Book 1, Chapter 8. Concerning the Excellencies and Perfections of the Divine Nature: And First, of those which are commonly called Incommunicable, namely, Simplicity, Unity,

Immutability, Infiniteness, Immensity, Eternity.

I Proceed to the second thing proposed as a principal part of Natural Religion, namely, Due apprehensions of the Divine Excellency and Perfections. Without which, the meer belief of his Being, will contribute but little to a true state of Religion. A man may have such unworthy notions of a Deity, that it would in some respects be as good, nay much better, to be without a God, than to have such a one, as he may frame. It would be better (saith a great Author) to have¹ no opinion of God, than such a one as is unworthy of him; the one is but meer unbelief, the other is contumely. ‘Tis a common saying cited out of Plutarch’s book of Superstition, where he professeth it much more desirable to him, that posterity should say, that there never was any such man as Plutarch, rather than that he was a fierce, unconstant, revengeful man, one who upon the least omission of any small circumstance towards him, by men otherways virtuous and worthy, would tear out their hearts, destroy their families and children, blast their fields, spoil their cattel with lightning and thunder. This would be such a representation as would make the notion and remembrance of him hateful; And it were better to be forgotten, than to be remembred with infamy. Now there are some opinions which do thus reproach the Deity, and render him under such a notion, that if the Gyants had prevailed in their attempt against heaven, that place had not been worse supplied. This therefore ought to be most carefully avoided.

Whereas the Divine nature is supposed to be the first and supreme Good, therefore the Idea of all absolute perfection must be essential to the notion of him. And though it be very difficult for us to raise our minds to any due apprehensions of this; yet we must endeavour in our thoughts of him, so far as our finite understandings are capable, to remove and separate from him whatever is in any kind evil or unworthy, and to ascribe unto him the utmost degree of all Goodness and Perfection.

The most general Notion that men have of God, is that He is the first cause, and a Being of all possible Perfection.

Some of his principal Excellencies discoverable by the light of Nature, may be reduced to these Heads; namely, such as are Incommunicable; Absolute Simplicity. Essential Unity. Immutability. Infiniteness, both in respect of Place and Time. Immensity. Eternity. Communicable; belonging either to the Divine Understanding, Knowledg. Wisdom. Particular Providence. Will, namely, his Goodness. Justice. Faithfulness. Faculties of Acting, his Power. Dominion over us in this life. Distributing of future Rewards and Punishments.

Each of these Attributes are upon this account of very great consequence to be believed and considered, because they are the foundations of those duties of Religion which we owe to him. According as a man apprehends God to be, so must his esteem be of him, and his demeanour towards him.

And whereas these great and necessary points, of so much influence to Religion, have been usually treated of by others either too largely, by the inserting of several things less pertinent; or too obscurely, by offering such proofs concerning them as are less intelligible, or intermixing the discourses about them, with such niceties as are neither very easie to be solved, nor material for men to know: I shall therefore in this place endeavour to avoid both these inconveniences, by treating concerning each of them with all imaginable brevity and plainness: Observing this method.

First, I shall endeavour to explain and describe, what is meant by each Attribute; And then prove, that these Attributes so explained, must belong to the natural notion of God. Which I shall make out, both by the consent of the wisest Heathen, expressed by their declared opinions, and by their general practice suitable thereunto: And from the nature of the things themselves; their congruity to the principles of Reason, and the absurdities that will follow upon the denial of them.

Those are called Incommunicable Attributes, which are proper to God alone, and not communicated to any Creature.

The first of these I have proposed to treat of, is his Absolute Simplicity. By which I mean his freedom from all kind of composition or mixture, either of Principles or of Parts: And that this doth belong to the natural notion of the Deity, may be evident,

1. From Testimony of the Heathen Philosophers, who do generally acknowledg him to be the First Cause and the most Simple Being, and do frequently style him mens pura & sincera segregata ab omni concretione mortali, &c. And not only Scripture, but the very Heathen likewise do express this Attribute by the similitude of Light, amongst all visible things the most pure and simple.

2. From Natural Reason, by which it will appear, that God cannot be compounded of any Principles, because the principles and ingredients which concur to the making of any thing, must be antecedent to that thing. And if the divine nature were compounded, it would follow that there must be something in nature before him. Which is inconsistent with his being the first Cause.

