Besides those incommunicable Attributes already insisted upon, there are others styled communicable, because they are in some lower degree, and by way of participation, communicated to other inferior Beings. And concerning these, there is a necessity that we should make an estimate of them, by such rules and measures as our natures are capable of. And because the chief perfections that we can apprehend in any reasonable Essence, must refer to one of these three things, the Understanding, the Will, the Faculties of working; for this reason, these Divine perfections may be reduced to these three heads. And whatever is the most excellent of rational Beings, must excel in each of these, (i. e.), There is no kind or degree of perfection that our imaginations are able to conceive, but these excellencies of the Divine nature, must run out still beyond it, so as not to be determined by any real or imaginary bounds.
I purpose to treat particularly concerning each of them, beginning with those perfections that belong to the Divine Understanding, namely, his Knowledg, Wisdom, and particular Providence.
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By the Knowledg of God, I mean that perfection or faculty whereby he understands and considers things absolutely and as they are in their own natures, their powers, properties, differences, together with all the circumstances belonging to them. And ‘tis necessary to the notion of God, that this should be ascribed to him, in the utmost perfection of it, infinitely beyond what the most knowing and the most learned men can pretend unto.
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His Knowledg is most deep and intimate, reaching to the very essence of things, ours but slight and superficial.
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His is clear and distinct, ours but confused and dark.
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His infallible, ours doubtful and liable to mistakes.
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His easie, and without labour and difficulty, always present and actual; ours gotten by sore travail, and easily lost again by the defects of memory or age.
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His universal, extending to all objects; ours short and narrow, reaching only to some few things, That which is wanting (Eccl. 1: 15) cannot be numbred.
He hath a perfect comprehension of all things, that have been, that are, or shall be, according to all the various relations, dependencies, circumstances, belonging to each of them. So that this Attribute of his must be infinite and unbounded, both extensivè, with respect to the several kinds of objects which it comprehends; and likewise intensivè, as it sees every single object with a most perfect infallible view. He doth not only understand all particulars; but he knows every particular so exactly, as if he were wholly taken up and intent in his thoughts upon that alone. There is a vast difference betwixt the wisest of men, and such as are grosly ignorant and sottish; and much greater betwixt men and other creatures, the little Insects, Ants and Worms, which are no ways fit to pass a judgment concerning humane counsels and designs. And yet these things hold some proportion to one another, being both finite; whereas betwixt Gods knowledg and mans, the distance is infinite.
And that this Attribute doth belong to the natural notion of God, may appear,
- From the acknowledgment of the Heathen. Tully mentions it as an usual saying of Thales, Deos omnia cernere, God beholds all things. So Seneca, Nihil Deo clausum, interest animis nostris, & mediis cogitationibus intervenit. Nothing is hid from God, he is intimate to our minds, and mingles himself with our very thoughts.
Besides, that general practice amongst them of swearing by him, and attesting him in their most solemn compacts, doth sufficiently imply their belief of his Omniscience.
- From natural reason. Nothing can be more manifest, than that knowledg is a perfection, and therefore ought to be ascribed to that Being which is supposed to have all possible perfection. ‘Tis a perfection that we know to be in some of the Creatures, and therefore must be much more in the Creator himself. He that made the eye, shall be not see? He that gives to men understanding, shall not be know?
Besides, that the denial of this perfection, would necessarily infer many other imperfections in the Divine nature. It would destroy his Wisdom, Providence, Dominion. Where there is no knowledg, there can be no forecast or provision for the future, nor any kind of regular government. In brief, the denial of this Attribute must take away his Goodness, Veracity, Justice. That Being cannot properly be said to be good, which doth act either out of ignorance or blind necessity.