie of the circumstances increase the difficultie, which causeth that we cannot haue certeine rules in those things. The other kind of difficultie ariseth of the weakenesse of strength, not of iudgement; for when we be out of danger or sorrow, we sée what is to be chosen, and oftentimes we discerne that which is right. But when we come to the féeling and experience of gréefe, paines and torments; we are then of an other mind. Whereof also it commeth to passe, that when we be in health, we giue good counsell vnto them that be sicke; but yet we doo not rightlie aduise our owne selues, when we are sicke. And they are verie much to be commended, which stand fast in their sound determination, and in their good purpose. And on the other part, they which shall fall from their sound determination, are to be dispraised. Themistocles is maruellouslie commended, who would rather die, than beare armes against his countrie. But they on the contrarie side are most worthie of dispraise, which would rather denie godlinesse, than to suffer torments or death.

³⁶⁵ 49 When Aristotle had set downe two kinds of the things which be Not voluntarie, then he confuted their opinion, which made a third kind of the same. For they said, that the wicked actions, which we commit for atteining of pleasure and profit, are violent: and they made onelie those to be voluntarie actions, which be rightlie consenting vnto reason. By these reasons they are confuted. The first is, bicause then all our actions would be violent: for whatsoeuer we doo, we doo for these causes; namelie, for delectation and commoditie. The second reason is, bicause that which is violent, is ioined with sadnesse: but they which deale for pleasure sake, are glad, not sad; so as it appeareth that those actions are not violent. The third reason is; that then euerie euill man would excuse his euill actions, transferring his fault vnto outward things; that is to wit, such as are pleasant and profitable; and he would saie, that he were constrained by these things: which is a matter to be laughed at. The fourth reason; There is no greater cause whie these men should make themselues authors of honest actions, than pleasant & profitable things to be the cause of shamefull actions; bicause they haue in them selues the originall as well of these as of those. Bréeflie, if these mens opinion were true, there would be no sinnes nor wickednesses of men, which might not be excused vnder pretence that the same is doone against their will, or violentlie. The reason is alleged; bicause all men deale for these causes, namelie for delight and profit. Which in verie déed is true, if also vnder the word, ⟨…⟩, thou comprehend honest things: for there be manie, which for honestie sake doo manie things.

But thou wilt saie, that the aduersaries doo not so vse that word, as thereby they haue noted onelie delightfull & profitable things. I knowe it. But thus dooth Aristotle argue, and saith, that They, which will rather blame delightfull and profitable things, than themselues, which yéeld themselues so readilie to be allured thereby, deserue to be laughed at. This is it that they are iustlie to be blamed for, that they suffer themselues so soone to be caught by these things, and to be called away from iust actions. Why should they attribute vnto themselues honest things, and ascribe that which is dishonest vnto outward things; séeing that those also are in our power? Euen as it appéereth in men that be temperate and continent, which doo soone temper themselues from these things. And furthermore it may be woondered at, why they doo not in like maner saie, that they are constreined by honest things; séeing that they choose them, and since those be no lesse outward, than be pleasures and commodities. Vndoubtedlie, if we of good right ascribe to our selues honest things, the dishonest also shall belong vnto vs: for contraries doo both belong to the selfe-same generall kind, and are to be measured by the selfe-same rule. Aristotle séemeth to speake those things against Plato: for ³⁶⁶ Plato said, that Good men are not made good by nature; as if he should saie, they are good by will, and by their owne election. And on the other side, of euill men (in his ninth booke of lawes) he said, that they are all and in all respects euill; but yet vnwillinglie. But Aristotle affirmed, that as well good men as euill are led by their owne accord, and with voluntarie actions. For as well of goodnes as of naughtinesse there be originals, which doo mooue outwardlie; to wit, things which doo offer themselues to our vnderstanding: but since they be both in the one and the other, there is an helpe and aid giuen therevnto by vs, which doo choose and discerne the same.

