Of mans Election, or making of choise.

61 Aristotle saith; ⁴²⁷ that making of choise is most proper to vertue. For in the definition, which he made of vertue, first was placed the generall kind, namelie the habit; then he added the difference, to wit, mediocritie; after that were ioined togither the two properties; namelie, that through vertue we do things of our own accord; and then, that we doo them by making of choise. Howbeit, of these two properties, making of choise is the more proper: neither onlie, if it be compared with that, which is of our owne accord, but also if it be compared with the other properties of vertue, which no doubt are manie. For this cause are the actions procéeding from vertue commended, bicause they come from the making of choise. ⁴²⁸ Maners (saith Aristotle ) ⟨…⟩re more iudged by making of choise, than by actions. True indéed it is, that maners are knowne by actions, as a trée is by the fruit: but yet that iudgement is deceiuable; for hypocrites doo verie oftentimes make a counterfet shew, and otherwhile we sée things doone of a far other purpose, than it is méet they should be. The Manicheis absteined from wiues; also from the eating of flesh: not bicause they were giuen to chastitie or sobrietie; but bicause of their erronious and blasphemous opinions. Tyrants doo sometimes deale curteouslie with their subiects, but to beguile them. And wicked men doo sometimes absteine from wickednes, but that is for feare of punishments, not for the loue of iustice. Euill men forbeare to sinne for the feare of punishment. Wherefore in iudgements, when the fact is apparant, there is oftentimes inquirie made of the will, mind, and purpose of him that dooth it. Neither at anie time is the making of choise subiect to fortune, as is action. Yea rather, they, which are found in anie crime, are oftentimes accustomed to saie, that they ment to haue doone otherwise, and that they purposed not in their mind, that such things should happen. And we easilie grant, that the actions are more apparant, since they are laid open to euerie mans eies; but yet they make not the iudgement either surer, or more certeine. Men doo iudge of maners, by that which followeth, namelie by the worke: but the iudgement of choosing procéedeth from the cause, and (as they vse to speake) from that which went before. And sometimes it happeneth, that a man dooth no action; so as it cannot be iudged by his actions, whether he be good or euill: but immediatlie, so soone as he sheweth what choise he hath made, although he doo no action, yet men giue a iudgement of him, either as touching his naughtinesse, or his goodnesse. But how can it be said, that yong children, and also bruit beasts want the making of choise, ⁴²⁹ when as they choose one meate before an other; plaie before discipline; and shunne some things more than other things? We must answer, that making of choise is of two sorts. One is common, whereby one thing is either preferred before an other, or else is more eschewed than an other: and this kind of choise neither brute beasts nor children doo want. The other is the verie proper choise, which hath counsell going before, and is directed by the iudgement of reason. And this kind of making choise can neither bruit beasts nor children haue: for when they pursue one thing before an other, or auoid one thing rather than an other, they are not lead by reason; but by sense. Also those things, which we doo in hast, and vpon the sudden, are without making of choise, not that we want reason while we commit those things, but bicause we admit no space of time to deliberate on them. Also the counsell, and the iudgement, and deliberation of reason is hindered by the vehemencie of the perturbation.

⁴³⁰ Wherefore there be reckoned vp thrée things, that want the making of choise. First, brute beasts, bicause they are not capable of reason. Secondlie, yong children; which although they be indued with reason, yet can they not vse the same, bicause of their tender age: in the third place are counted sudden and hastie motions of the mind: wherein, although men haue reason enough and also yeares, yet doo they want time of deliberation. Wherefore they, which doo anie thing by the force of anie affection, are woont to saie, that they did it not of purpose, or aduisedlie. Since that making of choise dooth belong vnto the mind, it is either of the power of knowing, ⁴³¹ or the power of appetite. All appetite is diuided into thrée parts. Either it is of the more noble part of the mind, and is ioined with reason, and is called the will; or else it is of the grosser part, and then it is diuided into the desiring power, and into the angrie power. Herevpon Aristotle said, that some thought choise to be the will, others thought it to be anger, others thought it to be desire: but if it belong vnto the knowledge, then come they which affirme choise to be an opinion, who perhaps were the Stoiks. But first Aristotle treateth of desire and anger, ⁴³² and reasoneth that their opinion is fond, bicause that then we should yéeld, that brute beasts haue choise: for they are mooued both with desire and anger, which he reiecteth, as an absurd and vnworthie thing. Wherefore it plainelie appéereth, that Aristotle did vtterlie remooue desire from choise, bicause we may not by anie means saie, that desire is choise: which cannot so be iudged of, as touching willingnesse. Indéed willingnesse differeth from choise, but it cannot be sundered from the same; séeing euerie choise is according to the will. And the argument which he vsed is this; If desire were choise, whatsoeuer thing worketh by desire, should (no doubt) worke by choise; But not euerie thing that worketh by desire, dooth worke by choise. The ouerthrowe of the consequent appéereth in this, bicause an incontinent man worketh by desire, but not by choise; for that he followeth it not. He determined to doo well, but he stood not to his determination; therefore he delt not according to the choise, which he had conceiued in his mind. Choise is an appetite, which is a counsellor; but the incontinent man, while he is carried awaie by desire, heareth no counsell. And on the other side, the continent man giueth no eare to desire, but followeth his right choise. And this reason may be applied vnto anger; for he also that dooth anie thing by anger, dooth it not by choise: and this we may sée in angrie men. And héerein it shall suffice to haue said, that an incontinent man is not altogither without choise; but yet he followeth not that which he hath in his mind.

