Therefore, it is obvious from the premises that this name ‘quantity’ connotes something, or permits one to understand that which is not denoted or permitted to be perceived through this name ‘substance’; for this name ‘quantity’ permits one to understand that that, of which it is predicated, may be ‘having part separate from part’; but this name ‘substance’ does not connote either in a proposition or outside a proposition that that, of which it is verified, may be ‘having part separate from part.’ And, indeed, no matter how much this may in a mode be true, ‘substance is quantity’; yet it might be able to be false, even though a substance remains; as this is in a mode true, ‘the substance of the bread is a substance having part separate from part’; and yet, though a substance remains, this could be false. Just as some say that this name ‘likeness’ connotes that two qualities of the same ground exist at the same time in the nature of things; but this name ‘whiteness’ does not connote that two qualities exist at the same time in the nature of things, and yet many Catholics say that ‘whiteness’ and some ‘likeness’ are one thing and are not things really distinct; although this may be able to be true, ‘whiteness is,’ while this appears false, ‘likeness is.’ And, indeed, although they might concede that this could be true, ‘whiteness’ and ‘likeness,’ are said to be two whitenesses existing in the nature of things; yet this might be able to be false, while whiteness remains, ‘whiteness (is whiteness,’ ‘white) is likeness’; for it would imply a fallacy, namely, ‘two whitenesses are really outside of the mind.’

Therefore, it is obvious from the previous statements that, although some quantity may not be a thing really distinct from the substance of the bread; yet this could be true, ‘the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ,’ though this appears false, ‘a quantity is converted into the body of Christ’; and this by virtue of a diverse mode of signifying or of consignifying of those two names ‘substance’ and ‘quantity.’

Through this it is obvious that, although it may not be found expressed in the canon of the Bible, nor in the canonical law, nor in the writings of the Saints approved by the Roman Church, that the substance of the bread is not converted into the quantity of the body of Christ; for they do not make mention of this; yet in virtue of the diverse mode of signifying or consignifying of these names ‘substance’ and ‘quantity,’ this might be able to be verified, ‘the substance of the bread is converted into the substance of the body of Christ’; although this would be false, ‘the substance of the bread is converted into the quantity of the body of Christ,’ as by virtue of the diverse mode of signifying these names ‘substance’ and ‘quantity,’ this would be able to be false, ‘substance is quantity,’ although substance and some quantity would not be things really distinct.

And that this may not even be contrary to the faith of the church is obvious in a similar case; for many Catholic doctors say that ‘relation’ is not a thing really distinct from its ‘fundament.’ For I do not think that anyone of sane mind, unless he, who alone would wish to be called a rabbi, wishes to say that all, who hold that relation is not a thing distinct from its fundament, are heretics. It is, therefore, not heretical to say that relation is a thing distinct from its fundament. It is, therefore, never heretical to say that the substance of the bread is converted into a relation, even to say that this is true, ‘the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ,’ and this is false, ‘the substance of the bread is not converted into a relation’; notwithstanding that some relation, say, relation of dependence itself upon God is not a thing other than the body of Christ.

And so it is manifestly obvious that the whole truth concerning the sacrament of the Eucharist can so easily be saved; although it may be conceded that some quantity is not a thing really distinct from substance, as I concede that some relation is not really distinct from substance, which many Catholics concede. For it is no more to be found in sacred scripture that a quantity is not converted into the body of Christ or that a substance is not converted into the quantity of the body of Christ, than that a relation is not converted into the body of Christ or that the substance of the bread is not converted into a relation. And, indeed, as it can be posited according to the Catholic faith that some relation is not a thing really distinct from the substance of the bread, and some relation is not a thing really distinct from the substance of the body of Christ; and then it is necessary to concede that some relation or some respect is converted into the body of Christ, and the substance of the bread is converted into relation as ‘next,’ or it is necessary to assign some mode of signifying or of consignifying the diversity of those names ‘substance’ and ‘relation’ by virtue of which some thing can truly be attributed to one and truly denied of another; and similarly one of them can truly be attributed to one, and the other truly denied of the same. So a Catholic can posit that some quantity is not a thing really distinct from substance; and then either it is necessary to concede as if not opposed to the faith, that ‘a quantity is converted into the body of Christ’ and ‘the substance of the bread is converted into the quantity of the body of Christ,’ or to assign some diverse mode of signifying those names, ‘substance’ and ‘quantity’; by virtue of which one can be conceded, another can not be conceded; no matter how much some quantity may not be a thing other than a substance, which it is easy to do, as was shown elsewhere.

Nor is this more difficult to do than to show how some quantity may not be a thing distinct from substance; and yet that this may be false, ‘quantity is substance’; but because this pertains more to logic than to theology, I, therefore, pass on.