And here I shall take occasion to speak somewhat concerning the Spirituality of the Divine nature, as having some affinity with this, though it be none of the incommunicable Attributes.

I know it hath been said, with confidence enough, that the notion of a Spirit, or immaterial substance, doth imply a contradiction; and that there is an utter impossibility of any other Being besides Matter. But though this hath been said, yet was it never proved, nor can it be, till either a man be able to evince, that the notion of the word Substance, according to the most general use of it, (which gives signification to words), doth necessarily imply Corporeity, than which nothing can be more false; or unless a man shall pretend to the certain knowledg and comprehension of all things that are or may be, than which nothing can be more vain.

What the Positive notion of a Spirit is, is not so necessary to enquire after, or determine. ‘Tis sufficient, that we conceive of it by way of Negation, namely, that it is a Powerful Intelligent Being that is not matter, without figure or parts, not capable of rarefaction or condensation, not visible to our bodily eyes, and therefore not to be represented by any kind of sensible Image: Not subject to those necessary Laws of Matter, which cannot move unless it be moved, and cannot but move when impelled by another. I say, it may be sufficient in our apprehending the Spirituality of God, to remove all Corporeity and Figure in our conceptions of him.

Now that this Attribute doth belong to the Divine nature, may be made evident both by Testimony and by Reason.

1. It hath been generally owned, by the wisest and most learned Heathen. Pythagoras is often cited for this; by whom (saith Lactantius) God was wont to be² styled incorporalis mens, an incorporeal Mind; and by Plato frequently […], without a body; by other Graecian Philosophers […], the Mind that made the world. Plutarch styles him […], a separated form, not mixed with matter, without any thing in him that is passible.

The Latin Philosophers do frequently³ give him the Attribute of mens divina, mens pura & sincera, mens soluta & libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali.

2. By Reason. That Spirituality is a Perfection, and therefore to be ascribed unto God; or rather, that Corporeity is an Imperfection, and therefore to be removed from him, may appear from hence. Because the supposing of him to be matter is inconsistent with divers of his other most Essential Perfections; As,

3. His Immensity, If we do suppose these two reasonable postulata. 1. That there are some other things in the world besides God. And 2. That two bodies cannot be both at the same time in the same place. From whence it will follow, that wherever any other Body or matter is, from thence God must be excluded; and so many Chasmes or breaches must there be in the Divine nature.

4. His Knowledg and Wisdom, It being not imaginable, how meer matter should be able to comprehend, much less to contrive all that variety of things in the world, past, present, and to come.

5. His Liberty and Freedom, and consequently with his Goodness. That action not being properly good, which is not done freely and out of choice. Now the Laws of Matter are necessary, there can be no […], or arbitrary principle in meer matter. And it is worth observation, how this very argument puzzled Epicurus and his followers, as is represented by Lucretius. If all material things move by necessary Laws, and the parts of Matter be naturally so dispos’d, that they do not move unless they be moved, and cannot but move when press’d upon by other parts that are in motion; whence comes that liberty which we may by an inward sensation perceive to be within us? Unde est haec inquam fatis avolsa voluntas?

To which he gives so wild and irrational an answer, from the motion of declining Atoms, as doth sufficiently manifest him to be baffled by this Objection.

The second Incommunicable Attribute to be treated of, is the Essential Unity of the Divine nature. By which I mean, his being One and no more. And that this perfection doth belong to the natural notion of God, may be made evident both by Testimony and by Reason.

1. By Testimony. I have shewed before, how that notwithstanding that Polytheism which did so generally abound amongst the Heathen, yet the wiser and more considerate persons amongst them, have in all ages acknowledged One Supreme Deity. The Egyptians of old, though of all others the most infamous for their multiplicity of Gods, yet did assert One Maker and chief Governour of the world, under whom they did suppose several subordinate Deities, who as his Deputies did preside over several parts of the Universe.

The first occasion of these lesser Deities, was probably from a desire that men had, to express their gratitude to, and to honour the memories of, such Heroical Persons, as in those first and ruder ages of the World, had either by their inventions or their prowess, been highly beneficial to mankind, or to their own Countries; who thereupon were for such publick services, thought fit to be advanced to the highest honour after their deaths, and admitted in a subordinate way, to some share of Government, especially in taking care of the welfare of their Countries. And to this doth the Apostle seem to allude, 1 Cor. 8. 4, 6. where he saith, We know there is no other God but one, for though there be that are called Gods, both in heaven and in Earth, (as there be Gods many, and Lords many): But to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him.