He is compared to a man that sléepeth, to him that is dronken, & to a citie wherein good lawes are not regarded. Héere Aristotle reasoneth; Choise is contrarie to desire; But desire is not contrarie to desire; Ergo desire is not choise. This argument is in the second figure. The reason is this; Those things that agrée in one third, they also agrée in themselues: Euen so those things that doo not oppose themselues against one third, doo not agrée togither at once themselues. But there ariseth a doubt: ⁴³³ bicause desire séemeth to be against desire. Some man desireth fame, and to haue his name renowmed, and the same man is much desirous of monie; one of these desires is repugnant to an other. Augustus desired souereigntie, and yet was desirous to imitate Silla, in giuing vp of souereigntie. These things séeme to be repugnant. Pamphilus lo~ged to be with his louer Glycerie, and yet was desirous not to offend his father. These things declare, that desires be contrarie. The answer is manie waies to be made. Contraries must alwaies be contrarie: but these things are not alwaies contrarie, as appéereth in the Sophister, which at one time hath both these desires; namelie, the desire of glorie, and the desire of monie. Moreouer, it behooueth that contraries haue respect to one and the selfe same thing: but the one of these desires respecteth fame, the other monie. Those things that respect one thing, after a quite contrarie maner, are verie contraries, and cannot be both at once togither. As, to desire to haue fame, and to desire not to haue fame; to be noble, and not to be noble; to be mainteined, and not to be mainteined: these be contrarie desires, and cannot be both at once togither. Aristotle was not of the mind, that among desires there is no contrarietie, but that contrarie desires cannot be togither at once in one man. But euill desire is alwaies an enimie to sound choise in one and the selfe-same man, and at one and the selfe-same time. Neither is euerie choise alwaies an aduersarie to euerie desire: for the desire of theft is not against the choise, whereby a man determineth to become rich, though it be by vniust meanes. And the desire of slaughter is not against the choise, which a tyrant hath made. But a sound choise (as it hath béene said) is euermore against an euill desire. But what maner of contrarietie is this of desire & choise? No proper contrarietie, but such as is of contrarie winds, or of two enimies. For it behooueth that these contrarieties, which be proper contrarieties, be in one and the selfe-same subiect, and that from thence they driue awaie one another; as white and blacke, cold & heat: which thing agréeth not with choise and ill desire, for they be placed in diuers parts of the mind. For choise is placed in the mind or reason, but desire in the grosser part of the soule.

Another argument is gathered from the obiects, the which being contraries, ⁴³⁴ doo cause that the powers themselues are not the verie same. Desire is caried vnto those things which be pleasant, and which be vnpleasant; namelie, to obteine the one sort, and to auoid the other. But choise hath not respect vnto these things, but regardeth onelie that which is shamefull and honest, profitable and hurtfull. Howbeit, here there is a doubt; bicause the choise séemeth to be of things pleasant, and of things gréeuous. Before yong men there is set vertue and pleasure, and they are said to be set as it were in the point of two waies; that when they shall be come vnto the yéeres of mans state, they may bend either to the right hand, or to the left. Wherevpon they are at their choise, to choose whether waie they will. Thus haue Pythagoras scholers and the Poets described the matter. And to Paris there was a choise giuen; Pallas offered him learning and good arts; Iuno offered him ciuill honors, & a happie gouernement of the common-weale; finallie, Venus offered him the grosser sort of pleasures: wherefore the choise was in Paris, and he rather chose that which was pleasant. Yea, and our sauior Christ setteth before vs a broad and a narrowe waie, a wide and a strait gate: so as it séemeth, that the choise is both of that which is gréeuous, and that which is pleasant. We answer: If by choise, thou vnderstand the action of the mind, whereby one thing is preferred before another; we cannot denie, but that choise is both of that which is pleasant, and that which is gréeuous, séeing we preferre pleasantnesse before gréefe. But deliberation concerneth not properlie pleasant and grosse delights: for to those we are not borne. Wherefore those which preferre such pleasures before seuere honestie, or sometimes before a gréeuous sense, are not said to choose, but rather to be led and violentlie caried by the desire. Yet is it not to be denied, but that it may sometimes be, that the honest and profitable things, which we choose, may be pleasant: howbeit, that happeneth at all aduentures, (or as the common sort speake) accidentallie. Wherfore choise is exercised about that which is good, and about that which is euill: for this by our choise we séeke, euen to obteine good things, and to auoid euill. ⁴³⁵ But if a man demand, whether there can be a choosing of euill? We will answer, that this cannot be, bicause we neuer make choise of that which is euill: for it behooueth, that that which is chosen, either be good, or at the least wise haue in it selfe a shew and resemblance of goodnesse. But thou wilt saie; Are not the lesse euils oftentimes chosen before the greater? I grant they are: but Aristotle in his Rhetoriks saith, that the lesse euill in that case, hath a consideration of good. ⁴³⁶ Finallie, Aristotle said, that anger pertaineth much lesse to choise; bicause those things séeme not to be doone deliberatelie, which be doone in anger. ⁴³⁷