50 Now that we haue spoken of Not voluntarie, which is doone by violence; let vs sée what can be said of Not voluntarie, procéeding from them that be ignorant. And first Aristotle taketh awaie Voluntarie, from that which is doone by ignorance; for nothing, done by him that is ignorant, can be called Voluntarie; séeing this requireth a knowledge of that which is doone. But Aristotle noteth a certein diffrence of those men, ³⁶⁷ which doo anie thing of ignorance: for some of them, when they haue afterward perceiued what they haue doone; it repenteth them: and there be others, which repent them not, but rather confirme that which hath béene doone. These two kind of ignorant men, bicause they differ much one from another, doo make diuers forms and kinds of ignorance: and bicause they differ one from another in matter, it is méet also that they be called by sundrie names. Wherefore he that repenteth him, after he hath perceiued his error, shall be called ⟨…⟩, that is, One that dooth against his will. And he which repenteth him not, shall be said to haue doone it being not willing: for he reteineth still the name of the generall word; to wit, of Not voluntarie. At the beginning our actions were diuided, that some of them are Voluntarie, & some Not voluntarie. We began the discourse of the parts of this diuision, with that which is Not voluntarie; & that, Not voluntarie, we distinguished againe into that which is against the will, or violent which is doone by force; and into that which is doone by ignorance. Violent was defined to be that, whose beginning is from without vs, and wherin that, which is the dooer or sufferer, giueth no helpe therevnto. Now is shewed the other part of Not voluntarie, wherby a thing is doone thorough ignorance: and this is shewed to be of two sorts; namelie, with repentance, or without repentance. That which is with repentance, is simplie against the will; but that which is without repentance, is at the beginning Not voluntarie; but after the acknowledging of the fact, bicause he dooth not repent him, he séemeth to be somwhat, yea to be verie far from dooing of it against his will; naie rather, that he hath somewhat Voluntarie therein. These things therfore in name must be thus distinguished. The first shall be called he that dooth against his will, and the other shall be called, he that dooth not with his will. ³⁶⁸ Oedipus is said in the fables to haue slaine his father, and to haue married his mother against his will: for vnderstanding what he had doone, he so repented him, as he put out both his eies. And on the other side, Tiberius racked his host of Rhodes ignorantlie, whom afterward when he knew, he put him to death. Wherfore at the beginning, when he racked him ignorantlie, he did it not with his will; but bicause afterward he did not repent him, he could not he said to haue doone it against his will. And there may be brought another example. He that killeth a man, thinking he had béen a wild beast, if he be afterward sorie, he did it against his will. But if anie man, to whom brasen monie was owing, receiueth gold, and dooth not repent him of his error, but rather reioiseth; he is said to haue doone it not willing, but yet not against his will. Thus may the reason be made; Whatsoeuer is doone violentlie, or against the will, it hath sorrowe or repentance ioined therewith; But not all things that are doon by him, which is ignorant, haue repentance or sorrowe ioined therewith; Therefore all such kind of things are not violent or against the will.

51 There is vsed also another distinction. ³⁶⁹ It is one thing to doo through ignorance, and another thing for the dooer to be ignorant. They are said to doo a thing through ignorance or vnwittinglie, vnto whom ignorance is after a sort the cause that they doo. On the other side, manie doo things being ignorant, who by reason of som gréeuous perturbation, whereof themselues are the cause, doo as it were bring an error vnto themselues. These things differ as the generall and the speciall kind, as a thing spred foorth, and a thing drawne togither. For whosoeuer dooth a thing through ignorance, is ignorant; but not so on the contrarie part, whosoeuer is ignorant, dooth a thing through ignorance. Herof Aristotle bringeth examples, first of droonkennes. ³⁷⁰ Manie things are doone by droonken men, wherein they knowe not what they doo; yet are they not properlie said to doo anie thing vnwittinglie, bicause they might haue absteined from too much wine: and they which drinke more than is requisite, did bring ignorance vnto themselues. Wherfore such a vice causeth not that they should be said to haue doone against their will. Another similitude is of anger: for they which shall be mooued with a great furie of wrath, doo oftentimes not knowe what they doo, but yet they deale not against their will: for they ought to haue tempered their wrath, and to haue atteined vnto vertue, whereby they might haue moderated that perturbation. Which, sith they would not doo, they are not excused of those things, which they through anger did amisse. And bréeflie it is said, that ignorance of that kind is the cause not of constreining the will, but of naughtinesse; otherwise euerie wicked man is ignorant, yet is he not therefore to be excused. That euill men be ignorant, this doth prooue it; namelie, that they knowe not what to followe, or what to auoid. For they are beguiled of their owne lusts, for whose sake they are so deceiued, as they perceiue not what things are trulie pleasant, & trulie profitable; and contrariwise, which be trulie gréeuous, and which be trulie damnable. Wherfore they are corrupt in their iudgement, and knowe not the nature of the end for the which they worke.

52 The reason may be framed thus; Not euerie euill man worketh through ignorance; But euerie euill man worketh being ignorant; Therefore to worke being ignorant, and to worke through ignorance, are things different. The Maior proposition is manifest; bicause euill men (as is said) if they wrought through ignorance, might be excused. And that, as is conteined in the Minor proposition, they be ignorant, we haue declared a little before. ³⁷¹ A generall ignorance (saith Aristotle ) excuseth not. That is called generall, which is not of the circumstances; but of the whole thing it selfe. As if one would saie, that he is ignorant that fornication or adulterie be sinnes; he is not excused, bicause he ought to haue knowen these things: nay rather, he shall be the more gréeuouslie accused for this ignorance. But a particular ignorance, that is to wit, of circumstances, excuseth and deserueth pardon; bicause the circumstances could not be knowen. Otherwhile such chances fall out, as no man can for certeintie knowe such circumstances. But contrariwise, the generall ignorance obteineth not mercie; bicause it was in the power of them that are ignorant, to haue learned it. Wherefore if they be ignorant, they them selues are in the fault, that they knowe not; and they séeme to haue had a desire to be ignorant. Againe, if the excuse of vniuersall ignorance were auailable, then should no wicked men be accused. The cause of their error is; that they onlie séeke for pleasure and profit, but neglect vertues and honestie: which neuerthelesse they doo vnaduisedlie.