There are many attestations amongst the Heathen Writers concerning this Attribute, the Unity of the Godhead. It is observed, that Orpheus was the first amongst them that wrote concerning the Genealogy of the Gods, where he reduces them to the number of 360. But he was afterwards so sensible of this impious folly, that he writes a particular discourse to his son Musaeus, and his other friends, wherein he doth solemnly recant these wild absurd Fables, professing to them, that he thought himself obliged to rectifie these errors and abuses, which his former Poem might have occasioned. And here he doth in the first place admonish them, that there is but one God, of himself, and none besides him; […], by whom all other things are made, and upon whom they depend. And then he goes on to shew, that God is invisible, and yet sees and knows all things; that as he is merciful, so is he just, being the Author of those judgments which befal wicked men, with several other things to this purpose. And though Homer do too often follow Orpheus in these fictions, concerning a multitude of Deities, yet when he is most serious, he supposes but one, […]. So Sophocles, —[…]. There is but one God, who made the Heaven and the Earth.

So Pythagoras, and several others after him, style God by the name of Monas or Unity.

It is commonly said, that Socrates was put to death for his endeavouring to undeceive his Country-men in that vanity they were addicted to, of worshipping a multitude of Deities; and that this made the Writers after him, more shy in speaking their thoughts about this matter: But though Plato do in some places (for fear of incurring the same danger) seem to favour this popular error, by defending Polytheism, yet he acknowledges these subordinate Deities to be begotten; and he lays it down in another place as a Principle, that whatever is begotten is corruptible, and therefore incapable of being properly a God. And (if the 13th Epistle be truly his), there is a remarkable passage in it to this purpose, where he gives this note, That in those Epistolary discourses, where he designs to be more serious, he doth mention the name of God in the singular number; but when he is not so, then he mentions Gods in the plural.

Hierocles in his Comment upon Pythagoras golden verses, doth style him […], God of Gods, the only maker of all things.

Arrian in his Dissertations of Epictetus, doth assure us, that in his time (which was about 120 years after Christ), it was an usual form in the prayers of the Heathen, to say, […], Lord have mercy upon us, whereby they did acknowledg the Unity of that God whom they did invoke in their prayers. Which clause is thought to be from that usage taken into the Liturgies of the Christians. So far then as the consent of the wisest and best men, in former times, is of any Autority, so far is this Attribute rendered highly credible.

I shall only add that remarkable passage in Maximus Tyrius: Though men⁴ differ much in their opinions about other matters, yet in this they all agree, That there is one God, the King and Father of all; under whom there are subordinate Deities, his offspring, who are admitted to some share of government with him. In this the Grecian consents with the Barbarian, the Inhabitants of the Continent with the Islanders, the Wise with the Unwise.

2. But besides the Testimonies to this purpose, it may likewise be made evident by Reason, That a Plurality of Gods is not only unnecessary, and therefore improbable; but that it is such a supposition as doth imply in it many inconsistencies, and therefore is impossible.

3. ‘Tis unnecessary, and therefore highly improbable. Those have been always esteemed good Rules, Frustra fit per plura, &c. Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate. It is most suitable to that common analogy to be observed amongst natural things, even in lesser matters, that there is nothing amongst them superfluous or redundant; And therefore much more ought it to be so, in the greatest and highest matters of all. Now nothing can be more evident, than that one infinite Being may be sufficient to all purposes whatsoever; for if it had any limits, it were not infinite; and nothing can be more absurd, than to suppose more Gods than are necessary.

4. ‘Tis not possible, that there should be two such infinite Beings. Because either they must have several Perfections, or the same: Neither of which is consistent with the most obvious notion of God, That he is a Being of all possible Perfections.

To suppose two Gods, with several Perfections, some belonging to one, and some to another, will plainly prove, that neither of them can be God, because neither of them have all possible Perfections.

To suppose two Gods of the same and equal Perfections, would likewise prove, that neither of them can be God, (i. e.), not absolutely perfect; because it is not so great a priviledg, to have the same equal perfections with another, and in a kind of partnership, as to be alone and superior above all others.

