BEsides those incommunicable Attributes already insisted upon, there are others styled communicable, because they are in some lower degree, and by way of participation, communicated to other inferior Beings. And concerning these, there is a necessity that we should make an estimate of them, by such rules and measures as our natures are capable of. And because the chief perfections that we can apprehend in any reasonable Essence, must refer to one of these three things, the Understanding, the Will, the Faculties of working; for this reason, these Divine perfections may be reduced to these three heads. And whatever is the most excellent of rational Beings, must excel in each of these, (i. e.), There is no kind or degree of perfection that our imaginations are able to conceive, but these excellencies of the Divine nature, must run out still beyond it, so as not to be determined by any real or imaginary bounds.
I purpose to treat particularly concerning each of them, beginning with those perfections that belong to the Divine Understanding, namely, his Knowledg, Wisdom, and particular Providence.
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By the Knowledg of God, I mean that perfection or faculty whereby he understands and considers things absolutely and as they are in their own natures, their powers, properties, differences, together with all the circumstances belonging to them. And ‘tis necessary to the notion of God, that this should be ascribed to him, in the utmost perfection of it, infinitely beyond what the most knowing and the most learned men can pretend unto.
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His Knowledg is most deep and intimate, reaching to the very essence of things, ours but slight and superficial.
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His is clear and distinct, ours but confused and dark.
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His infallible, ours doubtful and liable to mistakes.
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His easie, and without labour and difficulty, always present and actual; ours gotten by sore travail, and easily lost again by the defects of memory or age.
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His universal, extending to all objects; ours short and narrow, reaching only to some few things, That which is wanting (Eccl. 1: 15) cannot be numbred.
He hath a perfect comprehension of all things, that have been, that are, or shall be, according to all the various relations, dependencies, circumstances, belonging to each of them. So that this Attribute of his must be infinite and unbounded, both extensivè, with respect to the several kinds of objects which it comprehends; and likewise intensivè, as it sees every single object with a most perfect infallible view. He doth not only understand all particulars; but he knows every particular so exactly, as if he were wholly taken up and intent in his thoughts upon that alone. There is a vast difference betwixt the wisest of men, and such as are grosly ignorant and sottish; and much greater betwixt men and other creatures, the little Insects, Ants and Worms, which are no ways fit to pass a judgment concerning humane counsels and designs. And yet these things hold some proportion to one another, being both finite; whereas betwixt Gods knowledg and mans, the distance is infinite.
And that this Attribute doth belong to the natural notion of God, may appear,
- From the acknowledgment of the Heathen. Tully mentions it as an usual saying of Thales, Deos omnia cernere, God beholds all things. So Seneca, Nihil Deo clausum, interest animis nostris, & mediis cogitationibus intervenit. Nothing is hid from God, he is intimate to our minds, and mingles himself with our very thoughts.
Besides, that general practice amongst them of swearing by him, and attesting him in their most solemn compacts, doth sufficiently imply their belief of his Omniscience.
- From natural reason. Nothing can be more manifest, than that knowledg is a perfection, and therefore ought to be ascribed to that Being which is supposed to have all possible perfection. ‘Tis a perfection that we know to be in some of the Creatures, and therefore must be much more in the Creator himself. He that made the eye, shall be not see? He that gives to men understanding, shall not be know?
Besides, that the denial of this perfection, would necessarily infer many other imperfections in the Divine nature. It would destroy his Wisdom, Providence, Dominion. Where there is no knowledg, there can be no forecast or provision for the future, nor any kind of regular government. In brief, the denial of this Attribute must take away his Goodness, Veracity, Justice. That Being cannot properly be said to be good, which doth act either out of ignorance or blind necessity.
- As Knowledg doth respect things absolutely; so Wisdom doth consider the relations of things one to another, under the notion of Means and End, and of their fitness or unfitness for the various purposes to which they are designed.
And this likewise doth belong to the natural notion of God, may be evident,
- By Testimony. The Heathen Writers are full of expressions to this purpose. Plato asserts Wisdom to be a thing of that excellency, that it cannot properly be (Phaed) ascribed to any, but God. It is a saying of Tully, Sapiens est Homo, & proptereae Deus; Man is wise, and therefore much1 more God. And in the same Book, Deo tribuenda est ratio recta, constansque; To (Lib. 2) God is to be ascribed right and steady Reason; and a little after he says, it must be such as is perfect and absolute.
Nothing more frequent in Seneca, Epictetus, Antoninus, than to perswade men to an acquiescence under all the dispensations of Providence, because they are ordered by the highest Wisdom.
