Footnotes

1. 1 Pet. i. 15; 1 Thess. iv. 7. The opposite condition is abnormal (2 Cor. vi. 1). ↩

2. Phil. ii. 12, 13; Heb. xiii. 20, 21. ↩

3. 1 Pet. i. 2; 1 John iii. 24; iv. 13; Heb. vi. 4; x. 29; 1 Thess. iv. 7, 8; Gal. v. 5, 6, 22-25; 1 Cor. iii. 16, 17; Rom. viii. 4, 13. ↩

4. 1 Cor. ii. 10-12; Gal. iv. 6; Rom. viii. 15, 16… . Melanchthon, Loci theol. (1535. Corp. Ref. XXI. pp. 366, 367). “Scriptura … vult nos spiritus sancti divinitatem in ipsa consolatione et vivificatione cognoscere. Haec officia spiritus sancti prodest considerare. In hac invocatione filii, in his exercitiis fidei melius cognoscemus trinitatem, quam in otiosis speculationibus, quae disputant, quid personae inter se agant, non quid nobiscum agant.” ↩

5. 1 Pet. i. 3, 22, 23; Jas. i. 18; Gal. vi. 15; Eph. ii. 10; Rom. vi. 4-6; xii. 2; Col. iii. 9-11; Eph. iv. 22-24. The usual expression, the new birth, for the ideal beginning of the Christian life, corresponds to none of the expres- sions used in these passages. It is necessary to be on one’s guard against wishing to make certain of this foundation of one’s own Christian life by direct experience or at a definite time. Objectively, the new birth or new begetting by God, or admission into the relation of sonship with God, coincides with justification (§ 37), as well as with the bestowal of the Holy Spirit. This again is the same as admission into the community. Thus for the one who attains to the independence of his Christian life through the innumerable means of education belonging to the Christian community, it is quite impossible as well as unnecessary to mark the beginning of this result. What individuals regard as the beginning is at the best to be considered only as a step in their Christian development. ↩

6. Rom. v. 1-4; viii. 31-39; xiv. 17, 18; Jas. i. 2-4, 9, 25; 1 Pet. i. 3-9; Phil. iv. 4. ↩

7. Jas. i. 4; iii. 2; 1 Cor. ii. 6; Phil. iii. 15; Col. i. 28; iv. 12; Rcm. xii. 2; Heb. v. 14; vi. 1; 1 John iv. 18; Matt. v. 48. ↩

8. 1 John i. 8. ↩

9. Not individual good works, but a complete consistent life-work, is the duty set forth in the chief writings of the apostles (Jas. i. 4; 1 Pet. i. 17; Heb. vi. 10; 1 Thess. v. 13; Gal. vi. 4; 1 Cor. iii. 13-15). Good works are to be considered only as the manifestation of a consistent state of life (Jas. iii. 13; 2 Cor. ix. 8; Col. i. 10). ↩

10. In James under the name of σωφία (i. 5; iii. 17), in Paul and elsewhere under the name of ἁγιασμός (1 Thess. iv. 3-7; 1 Cor. i. 30; Rom. vi. 19, 22; Heb. xii. 14; 1 John iii. 3). ↩

11. This is clear in the case of Paul, who grounds his expectation of the completion of his salvation upon that which he accomplishes in his calling (1 Thess. ii. 19; Phil. ii. 16; 2 Tim. iv. 5-8; 1 Cor. iii. 5-9). Compare § 57. ↩

12. Jas. iv. 8-10; 1 Pet. ii. 11, 12; Rom, viii. 13; xiii. 12-14; Col. iii. 5-10, ↩

13. The exercise of righteousness serves to sanctification (Rom. vi. 19, 22; compare Heb. xii. 14), i.e., to the attainment of a godly character. ↩

14. Rom. vi. 11. It is analogous to this that the perfect no longer look upon that part of their course which is behind, but on that which is before (Phil. iii. 12-15). ↩

15. 1 John i. 8. ↩

16. Mark i. 15; 2 Cor. vii. 9, 10… . Luther’s First Thesis of Oct. 31, 1517: “In that our Mediator and Lord Jesus Christ says, ‘Repent,’ He means that the whole life of His believers shall be a constant and ceaseless repentance.” ↩

