Contrary to the previous opinion, certain reasons are adduced which, as I have understood them, I now wish to review and refute; others I intend to review and answer more clearly and more fully if they become more fully known to me. But as yet certain writers argue thus: if some substance and some quantity are really the same; then, wherever that substance is, there that quantity will be. Therefore, since the substance of the body of Christ may be in the sacrament of the altar, it follows that the quantity of the body of Christ will be in the sacrament of the altar. Whence, it is thus argued, as I have understood: whenever some are really the same, wherever one of them is, the remainder will be in the same place. But according to the previous opinion the substance of the body of Christ and the quantity of the body of Christ are really the same; therefore, where one is, the rest is; and consequently, as the substance of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar, so the quantity of the body of Christ would be in the sacrament of the altar.
Again, it is argued thus: whenever some are really the same; wherever any one of them is, the remainder of them is in the same place; but the substance of the body of Christ and the quantity of the body of Christ are really the same according to the previous opinions. But the substance of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar; and, therefore, a quantity is a quantum there by the power of conversion, et ultra; therefore, the substance of the body of Christ is a quantity in the sacrament of the altar, et ultra; therefore, the substance of the body of Christ is a quantum in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion, et ultra; therefore, the substance of the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar is ‘having part outside of part and part separate from part,’ which is heretical.
As regards the first of these, I concede the last conclusion by which it is deduced; namely, that the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar.
As regards the second it can be stated variously without prejudice. In one mode, that the proposition assumed, namely, this, whenever some, et cetera, are understood of creatures of which are substance, quantity and quality, is false according to the virtue of language by virtue of a false implication. For it implies that some may be some, and yet that they may really be the same, which is impossible; for some creatures are really never some and one; because of this itself, that there are some, there are many; and if there be many, they are not really the same. Yet of divine persons these must be conceded; that there are more persons and yet that they may be one simple thing. But this can not be conceded of creatures.
I say that, if that proposition is conceded under a good meaning, it becomes in another manner a fallacy of a figure of speech in the form of arguing; from this which is accepted under ‘one connotative term,’ namely, ‘quantity.’ Whence, as it does not follow, whenever some are really the same, wherever there is any one of them, the rest of the others is also in the same place. But the ‘body of Christ’ and ‘the body of Christ having part outside of part or part separate from part’ are really the same; for ‘the body of Christ’ is really ‘having part separate from part,’ and some substance is in the sacrament of the altar the body of Christ; therefore some substance in the sacrament of the altar is the body of Christ ‘having part separate from part’; or it may be taken in a narrower sense, thus: ‘the body of Christ’ and ‘existing circumscriptively in a place’ are really the same. And it does not similarly follow: whenever some are really the same, wherever there is any one of them, the rest of them is in the same place. ‘The body of Christ’ in the host and ‘existing circumscriptively in a place’ are really the same; and some substance in the sacrament of the altar is the body of Christ; therefore, some substance in the sacrament of the altar is ‘existing circumscriptively in a place.’
So also it does not follow: whenever some are really the same; wherever there is any one of them, the rest of them is in the same place. But the substance of the body of Christ and some quantity are really the same, and some substance in the sacrament of the altar is the substance of the body of Christ; therefore, some substance in the sacrament of the altar is a quantity. Whence, I say that, although this may be true, ‘the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar’; this is however false, ‘the substance of the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar is a quantity’; as, although this may be true, ‘the body of Christ having part separate from part is in the sacrament of the altar’; yet this is false, ‘the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar is having part separate from part.’ Similarly, this is true, ‘some substance circumscribed in a place is in the sacrament of the altar’; yet this is false, ‘some substance in the sacrament of the altar is circumscribed in a place.’ But perhaps you will say that this response is not so valid; for it is not however similar in arguing of abstracts as of concretes. But ‘quantity’ is a certain abstract having being circumscribed in a place and of this kind are concretes. And, therefore, although such a mode of arguing is not valid in accepting under concretes, yet it is valid in accepting under abstracts; for such however are false, ‘the body of Christ’ and ‘the body of Christ having part separate from part’ are really the same. Similarly, the ‘body of Christ’ and ‘circumscribed in a place’ are really the same.