Neither is the choise, saith Aristotle, our will, although it haue an affinitie thervnto. In which words he propoundeth two things; the one, that will hath an affinitie with choise: for both of them are placed in the chiefest part of the mind. And moreouer, the common people saie, that they will those things which they choose. And yet neuerthelesse, how néere so euer they be, they differ one from another: for the will is more at libertie, and stretcheth further than choise and election dooth. For will extendeth vnto manie things, wherevnto the choise doth not atteine: as vnto the end, vnto things vnpossible, and to those things which by vs cannot be performed. By common sense it is manifest, ⁴³⁸ that choise perteineth not to things vnpossible: for he shuld be counted a mad man, that would choose such things, as can by no means be compassed. That the will extendeth to such things, it appéereth, bicause that thou maist find manie men, which would not die: which in nature is vnpossible. Also there be, which would be monarchs of all the world, and beare rule ouer all men: which also is a thing vnpossible. Moreouer, the will is the end, but the choise is rather of those things which belong vnto the end, and therefore they differ. Bicause the end, especiallie the chiefest end is of that nature, that foorthwith, so soone as it is set before vs, it cannot be refused. Therefore since it is not in our power to slippe from the same, it belongeth not to the choise: for that concerneth those things which are in our power. But yet we must vnderstand, that there is a choise of such ends as consist betwéene two extremes: for manie times is set before a yong man the choise of good learning, or of chiualrie, or of ecclesiasticall function, or of the administration of the common-weale. First, they choose to themselues one of these things which liketh them best; then also they choose the means, whereby they may excell them. But we answer, that choise in those ends hath no place, as they be ends, but as they be certeine means vnto felicitie. For an end, so farre foorth as it is an end, is (as Aristotle saith) no choise.

⁴³⁹ Finallie, to prooue that choise is not opinion, which was set downe in the fourth place, the reason is drawne from the obiects. Opinion is of all things; But choise is not of all things; Therfore choise is not opinion. The argument is in the second figure, taken from the nature of relatiues: for the power is referred vnto his obiect. Now let vs sée what is opinion; ⁴⁴⁰ It is an assent of the mind, whereby we take vpon vs to mainteine the one part of a thing that is gainesaid: yet we auow it not without all feare, but somewhat doubting, least perhaps the other part of the contradiction should be found true. And herein opinion differeth from knowledge: for knowledge is a most sure and vnmooueable assent. Therefore let no man go about to persuade one that hath knowledge, or is a professor of the Mathematicall sciences, that a thing is otherwise than he knoweth it to be: for it is vnpossible to persuade him therevnto. But chéeflie doo Orators indeuour to roote opinions out of the minds of men, when they sée that iudges, or hearers doo otherwise iudge, than they themselues would would haue them. Aristotle prooueth, ⁴⁴¹ that opinion is of all maner of things; bicause men hold opinion euen of things eternall. For men haue opinion of manie things concerning God, concerning angels, concerning heauen, and such like things, which of the philosophers are holden for eternall. Also men haue an opinion of those things, which cannot be; to wit, that there be Chimeras, Centaures, and such like monsters: and that the diametre is equall to the side lines of the quadrangle, which cannot possiblie be. Also things necessarie be otherwhile subiect vnto opinion: for it may be, that what one hath perceiued by knowledge, another beléeueth by opinion. But when it is said, that opinion is as touching all things, this must not be vnderstood as concerning simple motions, or single words; but as touching propositions, which consist of manie motions or words, & doo shew, that either a thing is, or is not. Neither yet is there opinion of all these things: for there be certeine things, which euen of themselues are knowne either to the sense, or to the mind. As, that fire is hot, we certeinlie knowe by experiment of the sense, we haue not an opinion thereof; and that the whole is greater than the part thereof; or that we pronounce of euerie thing, either that it is, or is not (which things be called principles) we are not led by opinion, sith of themselues they are knowne to our vnderstanding. Opinion therefore is of all things; that is to wit, of all propositions, which of themselues are not knowne vnto vs. ⁴⁴² Also opinion is distinguished from diuine faith: for faith signifieth a firme assent giuen vnto the word of God, by the persuasion of the holie Ghost; so that it neither staggereth nor wauereth as dooth opinion. The Minor proposition of the argument aforesaid is thus prooued; Bicause choise is onelie of those things, which may be doone of vs, wherefore it is not of all things, as opinion is.