17. The example of Christ is, it is true, only appealed to in the New Testament in particular respects, as love (Eph. v. 2), devotion to the public good (1 Cor. x. 33; xi. 1; Phil. ii. 2-5), patience in suffering (1 Pet. ii. 21). ↩

18. Conf. Aug. II. 6: “Perfectio christiana est 1. serio timere deum, et rursus concipere magnam fidem et confidere propter Christum, quod habeamus deum placatum, 2. petere a deo, 3. et certo expectare auxilium in omnibus rebus gerendis juxta vocationem, 4. interim foris diligenter facere bona opera et servire vocationi. In his rebus est vera perfectio et verus cultus dei, non est in coelibatu aut mendicitate aut veste sordida” (contrast to the Catholic conception of Christian perfection as attained only in monasticism). This contrasted conception of perfection corresponds to the conception of sin in Conf. Aug. I. 2 (§ 27, 3). ↩

19. Mark viii. 35-37: “Whosoever shall lose his life for My sake and the gospel’s, the same shall save it. For what shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own life? Or what shall a man give in ex- change for his life?” The valuing of life as of an incomparable good, superior for us therefore to the value of the whole world, is here presupposed as a universal conviction. At the same time, a truth is also presupposed which is in direct opposition to this conviction, namely, that the loss of life, which awaits every man, proves the insignificance of life in the presence of the regular order of the world. But if one assures his life through union with Christ, even though it be by losing it according to the order of the world, then, on this special condition, the correctness of the claim felt by every human being to a value surpassing that of the world, is established, and any experience of an opposite nature is rendered invalid. ↩

20. 1 Cor. iii. 21, 22. ↩

21. Conf. Aug. I. 20: “Qui scit se per Christum habere propitium deum, scit se ei curae esse.” Justification by faith in Christ has for its object and its test reverence toward God and trust in His help in all times of need. Compare Apol. Conf. Aug. II. 8, 18, 34, 35, 45. This reciprocal relation between a special trust in Providence and the certainty of reconciliation with God is not rendered less valid by the fact that Seneca also says (De Providentia 2): “Vir fortis est omnibus externis poten- tior, nec hoc dico: non sentit illa, sed vincit… . Omnia adversa exercitationes putat… . Patrium deus habet adversus bonos viros animum.” For, first, these sentences do not signify that trust in God’s providence belongs to all human beings, and is thus a datum of so-called natural or rational religion. Instead, it is a special mark of the Stoic philosophers and not common to paganism as a whole, since this natural religion can attain to this idea neither in its polytheistic form, nor does attain to it in tragic poetry, nor in the course of philosophy as a whole. But these sentences of Seneca’s are also not at all like the Christian expressions which they resemble, because they stand in connection with all the hardness of the Stoic sense of self and consciousness of power: “Digni visi sumus deo, in quibus experiretur, quantum natura humana posset pati… . Praebendi fortunae sumus, ut contra ipsam ab ipsa duremur; paulatim nos sibi pares faciat” (cap. 4), and therefore are interwoven with positively irreligious expressions: “Ego non miror, si aliquando impetum capiant dii spectandi magnos viros colluctantes cum aliqua calamitate… . Non video, quid habeat in terris Jupiter pulchrius, quam ut spectet Catonem, jam partibus non semel fractis, stantem nihilo minus inter ruinas publicas rectum… . Ferte fortiter, hoc est quo deum antecedatis. Ille extra patientiam malorum est, vos supra patientiam” (cap. 2, 6). Particularly is there nothing more in contrast to a Christian trust in Providence, than the admiration for Cato’s suicide, which Seneca not only expresses for himself but even ascribes to his gods: “Non fuit diis immortalibus satis, spectare Catonem semel: retenta ac revocata virtus est, ut in difficiliori parte se ostenderet. Non enim tam magno animo mors initur, quam repetitur. Quidni libenter spectarent alumnum suum, tam claro ac memorabili exitu evadentem” (cap. 2, 6)? According to the Christian standard, suicide is only conceivable as a result of an utter lack of faith in the providence of God. ↩

22. Rom. xi. 33-36. Compare § 18, 8. ↩

23. This knowledge breaks through occasionally even in the Old Testament (Jer. xxx. 11; Prov. iii. 11, 12; Ps. cxviii. 18). It follows in Christianity from the necessary explanation of the sufferings of Christ the Righteous One (Mark viii. 34, 35; Jas. i. 2, 3; 1 Pet. i. 6, 7; Heb. xii. 4-11; Rom. v. 3, 4; viii. 28). ↩

