These points have been subtly stated, yet no lover of truth ought to be offended if they are assailed for the cause of seeking the truth and of training. For, if they are true, it is profitable to hear objections in order that they may be explained that the truth may thus be more clearly known. If they are false, it is expedient that they be refuted. But, that this response may not be sufficient, it can in the first place be proved thus: if position, which is a difference of quantity, indicates the order of parts in a whole and is sufficient for this, that something may be a quantum; I ask, of what kind is this order of parts in the whole; whether it is an order of parts situated so that one part is lower and another higher, one part before and another behind, one towards the East, another towards the West; or is it an order of perfection, for surely one part may be more perfect and another more imperfect; or is it an order of whole and of part, as the eye is part of the head; or is it an order of causality, and one part is the cause of another; or is it an order of origin or of nature; for surely one part prior by nature is produced and is in the nature of things prior to another. For in another mode, as it appears, it can be understood that there may be an order of parts in a whole; if however an order of parts in a whole which is occasioned through position, which is a difference of quantity.
Let it be the first order; namely, situal. It is manifest that that order can not be without local separation of parts, and so there never is any quantum unless the parts be separate in situation. Since, therefore, if the first case is posited, the parts of the body of Christ may not be separate in situation; the body of Christ will not be a quantum if that is conceded. But the order of parts in a whole, which is position which is a difference of quantity, can not be understood by other modes; for any such order could be so suitable to the substance of the body of Christ, if the whole substance of the body of Christ were separate from an entire quantity, which it is possible for God to do according to those writers, as when it is joined with a quantity. For if the whole substance of the body of Christ is preserved without this, that it be a quantum; so there would be one part of a substance more perfect than another, as it now is; for one part is not now any more a part of another, nor is one part any more the cause of another when more prior by nature than another would then be; and so it is obvious that no order of parts in a whole can be suitable to the parts of a substance when it is joined with a quantity without its being able to be suitable to them when it is not conjoined with a quantity aside from that order which is situal; and so a situal order of parts alone suffices for this, that something may be a quantum. But such an order of parts requires local separation of parts, and consequently nothing is a quantum continuous and permanent, unless it have parts separate in situation.
Again, every situate quantum is long; but no ‘long’ is without local or situal separation of parts. If, therefore, the body of Christ be a quantum when the prior case is posited, it is necessary that it be long; and consequently one part will be separate from another and one will be outside of another, and it is not true if the first case is held.
Again, every quantum is extended, but nothing is extended, unless one part be separate from another and be outside of another; for the presence of a thing in some quantum is not sufficient for extension, for then the rational soul would be a quantum since it may coexist and be present in the entire body and in each part of it. And so it is well known that, if the body of Christ were a quantum in the sacrament of the altar, if the first case is held, it would have part outside of part, since it would truly be extended and so would have position which indicates the order of parts in a place.
Again, every finite quantum continuous and permanent has form; but an order of parts in a place is required for form, if it be present in a place; nor does any other order of parts in a whole suffice for form, which is obvious from this; for it is possible for form to be changed if a local change alone of parts is made. For if all the parts of the human body were changed locally so that the hand, or so that the stomach could be placed above the head or the feet above the stomach or any such local change of parts could be made, it is manifest that the form would be changed; and yet it could not be unless another order of parts in a place or some diverse situal position is required. And so it is manifestly obvious that a situal order of parts is required for form. Whence, if parts may not be separate locally, it is manifest that form is not there. For if God could through His own omnipotence create anew the substance of wood with all its absolute accidents under the species of bread without this, that it would be elsewhere locally, which is possible for God according to those writers; I ask of what form would that wood be. For no reason can be assigned why it may be square more than triangular or round, and a foot of quantity can not be posited any more than two feet, since it may be able to be rarefied and condensed, and sometimes be of a greater quantity and sometimes of a less quantity. Nor could it be able to be posited that that wood would be rare or dense, since it would not be able to be said that the parts would lie near or not near; although however according to the opinion of the wise, that may be rare whose parts lie remote.
Again, a homogeneous body is truly a quantum and consequently truly has position which is a difference of quantity. But it is manifest that there is no order of homogeneous parts except situal. For, if a situal order of such parts is circumscribed, no part could be prior to another nor one part after another, since they may be entirely of the same ground; therefore, a situal position is not other than that, which is the order of parts in a place or which is a situal order of parts, and is required for this, that something may really be a quantum. Whence, he, who says that for this, that something may be a quantum, a certain order of parts in a whole is sufficient, which is not a situal order of parts. It is necessary, to indicate of what sort that order of parts may be; and it appears that no order could be assigned but that according to those they can be among the substantial parts, after such a quantity is circumscribed.