Aristotle hath another argument drawne from the parts. These two whole things, choise and opinion, haue not the same parts, whereinto they might be diuided; Ergo they are not all one. For the parts of choise are euill and good; but the parts of opinion are false and true opinion. And yet this argument may séeme to be weake; for we commonlie saie, that there be manie euill opinions; ⁴⁴³ as if a man thinke that our soules are mortall, or that God dooth not by his prouidence care for mens actions. Whosoeuer thinke these things, are said to haue ill opinions, First we answer hervnto, that ill is here vnderstood as it belongeth to maners: & therfore Aristotle saith, that opinion is neither euill nor good, bicause it is not reckoned among maners. But the common sort doo call opinions, euill; bicause that which is false, is euill; euen as that which is true, is good. For those things, which are commonlie called transcendent, are so ioined one with another, that true, is good; and false, is euill. Also these opinions may sometimes be called good or euill in a morall sense; bicause thorough those false or true opinions, men are stirred vp either to good or vnto euill maners. ⁴⁴⁴ The next argument is taken from the effects, to prooue that it cannot be particularlie said, that anie kind of opinion is all one with choise. Here we haue to deale with the particular part, bicause it hath béen alreadie declared in the whole, that opinion & choise doo differ. Wherefore, least anie man might saie; They differ generallie, and yet it may be, that some opinion is a particular choise; Aristotle prooueth, that this cannot be: bicause (saith he) this is the effect of choise, that through a iust cause we shall become men denominated of that qualitie; to wit, iust men. But this happeneth not in opinion; and therefore they are by no meanes all one. Those things, which be here spoken, are most euident in an incontinent man: for he, bicause he maketh an ill choise, is said to be an euill man, whereas in other matters he may hold an opinion right inough. For as touching vertues, he iudgeth rightlie; and thinketh, that it is good to temper him selfe from vnchastitie and droonkennesse, & yet dooth not choose this: he is not called a good man. But yet none can denie, but that euen by conceiuing an opinion, we are become indued with some certeine kind of qualitie, since opinion it selfe is a qualitie, and euen of opinions doo arise some affects of the mind. But Aristotle is to be vnderstood as touching that qualitie, whereby we conceiue an opinion, and doo make our choise: for in choosing of chast things, we become chast; by choosing of strong things, we become strong; by choosing of iust things, we become iust. But it is not likewise true in generall, as touching opinion: for in conceiuing an opinion of eternall things, we are not made eternall; nor yet in conceiuing an opinion of anie thing touching iustice, are we made iust. Howbeit this is true, that by true opinions we become more apt vnto vertues; and through false opinions, more prone vnto vices. But opinion it selfe dooth straitwaie of it selfe, so soone as it is present, communicate vnto vs such formes or denominations; but yet it behooueth that there be a choise had therein. Moreouer, choise is occupied in pursuing or flieng, but so is not opinion: for when anie thing is offered vnto vs, we begin to conceiue an opinion what it is, what com⟨…⟩oditie may be gotten thereby, and how it must be vsed. But we doo not so much conceiue in our opinion, whether the thing should be shunned or followed: for that rather apperteineth to choise. Yea rather, betwéene these things there séemeth, that there should be a certeine order set: for first (as I said) we conceiue in opinion what it is, what profit it bringeth, and how it will serue our turne. Which things being co~ceiued in opinion, then we procéed either to pursue, or to eschew the matter.

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← 19. The first Chapter. Of Sinne · Contents · 21. The third Chapter. Of the Lawe →

Footnotes

1. In Rom. 7. at the end of the chapter. ↩

2. This word Free will is not read in the scriptures. ↩

3. What is free. ↩

4. When the will is free. ↩

5. Free choise is placed i⟨…⟩ the will, but rooted in the reason. ↩

6. Two sorts of error in reason. ↩

7. Our lust ioineth it selfe with the weaker argument. ↩

8. Men vse not to deliberate but in things to be doone. ↩

9. Some things to be doone need no deliberation. ↩

10. In what things free will consisteth. ↩

11. Definition of free will. ↩

12. In man are foure differences of state. ↩

13. Adam was free in his first state. Three kinds of works in man. ↩

14. Gen. 1, 27. ↩

15. Psalm. 8, 6. ↩

16. Psal. 49, 13. ↩

17. Gen. 1, 28. ↩

18. The grace that wee haue by Christ is preferred before Adams grace in paradise. ↩

19. Phil. 2, 13. ↩

20. Why God at the creation gaue free will. ↩

21. Luk. 10, 30, ↩

22. Little freedome remaineth to them that be not regenerate. ↩

23. What freedome is left to the not regenerate. ↩

24. Rom. 2, 3. ↩

25. God vseth the wils of men to his owne ends. ↩

26. Ier. 10, 23. ↩

27. The successe of things is gouerned by the will of God not by our will. ↩

28. verse. 20. ↩

29. God is the author of counsels, and giueth successe as he will. ↩

30. The godlie determine alwaies with this condition: if God will. Iames. 4, 15. Rom. 1, 10. ↩

31. Psal. 127, 1. ↩

32. In works acceptable vnto God, strangers from Christ haue no freedome. ↩

33. Nature indeed was left after sinne, but yet vnperfect and wounded. ↩

34. A reason why men cannot chuse but sinne. ↩

35. 1. Cor. 2, 14
    ↩

36. Gen 2. 3 & 5 ↩

37. verse. 21. Touching our strength our owne creator must be best beleeued. verse. 12. ↩

38. Without the grace of God we be bondmen. Iohn. 8, 34. ↩

39. verse. 36. Rom. 7, 14. & 18. & 23. ↩

40. Gal. 5, 18. ↩

41. Iohn. 6, 44. None can come vnto Christ vnlesse he be drawne. ↩

42. Rom. 8, 7. ↩

43. Gal. 3, 10. Places to prooue that before regeneration we be not free. ↩

44. Rom 9, 16. ↩

45. Eze. 11, 12. ↩

46. Iere. 31, 11. ↩

47. Psal. 51, 18. ↩

48. verse. 4. ↩

49. Phil. 1, 6. ↩

50. Psa. 119, 36. ↩

51. 2. Thes. 3, 5.
    ↩

52. Prou. 21, 1. It is the worke of God, not our owne, that we be conuerted vnto God. The end & vse of the lawe. Esaie. 1, 19. ↩