24. 1 Thess. v. 16-18. Thankfulness to God is in general the motive to joy, which is expected to be the pervading tone of the Christian life. Compare also Rom. xiv. 17; xv. 13; Phil. iv. 4. ↩

25. Humility is most clearly expressed in the “fear of God” (1 Pet. i. 17; iii. 2; Phil. ii. 12; Rom. xi. 20, 21; 2 Cor. v. 11; vii. 1), which is the “beginning of wisdom” (Prov. ix. 10), i.e., godly righteousness. ↩

26. “Humility is like an eye, which sees everything else, but not itself; real humility does not know that it exists” (Scriver). Here the line is drawn against the self-conscious pride of virtue in Stoicism, and the self-conscious pride of religion in all kinds of Phariseeism. The healthy emotional life, expressive of constant harmony with one’s self or with the world and with God, moves along but dimly perceived. Thus religious experiences of conscious and hence heightened happiness can never be frequent, and are of doubtful value, since their discontinuance is usually experienced with dissatisfaction. We must judge in accordance with this the cases of conscious religious happiness, and the universal desire for religious enjoyment. ↩

27. Humility will, it is true, always be accompanied by modesty toward others (both meanings meet in ταπεινός, Phil. ii. 8; Matt. xxiii. 12; Col. iii. 12; Eph. iv. 2; Phil. ii. 3; 1 Pet. v. 5), but also, on occasion, by anger and zeal against the wicked (Mark iii. 5). ↩

28. Such a case is judged as “false humility” in Col. ii. 20-23. The ceremonial-legal exhibition of humility, as of a special devotion to God, Jesus judges in the Pharisees as hypocrisy (Matt. xxiii. ὑποκριτής = actor). The zeal which seeks to impose upon others such or similar ceremonial-legal forms of humility, or to put them into effect by force, is fanaticism. ↩

29. Jas. i. 3; v. 10, 11; 2 Cor. vi. 4; Rom. v. 3; xii. 12… . Calvin’s Institutes, III. 8, 8: “Neque ea requiritur a nobis hilaritas, quae omnem acerbitatis dolorisque sensum tollat; alioqui nulla in cruce esset sanctorum patientia, nisi et dolore torquerentur et angerentur molestia.” ↩

30. Petrus Martyr Vermilius: “Hoc est ingenium filiorum dei, ut quam frequentissime orationibus vacent: nam illud est dei providentiam agnoscere.” ↩

31. Matt. vii. 7-11. ↩

32. Mark xiv. 36; 1 John v. 14. ↩

33. 1 John iii. 21, 22. ↩

34. 1 John v. 15. That is, the certainty of God’s care in general is not disturbed by the fact that many petitions for individual blessings are not directly answered, but rather it furnishes a compensation for the fact that certain petitions are not answered with exact literalness. ↩

35. This is the error of the Catholic view that monasticism fulfils real Christian virtue or the ideal of the supramundane angelic existence just because it is outside of the natural forms of morality. But the giving up of family, private property, complete independence and personal dignity (in obedience to superiors), does not in itself assure a more positive and rich development of the moral nature, but rather threatens it. For these blessings are absolutely essential conditions of moral health and of the formation of character. Pietistic inclination approaches in this matter the error of the Catholic system. ↩

36. 1 Cor. vii. 20-24. If here even the condition of slavery is viewed in the light of an ethical calling and so made morally endurable (1 Pet. ii. 18, 19), this is certainly true of all kinds of free labor. As to labor, 1 Thess. iv. 11; 2 Thess. iii. 10-12; as to public spirit, Phil. ii. 2-4; Rom. xii. 3-5. Compare Apol. Conf. Aug. III. 68-72.—The demand of Christ in Mark x. 21 has reference to the condition on which the calling of the disciples was to be exercised at that time, but does not prescribe monasticism for all times. ↩

37. Apol. Conf. Aug. XIII. 48-50. (As to the conversation of Christ with the rich young man, Matt. xix. 21): “Perfectio est in hoc, quod addit Christus: sequere me. Exemplum obedientiae in vocatione propositum est… . Vocationes sunt personales, sed exemplum obedientiae est generale. Perfectio erat futura illi juveni, si huic vocationi credidisset et obedivisset; ita perfectio nobis est, obedire unumquemque vera fide suae vocationi.” ↩

