HAving premised these things in general, concerning several kinds of1 Evidences and Assents: I shall in the next place offer some particular Schemes of Principles, relating to Practical things, whether Natural or Moral, in the same way and method as is used in the Mathematics, consisting of Postulata, Definitions and Axioms.
A Scheme of Natural Principles
Every thing is endowed with such a natural Principle, whereby it is necessarily2 inclined to promote its own preservation and well-being.
That which hath in it a fitness to promote this end is called Good. And on the3 contrary that which is apt to hinder it is called Evil. Amongst which there are several degrees, according as things have more or less fitness to promote or hinder this end.
The lessening or escaping of Evil is to be reckoned under the notion of Good.4
The lessening or loss of Good is to be reckoned under the notion of Evil.
That which is Good is to be chosen and5 prosecuted, that which is Evil to be avoided.
The greater Good is to be preferred before the less, and the lesser Evil to be endured rather than the greater.
Such kinds of things or events, whether Good or Evil, as will certainly come to pass, may fall under computation, and be estimated as to their several degrees, as well as things present. Because when such a space of time is elapsed, that which is now future, will become present. Which is the ground of mens dealing for Reversions.
And thus likewise is it for such things as may probably come to pass; Though this probability should be somewhat remote. It is counted a valuable thing, and may be estimated at a certain rate, for a man to be one amongst four or five equal Competitors for a place, to be the fourth or fifth expectant of an inheritance; though in such cases there be the odds of three or four to one, yet the price that is set upon this, may be so proportioned, as either to reduce it to an equality, or make it a very advantageous bargain.
A present Good may reasonably be parted with, upon a probable expectation of a future Good which is more excellent. Which is the case of Merchants, who have large estates in their own possession, which they may safely keep by them; and yet chuse to venture them upon a thousand hazards, out of an apprehension that there is a greater probability of their gaining, than of their losing by such adventures.
And this would be much more reasonable, if besides the probability of gaining by these adventures, there were the like probability of their being utterly undone and ruined, if they should neglect or refuse to venture.
The greater the advantage is, the more reasonable must it be to adventure for it. If it be reasonable for a man to run the venture of 20 l. for the gain of a hundred pounds, much more for a thousand.
The reason why men are moved to believe a probability of gain by adventuring their stocks into such Forraign Countries as they have never seen, and of which they have made no trial, is from the Testimony of other Credible persons, who profess to have known those places, and the advantages of traffick thither by their own experience. And this is generally accounted a sufficient argument to perswade others unto the like trials.
The reason which moved men to adventure for the first discovery of unknown Countries, is, because they had fair probabilities to perswade them, that there were such places, which would probably afford very gainful Traffique.
And upon the same ground, if any considerable number of men, such whom we esteem the most wise and the most honest, should assure us, that they did firmly believe, (though they did not know it by experience), that there was such an undiscovered Country, to which if men would make any ventures, their gains would be a thousand times more than could be expected by any other way of Traffique; and that upon this perswasion. they themselves did resolve to venture their estates, and should withal offer such arguments for the reasonableness of what they assert, as to any men, whose judgments were unprejudiced, would render it much more probable than the contrary: In this case, he that would act rationally, according to such rules and principles as all mankind do observe in the government of their actions, must be perswaded to do the like, unless he would be counted foolish, and one that did affect singularity.
A present Evil is to be endured, for the avoiding of a probable future Evil, which is far greater. Which is the reason of mens undergoing the mischiefs and hardships of War, the charges and vexations of Law-suits, the trouble of Fasting and Physick. A man will endure the pain of hunger and thirst, and refuse such meats and drinks as are most grateful to his appetite, if he be perswaded that they will endanger his health, especially if he believe that they are poisoned. He will chuse to take nauseous offensive Physick, upon a probable expectation, that he may thereby prevent or cure a dangerous sickness.
The greater the Evil is, the more reason is there to venture the loss of a less Good, or the suffering of a less evil, for the escaping of it.
A Scheme of Moral Principles
There are several kinds of Creatures6 in the world, and several degrees of dignity amongst them, some being more excellent than others, Animate more than Inanimate, Sensitives more than Vegetatives, and Men more than Brutes. It is a greater preheminence to have life, than to be without it; to have life and sense, than to have life only; to have life, sense, and reason, than to have only life and sense.
That which doth constitute any thing7 in its being, and distinguish it from all other things, is called the Form or Essence of such a thing.
That state or condition by which the8 nature of any thing is advanced to the utmost perfection of which it is capable according to its rank and kind, is called the chief end or happiness of such a thing.
The nature of Plants doth consist in having a Vegetative Soul, by which they receive nourishment and growth, and are enabled to multiply their kind.
The utmost perfection which this kind of Being is capable of, is to grow up to a state of maturity, to continue unto its natural period, and to propagate its kind.
The nature of Brutes (besides what is common to them with Plants) doth consist in having such faculties, whereby they are capable of apprehending external objects, and of receiving pain or pleasure from them.
The perfection proper to these doth consist in sensitive pleasures, or the enjoying of such things as are grateful to their appetites and senses.
The nature of Man (besides what is common to him with Plants and Brutes) doth consist in that faculty of Reason, whereby he is made capable of Religion, of apprehending a Deity, and of expecting a future state of rewards and punishments. Which are capacities common to all mankind, notwithstanding the utmost endeavours that can be used for the suppressing of them; and which no other Creature in this visible world, except Man, doth partake of.
The happiness of man doth consist in the perfecting of this faculty; that is, in such a state or condition as is most agreeable to reason, and as may entitle him to the Divine favour, and afford him the best assurance of a blessed estate after this life.
That which every man doth and must propose unto himself, is the being in as good a condition as he is capable of, or as is reasonable for him to expect. And the desire of this is not properly a duty or a moral vertue, about which men have a liberty of Acting, but ‘tis a natural principle, like the descent of heavy bodies, it flows necessarily from the very frame of our natures; men must do so, nor can they do otherwise.
The Customary Actions of men, considered as Voluntary, and as capable of9 Reward or Punishment, are styled Moral.
As that which hath a fitness to promote the Well-fare of man considered10 as a Sensitive Being, is styled Natural Good; so that which hath a fitness to promote the Well-fare of man as a Rational voluntary and free Agent, is styled Moral Good. And the contrary to it Moral Evil.
That which is morally good is to be11 desired and prosecuted, that which is evil is to be avoided.
The greater congruity or incongruity12 there is in any thing to the reason of Mankind, and the greater tendency it hath, to promote or hinder the perfection of mans nature, so much greater degrees hath it of moral Good or Evil. To which we ought to proportion our Inclination or Aversion.
There is in some things such a natural decency and fitness, as doth render them most agreeable to our reason, and will be sufficient to recommend them to our practice, abstracting from all considerations of Reward. As in loving those who are kind to us, and from whom we receive benefit: In compensating Good with Good, and not with Evil.
It is most suitable both to the Reason and Interest of mankind, that every one should submit themselves to him, upon whom they depend for their Well-being, by doing such things as may render them Acceptable to him.
It is a desireable thing for a man to have the assistance of others in his need and distress. And ‘tis not reasonable for him to expect this from others, unless he himself be willing to shew it to others.
The rational nature and the Perfection13 belonging to it being more noble than the Sensitive, Therefore Moral Good is to be preferred before Natural, and that which is Morally Evil is more to be hated and avoided, than that which is Natural.
A present Natural Good may be parted14 with upon a probable expectation of a future Moral good.
A present Natural Evil is to be endured15 for the probable avoiding of a future Moral Evil.
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