53. Eze. 18, 30, and 32. ↩

54. Deu. 30, 15. ↩

55. Lawes indeed are Lawes indeed are giuen but it is not taught that mans strength is able to performe them. ↩

56. By the law of God we may measure our infirmitie, but not our strength. ↩

57. Rom. 3, 30. Rom. 7, 13. ↩

58. Why God is not to be accused of iniustice. ↩

59. Looke In 1. King. 16. at the beginning, and in the booke De votis, pag. 279. put foorth at Basil. ↩

60. Necessitie of sinning is without constraint. ↩

61. 1. Co. 12, 11
    ↩

62. Freedome is contrarie vnto compulsion not vnto necessitie. ↩

63. A similitude. ↩

64. Why the blessed cannot sinne. ↩

65. The not regenerate differ from brute beasts. ↩

66. Three maner of freedoms. ↩

67. What is Free, Violent, and Willing. ↩

68. A definition of Free. ↩

69. The will of the not regenerate is greatlie restrained. ↩

70. What they cannot choose. ↩

71. The will cannot be compelled. ↩

72. The necessitie of sinning is not absolute in the wicked. ↩

73. Augustine saith that it is of nature to be able to haue faith. ↩

74. The opinion of Augustine compared with the Pelagians. ↩

75. What manner of power vnto faith is in nature. ↩

76. How the will of man hath respect vnto good and euill. ↩

77. Aristotles definition of felicitie. ↩

78. What they call congruitie. ↩

79. What condignitie. ↩

80. Ephe. 2, 3. ↩

81. Iohn. 3, 36. ↩

82. Ephe. 2, 1. ↩

83. Philip. 3, 8. Before regeneration we can doo nothing that should please God. Esaie. 1, 12. Esai. 64, 6. Iohn. 15, 1. and, 5. ↩