38. The ethical blessings of family, station, patriotism, can be perverted into foolish pride of family, pride of station, national vanity. ↩

39. Luther, “To the German Nobility”: “Just as those whom we call the clergy [die Geistlichen] are distinguished from other Christians only by the fact that they are to administer the word of God and the sacraments,—this is their work and office, in the same way secular officials hold the sword to punish the wicked and to protect the good. A shoemaker, a smith, a peasant, each one has the work and office of his own craft, and yet they are all at the same time consecrated priests and bishops, i.e., spiritual persons [geistliche Personen], and each one ought in his office or his work to be useful and serviceable.” “De votis monasticis”: “Melior et perfectior est obedientia filii, conjugis, servi, captivi, quam monachi obedientia. Igitur si ab imperfecto ad perfectum eundum est, ab obedientia monachi ad obedientiam parentum, dominorum, mariti, tyrannorum, adversariorum et omnium eundum est.” ↩

40. Mark x. 6-8; Gen. ii. 24. Apol. Conf. Aug. XI. 11-13: “Conjunctio maris et feminae est juris naturalis. Porro jus naturale est jus vere divinum, quia est ordinatio divinitus impressa naturae.” Therefore the positive institution of the legal marriage contract falls under the control of the state. Christian marriage is legal marriage between Christians, and does not, therefore, first derive its Christian character through consecration by the Church. ↩

41. Mark x. 9-12; xii. 25; 1 Pet. iii. 7. Exceptions to the indissolubility of marriage appear early, Matt. xix. 9; v. 32; 1 Cor. vii. 15. ↩

42. Eph. v. 25-29. ↩

43. Col. iii. 18, 19; Eph. v. 33; 1 Pet. iii. 1. ↩

44. 1 Cor. vii. 14. ↩

45. Col. iii. 20; Eph. vi. 1-3. ↩

46. The view, therefore, of the Middle Ages, and shared even by Luther, that we could get along without legal ordinances were it not for sin, because then every one would act from love, is false. This view does not take into account the necessary organization and gradation of the ethical principles for the different spheres of life, whereby we are spared a waste of energy. The use of legal enactment thus makes active life an easier matter than would be possible if at every step it were necessary to consider the highest possible standards and their application to ordinary civic duties. ↩

47. Mark xii. 17. ↩

48. 1 Pet. ii. 13-17; Rom. xiii. 1-7. ↩

49. Society, when unorganized into a state, whether in a revolutionary or nomadic condition, is an absolute hindrance to the Christian task of the kingdom of God. Even the Israelites were obliged to abandon the nomadic life in order to perform the duties of their religion, whose fundamental promise was that they should acquire a permanent dwelling-place (Gen. xii. 1-3). ↩

50. Conf. Aug. I. 16: “Necessario debent Christiani obedire magistratibus suis et legibus, nisi cum jubent peccare; tunc enim magis debent obedire deo quam hominibus” (Acts v. 29). This limitation of the duty of obedience to the state deals with a very distant possibility. The expression of Peter referred to asserts rather the duty of Christian confession in direct opposition to unjustifiable limitations proceeding from a churchly authority. ↩

51. Paul clearly recognized this (Rom. xii. 2; Phil. i. 9-11; compare Rom. ii. 18). This proving of what is different, the good and the bad, denotes the finding out of duty, i.e., of what it is necessary to do in a particular case. Col. i. 9, 10, refers further to the reciprocal relation, that by wisdom we recognize what God’s will is as to a special course of action, while by the performance of the recognized duties the ability to recognize duty is increased. ↩

52. This table of virtues is complete. All others so referred to are either synonyms (as faithfulness with conscientiousness or kindliness), or are subspecies of self-control (chastity, frugality, moderation), or are the principles of duty which correspond to the virtue of kindliness (modesty, uprightness, readiness to serve, etc.). This may be seen in the fact that kindliness is to be present always, while these special activities cannot be exercised in all cases, but must be suspended in intercourse with certain persons. ↩