Wherevpon Plato in his treatise Memnon, dooth verie well expound this. First he taketh this as granted, that there is no man which would be a miserable and vnhappie man. Which being granted, he addeth, that then there is no man which desireth euill things; since to be miserable, and to be vnhappie, is nothing else, than to be conuersant in euill things, and to be delighted in them. So then it appéereth, that euill men doo choose to themselues those things that be euill, vnwittinglie. And this error (as saith Cicero ) we haue sucked togither euen with our nurses milke. But the reason whie this generall ignorance maketh not a man to doo against his will, is, for that it hindereth not his choosing of things, naie rather it is ioined therewith: for ill men choose rather to steale than to labour, rather to be idle than to exercise anie art, rather surfeting than abstinence. It may be, that otherwhile the whole matter may be generallie vnknowen, and sometime generallie knowen, but vnknowen priuatlie and particularlie. As if anie man shall saie, he knoweth adulterie to be sinne; but that he is ignorant particularlie, that this adulterie is forbidden: neither of these ignorances is worthie of pardon. But if anie man doo not knowe the circumstances in generall, and thinke that there is no consideration to be had of the end, nor of the place, nor of the time, nor of the matter that he is about to doo; whether shall this man be worthie of mercie or pardon? No verelie: for he ought to haue knowen this. And this common kind of perceiuing belongeth to the vniuersall knowledge, which must in anie wise be had: but the ignorance of this or that circumstance particularlie may be excused, since no man either maie or is able perfectlie to knowe all those circumstances in euerie particular. Wherefore onelie the ignorance of them maketh the action to be an action doone against the will.

53 And bicause such circumstances be of great weight (for they obteine pardon and mercie when they are not knowen,) therefore Aristotle reckoneth them vp, that they may be throughlie tried out and knowen. They are in number seuen or eight: and there is a common verse of them in the schooles; Who, what, where, whereby: Wherefore, how, and when.

These are seuen, but yet one wanteth, that is, Whereabout; vnder which word is signified the matter or subiect of action. And when it is said of Aristotle, Wherein, there be signified two things; namelie, place and time. So that, ³⁷² if we will haue the iust number, there be eight; of which number this reason may be alledged. Bicause either we respect the causes of the action, or else we consider the nature or substance of the action. The cause, if it be efficient, then is it named of this circumstance, Who. If it be the end, then we account it of the circumstance, Wherefore. Or if it be the matter, then we adde to it the circumstance, Whereabout. Or if it be as touching instruments, or the organs, we referre it to the efficient cause [which before we called, Who. ] But if so be we consider the action it selfe, the nature thereof is expressed by the circumstance, Whereby. But when we consider the measure thereof, then haue we the circumstance of time and place, which we call, When and Where. And last of all, we regard the proportion of the maner, which is a thing belonging to qualitie, and is the circumstance that we named, How. No man (saith Aristotle ) is ignorant of all these circumstances (he meaneth) of them all at once. A man may be ignorant of one or other of them particularlie, but none can be ignorant of them altogither, vnlesse he be a verie foole: for how shall a man haue no knowledge of himselfe? This is not generallie true, bicause a man may easilie be ignorant of the cause efficient. If himselfe be that efficient, I confesse it is the harder, not to knowe himselfe. But euen this also may haplie come to passe, that one, sometimes minding an other matter, may stirre a ship; and yet marketh not that which he dooth. But that we now speake of, is to be vnderstood for the most part. Howbeit, this subtill point falleth not out in things that are morall. The matter is made plaine by examples.

³⁷³ What did the circumstances excuse Aeschylus the tragicall Poet? He in a tragedie did séeme to reueale certeine sacred mysteries of Ceres, which thing raised so great a tumult in the theatre, as he was well néere slaine. He fled vnto the altar of Bacchus, from thence he was brought to the iudgement of the Areopagits: he pleaded his cause, he excused himselfe, that he knew not those things to be mysteries; and bicause he knew not what he did, he was quit. Also an other man made a certeine engine or instrument of warre, which did cast stones: the effect whereof when he was minded to shew, he discharged the péece, and by a stroke killed a certeine man: he excused himselfe that he knew not what he did. The circumstance, Whereabout, which is the matter or subiect of action, appéereth by the example of Merope. She laie in wait for hir sonne, and killed him, thinking that he had béene hir enimie, when he was hir sonne. Héer the error was in the circumstance, Whereabout. And this example is said to be in Euripides, in the tragedie of Crespontes, which is not extant. Sometimes we know not: and that is called the circumstance, Wherewith; as if a man thinke he runneth with a blunt speare, & the same shalbe armed with a sharpe head. Or a man thinking that he dooth throwe a pumice, when he hath throwne a stone, whereby some bodie is hit, or woounded, or slaine. Otherwise we are ignorant of the end. A man for health, or for recouerie from sicknesse, letteth bloud, giueth a medicine, or lanceth the flesh, and there followeth a contrarie effect; for either the partie dieth, or he is hurt: the ignorance of the end dooth excuse him.

