Having premised these things in general, concerning several kinds of1 Evidences and Assents: I shall in the next place offer some particular Schemes of Principles, relating to Practical things, whether Natural or Moral, in the same way and method as is used in the Mathematics, consisting of Postulata, Definitions and Axioms.

A Scheme of Natural Principles

Every thing is endowed with such a natural Principle, whereby it is necessarily2 inclined to promote its own preservation and well-being.

That which hath in it a fitness to promote this end is called Good. And on the3 contrary that which is apt to hinder it is called Evil. Amongst which there are several degrees, according as things have more or less fitness to promote or hinder this end.

The lessening or escaping of Evil is to be reckoned under the notion of Good.4

The lessening or loss of Good is to be reckoned under the notion of Evil.

That which is Good is to be chosen and5 prosecuted, that which is Evil to be avoided.

The greater Good is to be preferred before the less, and the lesser Evil to be endured rather than the greater.

Such kinds of things or events, whether Good or Evil, as will certainly come to pass, may fall under computation, and be estimated as to their several degrees, as well as things present. Because when such a space of time is elapsed, that which is now future, will become present. Which is the ground of mens dealing for Reversions.

And thus likewise is it for such things as may probably come to pass; Though this probability should be somewhat remote. It is counted a valuable thing, and may be estimated at a certain rate, for a man to be one amongst four or five equal Competitors for a place, to be the fourth or fifth expectant of an inheritance; though in such cases there be the odds of three or four to one, yet the price that is set upon this, may be so proportioned, as either to reduce it to an equality, or make it a very advantageous bargain.

A present Good may reasonably be parted with, upon a probable expectation of a future Good which is more excellent. Which is the case of Merchants, who have large estates in their own possession, which they may safely keep by them; and yet chuse to venture them upon a thousand hazards, out of an apprehension that there is a greater probability of their gaining, than of their losing by such adventures.

And this would be much more reasonable, if besides the probability of gaining by these adventures, there were the like probability of their being utterly undone and ruined, if they should neglect or refuse to venture.

The greater the advantage is, the more reasonable must it be to adventure for it. If it be reasonable for a man to run the venture of 20 l. for the gain of a hundred pounds, much more for a thousand.

The reason why men are moved to believe a probability of gain by adventuring their stocks into such Forraign Countries as they have never seen, and of which they have made no trial, is from the Testimony of other Credible persons, who profess to have known those places, and the advantages of traffick thither by their own experience. And this is generally accounted a sufficient argument to perswade others unto the like trials.

The reason which moved men to adventure for the first discovery of unknown Countries, is, because they had fair probabilities to perswade them, that there were such places, which would probably afford very gainful Traffique.

And upon the same ground, if any considerable number of men, such whom we esteem the most wise and the most honest, should assure us, that they did firmly believe, (though they did not know it by experience), that there was such an undiscovered Country, to which if men would make any ventures, their gains would be a thousand times more than could be expected by any other way of Traffique; and that upon this perswasion. they themselves did resolve to venture their estates, and should withal offer such arguments for the reasonableness of what they assert, as to any men, whose judgments were unprejudiced, would render it much more probable than the contrary: In this case, he that would act rationally, according to such rules and principles as all mankind do observe in the government of their actions, must be perswaded to do the like, unless he would be counted foolish, and one that did affect singularity.

A present Evil is to be endured, for the avoiding of a probable future Evil, which is far greater. Which is the reason of mens undergoing the mischiefs and hardships of War, the charges and vexations of Law-suits, the trouble of Fasting and Physick. A man will endure the pain of hunger and thirst, and refuse such meats and drinks as are most grateful to his appetite, if he be perswaded that they will endanger his health, especially if he believe that they are poisoned. He will chuse to take nauseous offensive Physick, upon a probable expectation, that he may thereby prevent or cure a dangerous sickness.

The greater the Evil is, the more reason is there to venture the loss of a less Good, or the suffering of a less evil, for the escaping of it.