I might here add another argument to the same purpose, from Natural Conscience, which is Gods Deputy, and doth internally witness for him, as other creatures do externally. ‘Tis plain, that all mankind are in some measure endowed with this; and one may as well assert, that Hope and Fear are not natural to men, as that Conscience is not. To this purpose I might further argue, from those natural notions of our minds concerning Good and Evil, the bounds of which are fixed in the nature of things, and do not depend either upon Custom or Positive Law. Those things which have in them a fitness to promote our chief end, being styled Good, and implying in the very Definition of them, Comeliness and Reward; Those things which have in them a natural aptitude to hinder our Chief end being styled Evil, and implying in the definitions of them, Turpitude and Punishment. From whence it will follow, that there must be some Superior Power, who by framing things with such respects towards one another, may be said to have declared this Law of Nature, and to have taken care to enforce the observance of it; both these belonging to the nature of a Law. But I may perhaps have occasion to speak more particularly to this afterwards.
These things put together, are so strong an evidence, and so sufficient to convince the existence of a Deity, that that man must be very wilful, who doth not submit and acquiesce in it. And for this reason is it (saith a Noble Author) that God1 never yet wrought any Miracle to convince an Atheist; because to a man that is capable of being convinced, his ordinary works are sufficient to this purpose. And I should think it much more easie and rational (saith the same Author) to believe all the fables in the Poets, the Legend, the Talmud, and the Alchoran, than that this Universal Frame should be without a Creator and Governour.
And now it may not be improper to look back, and take a review of what kind of Evidence hath been produced in this matter. As for any immediate proof from our outward senses, this cannot be pretended to for the demonstration of such a Being as is supposed to be a pure Spirit and invisible; But for the mediate proofs from the effects of a Wise Omnipotent Agent, we can look no where about us, But every object doth afford evidence of it. There is no conclusion in Philosophy (not immediately apparent to the sense) that is capable of so full and unquestionable an evidence from plain effects, as this.
As for that kind of Inward Sensation, whereby we can discern the impressions of our own minds, They that have any sense of a Law written in their hearts, or any natural notions about Good and Evil, must by these effects be convinced of a Supreme Being. And as for that kind of Evidence which belongs to our Understandings, If the Universal consent of mankind be of any autority: If this Visible world, replenished with such admirable variety of Creatures, preserved and governed in such an excellent order, be any evidence of Infinite Power and Wisdom: If besides what we our selves have known by our own experience, any credit be to be given to Universal History, attesting to many Signal Providences that have happened in the world: Besides the several Miracles and Prophesies, that have been taken notice of in several Ages and Nations. I say if any, or all of these things be of any force, they must needs render the thing I am proving to be credible in the highest degree, and even altogether unquestionable.
In so much, that if a Deity be supposed, It is not imaginable by what other kind of evidence we should be assured of it, than what we are now furnished withall. And it was before laid down as a Principle, That when a thing is capable of good proof in2 any kind, men ought to rest satisfied in the best evidence for it which that kind of things will bear, and beyond which better could not be expected supposing it were true.
If any should imagine, that frequent Miracles might be a more powerful means to convince men of this Principle. To this it may be said,
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That this is not fitting: the proper work of Miracles being for the confirmation of such doctrines as are not knowable by natural light, not for such things of which men may be sufficiently convinced by reason.
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‘Tis not so certain, that this would be effectual. Those frequent Miracles in the passage of Israel out of Egypt, The dividing of the Red-sea, The waters out of the Rock, The cloud and pillar of Fire, The Mannah, The Quails, The destruction of Korah, &c. did not prevail with the generality of the Israelites. Those constant Miracles under the Mosaical dispensation; The waters of Jealousie; The extraordinary plenty of the sixt year; The Urim and Thummim; The special Protection of the Coasts of Israel every third year, when all the Males were to go up to Jerusalem to worship; which custom of theirs must needs be known to their enemies, who lived round about them: None of all these, did prove effectual for the conviction of obstinate men. Those occasional Miracles wrought by our Saviour, though they were so many and so great, as were never before wrought by any one, yet did they not prevail with many of the Jews.
