But the first of those does not oppose; for the cause, why there is a fallacy of a figure of speech in such a mode of reasoning, is not because it is accepted under the name ‘concrete,’ but because it is accepted under a ‘connotative term.’ But now ‘quantity’ is a ‘connotative term,’ as ‘having’ or ‘quantum’ or any such; and indeed such a mode of arguing fails in accepting under ‘quantity,’ as in accepting under ‘having part distant’ et cetera, or ‘circumscribed in a place,’ or another such concrete.
Whence, neither among the philosophers nor among the Saints it is found that they have made so much distinction between many concretes and abstracts, as some modernists do. Whence, I have never found in any Saint or philosopher that they have made a distinction between ‘quantity’ and ‘quantum,’ but they indifferently posit ‘quantity’ for ‘quantum,’ and conversely; and sometimes the category, which they have distinguished from the other categories themselves, they have called ‘quantum,’ and sometimes ‘quantity,’ not distinguishing between these names.
Moreover, the second does not oppose; for it is manifest that this is true, ‘the body of Christ’ and ‘the body of Christ having part separate from part’ are really the same; and similarly is any other, and there is the same proof for all such.
But it is manifestly obvious that this may be true, ‘the body of Christ’ and ‘the body of Christ circumscribed in a place’ are really the same; for it follows that the body of Christ is circumscribed in a place; therefore, ‘the body of Christ’ is really similar to ‘some thing which is circumscribed in a place,’ et ultra. Therefore, ‘something which is really circumscribed in a place,’ is really the same as ‘the body of Christ,’ et ultra; because these are convertible: ‘circumscribed in a place’ and ‘that which is circumscribed in a place’; and it follows that ‘something circumscribed in a place’ is really the same as ‘the body of Christ’; therefore, ‘circumscribed in a place’ and ‘the body of Christ’ are really the same. Thus any such proposition can be proved; whence, all such are true, although one term signifies another which is not signified through the rest. Notwithstanding this, however one of those terms can truly be predicated of something with some determination of a ‘verb,’ of which the rest however is not predicated with the same determination. As this is true, ‘risible’ and ‘man’ are really the same; and yet this is true, ‘Sortes is a man’ per se in the first mode; and this is false, ‘Sortes is risible’ per se in the first mode. Similarly, this is true, ‘man’ and ‘Son of God’ are really the same; for this ‘man’ in designating the Son of God and ‘Son of God’ are really the same; and this also is true, ‘He was always the Son of God,’ and this is false, ‘He was always man.’
So is it in the thesis; because this is true, ‘some substance of the body of Christ’ and ‘some quantity’ are really the same; and yet this is true, ‘this substance is the substance of the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar’; and this is false, ‘this substance is a quantity in the sacrament of the altar.’ And as this is false, ‘the substance of the body of Christ is a quantity in the sacrament of the altar’; so this is false, ‘the substance of the body of Christ is a quantum in the sacrament of the altar by the power of conversion.’ And indeed this is false, ‘the substance of the body of Christ has part separate from part in the sacrament of the altar’; and so it is obvious that that argument is not valid; as it does not follow, when some are really the same, that wherever any one of them is, the rest of them will be in the same place. ‘Some quantum’ and ‘the body of Christ’ are really the same, and the substance of the body of Christ is the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar; therefore, there is a quantum in the sacrament of the altar. And if you say that arguing in concrete and abstract terms is not similar, I reply that ‘quantum’ is not more concrete than ‘quantity’ when for signification; although it may not terminate in ‘tas,’ as this name ‘quantitas,’ may terminate in ‘tas.’ And so the mode of arguing fails in accepting under this name ‘quantitas,’ as in accepting under this name ‘quantum.’ And so it is obvious that this does not include a sophism contrary to the previous opinion, although it may fail in the presence of a fallacy of a figure of speech.