From the previous statements it is gathered that, if the body of Christ were precisely under the species of bread sacramentally and nowhere else locally and circumscriptively, it would not be a quantum by any quantity distinct from substance and quality. If however everything one numerically, having parts really distinct, created to be separate locally and created to be produced by a natural agent in distinct places, be called a quantum; it can be conceded that, the body of Christ would be a quantum if that case is posited.
Again, I intend to show through the principles of those previously mentioned, that material substance is quantum through its substantial parts. For according to those writers as a whole substance is prior to a whole quantity, so the parts of a substance are prior to the parts of a quantity; therefore, the parts of a substance are before the parts of a quantity. Then I ask; whether they are in that prior in the same place or in distinct places. They are not in the same place, for they are not more in one place than in another; therefore, in that prior they are in distinct places; but a substance having parts existing in distinct places will be circumscribed in a place; therefore, a substance in that prior is circumscribed in a place, and consequently is a quantum in that prior and so a substance is a quantum through itself and through its intrinsic parts.
Again, everything, which is circumscribed in a place through itself and through its intrinsic substantial parts, through that same is a quantum. But a material substance is circumscribed in a place through itself and through its intrinsic parts, which is obvious from the principles of those writers; for according to them there is not a passive circumscription of location except a certain respect. But according to those holding such an opinion, a respect is altered according to a variation of a fundament which is a terminus. Therefore, since substance and quantity may really be distinguished, ‘a passive circumscription, by which substance is circumscribed,’ and ‘a passive circumscription by which a quantity is circumscribed,’ will be distinct; and so a substance is in a place by one passive circumscription, and quantity by another. And consequently substance is fundamentally circumscribed in a place by itself and its substantial parts and is formally circumscribed in a place by a proper circumscription. But, when all the others are circumscribed, these two are sufficient for this, that something may be quantum; therefore, substance is a quantum without an absolute quantity really distinct.
Again, there is one local distance of one part of a substance from one part of a substance and there is another distance of one part of a quantity from another part of a quantity; for from this fundament and terminus are distinct fundaments of one respect and of another respect according to them. It is necessary that respects be distinguished, therefore, these distances are distinguished. But the local distance of parts constituting any whole can not be without a quantity; therefore, since the parts of a substance may be separate locally before the parts of a quantity, as they are before; the substance will be a quantum before that other quantity may be posited in being.
And so from the arguments advanced and from others which I omit by virtue of brevity, it would seem to anyone that there is not a quantity except the extraposition of parts or the local or situal distance of parts making one whole for which extraposition, whether local or situal distance of parts, parts are not required. except those which are separate, and essential intrinsic causes, if they have intrinsic causes, and extrinsic causes; say, efficient and final; and so consequently the parts of a substance making one can be separate in situation and one can be outside of another by virtue of its natural causes.
But quantity, which is an absolute thing other than substance, is neither an intrinsic nor an extrinsic cause of those parts; by virtue of which such a quantity is not required for that extraposition or situal distance of parts.
Whence, from the principles of many writers it can be argued thus: respect, fundament, and terminus suffice for real existence, and extrinsic causes; but according to these situal distance of parts or extraposition of parts of a substance beyond the parts themselves does not add a respect, which it does not have, in place of fundament and terminus, except those parts of the substance. Therefore, when the parts themselves of substance and the extrinsic causes which make them to be separate are assumed, that respect will be sufficiently posited. Therefore, if there is required for that distance of parts of a substance another quantity, which may be a thing other than a substance, that quantity either will be a fundament or a terminus of that respect; which can not be granted, as has been shown before, or it is the extrinsic cause of that respect, and consequently without it that respect can be posited. Since whatever God can do by a mediating and extrinsic secondary cause, God can accomplish immediately per se; therefore, without any such distinct quantity that extraposition or situal distance of substantial parts can be posited. But when the extraposition or local or situal separation of parts is posited, it is considered quantity; for it is considered some whole having part outside of part. Therefore, without such a quantity there might be able to be a quantity; and so a quantity other than a substance and a quality seems to be entirely superfluous.
And many of the preceding arguments, through which it was proved that substance can be a quantum without a quantity other than substance, can be employed to prove that quantity can be a quantum without another quantity; the discussion of which I pass over for the sake of brevity.
Yet from the previous arguments it can be deduced that there is no necessity for positing a quantity other than substance and quality; because for this, that substance as well as quality may be a quantum, it suffices that substance and qualities be produced by virtue of essential causes, and that parts of these are produced in distinct places by virtue of the same causes without the production of any other, or that one part may take on being outside of another. For another thing does not seem to be required for this, that one part of a substance or of a quality may take on being outside of another, unless it be an intrinsic or extrinsic cause of it. But such a quantity can not be posited as an intrinsic or extrinsic cause of substance or of quality; and so for this, that one part may be brought into being outside of another, such a quantity is not required; therefore, it is needlessly posited.
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