Also the maner of the action: as when a man dooth a thing and would not, it holds him excused. They which contend one with an other, with all the strength of their hands or fingers, (which is a kind of wrestling) and one mindeth to teach the other, and thinking to strike but lightlie, striketh gréeuouslie: he is excused. Sith that there is an ignorance in those things, that which is doone shalbe counted against his will, especiallie, if those circumstances, which are the more principall, be hidden from vs. And these circumstances be, Wherefore, Whereabout, or Wherein. But Aristotle in his example séemeth to haue omitted the circumstance of place, and time, [that is, Where and When. ] Which is no maruell, since they might séeme to be knowne well enough, as those which néeded no examples. Neither is it required, that when manie things of one sort be expounded, examples should be brought of all things. For it sufficeth, that some things be shewed so to be: for the examples, which make plaine some of those things, do serue also for the declaring of other things. But least there should be found a lacke of them, we saie it may be, that some man knoweth not that the place wherein he co~mitteth anie euill is holie: & otherwhile also the circumstance of the time; namelie of a festiuall daie, or of a holie daie, or of a birth daie, may be vnknowne.

54 If that which is doone against the will, ought to be ascribed to the actions which are doone vnwittinglie, while we be ignorant of these particular circumstances, there is required moreouer, that the error being knowne and discouered, the action should be gréeuous, and we should be sorie for that which happened to vs vnawares. For if this gréefe should not ensue vpon it, the action may be called, not voluntarie, yet shall it not be against the will. But héere it is worth the séeing, ³⁷⁴ how ignorance can be called the cause of a thing doone against the will. This is therefore, bicause it depriueth vs of knowledge, which if it had béene present, that which is now doone, had not béene committed; or if it had béene committed, it had made the action voluntarie. Wherefore, either it depriueth vs of the knowledge, whereon voluntarie dooth depend, or else it depriueth vs of that knowledge; which, if it had béene present, the action had not followed. And it may be, that he which dooth vnwittinglie, hath ignorance ioined togither with the act which he dooth; ³⁷⁵ and yet he is not vnwilling to that which is doone, but rather desireth it: wherevpon there followeth no sorrowe afterward, when the thing is knowne.

And this kind of ignorance dooth not excuse him, nor yet maketh him to haue doone it against his will. As when a man, thinkeing to kill a hart, killeth his enimie, whom he before wished to haue béene slaine; and now being slaine, reioiseth, notwithstanding he then knew not what he did. There is moreouer, a certeine ignorance, which some of set purpose would haue: for they desire and choose, that they may be ignorant, least by knowledge they should be withdrawne from sinning, or from pleasurs. And this kind of ignorance is greatlie to be accused, much lesse excused. There is an other ignorance, which is so doone, as a man knowing what is right and méet, when he commeth to the action, neglecteth that cogitation of honestie & right; and rather considereth his profit and pleasure. And this commeth to passe, either of a vehement perturbation of the mind, or else of some ill habit. Neither also dooth this ignorance excuse, for he that so is ignorant for lacke of consideration, he dooth not that which he might and ought to haue doone. Now and then, ignorance commeth héereof, that a man will neglect to learne, or else for that he shunneth labour, or bicause he vseth no studie and diligence. For euerie man ought to knowe the generall lawes. Since therefore euen this man dooth not that which he can and ought, he is not to be excused. Howbeit, in these actions there is something that is Not voluntarie. for this ignorance preuenteth actions, or the motion of the will, which motion if it were present, knowledge would not followe. The last ignorance is that, whereof we treat: this excuseth, it obteineth pardon and mercie; bicause the circumstances are not knowen, and for that after the action, sorrowe and gréefe doo followe.

Of that which is Voluntarie.

³⁷⁶ 55 As touching Voluntarie, the definition standeth of two parts. First (saith Aristotle ) the beginning thereof must be inward. Secondlie, the circumstances must be knowne: for if voluntarie be contrarie to that, which is against the will; and that which is against the will, consist of two parts: then is it necessarie, that the contraries to them must be placed in the definition of voluntarie. Hervpon we sée the excellent method of Aristotle: for except he had before hand shewed the nature of violence and ignorance, he could not so easilie haue defined what voluntarie was. Moreouer, Aristotle was the rather mooued to write of these things, bicause that those things, which are doone of angrie men, or men that are mooued with desire, are comprehended in the definition of voluntarie. For both the originall of the dooing is in the man himselfe, which is the dooer, and they doo vnderstand and verie well knowe the particulars: for they vse deliberations, and sharpe iudgement, either to reuenge or to compasse that which they desire: which would not be doon if they were ignorant of the circumstances. Wherevpon it is concluded, that those things are voluntarie; and that those doo erre, which haue thought such things to be doone against the will. And what mooued them to thinke, that those things are against the will, it may easilie be perceiued. They sawe that it was altogither difficult, ³⁷⁷ to resist those two affections; namelie, anger and desire, as those which are more violent than the residue; and therefore they thought that men are constreined by them. Wherefore Heraclitus said, ⟨…⟩, that is, It is hard wrestling against anger. And Plato in his second booke De republica, saith; ⟨…⟩, that is; Anger is neither to be striuen with, nor to be subdued. But if there can be no striuing against the same, nor that it can be conquered, it séemeth to compell, and to make that the actions be doon against the will. For which cause the same Plato in his ninth booke De legibus saith, that An angrie man, ⟨…⟩, that is to saie, Is like to one that dooth against his will. He saith not that he dooth altogither against his will, but like vnto him. And Cato the Censor said, that he which is angrie, differeth from a mad man onelie in time. Yea and other men, as Euenus, haue béene bold to saie, that Wrath is much woorse than madnesse. But Plato in his treatise of Cratylus, writing of desire, compared the same to a verie strong bond. Wherefore we also doubt not, but that these two affections are vehement, and of great force; but yet that they are not so strong, as they cannot be bridled by reason. Which we sée come to passe in temperate men, and those which be indued with méekenesse, and other vertues. But yet would I not denie, that those actions are more voluntarie, which be doon without the inforcement of such affects: which neuerthelesse is no cause, that these should be excluded from the number of them.