But if certain propositions are accepted as true, a conclusion can evidently be deduced contrary to this opinion. Whence, in accepting this proposition, ‘when some thing informing another is created to designate this’; wherever that thing has that which is created to designate this, there is such; as wherever something has whiteness, everything there is white; and wherever something informatively has heat, everything there is warm. Therefore, if quantity be another thing distinct from the body of Christ, wherever the substance of the body of Christ has that quantity, there truly is a quantum. But the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar has quantity, for it is not separated there from quantity; therefore, the body of Christ is really a quantum in the sacrament of the altar, et ultra. Therefore, the body of Christ has part separate from part in the sacrament of the altar, which is heretical. If you say that the body of Christ is a quantum there, it is not however there in a quantitative mode.
Then I argue against those writers by preserving their mode of speaking; for I ask about this quantitative mode, whether or not it is a thing distinct from quantity. It can not be said that it is not a thing other than quantity; for the principle of them is that, if one remains and not the rest, they are distinct things; but quantity remains and a quantitative mode does not remain; therefore, they are distinct things. But, that they may not be distinct things, can be proved; for, if they be distinct things, either one is an absolute thing or the other respective. It is not absolute; for then there would be a quality or a quantity or a substance, any one of which is false; nor is it a relative thing, for neither fundament nor terminus can be assigned to itself; nor can it be classified in any of the others, that is, genera, because not in ‘time’ nor in ‘action’ and in ‘passion,’ nor in the genus ‘relation,’ nor in ‘position,’ nor in ‘possession,’ nor in ‘place’; from which it might the more appear that that quantitative mode can be without any ‘ubi.’ For if God could create some quantum without any other thing, it would truly be a quantitative mode and yet without any ‘ubi.’
Besides, it was shown before, that every continuous and permanent quantum has part separate from part, as was obvious before through John of Damascus, or at least these are convertibles: ‘quantum continuous and permanent,’ and ‘having part separate from part.’
From which I argue thus: it is impossible that something may be a ‘quantum continuous and permanent’ unless it have part separate from part, and conversely; therefore, wherever something is ‘a quantum, continuous and permanent,’ there it has part separate from part. Therefore, if the body of Christ be a quantum in the sacrament of the altar, the body of Christ will be ‘having part separate from part in the sacrament of the altar.’ Besides, if the body of Christ be a quantum in the sacrament of the altar, it is, therefore, long, wide and thick; but it is impossible that something may anywhere be long unless it be extended there; and it can not be extended anywhere unless it have there part separate from part. Therefore, if the body of Christ be a quantum in the sacrament of the altar, it will have there part separate from part.
And if you may say that the body of Christ is not a quantum there; on the contrary, that the body of Christ has there quantity inhering in itself; it will, therefore, be a quantum there; as wherever there is something having whiteness inhering in itself, the white is there; therefore, it seems to detract from the reality of the sacrament of the Eucharist to say, that the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar has one quantity or extension inhering in itself; for then it would be extended there and it would have part separate from part, which is false. And indeed no matter how much this might be conceded, ‘the body of Christ is a quantity’; yet this ought to be utterly denied, ‘the body of Christ is really a quantity in the sacrament of the altar’; just as this is true, ‘the body of Christ is really having part separate from part’; yet this is simply false, ‘the body of Christ in the sacrament of the altar is really having part separate from part.’
Therefore, the previous opinion stands on this, that there is no continuous and permanent quantity, unless parts may be placed outside of themselves, whether the parts may be separate in situation or those parts may be parts of a substance or may be parts of qualities. And indeed, as this is true, ‘the body of Christ having parts separate in situation is in the sacrament of the altar’; and yet this is false, ‘the body of Christ has parts separate in situation in the sacrament of the altar.’ So, suppose that this could be conceded, ‘a quantity, which is really the body of Christ, is in the sacrament of the altar’; yet this must be absolutely denied, ‘the body of Christ is a quantity in the sacrament of the altar’; as this is true, ‘some man, who is the Son of God, always was God’; yet this is simply false, ‘the Son of God always was man.’
And so in such it is of much importance to posit something from a part of a subject and from a part of a predicate, which is especially true of connotative names. Such a name is ‘quantity’; for this name ‘quantity’ signifies a thing by signifying that parts of that thing are separate in situation; by virtue of which this is true, ‘the quantity of the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the altar’; yet this is simply false, ‘the body of Christ is a quantity in the sacrament of the altar.’
It is ended; praise be to God.
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