If it be said, That none of these proofs do so infallibly conclude, but that there doth still remain a Possibility that the thing may be otherwise. To this I have shewed before, That there may be an indubitable Certainty, where there is not an infallible3 Certainty: And that a meer possibility to the contrary, is not a sufficient cause of doubting. To which I now add, That if it should be supposed, that a man could not be sure of the Being of God, Yet ‘tis most evident that he could not be sure of the contrary: For this plain reason, Because no man can be sure of a Pure Negative, namely, That such a thing is not; unless he will either pretend, to have a certain knowledg of all things that are or may be, than which nothing can be more monstrously and ridiculously arrogant; or else, unless he be sure that the being of what he denies doth imply a contradiction, for which there is not the least colour in this case; The true notion of God consisting in this, That he is a Being of all possible perfection.
If it be supposed, that notwithstanding all that hath been said, there may yet be some probabilities to the contrary. To this it may be answered, That unless these probabilities were greater and stronger than those on the other side, no man who acts rationally will incline to them. And if there be any such, why are they not produced? where are they to be found?
If men shall yet pretend, That though they cannot answer these Arguments, yet they do really find some doubt in their own minds. I would ask such, Have you seriously and impartially considered, what is alledged in this case? It should be no prejudice to any Proposition in Philosophy or Mathematicks, that an ignorant man who never applied his thoughts to such things, doth pretend to doubt of it. If you do in some measure understand, and have considered these arguments, I would then ask, Have you not as much reason for this, as you your selves would think sufficient, for the proof of any thing you were not unwilling to believe? Do you not knowingly and wilfully entertain prejudices against such things? Have you been true to so much light as you have received? Or have you not rather with-held it in unrighteousness? If so, ‘tis plain that you have dishonest minds, that you measure by an unjust balance, and therefore cannot be competent judges of truth or falshood.
If it be supposed yet further, that the Probabilities on each side should be equal, or that those on the other side should somewhat preponderate; yet if there be no considerable hazard on that side which hath the least probability, and a very great and most apparent danger in a mistake about the other: In this case, every rational and prudent man is bound to order his actions in favour of that way which appears to be most safe and advantageous for his own interest; as I have shewed before.4
So that in such cases, as may seem unto us not altogether free from some kind of doubt, and which we could not so far clear up to our selves, as to make them appear wholly unquestionable; I say, in such cases, men that would act prudently, should enquire, Where lies the danger of mistaking?
Why, on the one side, All the inconvenience of Believing this (if it be not so), will be, that we are hereby occasioned to tye our selves up to some needless restraints during this short time of our lives, wherein notwithstanding there is as to the present, much peace, quiet, and safety; And as for the future, our error shall dye with us, there being none to call us to an account for our mistake.
But now on the other side, what if there should be a Deity so holy, and just, and powerful, as is supposed? If this should prove to be a real truth (and no man can be sure of the contrary), what vengeance and indignation may such vile Miscreants and Traitors expect, who have made it their business to banish Him out of the world, who is the great Creator and Governour of it, to undermine his Being, to eradicate all notions of Him out of the minds of men; To provoke his Creatures and Vassals to a contempt of Him, a slighting of his fear and worship, as being but such imaginary Chimaera’s as are fit only to keep fools in awe? Certainly, as this is the highest provocation, that any man can be guilty of, so shall it be punished with the sorest vengeance.
There are two things that Atheistical men propose to themselves by their prophane loose principles, namely, to avoid the imputation of Credulity, and the fears and perplexities of mind, to which Religion makes men obnoxious. But their principles are not more irrational, than their design is foolish; for of all mankind these prophane persons are,
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The most Credulous, who can believe themselves to be wiser than all the world, who can believe the Eternity of the world, or its production by a casual concourse of Atoms, without any kind of argument for it, against the many reasons that are urged to the contrary. Who if they should demean themselves about matters of the world, as they do about Religion, would be counted ridiculous, senseless persons, and altogether unfit for humane conversation.
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The most Timorous. Tully hath observed,5 that no kind of men are more afraid of God, than such as pretend not to believe his Being. These are the men who above all others are most liable to be affected with dread and trembling, at thunder and lightning, at solitude and darkness, and more especially then when it doth most concern them to be freed from such disquiets, namely, in the time of sickness, and the approaches of death.
From whence it will follow, that upon all accounts Atheism may justly be accounted Folly; both as it is directly contrary to the principles of reason, and the rules of wisdom.
I have now done with the first thing required to a state of Religion, namely, A belief and an acknowledgment of the Divine Nature and Existence.
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