53. The exalted importance of conscientiousness (Luke xvi. 10; 1 Cor. iv. 2) appears in the fact that it serves as an abbreviated standard of right for the actions of one’s regular calling. It does not, it is true, serve to determine the necessary manner of conduct outside of the regular calling. It is, however, often enough applied as a rule in this realm, through a belief in the authority of conscience as a trustworthy and final standard for all ethical conduct. But the correctness of such a belief is confuted by the fact that there exists also an erring or weak conscience (1 Cor. viii. 7-12; x. 28-31; Rom. xiv. 1-4), which is to be respected in the person of its possessor, but which is also to be recognized as a tribunal needing correction by higher standards. Still less can the conscientiousness of individuals determined for themselves by false judgment be accepted as a general law for others. When one, for instance, not only erroneously makes ascetic rules a part of his own Christian calling, but also wishes to judge others by his own conscientiousness so determined, his conscience is spotted or seared (Tit. i. 15; 1 Tim. iv. 2, 3), because he must have suppressed his doubt as to the rightfulness of his proceeding. Compare § 52, 4. ↩

54. Wisdom: 1 Cor. iii. 10; vi. 5; Luke xxi. 15; Matt. xxiv. 45; xxv. 2; discretion, soberness, 1 Pet. i. 13; v. 8; 1 Thess. v. 6-8; determination, Rom. xiv. 22, 23; Col. iv. 5; Eph. v. 15, 16; constancy, Luke viii. 15; Heb. x. 36; xii. 1; Rev. ii. 2; Rom. ii. 7. ↩

55. Matt. 10. 16; Luke xvi. 8. ↩

56. 1 Cor. xiii. 4, 5; Gal. v. 22; Col. iii. 12; Eph. iv. 32; Phil. iv. 5. ↩

57. The moral peculiarity of individuals depends upon the different degrees in which the several groups of virtues are developed, and the various combinations thus arising. At the same time it is also conditioned upon the nature of one’s calling, the grade of intelligence and the kind and grade of artistic activity which belongs to each one and which affects his moral self-expression. ↩

58. This principle decides against Jesuitic morality, which, because the moral law does not extend to definite actions, treats the conception of obligation itself as indefinite, and accordingly withdraws the individual possible actions from any definite determination and teaches that they are to be decided according to the authority or assurance of the individual in accordance with the precept that “ the end justifies the means.” ↩

59. This appears clearly in Christ’s Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v.-vii.), the particular precepts of which are sometimes applicable only by analogy, and sometimes have reference to intercourse with brethren, i.e., with men of like moral disposition, and thus they always take for granted the free judgment of the circumstances which cannot be enumerated in the rule. ↩

60. Jas. i. 25. ↩

61. Because the duty of one’s calling is the regular and ordinary form of the duty of love, its fulfilment is rightfully recognized as a part of Christian perfection (§ 50, 2). For the determination of the duties belonging to one’s calling, the virtue of conscientiousness which corresponds to the calling is, in the formula of the authoritative conscience, the ordinarily sufficient subjective standard. Hence conscientiousness seems to extend also to the judgment as to whether one is called to the performance of certain extraordinary duties. Yet this is the very realm where the erring conscience (§ 66, 1) has full play, when one forgets that his own calling has its limitations, and that many actions are really less analogous to it than one easily imagines. ↩

62. Calvin’s Institutes, III. 10. 2: “Jam si reputemus, quem in finem deus alimenta creaverit, reperiemus non necessitati modo, sed oblectamento quoque ac hilaritati eum voluisse consulere… . Annon res multas citra necessarium usum commendabiles nobis reddidit?” ↩