56 Aristotle saith, that none of the rest of the liuing creatures doo anie thing against their wils, no not children. The proposition is to be confirmed; Those things that are doone by inforcement or by desire, be voluntarie. That was declared before by the definition. Now are other reasons added herevnto, whereof the first is this; If they were actions against the will, neither brute beasts nor children should doo anie thing of their owne accord; But those doo manie things of their owne accord; Therefore those things are doon against the will. The argument is conditionall of the consequent, taken to ouerthrowe the antecedent. The conclusion is prooued; Bicause brute beasts and children, since they be without reason, whatsoeuer they doo, ³⁷⁸ they doo it through those affects. But how absurd the consequent is, hereby it appéereth; insomuch as we sée, that these liuing creatures and children doo certeine things against their wils. As when they be ouercome and shut vp in anie place: but on the other side, when they be loosed and set at libertie, they doo manie things willinglie and of their owne accord. They choose themselues meat, when they will they enter into chambers & dens, & from thence, when it séemeth good, they go foorth. They defend their yoong ones, they flie to their nests; and infinite such other things they doo willinglie and of their owne accord. They reioise in libertie, and on the other side, when they be constreined to anie thing, it gréeueth them, and they are not a little disquieted. Alexanders horse Bucephalus admitted no man to sit vpon him but Alexander, which without doubt he did not by constreint. The elephants doo loue their maisters, they obeie them, yea they knéele downe when they be commanded. But what should we speake of elephants? Dogs in a house doo fawne vpon their maisters, but doo barke at strangers; they hunt chéerfullie, they followe those which féed them: & all these things certeinlie they doo of their owne accord. Manie things belonging to this matter might be rehearsed of birds, fishes, and other brute creatures, which are so woonderfull things, and are doone of them with so great an inclination; that sometimes manie haue thought, that in brute beasts there is a will, whereby they choose those things which like them most, refusing other things, which doo displease them. Yea and some men haue ascribed some reason vnto them, bicause they sée that those things which they doo, they doo them with great industrie. Which we would not grant, albeit as we haue said, we must affirme, that they doo those things of their owne accord. But and if thou wilt saie, that they be called wild beasts, bicause they be led after a certeine violent sort, we will not denie it; and yet will we affirme, that they are not without an inward appetite, whereby they are mooued: wherefore the actions which spring from them, must be said to be of their owne accord. And it is no maruell, if Aristotle in this matter ioined children togither with brute beasts: for those also, by reason of the infirmitie of age, haue not the vse of reason, but are onelie mooued with the affects, especiallie with anger and desire. And yet who will denie, that they doo those things willinglie? They runne abroad, they plaie, they skip, they make sport, and they fawne on their parents. But if they did not things of their owne accord, they should haue great iniurie doone them, when they be beaten of their schoole-masters. For what other thing doo they séeke, but that they should absteine from those things, from which they knowe they are able to refraine? ³⁷⁹ And as concerning the appetite, we must vnderstand that the same is of two sorts: for one followeth the sense, and an other the reason. Brute beasts and children are mooued with that appetite, which followeth the sense; howbeit such appetite is not all one in both of them. Herevpon ariseth the difference; bicause brute beasts are altogither destitute of reason, and therefore their desire is neuer obedient vnto reason: but children haue reason, yet not in act, although in power. Therfore, when through age, reason breaketh out into act, their desire may be obedient vnto reason. We must also consider, that this Gréeke word ⟨…⟩ is more large than Voluntarie: for it is extended both vnto brute beasts, and to children, vnto whom Voluntarie dooth not properlie apperteine, séeing (if we shall speake properlie) they haue no will.