84. Matt. 7, 18. ↩

85. Rom. 6, 5. ↩

86. Rom. 14, 23. ↩

87. Matt. 6, 22. ↩

88. Rom. 11, 6. ↩

89. Colos. 1. ↩

90. Rom. 11, 17. ↩

91. Rom. 6, 20. ↩

92. verse, 19. ↩

93. Vnder the praises of nature lurke the enimies of grace. ↩

94. Why they are called heretiks, which denie freewill. ↩

95. Our aduersaries come somewhat nigh vnto the Manicheis. ↩

96. A similitude. ↩

97. A comparison of our aduersaries with the Pelagians. ↩

98. To be with out faith in Christ, and without grace, in Augustines iudgement is all one thing. ↩

99. Acts. 10, 2, and 3, 4, ↩

100. Of Cornelius and his works. ↩

101. Cornelius beleeued before baptisme. ↩

102. verse. 23. ↩

103. A similitude. ↩

104. True godlines cannot be ioined with ignorance. ↩

105. verse. 22. ↩

106. Iob. 1, 1. ↩

107. How great a dignitie it is to feare God. ↩

108. Psal. 112, 1. ↩

109. Acts. 10. ↩

110. The effects are a testimonie of Cornelius iustification. ↩

111. Galat. 6, 6. ↩

112. Acts. 10, 22. ↩

113. verse. 30. He praie⟨…⟩ continuallie. ↩

114. How it is to be vnderstood that sinners are not heard of God. ↩

115. Why God heareth the the praiers of ill ministers. ↩

116. Rom. 12, 14 ↩

117. Acts. 10, 34. ↩

118. Iohn. 14, 1. ↩

119. Iohn. 5, 46. ↩

120. Cornelius had the faith of the fathers in the old testament. Iohn. 1, 48. The example of Nathaniel. ↩

121. A similitude. ↩

122. Heb. 11, 6. ↩

123. Faith is not of our selues. Ephe. 2, 8. ↩

124. Cornelius had faith in Christ, but not distinct and vnfolden. ↩

125. verse. 13. ↩

126. Peter was sent to edifie Cornelius, not to laie the ground of his faith. ↩

127. The saluation which we haue in this life is not perfect. ↩

128. Ephes. 2, 8. ↩

129. Phil. 2, 12. ↩

130. Saluation begun by iustification is to be made perfect euerie daie. ↩

131. Matt. 13, 17. ↩

132. Iohn. 17, 8. ↩

133. Luke. 24, 16, Matt. 16, 9. Luke. 18, 34 ↩

134. Note the interpretation of the words of Augustine. ↩

135. Ephes. 2, 8. ↩

136. Whether grace and a weake faith haue the power to iustifie. ↩

137. A historie of Pelagius. ↩

138. Who be Catechumeni, and conceiued sonnes of God. ↩

139. Grace following is all one with the first, but differeth in degree and quantitie. ↩

140. Why God by his prouidence so transferreth kingdoms from nation to nation. ↩

141. Ciuill discipline must not be pretermitted of infidels. ↩

142. The Ethniks sinne lesse by keeping of ciuill discipline, than by reiecting of it. All sinnes are not alike. ↩

143. Our aduersaries, not we, ⟨…⟩oo open a windowe vnto sinnes. ↩

144. Our aduersaries doe derogat⟨…⟩ much of the grace of God. ↩

145. Goodlie works are sometimes occasions of destruction. ↩

146. Works doon before iustification bee otherwhiles preparations to the same, but yet to the predestinate onlie. ↩

147. A knowledge of sinne hauing not his proper end is sinne. ↩

148. The end of the knowledge of sinne. ↩

149. Esaie. 58, 2. ↩

150. God refuseth works although they be goodlie. ↩

151. Augustine accuseth the meane works which he did before his conuersion. ↩

152. Whatsoeuer wanteth his due perfection is sinne ↩

153. Of the Publican. Luk. 18, 13. ↩

154. Rom. 10, 14 ↩

155. While he praied he was iustified. ↩

156. If he be iustified, why dooth hee call himselfe a sinner? The iustified doo yet still praie for their sinnes. Matth. 6, 12 ↩

157. Psal. 31, 3. ↩

158. Psal. 40, 15. ↩

159. Psal. 51, 6. ↩

160. Ibidem. 10. ↩

161. He did not so call himselfe a sinner, as he ment to retein⟨…⟩ his old sinnes. ↩

162. What is required vnto the works, which be acceptable vnto God. ↩

163. Rom. 14, 23 ↩

164. 1. Co. 10, 31
     ↩

165. Psal. 32, 1. ↩

166. Rom. 8, 1. ↩

167. Ibidem. 3. ↩

168. Ierem. 9, 23. 1. Cor. 1, 31. ↩

169. 1. Cor, 4, 7.
     ↩

170. Whence may be gathered the definition of good works. ↩

171. How far the wicked are from the condition of good works. ↩

172. A metaphor of a good and euill tree. Matt. 7, 18. Rom. 14, 23. ↩

173. verse. 33. verse. 34. ↩

174. To cloth the naked without faith is sin. ↩

175. Heb. 11, 6. ↩

176. If the respect be vnto nature, no tree is euill. Natures must not be weighed as they were made by God, but according to the state that coms to them afterward. ↩

177. Mercie doone to a neighbour without faith is faithlesse. ↩

178. Mercie of it selfe is not good. ↩

179. 1. kin. 20, 35. 1. Sam. 15, verse. 16.
     ↩

180. God disallowed certeine works of mercie. ↩

181. The wicked abuse naturall affections. ↩

182. Pelagius and the Schoolemen affirme good works but not such as further to the kingdome of heauen. ↩

183. A grace preuenting and knocking. ↩

184. A similitude. ↩

185. Against the former similitude. ↩

186. Mat. 21, 1⟨…⟩. Luk. 13, 6. ↩

187. Acts. 17, 28. ↩

188. Rom. 14, 23 ↩

189. Augustine obiected against Pelagius, that whatsoeuer is not of faith is sinne. ↩

190. We must assure our selues of that wee doo, that it is acceptable vnto God. ↩

191. Paule by a particular proposition prooueth a generall. ↩

192. The lawe of God is the rule of the conscience. ↩

193. Rom. 12, 2. ↩

194. Rom. 5, 17. ↩

195. Commentaries ascribed vnto Ierom. ↩

196. Ambrose & Basil saie that the works of infidels are sins. ↩

197. Esaie. 62, 3. ↩

198. Iohn. 8, 34. ↩

199. Matt. 6, 24 ↩

200. 2. Cor. 6, 14.
     ↩

201. Matt. 7, 18. ↩

202. Of the freedome of men regenerate. ↩

203. The godlie can atteine vnto works acceptable vnto God. ↩

204. Gen. 22, 10, and 19. ↩

205. Phil. 4, 18. ↩

206. Heb. 13, 16. ↩

207. Phil. 2, 12. ↩

208. Matt. 25, 35. ↩

209. The regenerate haue their freedome by the benefit of God, not by their owne merit. Ezec. 36, 26 Iohn. 6, 44. ↩

210. At the first impulsion of the holie Ghost the mind suffereth. ↩

211. By the benefit of regeneration both the vnderstanding and lust are holpen. ↩

212. The libertie also of the godlie is vnperfect. ↩

213. Gal. 5, 17. ↩

214. Rom. 7, 15. ↩

215. Ibidem. 25. ↩

216. 1. Ioh. 1, 10 Iames. 3, 2. Matth. 6, 12 We are not let by the imperfection of libertie, but that we may worke togither with God.
     ↩
217. 2. Tim. 1, 6.
     ↩
218. 1. Cor. 14, 1.
     ↩

219. The regenerate are called men of God, not men simplie 2. Tim. 3, 17. ↩

220. The difference betweene the freedome of the godlie and of the vngodlie. ↩

221. Of the freedome in our heauenlie countrie. ↩

222. Before part ⟨…⟩. place. 1. art. 10. and in the booke De votis, pag. 354. ↩

223. Whether concupiscence and the motions left in the regenerate be sinnes. Rom. 7, 23. ↩

224. A definition of sinne. ↩

225. How Coueted in that definition is to be vnderstood. ↩

226. verse. 4. A definition of sinne out of the word of God. ↩

227. Sinne is called a priuation of that good thing which the lawe of God prescribeth. ↩

228. Rom, 7, 23, ↩

229. Rom. 8, 7. ↩

230. Mat. 22, 37. ↩

231. Exod. 20, 17 Augustine. ↩

232. Gen. 1, 27. Rom. 8, 29. ↩

233. verse. 10. ↩

234. Eph. 4, 24. ↩

235. Wherein consisteth the image of God. ↩

236. Phil. 2, 5. ↩

237. Colo. 3, 5. ↩

238. Gal. 5, 24. ↩

239. Eph. 4, 22. ↩

240. Rom. 6, 23. ↩

241. Rom. 4, 25. ↩

242. Vnto what kind of sin naturall lust, and the first motions vnto euill, is to be referred. A distinction of sinne. Mat. 12, 31. ↩