63. This is the underlying principle of the second table of the commandments (§ 6, 4). ↩

64. The right conception of modesty must always be distinguished from such a false ascetic conception as that of Thomas à Kempis (De Imitatione Christi, I. 7). “Si aliquid boni habueris, crede de aliis meliora, ut humilitatem conserves. Non nocet, si omnibus te supponas; nocet autem plurimum, si vel uni te praeponas.” This rule contradicts the natural impression of many experiences and involves a constant reflective self-scrutiny in comparing ourselves with others, and is so much the more unwholesome since the result sought after can often enough be reached only by ignoring the truth. For in modesty it cannot be the important thing that one regards an immature man as more mature than himself, etc., but the important thing is that one subjects himself as an individual to the value of the fellowship which is sought, by putting himself both in speech and action in relation to another. When we are forbidden to judge [richten] others (Matt. vii. 1-5), the giving up of all moral judgment [Beurteilung] of others is not demanded of us. It appears rather from a comparison with Jas. iv. 11, 12, and Rom. xiv. 4, that such judging of others is wrong as elevates itself indirectly above the law-giver or ignores the value of another in God’s sight. For thereby the value of this one for our fellowship would be denied also; but the necessity of such fellowship is established by the law of Christ and by the common dependence of all upon God. One can thus, for instance, make clear to one’s self the lower moral grade of another in accordance with the truth and yet show to him modesty, i.e., the loving regard for his personality which makes one care for his education or improvement. ↩

65. That sincerity which duty demands of us is not the same as natural frankness, though it is made more easy by frankness, and the material of individual self-communication is contained in them both. But frankness cannot come to its full expression in sincerity without a recognition of the common end which one is seeking in contact with others. This limitation of natural frankness in sincerity varies according to the character of those with whom one has to do.—The two negatives, immodesty and insincerity, denote direct and positive violations of regard for others, the latter as falsity under the guise of sincerity. Non-sincerity or reserve is to be distinguished from these as a purely negative manifestation. ↩

66. Therefore rectitude is possible apart from the disposition of love, as is the negative regard for the person and property of others (§ 73, 1). Both are included in the conception of civil justice which according to the doctrine of the Reformers is possible in the sinful state. It is, however, to be remarked that even in this conception of rectitude the standard is found not in the positive law but in the idea of justice. For this rectitude also excludes such forms of fraud as under certain circumstances are not subject to punishment by the letter of the law and the administration of justice connected with it, for instance, usury, i.e., the making use of another’s distress to one’s own profit under the form of a legal contract. ↩

67. These three principles have a common opposite in a fundamental unwillingness to please which refuses personal services, gifts and information (in disobliging taciturnity or reserve). Truthfulness has, however, a more distinct opposite in lying, or in a fundamental mendacity. Not every untrue statement is a lie. In the realm of art, in jest, in the deception of children or of the sick or of enemies, an untrue statement is occasionally permissible or even desirable. But a lie is an untruth told with the purpose of injuring another or of gaining an unwarrantable advantage for one’s self, or both. Mendacity is the habitual inclination to untruthfulness, arising either from such a purpose, or from such an indifference to truth as excludes the purpose of being of service to others through truthfulness. ↩

68. Matt. v. 23, 24. ↩

69. Matt. vii. 6. ↩

70. Such an order appeared originally in Buddhism, then in Manicheeism, then was applied in the estimate of Christian monasticism, and finally appears again in Pietistic circles. In all these similar manifestations, there is prominent a religious tendency toward an abstract denial of the world, which in varying degrees is common to these religions and tendencies. At the same time it is true, that a separation of the “perfecti” from the “auditores” (as they are classified in Manicheeism) only appears when at bottom there is a strong tendency to a ceremonial-legal conception of religion. ↩

71. Mark viii. 38; ix. 1; 1 Pet. iv. 7; Jas. v. 8, 9; 1 John ii. 28; 1 Thess. iv. 15; 1 Cor. x. 11; xv. 52; Heb. x. 35-37. Compare, on the other hand, 2 Pet. iii. 4-9.—Rev. xix. 11-21; 1 Pet. iv. 5; Heb. x. 30, 31; 2 Cor. v. 10; Matt. xxv. 31-46. ↩

72. 1 Thess. iv. 16, 17. ↩

73. Conf. Aug. I. 17: “Christus apparebit in consummatione mundi ad judicandum et mortuos omnes resuscitabit; piis et electis dabit vitam aeternam et perpetua gaudia, impios autem homines et diabolos condemnabit ut sine fine crucientur.” ↩

74. Here belongs the expectation of continued existence in a body corresponding fully to the spirit (1 Cor. xv. 35-53; 2 Cor. v. 1; Phil. iii. 20, 21); further the destiny of those who are not saved, of whom it seems uncertain whether they shall suffer endless punishment or be annihilated (Mark ix. 43-48; Rev. xix. 20; Rom. ii. 9, 12; ix. 22; Phil. iii. 19; Rev. xvii. 8, 11; Matt. vii. 13). ↩