57 Moreouer, whereas some which were against Aristotle, affirme that those things which are doone by anger or lust, are doone against the will; then it would followe, that either all such things should be doone against the will; or else that good things are with the will, and euill things against the will. Howbeit, neither of these things may be granted. But this did Aristotle ouerthrowe, and saith; Is it not a ridiculous thing to affirme, that these things are doone with the will, and those by constraint and against the will; séeing that shamefull acts, which are doone through anger or lust, haue no lesse the selfe same beginning that honest acts haue, which procéed of the selfe same affects? No doubt but those things, which haue all one beginning, must be accounted of the selfe same order. And further he saith, as touching anger, that this, by the lawe of honestie and iustice is required at our hands, that we should be angrie against some; namelie, against vices, and against wicked men, whom vnlesse that priuate men should rebuke, and magistrates should punish, they were to be blamed. Also there be manie things, which if a man doo not desire, and by great indeuour procure to himselfe, it is a great offense; as for example: health and doctrine. Shall we therefore saie, that the lawe of honestie and iustice dooth require of vs, things to be doone against our will and by constraint, and such things as we are not able to performe; or from the which we are not able to absteine? This would be absurd as touching ciuill lawes. And againe, whatsoeuer things are doone against the will, they bring gréefe and sorrowe with them. But those things that are doone through anger and lust are delightfull, so farre is it off, that they bring trouble and heauinesse with them. As concerning lust, there is no doubt thereof. But as for anger, it may be doubted, bicause Aristotle in his Rhetoriks intreating of those things which bring pleasure, in describing the affection of wrath, bringeth in the verse of Homer, which saith, that Anger vnto Achilles was euen as honie that melted vnder his toong. Neither indéed is anger anie other thing than a desire of reuenge. Moreouer (saith Aristotle ) what difference is there betwéene those things to be doone against the will, which are according vnto reason, or which be wickedlie doone according to wrath, sith either of them are things that may be auoided? This reason semeth to stand on the nature of sinne: for séeing that sinne consisteth in those things, which ought or can be auoided; and that this estate is found as well in those things, which are doone amisse by reason, as in those, which are naughtilie doone of anger with a desire; they ought to be both called voluntarie. Why then are these things, rather than those other, accounted of the aduersaries to be doone against the will?

58 And as concerning humane affections, Aristotle dooth thus argue; Bicause the vnreasonable affections, which we haue, be humane, and those be humane affections, which doo arise of anger or desire, therefore are they also voluntarie, and are doone without constreint. For whatsoeuer is humane, is voluntarie. But there is no man will saie, that desires and angers be not affections in the minds of men, euen as reason is in the selfe same men. Wherefore, if actions, which flowe from reason be humane, bicause reason is a part of our mind; so likewise shall those be humane, which procéed from anger or desire. For the powers of anger, and of desire, be in the minds of men. It may happen that this will be obiected; to wit, that The actions which be of anger or desire, procéed from the part vnreasonable. True it is (saith Aristotle ) but yet these be powers of an humane mind, and therefore shall the acts procéeding from thence be humane. And these powers, although by essence they haue no reason, yet are they partakers thereof, and may be ruled by the same: which thing commeth not to passe in brute beasts. Againe, these affections and actions are the first beginnings doone with the will; for they may be restreined by the will. And it standeth not with them, as it dooth with the power that nourisheth and increaseth, which worketh euen whether we will or no. And therefore we conclude, that it is absurd to affirme, that these things are doone against the will, or by constreint.

³⁸⁰ 59 Now let vs sée, how these things, which we haue here treated of, doo agrée with the holie scriptures. Aristotle said, that he would treat of Voluntarie, and Not voluntarie; bicause praises and dispraises, rewards, punishments, and mercie, doo accompanie those things which be voluntarie. ³⁸¹ Euen so, in the 111. psalme, the faithfull are praised, bicause they be a willing people. ³⁸² Also Eunuchs are commended, not those Eunuchs which are so become through violence, or be so borne; but they which shall willinglie chasten themselues for the kingdom of heauen sake. ³⁸³ An hewer of wood, which by chance killeth his fellowe, is forgiuen; bicause that action was not voluntarie. ³⁸⁴ The deuill is constrained to speake a truth, is compelled to depart from them which were possessed; but yet he deserueth no praise or rewards at all. ³⁸⁵ Balaam is of the angell compelled by the sword, that he should not curse the people of God; he hath no praise at all, bicause he did it not willinglie. The definition of violent, as it hath an outward beginning, so doth it not giue anie helpe, as a thing that worketh or that suffereth. And it declareth, that originall sinne is no violent thing, bicause it is an inward corruption in vs: and we further it by that naughtinesse, which dailie we adde therevnto. But and if anie man will saie, that we are without knowledge and vnderstanding, when the same is gotten; and that it commeth by occasion of the first naughtie motions of our mind wherein is giuen no choise or deliberation: we answer, that those things which Aristotle saith, must be vnderstood as touching morall and actuall doings: for these sinnes did not he knowe. Howbeit, this sufficeth vs, that such things cannot be called violent, séeing they haue their beginning from within. Also we grant, that there be mingled actions; and we affirme that they ought to be reckoned among those which be voluntarie: and therefore the holie scriptures doo exhort vs vnto them, persuading vs, that wée must indure anie thing, rather than to run into sinne. Paule saith; We must neuer doo euill, ³⁸⁶ that good may come of it. ³⁸⁷ We must rather obey God than men. ³⁸⁸ And we are called To take our crosse and to followe the Lord. And he is said, to haue found his soule, which hath lost the same. Neither hath the deniall of a mans owne selfe anie other respect. These actions be of the mingled sort, bicause no man would choose these things, except by chance: but these things we will and we doo, partlie to auoid sinnes, and partlie to be ioined vnto the Lord.