243. 1. Cor. 6, 9.
     ↩

244. Rom. 6, 1⟨…⟩. ↩

245. Rom. 7, 24. ↩

246. Lust and the first motions vnto euill, be in their owne nature mortall. Rom. 5, 23. ↩

247. By the mercie of God they be not imputed to damnation. ↩

248. Three degrees of sinnes remissible. ↩

249. Rom. 6, 12. ↩

250. The lust in nature belongs vnto originall sinne. ↩

251. ⟨…⟩. ↩

252. An other distinction of sinne. ↩

253. Rom. 1, 21. ↩

254. verse. 24. ↩

255. Rom. 2, 5. ↩

256. Rom. 1, 2⟨…⟩. ↩

257. A similitude. ↩

258. Prou. 6, 27. ↩

259. Why sinne is said to be a punishment. ↩

260. Falling from faith may be called the punishment of sinne. ↩

261. Rom. 7, 15, and 18. ↩

262. Gal. 5, 17. ↩

263. The first motions be sinnes, bicause we depart from the state wherein we were made. ↩

264. Why it is not in mans power to be good. ↩

265. These things are spoken euen of the regenerate. ↩

266. He speaketh of nature in perfect state. ↩

267. The regenerate can abstaine from the grosser kinds of sinnes. ↩

268. Concupiscence remaineth, but the giltines is taken awaie. ↩

269. Euerie thing must be iudged of, according to his own nature. ↩

270. The Pelagians vpbraided the Catholiks of folishnes. A similitude. ↩

271. Similitudes. ↩

272. The fathers meane that they be no actuall sinnes. ↩

273. Note these words of Augustine. ↩

274. Concupiscence left in vs is verelie and properlie sinne ↩

275. Against Free will. ↩

276. The first reason. 1. Cor. 2, 14. ↩

277. The 2. reason. ↩

278. The 3. reason. ↩

279. The 4. reason. ↩

280. The 5. reason. ↩

281. The 6. reason. ↩

282. The 7. reason. ↩

283. Looke part 1. pl. 13. art. 13. ↩

284. To the first reason. ↩

285. To the second reason. ↩

286. Few see how the prouidence of God can suffer anie free choise in our will. ↩

287. A prouerbe. ↩

288. A licence of the Poets. ↩

289. Rom. 4, 20. ↩

290. Christ was not deliuered to the crosse against his fathers wil. ↩

291. Iohn. 3, 16. ↩

292. Rom. 8, 23. ↩

293. Iohn. 15, 13. ↩

294. Luke. 22, 15. ↩

295. Augustine against Cicero. ↩

296. Augustines example of a Physician ↩

297. If he be God he foreseeth things to come. ↩

298. Esai. 41, 23. ↩

299. Psal. 14, 1. ↩

300. What draue Cicero so earnestlie to stand with free will. ↩

301. Selfe-loue is the originall of impietie. ↩

302. Rom. 8, 29. ↩

303. Ephes. 1, 4. ↩

304. Matt. 10, 29. and 30. ↩

305. Ciceros maner of reasoning. ↩

306. Augustine. ↩

307. It is granted that before God is a necessitie of causes & things. ↩

308. Cicero erreth more than the Stoiks. ↩

309. The Stoiks remoue our will fro~ the order of causes. ↩

310. Manie things might be doone, which are not doone. ↩

311. Two sorts of necessitie. ↩

312. Admonitions, lawes, and praiers are not taken awaie. ↩

313. Our will can neuer be constrained. ↩

314. A necessitie vpon condition may be granted, but not absolute. Aristotle. ↩

315. Chrysost. ↩

316. 1. Co. 11, 19.
     ↩

317. Matt. 18, 7. ↩

318. Luk. 24, 26. ↩

319. A necessitie of the consequent, not of consequence. ↩

320. A similitude. ↩

321. Let no man laie his owne fault vpon God. ↩

322. The Peripatetikes are reprooued. ↩

323. To the 3. reason. ↩

324. The power of God doth what it wil, but it marreth not the nature of things. Wisd. ⟨…⟩, 1. ↩

325. To the 4. reason. ↩

326. To the 5. reason. Wisdome shall rule in the starres. ↩

327. Augustine. ↩

328. The iniuries against heauen. ↩

329. Gen. 1, 14. ↩

330. How a place in Gen. is to be vnderstood. ↩

331. Twins conceiued at one instant. ↩

332. Augustine. ↩

333. Two brothers of like affection. ↩

334. Hippocrates. ↩

335. Possidonius. ↩

336. Ciceros booke De fato. ↩

337. To the sixt. ↩

338. The Stoiks doo not vtterlie seuer mans will from destinie. ↩

339. How we put the knitting togither of causes. ↩

340. To the seuenth. ↩

341. Out of the Commentaries vpon Aristotles Ethiks. ↩

342. Whether lawes may command things not possible to be performed. ↩

343. A definition of lawe. ↩

344. Whether the affects of the mind be voluntarie or not voluntarie. ↩