And to suppose one of them, whether of several or the same kinds of Perfections with the other, but only in an inferior degree, may sufficiently evince that one of them is not properly God, because not supreme.

3. The third Attribute to be discussed, is the Divine Immutability. By which I mean a freedom from all kind of change or inconstancy, both as to his Nature and his Purposes.

And that this Attribute is likewise very suitable to those natural notions which men have of God, may appear,

1. By Testimony. Plato having proposed⁵ the Question, whether God be mutable and inconstant, answers expressly. ‘Tis most necessary that he should be always the same and alike. His words are most emphatical, […], that he is never in any wise capable of any kind of change whatsoever.

And in another place, he mentions these⁶ two things, as being the grand principles of Religion. 1. That God is the cause of all good, and in no wise of any evil. 2. That he is constant and immutable, and cannot deceive by making various representations of himself.

So Seneca, speaking of the necessity of ascribing this Attribute to the Divine Nature as to his Purposes or Counsels, hath this passage; Statuerunt quae non mutarunt, nec unquam primi consilii Deos paenitet.⁷ God is always constant to his own Decrees, and doth never repent of his Purposes. And in another place, Necesse⁸ est ei eadem placere, eui nisi optima placere non possunt; nec ob hoc minus liber ac potens est, ipse enim est Necessitas sua. ‘Tis necessary that he should be always pleased with the same things, who can be pleased with nothing but what is best: Nor can this be any prejudice to his Liberty or his Power, since he is his own Necessity, i. e. nothing from without, but his own natutural perfection lays this necessity upon him.

2. By reason. There is an excellent argument to this purpose, in that place before-cited out of Plato, which according to his manner, he delivers in a more copious way of expression. But the substance of it is this; All change must be either involuntary and upon necessity, or voluntary and upon choice. Now God being the most powerful Being, cannot by any thing be necessitated to an involuntary change. And for any voluntary change, whereas it must be either for the better or the worse, it is not imaginable, that any wise Being should be willing to change for the worse; Nor is it possible that any perfect Being should change for the better. And therefore ‘tis necessary that the divine nature should be immutable.

We esteem changeableness in men either an imperfection, or a fault. Their natural changes, as to their persons, are from weakness and vanity; their moral changes, as to their inclinations and purposes, are from ignorance or inconstancy. And therefore there is very good reason, why we should remove this from God, as being that which would darken all his other perfections. The greater the Divine Perfections are, the greater Imperfection would Mutability be. Besides, that it would take away the foundation of all Religion, Love and Fear, and Affiance and Worship: In which men would be very much discouraged, if they could not certainly rely upon God, but were in doubt that his nature might alter, and that hereafter he might be quite otherwise from what we now apprehend him to be.

4. Infiniteness is another Attribute most natural to the Notion of God. By which is meant, his not being bounded by place, or space, or by duration, but being Immense and Eternal.

5. This Attribute of Gods immensity doth signifie his not being so confined by any bounds of space, but that he doth spread himself to all places that we can see or can imagine, and infinitely beyond: So as we cannot say, he is here and not there, thus far he reaches and not farther. Some have thought, that it is not absolutely necessary to believe such a kind of Omnipresence of the Divine substance, as to be actually present in every place. But this is most necessary to be believed, That God is every-where in respect of his Power and Providence, whereby he doth influence and govern all things, (which is hardly possible to conceive without his actual presence in all places) And in respect of his Knowledg, whereby he doth see and take notice of every thing, though never so secret; and that he can pierce through all these created things, with greater facility than the Light doth through the Air. And that this doth belong to the natural notion of God, may appear,

6. By the general consent of the Heathen, testified by their praying to him at any place or time, which shews that they were perswaded that he was always and every-where present, at least by his Knowledg and his Power. Tully cites Pythagoras affirming, Deum esse animum per naturam rerum omnium intentum & commeantem,⁹ That God is a Spirit or Mind, which doth pass through all things. And in another place, he cites it as Thales his¹⁰ saying, which he commends, Homines existimare oportere, Deos omnia cernere, Deorum omnia esse plena, That men ought to think, that God beholds every thing, and fills every place. Plato affirms, that God¹¹ doth see and take notice of all our actions, words, and thoughts. So Virgil,¹² —Jovis omnia plena. And in another¹³ place, —Deum namque ire per omnes Terrasque tractusque maris, coelumque profundum.