Howbeit thou wilt saie, that these things haue an outward beginning; wherfore they be rather violent. For vnlesse the Lord did these things in vs, none of vs would doo them. We grant, that the beginning, whereby our wils are changed, is from without: but our wils being changed by the spirit of God, are inward vnto vs, and at their commandement we are mooued vnto these actions, and therefore they ought to be called voluntarie, for they are not doone of God without vs. Yea and we be praised and dispraised for these mingled actions: for Christ saith, that He will denie before his father, ³⁸⁹ those which shall denie him before men. Neither (saith he) will I be ashamed of him, which is not ashamed of me before men. And they in verie déed are commended, which for Christ his sake do suffer gréeuous vexations; ³⁹⁰ Blessed (saith he) are they, which suffer persecution, for theirs is the kingdome of heauen. In such things as these (saith Aristotle ) is pardon giuen. As when Dauid, that he might not be slaine, feigneth himselfe before king Achis, ³⁹¹ to be mad. But there be certeine things, which we should neuer be led to commit. And what be those? They be sinnes. And it is an old saieng; Vsque ad aras; that is to wit, Sauing a mans conscience and religion. Iob is an example vnto vs, who in aduersities could neuer be driuen, either by the reprochfull speaking, or bragging of his wife, to blaspheme God. And they which are driuen vnto these things, so farre is it off, that they find mercie, as they rather fall from the hope thereof: as in the epistle to the Hebrues, it is said of them which departed fro~ the knowen truth. So did it happen to Spiera the Italian, & to those which slew themselues, when they had abiured the Gospell. Aristotle propoundeth two things verie hard. The one is, what a man should suffer for anie thing. The answer is easie; We must suffer anie thing, rather than we should depart from Christ and his holie commandements. ³⁹² What auaileth it a man if he gaine all the world, and suffer losse of his owne soule? ³⁹³ Feare ye not them which kill the bodie, but are not able to kill the soule, (saith the Lord.) Of the other difficultie we haue experience in our owne selues: and we often sée followers which onelie beléeue for a time. Againe, The spirit is readie, ³⁹⁴ but the flesh is weake. But on the other side, we comfort our selues, bicause All things are possible to him that beleueth. ³⁹⁵ And Paule said, ³⁹⁶ that He was able to doo all things through Christ, which strengthened him. Iustlie moreouer did Aristotle reprooue them, which thought that honest and iust things are voluntarie; but affirmed, that dishonest things are not voluntarie: for we must not thinke so in anie wise. ³⁹⁷ Paule said; I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing. Yea, and if we haue anie thing that is good, that must be altogither transferred vnto God. For vnto the Philippians we read, ³⁹⁸ that It is God which worketh in vs both to will, and to performe.

60 Now let vs sée what is to be said touching ignorance. There is a certeine ignorance, after which repentance dooth foorthwith followe, vpon the perceiuing of the error; and sometime no repentance at all dooth followe. As touching the latter member, ³⁹⁹ the Lord saith; Forgiue them, for they knowe not what they doo. The same thing did Stephan praie. ⁴⁰⁰ Among those neuerthelesse, for whom praier was made, some did otherwhile repent, and some did neuer repent. Also Ionathas tasted honie, ⁴⁰¹ being ignorant what his father decréed; and knowing his fathers decrée, he sorrowed not, but rather was angrie with him. But Paule, when he perceiued his error, sorowed. In like maner sorowed they, of whom Peter said in the Acts; I knowe that they did it of ignorance. And that they sorowed, those words which they speake, doo declare; ⁴⁰² Men and bretheren, what behooueth vs to doo? The sorowe which followeth, doth not alwaies shew that there happened no sinne; for both they, which crucified the Lord, sinned; and also Paule sinned: for these men were ignorant of that which they ought to haue knowne. But if there had happened to haue come a certeine ignorance of the circumstance, which could not haue béene knowne; as in Noah, when he was dronken, ⁴⁰³ who had not séene the wine before, neither knew the strength and propertie thereof. And as it happened vnto Iacob, when he laie with Lea in the place of Rachel: ⁴⁰⁴ for both of them were ignorant what to doo, and were excused. But he that knoweth not the generall and principall points of the lawes, is not excused. Therefore is it said of Paule, in the first epistle to the Corinthians; ⁴⁰⁵ He that is ignorant, let him be ignorant. And this ignorance, which dooth not excuse, is sometime laid vpon men by God as a punishment, while he punisheth sinnes with sinnes. ⁴⁰⁶ Vnto the Thessalonians, the second epistle it is written; Bicause they haue not receiued the loue of the truth, that they might be saued, therfore will God send vpon them strong delusion, that they shuld beleeue lies. And in Ezechiel; If the prophet be deceiued, ⁴⁰⁷ I haue deceiued him. ⁴⁰⁸ Also Achab was seduced by the euill spirit, God being willing therevnto. Thus then we sée what ignorance doth excuse, & what ignorance doth not excuse. Aristotle addeth, that Those things, which be doone by dronkennes & anger, are voluntarie; the which also we do affirme: For as touching those things we haue receiued a lawe; Be angrie, but sinne not. ⁴⁰⁹ Let not the sunne go downe vpon your wrath. And we forbid to saie vnto anie man; Thou foole. ⁴¹⁰ And as touching dronkennesse, it is said of the Lord, ⁴¹¹ Beware that your bodies be not oppressed with surfeting and dronkennesse. Also Paule; Be ye not dronken with wine, wherin is excesse. ⁴¹² These things therefore, which are doone by anger and dronkennesse, doo not excuse; séeing these things might either not be admitted or be bridled. But that all the wicked and vngodlie sort are ignorant, though they be not excused, the scriptures doo euerie where plainelie declare; ⁴¹³ The foolish man hath said in his hart, that there is no God. In the seuenth chapter of the Prouerbs, ⁴¹⁴ as touching them which are lead with lust, and with pleasures; He is led as an oxe vnto the slaughter, and like as it were a foole, which in fetters is led to his punishment. ⁴¹⁵ In the epistle to the Romans; They which called themselues wise, became fooles, and the foolish hart of them was blinded. Vnto the Ephesians; ⁴¹⁶ Ye shall not walk as other gentils walke, in vanitie of their mind, being strangers from the life of God, thorough the ignorance that is in them, and the darkenes of their hart. Yea and as Esaie saith, and all the Euangelists testifie; ⁴¹⁷ They seeing shall not see, and hearing shall not heare; seeing they be in the darkenesse, they knowe not whither they may go.

