- FROM the Works of Providence in the Government of the world; And that continual experience which we have of some Wise and Powerful Being, who doth preside over and govern all things; Not only by his general concourse, in preserving all kinds of things in their Beings, and regulating them in their Operations: But chiefly in his wise and just government over mankind and humane affairs, which may appear by such effects
as are Ordinary, Extraordinary.
- For the more common effects of it, namely that general success which in the ordinary course of things doth accompany honest and virtuous actions: And the punishment and vengeance that doth one time or other in this world usually befall such as are wicked: Both Virtue and Vice being generally, and for the most part, sufficiently distinguished by Rewards and Punishments in this life.
There are indeed some instances to the contrary, concerning the Miseries of Good men, and the Prosperity of the Wicked; But these have been by several of the wisest Heathen, Plato, Plutarch, Tully, Seneca &c. sufficiently vindicated, by the clearest Principles of Reason, from being any prejudice to the wise Government of Providence.
It is not either Necessary or Convenient, that Happiness and Prosperity in this Life, which is the usual reward of Virtue, should have either such a Physical or Mathematical Certainty, as could not possibly fail. Because,
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It would not be consistent with our dependent conditions, that worldly prosperity should be so infallibly under the power of our own endeavours, as that God himself might not sometimes interpose for our disappointment. If I may have leave to suppose, what I am now proving, namely a Wise and Omnipotent Providence, It must needs appear highly reasonable, that it should be left to his Infinite Wisdom and Power, to make what reserved cases he pleases, from the ordinary course of things. From whence it will follow, that these unequal dispensations can be no sufficient ground for the disbelief of Providence.
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It would very much prejudice another great Principle of Religion, which is of mighty influence for the regulating of mens lives and actions in this world, namely, the Belief and Expectation of a future state of Rewards and Punishments.
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If temporal prosperity did infallibly attend all good actions, This would be a diminution to Virtue it self. Men would do good by a kind of natural necessity, which would abate just so much from the Virtue of their Actions, as it does from the Liberty of them. It is sufficient, that Moral Actions should have Moral Motives. And that Virtue doth generally and for the most part, make men prosperous and happy in this world. We know by experience, that all Mankind do in their most weighty affairs, think it sufficient to depend upon such causes as do commonly and for the most part prove effectual to the ends for which they are designed. So that this very thing which is usually looked upon as the greatest objection against Providence, is really and truly an argument for it.
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For extraordinary effects of it. If we give any credit to the universal History of all Ages and Nations, It will by that appear,
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That there have many times happened such special signal Providences for the punishing of obstinate sinners, and for the deliverance of such as were Religious, in answer to their Prayers, whereby the Supreme Governour of the World hath so visibly pointed out his will and meaning, and so plainly manifested his power, that every impartial man must be forced to say, doubtless there is a God that judges in the earth.
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That sometimes Miracles have been wrought, which could not be effected without the help of some Superior Power; And sometimes there have been plain prophesies and predictions concerning such future things, as in their various circumstances were contingent. Of which the Annals of all Ages and Nations, as well Heathens as Christians, do give very particular and large accounts. And though we may safely grant, that some of the stories to this purpose, delivered either from the more ancient or later times, were fabulous and vain; yet for a man to deny that ever such things happened in the world, but that they were all meer forgeries and designs to cheat Posterity, this were to subvert the Credit of all History; which is so immodest a thing, as any sober man would be ashamed of.
These arguments are more largely discussed by others, who have writ upon this subject: But there is one particular which to me seems very considerable to this purpose, though but little notice of it be taken by others: And that is, The state of the Jewish Nation, who for these 1600 years have been driven out of their own Countrey, having now no particular place of abode, belonging to them as a Nation; but are scattered and dispersed over all the habitable world, hated and despised where-ever they are permitted to dwell; very frequently persecuted, impoverished, banished, murdered in vast multitudes; And notwithstanding all this, they are not yet so mixed and blended with other Nations, as to be lost amongst them; But are still kept up a distinct people, There being no instance like this in any story. As if they were intended for a standing memorial and example to the world, of the divine power and vengeance. To me it seems, amongst rational arguments one of the plainest, not only for the proof of a Deity, and a just Providence in pursuing that Nation with such exemplary Vengeance; But likewise for the autority of Scripture, and the truth of the Christian Religion.