345. To knowe which is voluntarie and which not voluntarie, may serue to the moderating of punishment due by lawe. ↩

346. Deut. 19, 5. ↩

347. The definition of not voluntarie. ↩

348. That the originall of that which is violent, is from without. ↩

349. Whether those things that are moued violentlie, may also themselues haue a doing. ↩

350. Whether voluntarie and without constraint, be all one. ↩

351. Whether those that seeme to be meane actions, be voluntarie, or not voluntarie. ↩

352. Which he called great euils. ↩

353. The lesse euils are chosen for auoiding the greater. ↩

354. Gen. 19, 8. ↩

355. Gen. 19, 31. ↩

356. Gen. 20, 2. ↩

357. Iudith. 10, 11, and 12. ↩

358. That some actions be both voluntarie, and not voluntarie. ↩

359. That the actions called mixed, be voluntarie, bicause. for them we are praised or dispraised. ↩

360. For which good things hard mishaps must be abidden. ↩

361. What kind of shamefull things must be abidden for a gret good thing. ↩

362. That praise dooth not alwaies folowe them that suffer greeuous things. ↩

363. Certeine things whereto a man must not suffer him selfe to be constrained. ↩

364. Two difficulties about the suffring for honest things: one commeth from our iudgement, & the other from the infirmitie of our strength. ↩

365. Whether those things that be doone for pleasure or vtilitie sake be not voluntarie. ↩

366. In Mnemone. ↩

367. Two kinds of ignorance. ↩

368. Examples of both sorts of ignorance. ↩

369. Another distinction of ignorance. ↩

370. An example. ↩

371. An ignorance generall, and an ignorance particular. ↩

372. The circumstances are eight in number. ↩

373. How circumstances do excuse. ↩

374. How ignorance is the cause of a thing doone against the will. ↩

375. What kind of ignorance dooth not excuse. ↩

376. The definition of voluntarie standeth vpon two parts. ↩

377. Why some thinke that angrie and lusting men doo things against their wils. ↩

378. That children and brute creatures doo some things with their wils, and some things against their wils. ↩

379. The appetite or desire of two sorts. ↩

380. How these things agree with the holie scriptures. ↩

381. Psa. 111, 3. ↩

382. Matt. 19, 12. ↩

383. Deut. 19, 5. ↩

384. Matt. 8, 29. ↩

385. Num. 22, 31 ↩

386. Rom. 3, 8. ↩

387. Acts. 5, 29. ↩

388. Matt. 10, 38 and 16, 24. Matt. 10. 39. ↩

389. Matt. 10, 33 ↩

390. Matt. 5, 10. ↩

391. 1. Kin. 21, 13
     ↩

392. Matt. 16, 26. ↩

393. Matt. 10, 28 ↩

394. Matt. 26, 41. ↩

395. Mark. 9, 23. ↩

396. Phil. 4, 13. ↩

397. Rom. 7, 18. ↩

398. Phil. 2, 13. ↩

399. Luk. 23, 34. ↩

400. Acts. 7, 60. ↩

401. 1 Sam. 14, 43 ↩

402. Acts. 2, 37. ↩

403. Gen. 9, ⟨…⟩1. ↩

404. Gen. 29. verse. 21, & ⟨…⟩ ↩

405. 1. Co. 14, 38
     ↩
406. 2. The. 2, 11
     ↩

407. Eze. 14, 9. ↩

408. 3. King 22, 20, &c.
     ↩

409. Eph. 4, 25. ↩

410. Matt. 5, 22. ↩

411. Luk. 21, 34. ↩

412. Ephe. 5, 18. ↩

413. Psal. 13, 2. ↩

414. verse. 22. ↩

415. Rom. 1. ↩

416. Ephe. 4, 17. ↩

417. Esaie. 44, 18 ↩

418. 2. Sam. 15, 9
     ↩

419. Gen. 20. ↩

420. Acts. 8. ↩

421. 1. Kin. 22. 34.
     ↩

422. Matth. 5, 22. ↩

423. Esaie. 1, 3. ↩

424. verse. 7. ↩

425. Psal. 69, 9. ↩

426. Rom, 7, 24. ↩

427. Choise most proper to vertue. ↩

428. Maners are more iudged by choise than by actions. ↩

429. Whether children and brute beasts, be without choise. ↩

430. Three things void of choise. ↩

431. An order whereby the definition of choise is found out ↩

432. That choise and desire are diuerse. ↩

433. Desire against desire. ↩

434. Whether choise be both of that which is pleasant and vnpleasant. ↩

435. Whether there can be a choosing of euil. ↩

436. That wrath is not choise. ↩

437. That the will is not the choise, but these two doo differ. ↩

438. That the choise is not of things vnpossible. ↩

439. That choise is not opinion. ↩

440. A definition of opinion. ↩

441. That opinion concerneth all things. ↩

442. Opinion distinguished from faith. ↩

443. Ill opinions. ↩

444. That no kind of opinion is all one with choise. ↩