With reference to that which is introduced under the last head in the second argument, it must be said that this does not follow; namely, that, if some quantity of the body of Christ could begin to be in the sacrament of the altar by virtue of the sacrament, then by virtue of the sacrament the body of Christ could be a quantum both locally and circumscriptively in a place in the sacrament of the altar. For as it is not established according to some writers that ‘the quantity of the body of Christ’ or ‘the body of Christ existing in a place locally is in the sacrament of the altar’; therefore, the body of Christ there is a quantum and is locally in a place. So it does not follow that ‘the quantity of the body of Christ begins to be in the sacrament of the altar by virtue of the sacrament’; therefore, by virtue of the sacrament it begins to be there locally. Whence, whether this be conceded or not, ‘the quantity of the body of Christ begins to be under the species of bread by the power of conversion’; yet this I simply deny, ‘the body of Christ is a quantum under the species of bread by the power of conversion.’ And, indeed, I make this assertion, that the body of Christ is a quantity or a quantum neither by the power of conversion nor by the power of the sacrament; as notwithstanding that this may be true, ‘the body of Christ having part separate from part,’ say, in heaven, is there under the species of bread by the power of conversion; yet this is simply false, ‘the body of Christ by the power of conversion has part separate from part under the species of bread.’ Whence, he who would desire to concede that this would need to be conceded by virtue of language, ‘some quantity is substance,’ could easily reply to all the arguments about this matter by conceding or denying the propositions and by positing the consequences in place of this name ‘quantitas,’ this whole, ‘a thing having part separate from part’; since they would then have to say that these two, ‘quantity continuous and permanent’ and ‘a thing having part separate from part,’ would be convertibles; in fact, one would be a definition expressing something of another name, if there could be some name convertible with this, ‘quantity continuous and permanent.’ And, therefore, in replying to whatever proposition or consequence in which this name ‘quantity’ would be posited, it would be necessary to posit in place of this name this whole ‘a thing having part separate from part’; and it could be easily seen, if the proposition or consequence were to be conceded or denied; and then this propositioin would necessarily be conceded, ‘a quantity is converted into the body of Christ,’ as this, ‘a thing having part separate from part is converted into the body of Christ.’ Similarly, this would necessarily be conceded, ‘the substance of the bread is converted into a quantity,’ as this must be conceded, ‘the substance of the bread is converted into a thing having part separate from part’; although this thing may not have part separate from part in the species of bread; for it is not there locally and circumscriptively in a place, but is elsewhere.

And I certainly confess that I have never read either in the canonical law or in the original sources of the Saints or in decrees of any High Pontiff or in any general council or in any authorized writing, such a proposition, ‘quantity is not converted into the body of Christ,’ ‘the substance of the bread is not converted into quantity,’ or any similar proposition; although I seem to posit an opinion contrary to many modern Doctors who mutually condemn one another, and, indeed, their writings are not authoritative; on the contrary, many opinions of some have even been condemned in the established universities; for they have presumed to approve such propositions. However, this is in every mode false, ‘the bread is converted into the body of Christ, which is a quantity under the species of bread.’

And if you say; if they concede such propositions, they have not done this unless influenced by sacred scripture or at least by some authentic scripture; I reply that they have said many things for which they did not have either sacred scripture or any authentic scripture. I ask from what authentic scripture have they the statement that the accidents in the sacrament of the altar do not subsist per se without a subject, and that all qualities are in a subject. I ask from what authentic scripture have they the statement that in the sacrament of the altar there is some subject of ponderosity, which is ponderous. Also from what scripture have they the statement that God can not make several angels in the same species, that God can not make a man or an ass without an absolute accident inhering in it, that a quality can not be without a subject, that there are not many substantial forms in man, that the will can will nothing contrary to the judgment of reason; and many such statements, which disagree with authentic statements and reason.

Whence, I ask, are the modern writers inspired, or what authentic scripture do they have per se for positing that there is some thing of which God can not be the cause, that there is some thing which God can not destroy through His omnipotence, that a dead man is a man, and innumerable statements which are manifestly not in accord with the authentic scriptures.

So then it is easy to see that it is not contrary to the Christian faith to posit that some quantity is not a thing really distinct from substance by virtue of this, that a quantity is then converted into the body of Christ, and the substance of the bread is converted into a quantity; so however that it may be converted into a substance which may be a quantity there.

Nor does it contradict the statement which is afterward adduced, that a quantity would not then remain in the sacrament of the altar; for, although some quantity may pass over, say, that quantity which was not a thing distinct from the substance of the bread; yet one other remains, namely, that which is not really distinct from quality.

Nor does it seem more in conflict with the statements of the Holy Fathers that one quantity, which is not a thing other than a substance, may pass over; and another, which is not a thing other than a quality, may remain, than that one relation or respect, which is not really a thing other than a substance, may pass over; and another relation or another respect, which is not really a thing other than a substance, may pass over; and another thing or another respect, which is not really a thing other than a quality, may remain. But in what way two quantities can be at the same time will be shown later.

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