A Scheme of Moral Principles
There are several kinds of Creatures6 in the world, and several degrees of dignity amongst them, some being more excellent than others, Animate more than Inanimate, Sensitives more than Vegetatives, and Men more than Brutes. It is a greater preheminence to have life, than to be without it; to have life and sense, than to have life only; to have life, sense, and reason, than to have only life and sense.
That which doth constitute any thing7 in its being, and distinguish it from all other things, is called the Form or Essence of such a thing.
That state or condition by which the8 nature of any thing is advanced to the utmost perfection of which it is capable according to its rank and kind, is called the chief end or happiness of such a thing.
The nature of Plants doth consist in having a Vegetative Soul, by which they receive nourishment and growth, and are enabled to multiply their kind.
The utmost perfection which this kind of Being is capable of, is to grow up to a state of maturity, to continue unto its natural period, and to propagate its kind.
The nature of Brutes (besides what is common to them with Plants) doth consist in having such faculties, whereby they are capable of apprehending external objects, and of receiving pain or pleasure from them.
The perfection proper to these doth consist in sensitive pleasures, or the enjoying of such things as are grateful to their appetites and senses.
The nature of Man (besides what is common to him with Plants and Brutes) doth consist in that faculty of Reason, whereby he is made capable of Religion, of apprehending a Deity, and of expecting a future state of rewards and punishments. Which are capacities common to all mankind, notwithstanding the utmost endeavours that can be used for the suppressing of them; and which no other Creature in this visible world, except Man, doth partake of.
The happiness of man doth consist in the perfecting of this faculty; that is, in such a state or condition as is most agreeable to reason, and as may entitle him to the Divine favour, and afford him the best assurance of a blessed estate after this life.
That which every man doth and must propose unto himself, is the being in as good a condition as he is capable of, or as is reasonable for him to expect. And the desire of this is not properly a duty or a moral vertue, about which men have a liberty of Acting, but ‘tis a natural principle, like the descent of heavy bodies, it flows necessarily from the very frame of our natures; men must do so, nor can they do otherwise.
The Customary Actions of men, considered as Voluntary, and as capable of9 Reward or Punishment, are styled Moral.
As that which hath a fitness to promote the Well-fare of man considered10 as a Sensitive Being, is styled Natural Good; so that which hath a fitness to promote the Well-fare of man as a Rational voluntary and free Agent, is styled Moral Good. And the contrary to it Moral Evil.
That which is morally good is to be11 desired and prosecuted, that which is evil is to be avoided.
The greater congruity or incongruity12 there is in any thing to the reason of Mankind, and the greater tendency it hath, to promote or hinder the perfection of mans nature, so much greater degrees hath it of moral Good or Evil. To which we ought to proportion our Inclination or Aversion.
There is in some things such a natural decency and fitness, as doth render them most agreeable to our reason, and will be sufficient to recommend them to our practice, abstracting from all considerations of Reward. As in loving those who are kind to us, and from whom we receive benefit: In compensating Good with Good, and not with Evil.
It is most suitable both to the Reason and Interest of mankind, that every one should submit themselves to him, upon whom they depend for their Well-being, by doing such things as may render them Acceptable to him.
It is a desireable thing for a man to have the assistance of others in his need and distress. And ‘tis not reasonable for him to expect this from others, unless he himself be willing to shew it to others.
The rational nature and the Perfection13 belonging to it being more noble than the Sensitive, Therefore Moral Good is to be preferred before Natural, and that which is Morally Evil is more to be hated and avoided, than that which is Natural.
A present Natural Good may be parted14 with upon a probable expectation of a future Moral good.
A present Natural Evil is to be endured15 for the probable avoiding of a future Moral Evil.
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