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By Reason. The want of wisdom is counted a very great imperfection, and one of the worst defects belonging to men; and that which every one is most unwilling to own, being content to be counted any thing rather than a Fool. And therefore there is very good reason, why we should remove this imperfection from that Being, which is supposed to have all possible perfections. And what was said before concerning the denial of his Knowledg, must be equally true likewise in this case, that it must necessarily destroy his other perfections, or render them insignificant. What reason would there be for men to trust either to his Goodness, or his Justice, or his Providence in the managing of things, if he were not withall infinitely wise. And as for his Power, that without wisdom, would be but a kind of a blind force, as much to be feared and hated, as loved and trusted to.
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The third Attribute to be considered is his particular Providence, whereby he does superintend and take care of every individual thing in the world; continuing them in their Beings, disposing of their operations and effects in such a wise order, as may be most suitable to those ends and purposes for which they are designed. This likewise doth belong to the natural notion of God. Though it must be granted, that the belief of this Attribute hath met with some opposition from several of the Philosophers, chiefly Epicurus, who in truth was an Atheist, and out of a pretended respect to the Deity, did think it to be below his Greatness; and for the trouble of it, inconsistent with his Happiness, to have any regard to these Inferiour things, which he therefore imagined to be left to their own courses, whilst the Divine nature is wholly taken up in the contemplation of it self.
Semota a nostris rebus sejunctaque longè. as Lucretius speaks. But because this might seem to argue too slight and narrow apprehensions of the Deity, therefore others to mend the matter, have thought that he might have leisure, and perhaps an inclination, to extend his Providence to heavenly things, but not to earthly. Others yet more bountiful, will allow it to reach both to Celestial and Terrestrial things: But then it must be only to the general kinds of them, which are to be put into a natural course; not to every particular of each kind by it self, which they conceived must needs prove too great a trouble and distraction to his mind.
But ‘tis evident that all these wild conceits did proceed from a misapprehension of what kind of knowledg or wisdom does belong to the Deity, namely, infinite and absolutely perfect, not to be limited, nor capable of any difficulty to be put upon it, by the nature or number of things.
Any particular man, whom we know to be a person of Diligence and Sagacity, may without any trouble to himself undertake the management of any single business. Why, God can with far greater facility provide for all, than any single man can for one. Though we should suppose that the particulars to be taken care of, are infinite, yet so is his Wisdom likewise; and there is the same proportion of infinite to infinite, as of one to one. And that this Attribute doth belong to the natural notion of God, may be made evident,
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By the more general consent of the wise and learned Heathen Writers (notwithstanding the dissent of some amongst them). Aristotle himself, or whoever else was the Author of that Book de Mundo, (Cap. 6) amongst other Testimonies he gives of the Divine Providence, hath this for one, That as a Governour is to a Ship, as a Law to a City, as a General in an Army, so is God in the world; but with this difference, that they perform their business not without labour, care and difficulty; whereas the Divine Providence doth dispose of all and every particular thing, without the least kind of trouble. Tully doth acknowledg that the Providence of God doth extend not only, universo generi hominum, sed2 etiam singulis, to mankind in general, but likewise to every particular person. And in another place, Deorum providentiâ3 mundus administratur, iidemque consulunt rebus humanis, neque solum universis, sed etiam singulis. The whole world is governed by Divine Providence, and not only human affairs in general, but likewise every particular business. Seneca speaking of4 such as denied particular Providence, hath this remarkable passage, Sunt qui putant, &c. There are some who think so well of their own minds, that they are able to take care of their own business, and to provide for other mens affairs likewise; And yet are so absurd as to question, whether this great Universe, whereof they themselves are but a very inconsiderable part, be managed by any kind of Wisdom or counsel, and not left wholly to Chance. Hierocles doth acknowledg, that the Providence of5 God doth extend to contingencies. And to say no more by way of Testimony, this may sufficiently appear, by the general practice of swearing by Him, and praying to Him, which doth sufficiently evince their belief of his particular Providence.
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By Reason. The denial of this Attribute will evacuate several others, namely, his Goodness, Justice, Dominion, which must all signifie nothing without Providence in the application of them. And withall, the denial of this, doth take away the ground of Worship. The belief of a particular Providence, being necessary unto that adoration which we owe to the Divine nature. The Greatness and the Excellency of the Deity in it self, abstracted from any concernment of our own, will have but a very flat and jejune operation upon our hearts. Do we not find by experience, that men have but little regard to the great Mogul, The Cham of Tartary, The Emperors6 of China and Persia, and such other Potentates of remote Countreys? who though they are Princes of great power and magnificence, able to bring many hundred thousands of fighting-men into the field; yet they having nothing to do with us, nor we with them, we have therefore but a small regard for them. Whereas the next ordinary Gentleman, who is but Lord of a Mannour, or Justice of Peace, with whom we are concerned to deal, and who hath any power of punishing or rewarding, of doing us either a kindness or a discourtesie, we use to be accordingly affected in our esteem and veneration towards him. And thus must it be likewise for our adoration of the Divine nature, which will be either more or less, according as we conceive our selves more or less concerned in his Providence towards us.
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