But among the circumstances, which being vnknowne doo excuse, Aristotle dooth speciallie reckon vp the end, and Whereabout. And this in verie déed is true. ⁴¹⁸ Dauid sent awaie Absalom to go into Hebron, but to what end, or to what purpose he did it, he could not know: he is excused. Also Abimelech had an other mans wife, ⁴¹⁹ but he knew not what she was, with whom he was conuersant: therefore might he saie vnto God, that he did it in the simplicitie of his hart, and that it was vnknowne vnto him. ⁴²⁰ Also, that Simon Magus was baptised, the church is excused; bicause it knew not of his ill and fraudulent counsell. Howbeit, in those ignorances which doo excuse vs, if there followe no sorrowe, we are giltie: we allow not that which is doone. He which shot an arrowe, & by thance slew king Achab, ⁴²¹ if he had béene witting of the déed, he would not haue sorrowed, neither would it haue béene perceiued, that that which was doone, was doone against his will. Againe, Dauid sorrowed for the death which followed of Absalom; also of the death of Abner and Amazias: wherevpon it appéereth, that such things happened vnto him against his will and mind. Voluntarinesse comprehendeth two things; both, that the beginning be from within, and that there be not an ignorance of that which is doon. Originall sinne hath his beginning from within, and we know, that such a corruption is against God and righteousnesse, although that of our owne choise we call not for the same: and therefore it is voluntarie. Yet is it in yong children, where there is a want of knowledge. But this maketh no matter, bicause we meane héere, of actuall sinnes. Neither can Aristotle, or morall facultie atteine vnto that kind of sinne. That those moreouer be voluntarie sinnes, which are doone through lust and wrath, it hath béene shewed by diuers reasons. The which thing we doo admit: for we haue receiued lawes concerning either of both vices; Thou shalt not lust. ⁴²² Againe, we are commanded, that we should not be angrie with our brother without a cause. Aristotle in his arguments affirmed, that brute beasts doo things of their owne accord Esaie likewise said; The oxe hath knowne his owner, ⁴²³ and the asse his masters crib. ⁴²⁴ And Ieremie said, that The storke knoweth his appointed time: chapter eight. And the same opinion are we of touching children: for in the time of Elizaeus, they were punished by beares. Also Isaac, while he was oppressed by Ismael, was commanded to be cast foorth by Sara. And further, Aristotle affirmeth, that it is required and otherwhile exacted of vs, that we should be angrie. ⁴²⁵ The zeale of thy house hath euen eaten me. And Phinees is commended by God, bicause he was reuenged vpon the vnpure fornicatours. And where it is said, that those things, which be doone against the will, haue sorrowe ioined with them, Paule to the Romans testifieth the same; Vnhappie man that I am! ⁴²⁶ Who shall deliuer me from the bodie of this death? But whereas Aristotle saith, that those things, which are committed through wrath and lust, and also those things, which are doone by the reason and will, are to be auoided: this we correct, on this wise; That auoided indéed they may be, if Gods grace be applied therevnto: for without the same, who can beware of the motions of anger and lust? No doubt but we may temper our selues from outward actions, but these motions of the hart are not in our power. Also we agrée that they be mens actions, which procéed from lust and wrath: for euen of them also we shall yéeld an account.