I might here add another argument to the same purpose, from Natural Conscience, which is Gods Deputy, and doth internally witness for him, as other creatures do externally. ‘Tis plain, that all mankind are in some measure endowed with this; and one may as well assert, that Hope and Fear are not natural to men, as that Conscience is not. To this purpose I might further argue, from those natural notions of our minds concerning Good and Evil, the bounds of which are fixed in the nature of things, and do not depend either upon Custom or Positive Law. Those things which have in them a fitness to promote our chief end, being styled Good, and implying in the very Definition of them, Comeliness and Reward; Those things which have in them a natural aptitude to hinder our Chief end being styled Evil, and implying in the definitions of them, Turpitude and Punishment. From whence it will follow, that there must be some Superior Power, who by framing things with such respects towards one another, may be said to have declared this Law of Nature, and to have taken care to enforce the observance of it; both these belonging to the nature of a Law. But I may perhaps have occasion to speak more particularly to this afterwards.
These things put together, are so strong an evidence, and so sufficient to convince the existence of a Deity, that that man must be very wilful, who doth not submit and acquiesce in it. And for this reason is it (saith a Noble Author) that God1 never yet wrought any Miracle to convince an Atheist; because to a man that is capable of being convinced, his ordinary works are sufficient to this purpose. And I should think it much more easie and rational (saith the same Author) to believe all the fables in the Poets, the Legend, the Talmud, and the Alchoran, than that this Universal Frame should be without a Creator and Governour.
And now it may not be improper to look back, and take a review of what kind of Evidence hath been produced in this matter. As for any immediate proof from our outward senses, this cannot be pretended to for the demonstration of such a Being as is supposed to be a pure Spirit and invisible; But for the mediate proofs from the effects of a Wise Omnipotent Agent, we can look no where about us, But every object doth afford evidence of it. There is no conclusion in Philosophy (not immediately apparent to the sense) that is capable of so full and unquestionable an evidence from plain effects, as this.
As for that kind of Inward Sensation, whereby we can discern the impressions of our own minds, They that have any sense of a Law written in their hearts, or any natural notions about Good and Evil, must by these effects be convinced of a Supreme Being. And as for that kind of Evidence which belongs to our Understandings, If the Universal consent of mankind be of any autority: If this Visible world, replenished with such admirable variety of Creatures, preserved and governed in such an excellent order, be any evidence of Infinite Power and Wisdom: If besides what we our selves have known by our own experience, any credit be to be given to Universal History, attesting to many Signal Providences that have happened in the world: Besides the several Miracles and Prophesies, that have been taken notice of in several Ages and Nations. I say if any, or all of these things be of any force, they must needs render the thing I am proving to be credible in the highest degree, and even altogether unquestionable.
In so much, that if a Deity be supposed, It is not imaginable by what other kind of evidence we should be assured of it, than what we are now furnished withall. And it was before laid down as a Principle, That when a thing is capable of good proof in2 any kind, men ought to rest satisfied in the best evidence for it which that kind of things will bear, and beyond which better could not be expected supposing it were true.
If any should imagine, that frequent Miracles might be a more powerful means to convince men of this Principle. To this it may be said,
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That this is not fitting: the proper work of Miracles being for the confirmation of such doctrines as are not knowable by natural light, not for such things of which men may be sufficiently convinced by reason.
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‘Tis not so certain, that this would be effectual. Those frequent Miracles in the passage of Israel out of Egypt, The dividing of the Red-sea, The waters out of the Rock, The cloud and pillar of Fire, The Mannah, The Quails, The destruction of Korah, &c. did not prevail with the generality of the Israelites. Those constant Miracles under the Mosaical dispensation; The waters of Jealousie; The extraordinary plenty of the sixt year; The Urim and Thummim; The special Protection of the Coasts of Israel every third year, when all the Males were to go up to Jerusalem to worship; which custom of theirs must needs be known to their enemies, who lived round about them: None of all these, did prove effectual for the conviction of obstinate men. Those occasional Miracles wrought by our Saviour, though they were so many and so great, as were never before wrought by any one, yet did they not prevail with many of the Jews.