So Seneca speaking of God, saith, Ubique¹⁴ & omnibus praesto est. He is every-where, and always at hand. And in another place,¹⁵ Quocunque te flexeris, ibi illum videbis occurrentem tibi, nihil ab illo vacat, Opus suum ipse implet. We can turn our selves no-whither but we shall meet him, no place is without him, he fills his own Work.

2. By the principles of Reason. If it were otherwise, and the Divine nature should be limited, this would contradict his universal Providence, and render all worship of him vain and useless. Why should a man either fear him, or serve him, if he could neither hear our prayers, nor take notice of our wants, nor receive our acknowledgments.

3. For the Attribute of Eternity, whereby is signified Gods being of infinite duration, without beginning or end; that this likewise doth belong to the natural notion of God, may be evident,

4. By the general consent of the Heathen Philosophers. And though there have been disputes amongst them, about some of his other Attributes, yet in this all of them have agreed. They do indeed describe the Genealogies of their Heroes and subordinate Gods, but for the supreme Deity, he is constantly acknowledged to be without beginning of time or end of days. Epicurus himself, who had the lowest and meanest opinion of God, and robbed him of as many of his other perfections, as by the utmost straining of his wit he was able to do; yet is forced to leave him this Attribute. So Tully relates of him, speaking to those of that Sect, Ubi igitur vestrum beatum & AEternum, quibus duobus verbis¹⁶ significatis Deum? Where is that blessed and eternal Being of yours? which are the two usual words whereby you describe the nature of God? And Lucretius, who made it his design to represent to the world the doctrine of that Philosopher, doth from him give this account of the divine nature, Omnis enim per se Divum natura necesse est Immortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur.

It is essential to the notion of God, that he should be happy and immortal. The Poets themselves, who amongst all others had the wildest thoughts of God, yet do continually give him the Title of […], and seldom mention his name without it. And the Oath most usual amongst them, was in this form, Deos testor immortales, I appeal to the immortal Gods. Aristotle doth in several places, make Eternity to be essential to¹⁷ the notion of God. And Tully asserts it impossible to conceive of God without this perfection; Nos Deum nisi sempiternum intelligere quî possumus? How is it possible for us to conceive of God, but as being Eternal? There never yet was any man, that had any conception of God, who did not esteem him to be Everlasting. To speak of a God that should be corruptible and mortal, is so monstrous an absurdity, that a man could not, though he should purposely study for it, devise any thing more wild and extravagant, saith Plutarch.¹⁸

2. There is very good reason, why this Attribute should not by the most Sceptical Atheistical men be esteemed impossible, because they themselves are willing to grant it to the World, or at least to matter. And if we suppose God to be the first Cause or Mover, it will thence necessarily follow, that he must always be, and could not have a beginning; because if he ever were only in possibility, he could not from thence pass into actual Being, without some precedent Cause and Mover, which is inconsistent with his Being the first Cause. And if nothing could cause his Being, then nothing can take it away, and consequently he must be Everlasting.

It would be a great abatement to all the other Divine perfections, if they were finite and perishing. Besides, that it would be altogether inconsistent with some of them, namely, his Self-existence, and necessary Existence. And withall, it must needs take off from the obligation to duty on the Creatures part, if they were uncertain of the continuance of his Being, by whom Rewards and Punishments were to be distributed in the world.

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Footnotes

1. Lord Bacons Essays. ↩

2. De Ira Dei. cap. 11. ↩

3. Tus[…]ul. Qu. lib. 1. ↩

4. Dissert. 1. ↩

5. In Phaed. ↩

6. De Republ. lib. 2. ↩

7. De Benefic. lib. 6. ↩

8. Nat. Quest. 1. Praef. ↩

9. De Natur. Deor. ↩

10. De Legib. lib. 2. ↩

11. De Legib: lib. 10. ↩

12. Eclog. 3. ↩

13. Georg. lib. 4 ↩

14. Epist. 95. ↩

15. Benefic. lib. 4. ↩

16. Nat. Door. lib. 1. ↩

17. De coelo. lib. 2. ↩

18. Against Colotes. ↩