If it be said, That none of these proofs do so infallibly conclude, but that there doth still remain a Possibility that the thing may be otherwise. To this I have shewed before, That there may be an indubitable Certainty, where there is not an infallible3 Certainty: And that a meer possibility to the contrary, is not a sufficient cause of doubting. To which I now add, That if it should be supposed, that a man could not be sure of the Being of God, Yet ‘tis most evident that he could not be sure of the contrary: For this plain reason, Because no man can be sure of a Pure Negative, namely, That such a thing is not; unless he will either pretend, to have a certain knowledg of all things that are or may be, than which nothing can be more monstrously and ridiculously arrogant; or else, unless he be sure that the being of what he denies doth imply a contradiction, for which there is not the least colour in this case; The true notion of God consisting in this, That he is a Being of all possible perfection.
If it be supposed, that notwithstanding all that hath been said, there may yet be some probabilities to the contrary. To this it may be answered, That unless these probabilities were greater and stronger than those on the other side, no man who acts rationally will incline to them. And if there be any such, why are they not produced? where are they to be found?
If men shall yet pretend, That though they cannot answer these Arguments, yet they do really find some doubt in their own minds. I would ask such, Have you seriously and impartially considered, what is alledged in this case? It should be no prejudice to any Proposition in Philosophy or Mathematicks, that an ignorant man who never applied his thoughts to such things, doth pretend to doubt of it. If you do in some measure understand, and have considered these arguments, I would then ask, Have you not as much reason for this, as you your selves would think sufficient, for the proof of any thing you were not unwilling to believe? Do you not knowingly and wilfully entertain prejudices against such things? Have you been true to so much light as you have received? Or have you not rather with-held it in unrighteousness? If so, ‘tis plain that you have dishonest minds, that you measure by an unjust balance, and therefore cannot be competent judges of truth or falshood.
If it be supposed yet further, that the Probabilities on each side should be equal, or that those on the other side should somewhat preponderate; yet if there be no considerable hazard on that side which hath the least probability, and a very great and most apparent danger in a mistake about the other: In this case, every rational and prudent man is bound to order his actions in favour of that way which appears to be most safe and advantageous for his own interest; as I have shewed before.4
So that in such cases, as may seem unto us not altogether free from some kind of doubt, and which we could not so far clear up to our selves, as to make them appear wholly unquestionable; I say, in such cases, men that would act prudently, should enquire, Where lies the danger of mistaking?
Why, on the one side, All the inconvenience of Believing this (if it be not so), will be, that we are hereby occasioned to tye our selves up to some needless restraints during this short time of our lives, wherein notwithstanding there is as to the present, much peace, quiet, and safety; And as for the future, our error shall dye with us, there being none to call us to an account for our mistake.
But now on the other side, what if there should be a Deity so holy, and just, and powerful, as is supposed? If this should prove to be a real truth (and no man can be sure of the contrary), what vengeance and indignation may such vile Miscreants and Traitors expect, who have made it their business to banish Him out of the world, who is the great Creator and Governour of it, to undermine his Being, to eradicate all notions of Him out of the minds of men; To provoke his Creatures and Vassals to a contempt of Him, a slighting of his fear and worship, as being but such imaginary Chimaera’s as are fit only to keep fools in awe? Certainly, as this is the highest provocation, that any man can be guilty of, so shall it be punished with the sorest vengeance.
There are two things that Atheistical men propose to themselves by their prophane loose principles, namely, to avoid the imputation of Credulity, and the fears and perplexities of mind, to which Religion makes men obnoxious. But their principles are not more irrational, than their design is foolish; for of all mankind these prophane persons are,
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The most Credulous, who can believe themselves to be wiser than all the world, who can believe the Eternity of the world, or its production by a casual concourse of Atoms, without any kind of argument for it, against the many reasons that are urged to the contrary. Who if they should demean themselves about matters of the world, as they do about Religion, would be counted ridiculous, senseless persons, and altogether unfit for humane conversation.
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The most Timorous. Tully hath observed,5 that no kind of men are more afraid of God, than such as pretend not to believe his Being. These are the men who above all others are most liable to be affected with dread and trembling, at thunder and lightning, at solitude and darkness, and more especially then when it doth most concern them to be freed from such disquiets, namely, in the time of sickness, and the approaches of death.
From whence it will follow, that upon all accounts Atheism may justly be accounted Folly; both as it is directly contrary to the principles of reason, and the rules of wisdom.
I have now done with the first thing required to a state of Religion, namely, A belief and an acknowledgment of the Divine Nature and Existence.
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